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This study is an operational and tactical study of a battle fought by the U. S. 1st 
Marine Division near “the Punchbowl,” an extinct volcano of military value in the 
Taebaek Mountains of Korea, from late August through mid September 1951. That 
engagement was to be the last 1st Marine Division offensive of the Korean War. This 
battle, for Yoke and Kanmubong Ridges, has received little coverage from historians. 
That it is all but forgotten is surprising, since it was one of the hardest fought for United 
States Marines in the war. The casualties were high, and Americans did not understand 
why so many had to die for a war that seemed to already be set to conclude by 
negotiations. This study tells the story of that battle more completely than ever before, 
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The Korean War has been called “the forgotten war.” Of this forgotten war, some 
periods are more forgotten than others. Among those least studied is anything (besides 
the peace talks and the POW riots) that took place after the Truman-MacArthur 
controversy, in other words, from mid 1951 through the end of the war. One portion of 
this phase in particular has received scant attention, the Fall Offensive of 1951, which 
included a noteworthy engagement that is all but unknown despite the fierce intensity of 
the combat involved. That engagement was the battle of the 1st Marine Division (1st Mar 
Div) for the ridges north of the Punchbowl in late August through mid September 1951, 
sometimes called the “Punchbowl Offensive” by the Navy /Marine Corps. The 
“Punchbowl” is a bowl-shaped, extinct volcano ringed by mountains of the Taebaek 
range in Korea (see map # 2).1 
This study is an operational and tactical study of a Marine Corps battle in the 
fourth phase of the Korean War, which was part of the Fall Offensive, a series of battles 
and campaigns that facilitated the Eighth Army’s strategic objective of preserving South 
Korea by establishing a defensive line across the peninsula (see maps # 3 and 4). This 
line was to be on defensible enough terrain that UNC forces could repulse any 
Communist attacks and maintain their positions until a negotiated settlement to end the 
war could be reached. The decision to end the war through negotiations rather than 
military force had already been made months before by Washington under the Truman 
                                                 
1 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War (New York: Times Books, 1987); U. S. Pacific Fleet, “Third Interim 
Evaluation Report, May-December, 1951” (National Archives, RG 127, Records of the United States 
Marine Corps): 9-14. 
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Administration. Eighth Army was carrying out “Limited Objective Attacks,” not to break 
the enemy’s lines and force his overall surrender in Korea or to secure the whole of the 
Peninsula to the Yalu River, but to establish its final defensive line on the most 
defensible terrain available in the vicinity of where its lines lay when negotiations began 
in July 1951. The UNC had been given the mission to take the strategic defensive. Now 
it was facilitating that decision from Washington by making an operational and tactical 
offensive, what Van Fleet called an “active defense.”2 
The fighting of late summer and fall, 1951, was bitter. Morale in EUSAK (Eighth U. 
S. Army Korea) was hurt by the seemingly pointless peace talks, and the fighting for the 
ridges around the Punchbowl was particularly tough on morale due to high casualties. 
The most infamous engagements in that area were Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge 
in the sector of the 2nd Infantry Division. Such battles seemed to many at home in the 
United States to be a pointless waste of lives.3  
The fighting . . . [in the area of the Punchbowl] was perhaps the bloodiest 
to date and the most strenuous, demanding the utmost in physical strength, 
endurance and raw courage. Infantrymen fought like Indians, crawling up 
hillsides, lugging mortar rounds as well as their own rifles and ammunition and 
sometimes having to blast the enemy out of dug-in positions at point-blank range. 
                                                 
2 Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1997): Chapter Five, “Negotiations;” Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, (New York: Da 
Capo Press, 1967): 187. There are three basic levels of war, strategic, operational, and tactical. The first 
deals with the ends of the war, its objectives as dictated by policy; the second, with how the ends of 
strategy are to be achieved in a given theatre; and the third, with how the separate battles can fulfill the 
concerted direction of operations. For more information see: Adrian R. Lewis, Omaha Beach: A Flawed 
Victory, (North Carolina: Chapel Hill, 2001): 5-7. The first phase of the Korean War was from the NK 
(North Korean) attack, June, 25, 1950 through September 15, 1950. The second phase was from 
September 15, 1950, the date of the Inchon landing, through the intervention by the CCF (Communist 
Chinese Forces) in November 1950. The third phase extended from then until the retreat of UN forces 
ended an they once more resumed the offensive. The fourth phase lasted from then until the end of major 
offensive movements. The fifth phase was the longest, consisting of the time of stalemate form Fall, 1951 
through the end of the war, July 27, 1953. 
3 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 950; Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, 190; Arned L. Hinshaw, 
Heartbreak Ridge: Korea, 1951 (New York: Praeger, 1989): 23; Lynn Montross, Major Hubard D. Kuokka, 
USMC, and Major Norman W. Hicks, USMC, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953: Volume IV, 
The East-Central Front, (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC, 1962): 199. 
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The enemy worked with Oriental doggedness to fortify himself in the hills, 
sometimes tunneling, with hand labor, from the reverse slope of a hill, so that he 
could pull out of his forward positions under air and artillery attack and find 
shelter on the reverse slope of a hill, where it was difficult to zero in on him with 
airstrikes or heavy howitzers. He might build tunnels as much as a thousand 
yards long to enable him to take quick shelter from bombardment, yet move 
forward to meet an attack on the ground. The forward ends of these tunnels were 
usually camouflaged with great skill and care, and it took sharp observation to 
spot them. Once spotted, however, they could be knocked out with direct hits 
from our howitzers sighting directly at their targets. [This was using the piece like 
a rifle in flat trajectory fire and, in harsh terrain, was only possible in certain 
instances.] Our artillerymen demonstrated some pinpoint accuracy in blasting out 
these strong points with 8-inch howitzers that had been hauled into position by 
bulldozers—a novel and effective use for the invaluable weapons.4 
 
The assessment that this was wasted effort, touted at the time by many in the 
press in the U. S. and in Washington, needs reexamination. To date, the standard 
assessment of the Fall Offensive of 1951 is that the large number of casualties incurred 
by U. S. troops convinced General Matthew B. Ridgway, CINCUNC (Commander in 
Chief United Nations Command), and LtGen James Van Fleet, commander of EUSAK, 
to stop all offensives greater than battalion in size and concentrate on defending the 
territory already taken -- waiting for an armistice. This assessment is true, but Ridgway 
also believed that one reason the Communists returned to negotiating after walking out 
of the peace talks in late August, 1951, was these battles. They convinced the 
Communists to “get back to the negotiating table.” This result of the offensive is one that 
is often overlooked and should be reemphasized in the historiography of this 
campaign.5  
In addition, many histories treat the end of the “war of movement” as coinciding 
with the initiation of the truce-talks at Kaesong. This is a mistake. Though there was a 
                                                 
4 Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, 187. 
5 Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, 188-91; Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 948; Lynn Montross, et 
al., The East-Central Front, 199-201; Arned Hinshaw, Heartbreak Ridge, 127. 
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pause, the true end of the “movement” was not until the Fall Offensive ended. It was 
only after this that the peace-talks resumed and the commanders of EUSAK and UNC 
decided to halt all offensives except raids.6 
Although all the battles of this period have received little attention and are in need 
of further examination, the battle of the 1st Mar Div for Yoke and Kanmubong Ridges 
has received even less study. The Army fight for Heartbreak and Bloody Ridges to the 
east obscured it at the time, and in the handful of secondary works that describe the 
period with any detail beyond a paragraph or two, the fight of the Marines is seldom 
even mentioned. One of the only books on a battle of the campaign, Arned L. Hinshaw, 
Heartbreak Ridge: Korea, 1951 (New York: Praeger, 1989), only obliquely refers to it as 
“tidying up” in September and does not even mention the Marines in 1951 at all. But the 
battles of the entirety of X Corps (as well as Operation Commando to the west) had 
some significance to the course and outcome of the Korean War. And while the 1st Mar 
Div’s fight was but a single part of the larger effort, it needs thorough assessment 
because of its importance to American military history, Marine Corps history, EUSAK 
history, X Corps history, and as a beginning to a better understanding of the whole 
offensive. One can see a whole of any size only by first examining the parts. 
The Punchbowl Offensive would be a significant battle in Marine Corps and 
Korean War history because of the high casualties, even if no other reason existed. In 
just one day, on September 14 , 1951, the 1st Mar Div suffered 39 killed in action (KIA) 
and 463 wounded (WIA), and that was with only two of its four regiments engaged. (If 
one counts the KMC (Korean Marine Corps) Regiment, the bloodiest day for the division 
                                                 
6 Arned Hinshaw, Heartbreak Ridge, 22; Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 256; Lee 
Ballenger, The Outpost War: U. S. Marines in Korea, Vol.1: 1952, (Washington, D. C.: Brassey’s, 2000): 
3-4. 
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in men killed was September 2nd with 52 KIA and 256 WIA.)  The total casualties for the 
battle were 2,416. This breaks down as 5 MIA, 2,080 WIA, and 331 KIA. That is higher 
than ten percent of the division’s total strength (24,000), including elements not even 
engaged! If one counts only the infantry regiments (each about 4,000 men strong), the 
units taking the greater part of the fighting and the casualties, the percentage of losses 
climbs staggeringly to near twenty percent (KMCs included; 594 casualties were taken 
in the KMC Regiment in September 1951.)7  
The casualties of the 2nd Infantry Division (ID) at Heartbreak Ridge, a battle 
longer than one month, were 3,700—597 KIA, 3,064 WIA, and 84 MIA. The 1st Marine 
Division’s actual days of fighting numbered only fourteen, but it suffered a rate that was 
also shockingly high. This attests to the tenacity of the NKPA (North Korean People’s 
Army) enemy in the Punchbowl sector and the fierceness of the fighting. (There were no 
Chinese Communist Forces – CCF – in the Marine sector of front at this time.) 8 
To give some perspective, on the first day of the battle of Peleliu in the Central 
Pacific, on September 15, 1944 (seven years earlier almost to the day), the 1st Mar Div 
suffered 210 KIA and 901 WIA. (The total Marine casualties for Peleliu were: 6,500 
Marines with 1,200 dead.) That was one of the most fiercely contested assault landings 
of World War II, and that was with all three regiments engaged. (Marine losses at 
Tarawa were also much higher than the Punchbowl battle, 1,000 dead and 2,400 
wounded in three days, but of Korean War battles, the fight for the Punchbowl was 
among the most costly.)  The 5th Mar Div on D-day at Iwo Jima lost 189 KIA and 697 
                                                 
7 1st Mar Div “Historical Diary,” September 1951, narrative for actions on September 14; Ibid., 31. The 
fourth regiment was the attached KMC regiment. 
8 Arned Hinshaw, Heartbreak Ridge, 127. 
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WIA. The Marines’ losses, while not as great as in some of the worst fighting in the 
Pacific, were still high by any standard in American 20th Century warfare.9  
With such a high price paid, one wonders why and how this battle took place, 
and the results gained. It is also important to remember what the veterans who survived 
went through, and perhaps most important, what those who did not survive went 
through. 
Very little has been written on this action, but what there is bears mentioning. 
Some memoirs that briefly mention this battle are Gerald P. Averill’s, Mustang; A. Andy 
Andow’s, Letters to Big Jim Regarding Narrul Purigo, Cashinum Iman (1994); Charles 
Hughes’s Accordion War: Life and Death in a Marine Rifle Company, Korea, 1951 
(2006); and Burton F. Anderson’s We Claim the Title (1994). Other accounts are a 
handful of Marine Corps Gazette and Leatherneck articles (mostly based on the Official 
History); the Official Marine History itself (Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 
chapters IIX-IX); and the writings of Allan R. Millett in his books, In Many a Strife (1994), 
and The Drive North (2001)—a few pages in the former and about twenty pages in the 
latter.10 
                                                 
9 Jeter A. Isley, and Philip A. Crowl, The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory, and Its Practice 
in the Pacific (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951): 406, 482. 
10 A. Andy Andow, Letters to Big Jim Regarding Narrul Purigo, Cashinum Iman, (New York: Vantage, 
1994); Allan R. Millett, The Drive North: U. S. Marines at the Punchbowl (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Marine 
Corps Historical Center, 2001). The “Official Histories” are histories of U. S. Marine Operations in the 
Korean War, written with the participation and approval of the Marine Corps. They are: Lynn Montross 
and Nicholas Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations In Korea, 1950-1953: Volume I;  Lynn Montross and 
Captain Nicholas A. Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953:Volume II, The Inchon-Seoul 
Operation (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC, 1955); Lynn Montross and Captain Nicholas 
A. Canzona, based on research by K. Jack Bauer, PhD., U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953: 
Volume III, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC, 1957); 
Lynn Montross, Major Hubard D. Kuokka, USMC, and Major Norman W. Hicks, USMC, U.S. Marine 
Operations in Korea, 1950-1953: Volume IV, The East-Central Front, (Washington, D.C.: Historical 
Branch, G-3, HQMC, 1962); Lieutenant Colonel Pat Meid, USMCR, and Major James M. Yingling, USMC, 
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953: Volume V, Operations in West Korea, (Washington, D.C.: 
Historical Division, HQMC, 1972). 
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Millett’s work on the battle is part of the background in Many a Strife, his 
biography of General Gerald C. Thomas, the 1st Mar Div commander for most of 1951. 
And in The Drive North, the battle is covered in a brief narrative and general analysis. 
The Drive North is a commemorative monograph of the Korean War’s fiftieth 
anniversary and briefly details the campaigns of the 1st Mar Div from May 1951 through 
the end of the year. This work is well done, but it has neither the space nor the purpose 
to give a definitive, complete, detailed narrative and in-depth analysis of this battle. Its 
purpose was to survey and describe a broad period of 1st Mar Div activity in Korea as a 
whole and not focus on one part of that period. No in-depth study of this battle and its 
individual significance has yet been done. 
The official sources are often litanies of dry and “lifeless” facts. For that reason, 
details that bring the Marine’s experience on those bloody Korean hills to life beyond the 
bare recitation of facts on the page are provided throughout from memoirs or oral 









ORGANIZATION OF THE MARINE CORPS IN THE ERA OF THE KOREAN 
WAR 
 
Fighting spirit is not primarily the result of a neat organization 
chart nor of a logical organizational set-up. The former 
should never be sacrificed to the latter.  
                                                              --Ferdinand Eberstadt 
 
The 1st Marine Division had . . . [many] strengths, some 
obvious in its structure and others based on experience and 
Marine Corps Tradition. . . . the division provided much of its 
own support: amphibian tractor battalion, armored amphibian 
(artillery) battalion, combat service group, engineer battalion 
. . . [etc.]. Except for its engineers and medical personnel, an 
Army infantry division contained service units at company, 
rather than battalion strength. This structure and strength 
gave the 1st Marine Division the advantage of depending on 
its combat support and combat service support units to 
provide their own rear-area security or even provide infantry 
reinforcements, if necessary. The division had proved the 
soundness of the Corps’ [sic] adage of “every Marine a 
rifleman” during the Chosin Reservoir withdrawal, and it 
retained this principle. In addition, the division enjoyed 
unparalleled professionalism in its leadership. Its officers in 
the rank of first lieutenant and above and its senior 
noncommissioned officers were World War II veterans; its 
second lieutenants and young enlisted men, who bore the 
burden of combat casualties, simply followed the World War 
II model and their senior leaders 
                                                                       --Allan R. Millett 
 
To understand the Marine Battle for the Punchbowl in September, 1951, one 
must have basic understanding of Marine Division structure, organization, and 
characteristics. A key part to understanding the organization of the Marine Corps is the 
relationship and position of the Marine Corps within the defense establishment. The 
Marine Corps is a separate service branch within the American armed forces, but it is 
still within the Department of the Navy and works closely with the Navy. Its operating 
 
 9
forces, the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF), are under the command of the Chief Naval 
Officer (CNO), the highest officer in the Navy, equivalent to the Army Chief of Staff. He 
commands all of the Navy’s operating forces. (The Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
however, is not under the CNO. While the CNO had operational control of the FMF, the 
fighting units of the Marines, the Commandant retained administrative control over the 
whole Marine Corps.) This status within the Navy Department at the time of Korea was 
defined by Department of the Navy General Order No. 5. This order established that the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps was “a naval executive assistant to the Secretary of 
the Navy,” or what is known as a “Command Assistant.”1 (See Chart #1) 
The Commandant of the Marine Corps, under the Secretary of the Navy, 
shall command the United States Marine Corps. He is directly responsible to the 
Secretary of the Navy for its administration, discipline, internal organization, 
training requirements, efficiency, readiness, operation of its materiel support 
system, and for the total performance of the Marine Corps. When performing 
these functions, the Commandant of the Marine Corps is not a part of the 
command structure of the Chief of Naval Operations. However, there must be a 
close cooperative relationship between the Chief of Naval Operations, as the 
senior military officer of the Department of the Navy, and the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, who has command responsibility over that organization. The 
Commandant of the Marine Corps is directly responsible to the Chief of Naval 
Operations for the organization, training, and readiness of those elements of the 
operating forces of the Marine Corps assigned to the Operating Forces of the 
Navy [the FMF]. Such Marine Corps forces, when so assigned, are subject to the 
command exercised by the Chief of Naval Operations over the Operating Forces 
of the Navy.  
. . . [These] operating forces . . . consist of (1) the Fleet Marine Forces; (2) 
detachments afloat, that is, Marine complements aboard naval vessels; (3) 
security forces at shore (field) activities of the naval establishment; and (4) U. S. 
Marine Corps combat forces not otherwise assigned.2 
 
However, the Commandant’s status with the CNO, the Corps’s relationship to the 
Navy, and the Marine Corps’s status as a separate service remained cloudy depending 
                                                 
1 Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, Marine Officer’s Guide, Chapter 4; James Donovan, The United States 
Marine Corps (New York: Praeger, 1967): 81-82; Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, Marine Officer’s Guide, 75. 
2 James Donovan, U. S. Marine Corps, 82. 
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on who the Secretary of the Navy was and who was CNO, until the Douglas-Mansfield 
Act of 1952 amended the National Security Act to clarify the question in law. Between 
the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and the 1952 amendment, the 
Commandant was often taken to be a subordinate of the CNO, not a coequal, and the 
Corps itself an appendage of the Navy and not a separate service within the Navy 
Department (on the assumption that the act had “intended to tri-elemantize the Armed 
Forces on a three-Service basis, with the Marine Corps merely a specialist branch of 
the Navy”), though gentlemen’s agreements between a Secretary of the Navy and a 
Commandant of the Marine Corps had ascertained otherwise.3  
Further clarification of the status of the Marine Corps within the Department of 
the Navy is needed because of the pervasiveness of the misconception that the Corps 
is part of the Navy. “Side by side with the Navy, the Marine Corps is one of two military 
services in the Naval Establishment [Department of the Navy], under direct control of 
the Secretary of the Navy. . . .” And, as Chairman of the House Armed Services 
Committee during the late 1940s, early 1950s, Carl Vinson said, “The fact is that the 
Marine Corps is and always has been, since its inception 175 years ago, a separate 
military service apart from the United States Army, the United States Navy, and the 
United States Air Force.” The “misconception” that the Marine Corps is an “appendage” 
                                                 
3 Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, Marine Officer’s Guide, 73-74; Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History 
of the United States Marine Corps (New York: Macmillan, 1980): 506-07. That Secretary of the Navy was 
John L. Sullivan and the Commandant of the Marine Corps was General A. A. Vandegrift. Sullivan wrote 
to Vandegrift on 17 December 1947 to say that, “The Commandant of the Marine Corps is informed that it 
is not the intent of the Navy Department, in seeking enactment of H. R. 3432 [Public Law 432, what would 
become the National Security Act], to alter the Commandant’s direct responsibility to the Secretary of the 
Navy for the administration and efficiency of the Marine Corps. The Navy Department interprets neither 
Executive Order 9635 [an earlier directive defining the wartime position of the Chief of Naval Operations] 
nor H. R. 3432 as interposing the Chief of Naval Operations in the administrative chain of responsibility 
between the Secretary and the Commandant, or as otherwise modifying the historical relationship 
between the Secretary and the Commandant.” (Quotation from the Officer’s Guide.) 
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of the Navy was “set at rest with some emphasis in the debate and hearings on Public 
Law 416, during which Congress avowed that the Marine Corps was not a mere 
appendage, but a Service in its own right.” But there was more. “As stated in Navy 
Regulations . . . the Naval Establishment embraces all activities committed to the care 
of the Secretary of the Navy, and thus includes the Marine Corps. This does not make 
the Marine Corps a part of, but rather a partner of the Navy proper.”4   
The Fleet Marine Forces themselves are combined arms forces of land, air, and 
sea components divided into two commands, based on either of the two main coasts of 
the United States, Atlantic and Pacific. “Each includes a force headquarters, force 
troops, elements of the service command, divisions and brigades, and wings and 
groups.” These Fleet Marine Forces are “integrated with the several U.S. fleets,” and, 
“have the status of a fleet command . . . subject to the operational authority of the 
respective fleet commanders, except that the conduct of individual –intra-unit training is 
retained by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who also retains administrative 
control.” So while the 1st Mar Div was under the operational control of the Eighth U.S. 
Army in Korea, this was a departure from the normal operational relationship it would 
have had as an element of the Operating Forces of the U. S. Navy. (See Charts # 2 and 
3) This was done under the clause of the National Security Act giving the Marines the 
mission of “such other duties as the President may direct,” and tradition wherein Marine 
Corps elements were attached to Army command in the War of 1812, the Mexican War, 
World War I, and various operations in World War II, all before the said act was written. 
Ordinarily or at least, ordinarily under Navy command, the FMF has its operational 
planning done by “the unified commands through the naval component commands to 
                                                 
4 Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, Marine Officer’s Guide, 72-73, 74. 
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which Fleet Marine forces are assigned. Thus, the Fleet Marine forces and the Naval 
Amphibious forces plan and train together as a team.”5 
The Fleet Marine Forces were classified as a “Type Organization” of the U. S. 
Fleets. “As its name implies, the type organization is based on types of ships or forces.” 
An example would be the “type command” of Commander Destroyers, in which all the 
destroyers in a fleet are grouped. “. . . the Fleet Marine Force is a type command, since 
it comprises all Marine Corps tactical units – air and ground – assigned to the Fleet.” 
The FMF is the teeth of the Corps, where the actual fighting forces are.6 (See Charts # 
4 and 5) 
The threefold mission of the Fleet Marine Forces at the time of Korea was: “(1) to 
serve with the fleets in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the 
conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval 
campaign; (2) to develop, as directed by the commandant of the Marine Corps, those 
phases of amphibious operations pertaining to tactics, technique, and equipment 
employed by landing forces; and (3) to train a maximum number of personnel to meet 
the requirements of expansion during time of war.” In any case, the 1st Mar Div was still 
under the administrative command of FMFPac (and the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps), whose commander for the greater part of the Korean War (and in September 
1951) was LtGen Lemuel Shepherd.7  
On June 30, 1950, the total strength of the Corps was 74,279 active duty 
Marines. This total consisted of 40,364 in Operating Forces; 24,552 in the Supporting 
                                                 
5 James Donovan, U. S. Marine Corps, 82-83; Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, Marine Officer’s Guide, 86, 9, 
63, Chapter 5; Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, Marine Officer’s Guide, 69-71; James Donovan, U. S. Marine 
Corps, 96. 
6 Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, Marine Officer’s Guide, 63. 
7 James Donovan, U. S. Marine Corps, 83; Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, Marine Officer’s Guide, 86. 
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Establishment; 3,871 in Special Assignment; and 5,492 who were hospitalized, 
imprisoned or otherwise incapacitated. In the Operating Forces, the FMF at this time 
numbered 27,703 men; security detachments 11,087; and 1,574 Marines were on sea-
duty. The FMF was divided between FMFPac (Fleet Marine Force Pacific) and FMFLant 
(Fleet Marine Force Atlantic). FMFPac numbered 11,853; 7,779 of which were in the 1st 
Mar Div (based in Camp Pendleton, California), and 3,733 of which made up the 1st 
MAW. The other 15,803 Marines were in FMFLant: 8,973 in the 2nd Mar Div (based in 
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina), 5,297 in the 2d MAW. Since the wartime strength of a 
reinforced Mar Div was then from 22-26,000 men, it is obvious that the entire FMF 
barely had enough numbers to constitute one full strength division, much less two (later, 
the Douglas-Mansfield Act of 1952, which amended the National Security Act, included 
a third division in the Marine Corps’s strength, based in Okinawa). In addition, the 
Marine Corps had a total of 128,959 reserve Marines (about twice as many as the 
Marines then on active duty) – a force the Corps relied on, in planning for a war, to 
expand the peacetime establishment to war strength. By the end of the war, Marines 
had suffered 26,043 casualties with 4,262 dead, but the Marine Corps’s total strength 
had been rebuilt to a total of 230,488 on active duty.8 
                                                 
8Lynn Montross, et al., Marine Operations in Korea Vol. II, 20-21; James Donovan, U.S. Marine Corps, 
65. “In basic combat units this pitifully small figure equated to three infantry battalions and three tactical 
aircraft squadrons on the West Coast and three infantry battalions and four tactical aircraft squadrons on 
the East Coast. All of these formations, plus units of supporting artillery, engineers, tanks, air control, and 
supply were gravely understrength. Despite the [Secretary of Defense Louis]Johnson austerities, 
however, the Marines had managed to attain a respectable state of training. . . . Put in other terms, on 25 
June when the North Korean blitz of some 75,000 men drove south across the 38th Parallel, the Marines’ 
existing air/ground expeditionary force was tiny and emaciated. But what there was of it was ready to go. . 
. . To . . . provide a reinforced regiment and a Marine aircraft group at anything approaching full war 
strength . . . would take the bulk of the Fleet Marine Force resources on the West Coast. Only bits and 
pieces would be left of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Realistically, however, that is 
what they were there for.” – Victor Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the United States Marine Corps 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984): 122-24. 
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A Marine Division in 1950 numbered approximately 22,000 men. (See Charts # 6 
and 7) It was the main unit for infantry combat in the Marine Corps. It was a force of 
combined arms organized, basically, in triangular fashion (i.e., by threes: three 
regiments per division, three battalions per regiment, three companies per battalion, 
three rifle-platoons per company, etc.), however, Marine aviation was not organic to a 
Marine division, contrary to popular misconception, despite the “inseparable” makeup of 
the Marine air-ground team (addressed later). More than half of the 20,000 plus men 
comprised the teeth of the division, the three infantry regiments. In addition, a Marine 
division included organic artillery (one regiment), “a service regiment, a tank battalion, 
special teams to control air and naval gunfire support, engineers, shore party, motor 
transport, medical, signal, and other units normal for a force of combined arms.”9  
The 1st Mar Div (reinforced) in the Korean War was very big indeed. It was 
almost “a corps within a corps.” It actually numbered almost 30,000 men in 1951 with 
the KMC regiment attached.10 
The division was definitely equipped for heavy combat, though its organic motor 
transport was inadequate for long term land operations far from the sea. A Marine 
division was no light-weight. Robert D. Heinl included an appendix to his Victory at High 
Tide, entitled, “the Sinews of Battle,” that compared the 1st Mar Div of 1950 during the 
Inchon/Seoul campaign to the standard Army infantry division. Some excerpts from that 
appendix are useful here: 
Although the Chromite operation [Inchon landing] was conducted, at least 
nominally, under a corps headquarters, it was nonetheless a campaign in which 
the division, either Marine or infantry, was the dominant fighting organization. In 
modern warfare, the division is said to be the smallest unit (comparatively 
                                                 
9 Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, Marine Officer’s Guide, 88. 
10 Allan R. Millett, Many a Strife, 293, 306. 
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speaking) which embodies all the combined arms and services required for 
sustained combat. In 1950 the Marine division at war strength (22,343) was a 
heavier, stronger division than the infantry division (18,804). 
The teeth of a division, as distinct from its administrative and logistic tail, 
are its three infantry regiments (each of three battalions), its artillery, and its 
armor. . . . As distinct from the infantry division of the Army, the Marine division of 
course includes units, equipment and skills of primary importance in amphibious 
operations. [The shore party battalion is an example.] In 1950 the Marine infantry 
regiment had a strength of 3,902; the Army regiment numbered 3,774. The 
Marine infantry battalion (1,123) outnumbered the Army battalion (917) by about 
20 per cent. 
In artillery the two divisions were exactly comparable: each had one 
battalion of 18 medium (155mm) howitzers, and three battalions, each equipped 
with 18 105mm light howitzers. In infantry firepower, however, as shown by the 
following table, considerable disparity existed between the Marine division and 
the infantry division. 
  
Weapon                                    USMC Army 
Carbine                                      9740 7474 
Rifle, M-1                                      8748 6913 
Pistol, .45                                      3196 2769 
BAR                                                   903 412 
Shotgun                                            6 0 
Thomson submachine                    99 0 
Machine gun, water-cooled .30         54 40 
Machine gun, air-cooled.30       575 160 
Machine gun, .50 cal.                  187 354 
3.5" Bazooka                             376 546 
Recoilless rifle, 75mm                    12 39 
60mm mortar                               81 84 
81mm mortar                               54 40 
4.2" mortar                                          24 36 
Flame thrower                             111 0 
 
Epitomizing the comparison between the two divisions is the fact that, in 
1950, the Marine division, 18 per cent stronger, had 27 per cent more men 
armed with the basic weapon of infantry combat, the M-1 rifle. 
In armor the two divisions were nearly equal, though not numerically so. 
The Army division had 144 tanks of all types; the Marines had but 100. However, 
the Army figure included light tanks, whereas the Marine tanks were all medium, 
except for 9 flame-thrower tanks, of which the Army division had none. Being 
shaped for sustained land operations, the Army unit’s motor transportation (3,800 
vehicles) far exceeded that of the Marine division (2,409)11 
 
                                                 
11 Robert D. Heinl, Victory At High Tide (Baltimore: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company, 
1979): 291-92. Used by permission. 
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Many of these disparities were due to the Marine Corps’s experiences in the 
Pacific in WWII. For instance, the Marines added more machine guns after the battle of 
Tarawa in 1943. They also had a great many more BARs, organized in a different 
manner within the squad (this is addressed in detail later on in this chapter) than the 
Army, and this was also because of the need experienced in the Pacific war for more 
firepower than previous tables of organization, adopted from Army doctrine, allowed for. 
Thus, even without reinforcement from non-organic subordinate units, the Marine 
division is “the largest – and heaviest – infantry-type division in the world.”12 
Furthermore, beyond standard tables of organization, a Marine Division in 
wartime was usually reinforced with “additional combat support and combat service 
support elements from force troop units.” (Force troops were a pool of combat or 
combat support units within the FMF not organic to a division or wing, which were there 
for the purpose of reinforcing a division, brigade, regimental or battalion landing team -- 
or regimental or battalion combat team.)13 
The structure of a Marine Division allowed for great flexibility and task grouping, 
enabling applicability to almost any situation or contingency. 
The combat support and combat service support units of the division are 
organized to permit their attachment to subordinate combat units. Consequently, 
task groups of combined arms are organized around the infantry regiment or 
battalion. These task groups are called regimental landing teams (RLT) – or 
                                                 
12 James Donovan, United States Marine Corps, 98, 78. 
13 James Donovan, United States Marine Corps, 98; Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis, 508, 102-03. Though 
one source claims that force troops did not come about as a concept or organization until 1951, I have 
found reference to force troops as early as 1948 in Marine war planning. -- Marine Corps Board Report, 
“Organization of the Fleet Marine Force,” (Quantico, VA: NAVMC, National Archives, Record Group 127, 
1 December 1948): 4. “Force troops constitute a pool of supplementary and specialized units with which 
the Fleet Marine Force commander may augment a landing force. Force troops and aviation units are 
composed of combat support, combat service support, and service troops organized as separate 
regiments, battalions, companies, batteries, or groups. Typical units found in force troops are 
communication battalions, heavy artillery units, tank battalions, engineer battalions, service regiments, 
dental companies, reconnaissance companies, and amphibious tractor battalions.” 
 
 17
reinforced regiments – and battalion landing teams (BLT) – or reinforced 
battalions [when utilized amphibiously, but in Korea, where the division and 
subordinate task units fought mostly in land campaigns, these were called 
regimental combat teams (RCT) and battalion combat teams (BCT) like the 
Army’s]. This organization of the Marine division permits flexibility in task 
groupings for many situations, in place of a fixed organization for all situations.14 
 
Within a Marine Division were three maneuver elements, the infantry regiments. 
These were typically employed in the assault or the defense with two forward and one 
held back as reserve. Below these were the infantry battalions, “the basic tactical unit 
organized to form a balanced fire and maneuver team.” (See Chart # 8) Again 
containing a triumvirate of principal subordinate units, the battalion contained three rifle 
companies (sometimes four), each having three platoons of three rifle squads. Each 
squad was composed of three fire teams. In addition to the infantry regiments, the 
Marine division included one regiment of artillery numbering 3,108 men.15 
The reinforced regiment (RCT) or Battalion Combat or Landing Team (BCT or 
BLT respectively) could have various elements attached. Organic to it were three 
infantry battalions, a headquarters and service company, a weapons battalion, a 4.2 
inch mortar company, a communications company, a TACP (Tactical Air Control Party), 
an anti-tank company, as well as other elements. A Marine regiment without 
reinforcement numbered 3,902 men (169 officers and 3,733 enlisted). The infantry 
regiments of the 1st Mar Div in the Korean War were the 1st, 7th, and 5th Marines. 
Sometimes a Korean Marine Corps (KMC) regiment was also attached to the division. 
The 1st Mar Div artillery regiment was the 11th Marines.16 
                                                 
14 James Donovan, United States Marine Corps, 98-99. 
15 Ibid., 99. 
16 The nine rifle companies in a Marine regiment were designated by the letters A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, 
and I, with A, B, and C – called according to the phonetic alphabet Able, Baker, and Charlie – in the first 
battalion; D, E, and F, -- Dog, Easy, and Fox – in the second battalion; and G, H, and I – George, How, 
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A typical organization of a Marine infantry battalion (not reinforced), “the basic 
tactical unit of infantry,” was three rifle companies (228 men each), one weapons 
company (215 men), and one headquarters and service company (224 men). (See 
Chart # 8) Within the headquarters and service (H&S) company were: the battalion 
headquarters, a company headquarters, a communication platoon, a recoilless rifle 
platoon, a service platoon, an 81mm mortar platoon, a TACP, and a medical platoon. 
Within the company headquarters inside this “H&S” company was a headquarters 
section and a flamethrower section with one to four flamethrower squads. Beneath the 
recoilless rifle platoon were four anti-tank (AT) sections with one to two recoilless rifle 
squads to them. Inside the 81mm mortar platoon were four 81mm mortar sections that 
each had a Forward Observer (FO) team and two 81mm squads.17  
Each rifle company in the infantry battalion had within it a headquarters platoon, 
three rifle platoons, and one weapons platoon. The rifle company numbered 228 men, 7 
officers and 221 enlisted. Inside the rifle platoons were three rifle squads consisting of 
three fire teams each, and a platoon headquarters. Each rifle platoon numbered 44 
enlisted and 1 officer. The platoon headquarters consisted of the platoon commander 
(usually a 2ndLt—for rank abbreviations, see list of abbreviations), a platoon sergeant 
(Technical Sergeant was the usual rank of this billet), a platoon guide (Staff Sergeant), 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Item – in the third battalion. So, for example, if How Company, 7th Marines is mentioned, one should 
know that it is in the Third Battalion 7th Marines, or 3/7. A regiment in Marine terminology is referred to in 
plural and by its number: thus the 1st Marine Regiment is referred to as the “1st Marines.” This terminology 
will be adhered to hereafter in this work, without the quotation marks. 
17 U.S. Marine Corps, MCS 3-30, Rifle Platoon Tactics, NAVMC—7700, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps 
Schools, 1958): 1-2.; U.S. Marine Corps, NAVMC—4161: PHIB-10, Amphibious Operations: The 
Battalion Landing Team in the Assault of a Defended Beach  (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Schools, 
1947): 5; U.S. Marine Corps, Reference Data: Amphibious Operations, NAVMC—1048 (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1951); U.S. Marine Corps, NAVMC—4520: PHIB-3, 
Amphibious Operations: Command and Organization of the Attack Force (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps 
Schools, 1948). The following section is mostly drawn from these manuals. 
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and three messengers or runners (Pvt). Each of the three rifle squads contained thirteen 
men organized into three fire teams of four men each and one squad leader. (See chart 
# 9) 
The weapons platoon within the rifle company had three machine gun sections 
with two machine gun squads each, and a rocket section with three rocket squads each 
(in the Korean War a “rocket section” was a 3.5 inch bazooka section for anti-tank 
purposes). The machine gun squads each had one .30 caliber light machine gun (LMG), 
“a squad leader, a gunner, assistant gunner, and five ammunition carriers for each gun 
or 16 men per section. Each section is attached [at least in the September fighting] to 
each of [the] three rifle platoons [in the rifle company] . . .”18 
 The Marine Corps rifle squad differed from that of the Army in the Korean War. 
The Army squad consisted of ten to twelve men organized around one BAR. The 
Marine Corps, too, organized its squads this way at first.  But in World War II, 1943, the 
Marines needed more firepower in the amphibious landings and on the small unit level 
in jungle warfare. So they broke the squad down into smaller groups of four men called 
“fire teams,” each built around a BAR. “The result, first noted in reports on the Marianas, 
and uniformly in later battles, was a notable gain in the aggressiveness and hitting 
power of Marine infantry.”19  
Korean War Marine and infantry officer, James Brady, described the fire team 
concept very well: 
                                                 
18 Burton F. Anderson, We Claim the Title (Aptos, CA: Tracy Publishing, 1994): 90. 
19 Andrew Geer, The New Breed (New York: Harper, 1952): 84; James Donovan, U. S. Marine Corps, 
151-56; Robert D. Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962 (Baltimore: 
The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America): 464; Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis, 406; 
Isley and Crowl, Marines and Amphibious War, 341; 1st Lt L. M. Holmes, “Birth of the Fire Team,” Marine 
Corps Gazette 36:11, November 1952: 16-23. 
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A Marine rifle platoon in Korea was a superbly balanced tactical unit with 
enormous firepower and an eminently sensible fundamental premise: in combat 
no one man can reasonably be expected to control directly and effectively more 
than three other men. In a firefight, you can’t keep tabs on more than three 
Marines and still be aware of the enemy. A Marine rifle platoon has three squads 
whose squad leaders are trained to maintain contact with the platoon leader. 
When he issues orders he issues them not to forty men, but only to these three 
sergeants. In their turn, they each control three fire teams, each of which is 
commanded by a corporal fire-team leader. They look to the squad leader for 
orders, he to them for action. In the fire team the corporal has three men, whom 
he controls and who look always to him during a firefight.20 
 
 This also meant that the Marine platoon had the greatest amount of organic 
firepower of any U. S. rifle platoon. Brady continued: 
Army platoons also have three squads, but the squads aren’t broken down into 
fire teams but remain an unwieldy straggle of ten or a dozen men. There is one 
other material distinction between Marine and Army rifle platoons: fire power and 
the Browning Automatic Rifle. The BAR is a wonderfully steady, fast-firing, very 
accurate weapon. Each Marine fire team is built around the BAR. A Marine 
platoon had nine BARs, the Army platoon only three, one to each squad.21  
 
 Marines thought very highly of the BAR, its weight was worth the effort required 
to haul it around. Said Brady: 
The BAR weighed twenty pounds even without ammo, and the ammo belts 
weighed that much again, yet it seemed that a stunted little guy weighing about 
130 pounds was always lugging it. At Quantico we bitched about being chosen 
as BAR men during field problems. Out here you couldn’t pry one away from a 
BAR man. It was the finest one-man weapon employed in the infantry, a great 
weapon. It had a range with a certain type of ball cartridge of 5,500 yards—more 
than three miles. BAR men were forever arguing over that, whether you could hit 
a man at three miles, or if at that distance he had disappeared below the 
curvature of the earth and you couldn’t even see him. Marines delighted in 
intellectual debates like that, loud and obscene.22 
 
The amount of firepower in the fire team concept and the BAR gave Marine 
squads a distinct tactical advantage on the small-unit level over enemies and allies 
alike. It also gave the Marine platoon commander and particularly the NCOs, a great 
                                                 





deal more influence on the battlefield. “In a fire fight, the fire team leader is the ‘general’ 
of three men and twenty yards of front.” This was a principle of decentralization of 
control. “Because of its great firepower, the BAR was the most vital weapon of the 
platoon and every man had to know that weapon as well as his own M1 rifle. The basic 
philosophy was that any member of the platoon could take over as BARman if 
necessary.” There were other benefits as well. “The reorganized squad was also easier 
to organize for assaulting fortified positions,” such as the Marines assaulted in the 
Punchbowl Offensive.23  
Brady went on from a very “Marine” perspective: 
But those nine automatic rifles gave young Marine officers like . . . me one 
of our two big advantages over our Army counterparts. We had more firepower. 
The other advantage was the Marine rifle platoon’s organization, easier to 
command in a firefight, when even the coolest of men can become confused. 
Add to this the fact that Marines, enlisted Marines, take orders without question, 
and you understand why it is simpler to command troops as a Marine officer and 
that it has little to do with courage or brains. Marines are no better or worse than 
soldiers as men. What the Marine has is better training, a more maneuverable 
unit, more actual firing practice, often better noncommissioned officers, and an 
intangible spirit founded on tradition. 
He also had more BARs, which may be more important than anything 
else.24 
 
  An example to give perspective on the amount of firepower this gave a Marine 
division is that the 5th Marines alone in 1951, had eighty-one rifle squads. (The Marine 
Corps had a policy of keeping its division in Korea at full strength). With the other two 
infantry RCTs, that would make 243 rifle squads in the full-strength 1st Marine Division.  
 This is one area where the Marines were not forced to conform to the rest of 
Eighth Army in the fighting for the Punchbowl in 1951. Thus the Marine had advantage 
                                                 
23 Andrew Geer, New Breed, 84; Burton Anderson, We Claim the Title, 228; Allan Millett, Semper Fidelis, 
406. 
24 James Brady, Coldest War, 80-81.  
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over the standard Army infantry division besides just those of numbers. However, one 
point of note about soldiers in the Korean War was that they were deprived of the same 
quality of overall manpower by the KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to the U. S. Army) 
program. Koreans were integrated with the American soldiers, and because of the 
language and cultural problem, the development of effective cohesion or sound primary 
groups was hindered severely.25  
It is thus unfair to compare the Army in Korea with the Marines, particularly before 
Ridgway took command. This is because of KATUSA, comparative lack of pre-war 
training, and the formidable morale problem brought on by the first few months’ 
experiences and defeats. Furthermore, due to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and 
the new emphasis on the Air Force and Nuclear weapons before 1950, the Army was 
cut very drastically on the eve of Korea. It took time to build back up. A smaller service 
that had always been cadre based and very familial like the Corps could do so much 
easier than could the larger Army.  
Also, the USMC had one division and placed many of its best men therein; the 
Army had many divisions and had to spread its best men out more. Furthermore, the 
Marines didn’t have Europe and other major commitments around the globe to pull 
away good men. The Marines in Korea were at the best they had ever been—highly 
salted with the cream of the crop of WWII veterans. The Army, in general, though 
certain individual units were exemplary, was at a low ebb (before Ridgway came in at 
least – though after the stalemate began, the rotation system, the KATUSA program, 
and other factors led the quality of manpower in Army ranks to decline), and it is unfair, 
                                                 
25 Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis, 507; Allan R. Millett, Many a Strife, 294. 
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if one must insist on making any kind of comparison, to compare one case at its best to 
one that was not.26 
Marines in the Korean War (and today) did not have their own medical personnel 
as did the Army and the Navy. The Navy supplied its medical services. A Navy medical 
battalion was often found in a Marine division and two “Corpsmen” (the equivalent of a 
medic in the Army) were attached to each platoon in a company. The Corpsmen tended 
wounded on the front lines and tried to stabilize them with first-aid for transport to the 
rear. The next stop was a forward aid station and then the Battalion Aid station. From 
there, Navy or Army field hospitals “performed necessary surgery. . . . The more 
seriously wounded were transported to Japan and, when recovered sufficiently, sent 
home to the states or back to Korea.”27 
Marine air was the other half of the Marine fighting team. The purpose of the 
organization of the air segment of the Marine Corps is closely tied conceptually to what 
Marines called the “air-ground team concept.” Together, the Marine air and ground 
segments were intended to work together according to it. Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton 
described it thusly in the Marine Officer’s Guide:  
The role of Marine Corps aviation in the air-ground team is to support 
Fleet Marine operations by close and general tactical air support, and air 
defense. Secondary to this main job, Marine aviation may be called on to provide 
replacement or augmentation squadrons for duty with the fleet air arm. 
The noteworthy characteristic of Marine aviation is that it forms an 
inseparable part of the combined arms team with which the Corps backs up its 
infantry. . . . The kind of close air support that Marines are accustomed to 
demands complete integration between air and ground. Pilot and platoon leader 
                                                 
26 S.L.A. Marshall, Pork Chop Hill (New York: Berkley Publishing, 1956. Reprint. 1986): 2, 5, 37; Spencer 
C. Tucker, Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History. 3 vols. (Santa 
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2000): entry for “Korean Augmentation to the United States Army.” 
27 Burton Anderson, We Claim the Title, 187; Henry Berry, Hey, Mac, Where Ya Been?: Living Memories 
of the U. S. Marines in the Korean War (New York: St. Martin’s, 1988): 108; Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, 
Marine Officer’s Guide, 55-56; Martin Russ, The Last Parallel: A Marine’s War Journal (New York: 
Rinehart, 1957): 120. 
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wear the same color uniform, share the same traditions and common fund of 
experience, and go to school side by side in Quantico.28 
 
 James Donovan adds some background to this concept: “The air-ground team 
concept is predicated on amphibious assault operations conducted largely by Navy-
Marine amphibious forces in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases, 
somewhat in the pattern of the Central Pacific in World War II. . . .” He also supplies 
some description, “The theory of the balanced air-ground team organization as a ready, 
mobile, flexible, and well coordinated weapons system is particularly applicable to 
small-scale contingencies within the logical scope of naval task force capabilities.”29 
 Marine air was organized to provide supporting air to Marine ground forces in 
amphibious operations, but was intended to provide the same support to FMF forces in 
ground operations as well.  A Marine aircraft wing, “contains the necessary personnel, 
aircraft, air defense and control equipment, and logistic services for the support of a 
Marine division.” (See Chart # 10) It usually numbered about 12,000, and, where a 
Marine Division consisted of three regiments, was made up of three Marine Aircraft 
Groups (MAG). Each MAG consisted of at least two squadrons.30  
It was organized for expeditionary amphibious operations. “Marine Corps combat 
aviation is organized, trained, and equipped as a completely expeditionary air arm. It is 
this implicit expeditionary aspect that sets Marine Corps aviation apart from other 
aviation organizations. It is prepared to operate, after rapid establishment ashore, from 
minimal airfields within the objective area during the assault phase of an amphibious 
                                                 
28 Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, Marine Officer’s Guide, 97-98. 
29 James Donovan, United States Marine Corps, 106-07 
30 Ibid., 100-101. 
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operation. It is also capable of operating from aircraft carriers in support of an 
amphibious operation.”31  
However, unlike Marine divisions, Marine wings and groups “are not organized 
according to tables of organization, but are task-organized to accomplish the missions 
assigned. . . . Squadrons and battalions within a wing do, however, have tables of 
organization.”32  
A typical wing in the era of the Korean War was composed as follows: three 
fighter/attack MAGs that each contained two fighting squadrons, one night fighter 
squadron, one attack squadron, one air base squadron, and one HQ and maintenance 
squadron. Another MAG was organized for transport. In addition, the wing contained a 
Marine Wing service group; another HQ squadron with a composite squadron, a 
photographic squadron, and an observation squadron underneath it; a Marine air control 
group; and a MAG (helicopter) with a HQ and maintenance squadron, an air base 
squadron, and three helicopter transport squadrons underneath it. Again, the principal 
task of the Marine air wing was to provide air support to the infantry of a Marine 
division.33 
From the preceding, the reader should have a basic understanding of the 
organization of the Marine Corps fighting arms and especially a Marine Division. This 
understanding is essential to be able to follow the narrative of the Punchbowl Offensive. 
 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 101. 





SUMMARY OF MARINE OPERATIONS, 
JANUARY-AUGUST, 1951 
 
The events of that time might well be called the “Forgotten 
Campaigns” of what is now often termed the “Forgotten 
War.” 
                                                                   —Ronald J. Brown 
 
 
To give the reader perspective, it is necessary to summarize the interim period 
between the Hungnam evacuation in late December, 1950 and the Fall Offensive of 
1951.  
After taking time out to recover from the losses of the Chosin Reservoir campaign, 
1st Mar Div spent early 1951 involved in an anti-guerilla operation, called the “Pohang 
guerilla hunt” by the Marines, in the vicinity of Pohang on the east coast of Korea about 
one hundred miles south of the 38th parallel. This operation was well behind UN lines 
and the goal was to root out guerillas hiding in the hills in order to protect the Eighth 
Army supply line. Here MajGen O. P. Smith, still commanding the division, executed 
anti-guerilla operations strictly in accordance with Marine “small wars” doctrine.1 (See 
Map # 5) 
After weeks of patrolling after guerillas, the Marines saddled up for General 
Ridgway’s Operation Killer in mid February. They moved to the central front of Korea 
near Wonju, and attacked north to Hoensong about eight miles away. After combat in 
the hills above this town and four hundred Marine casualties to 2,000 for the enemy, the 
Marines participated in Operation Ripper in March. Here, 1st Mar Div again attacked 
                                                 
1 Most of the summary of the operations leading up to the battles of August and September is drawn from 
the following sources: U.S. Pacific Fleet, “Third Interim Evaluation Report”; Ronald Brown, 
Counteroffensive; Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 1-37; and Allan R. Millett, Many a Strife, chapter 23. 
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north, this time to phase line Cairo about twenty miles away. Operation Ripper ended 29 
March in the Marine zone of action, with all the division’s objectives in hand. These two 
operations cost the division 958 casualties to 7,000 estimated for the enemy.2 (See 
Maps # 6, 7, and 8) 
Through April, the division then participated in operations Rugged and Dauntless 
where it advanced another twenty miles to Hwachon near the Hwachon Reservoir. 
Intelligence sources correctly told Eighth Army another major Chinese offensive, the 
“CCF Fifth Phase Offensive” was brewing, and it broke 22 April before the final 
objectives of Dauntless had been reached.3 (See Map # 9) 
In the actions that followed, the Marines encountered some of their toughest 
fighting of the war in holding the eastern flank of a salient that developed in IX Corps 
(the Army corps the division was a part of at the time) lines when the 6th ROK Division, 
stationed on the Marines’ left, dissolved under Chinese pressure. The Marines held and 
could have continued to hold in their opinion, (anything that looks like a retreat is 
disgruntling to a Marine) but the IX Corps commander, disagreed and had them pull 
back to even out Eighth Army lines and avoid a situation where the CCF could 
penetrate deeply south of 1st Mar Div and then cut east in its rear, effectively cutting off 
its support and possibly surrounding it.4 (See Map # 9) 
The Marines fell back by phase lines in good order, with some complex but 
smoothly executed maneuvers that brought 1st Mar Div south and east to the zone of X 
Corps. Thus the Marines were detached from IX Corps by order of Lt Gen James Van 





Fleet, commander of Eighth Army, and put into X Corps, the same corps it had served 
under from Inchon to the Chosin Reservoir to the withdrawal from Hungnam.5  
In order to complete this transfer, Van Fleet could not have General Smith 
continue to command 1st Mar Div because of enmity over operations in 1950 between 
Smith and MajGen Edward Almond, X Corps’s commander. Ridgway had promised 
Smith he would not have to serve under Almond again. And so MajGen Gerald C. 
Thomas came to command 1st Mar Div in late April while the division was still engaged 
in withdrawal operations to the No Name Line.6 (See Map # 9)  
Smith had been no slouch as a commander, but Thomas had attended the Army’s 
Command and General Staff College and also got along well with many important Army 
officers. He had been G-3 (operations officer) on MajGen A. A. Vandergrift’s staff during 
the battle of Guadalcanal, making him an insider of the Guadalcanal clique prominent in 
Marine leadership after World War II and no stranger to the “Old Breed,” as the 1st Mar 
Div was called in that war. He proved to be a stalwart commander who followed the 
Marine combat ideal of leading as close to the sound of the guns as possible. Energetic, 
he frequently traveled about the division and corps area by helicopter (a necessity in the 
harsh terrain), and rather than planting himself at his headquarters, spent much of his 
time visiting the subordinate units of his division.7 
On the No Name Line, 1st Mar Div again found combat when CCF attacked the 7th 
Marines guarding a key pass on the road from Hongchon to Chunchon as a forward 
“patrol base,” a concept Marines disdained. “The patrol base idea was a new Army idea. 
                                                 
5 Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 1-37; Allan R. Millett, Many a Strife, chapter 23; U. S. Pacific Fleet, “Third 




It sure wasn’t in the field service regulations, and they sure as hell didn’t teach it when I 
was at Leavenworth [Command and General Staff College], and I didn’t like it.” This was 
the second phase of the Fifth Chinese Offensive. The battle to hold Morae Kogae Pass 
began on the night of 16 May 1951 and lasted all night (part of the larger battle of the 
Soyang River, 16-21 May). The Marine slew 112 Chinese and captured 82 in the fight. 
The enemy had been mowed down in droves.8 (See Map # 10) 
General Thomas had disliked having one regiment out of mutual reinforcement 
distance from the rest and took the opportunity of this attack to pull the 7th Marines back 
to the No Name Line with the rest of the division. Then X Corps had the division shift 
some of its units east to relieve the 9th Infantry, USA, part of the 2nd Infantry Division, 
and south to strengthen the Marines’ defensive posture. Thus the division had curved its 
right flank towards the south above Hongchon. The division held here, and on 20 May, a 
single battalion of the 5th Marines blistered a probe by CCF with its supporting arms, 
resulting in 170 enemy dead. “The withdrawal and our rapid movement there had given 
me confidence in what the division could do. It revealed the division, as I said a while 
ago, as a real pro outfit. I doubt if there was a better outfit ever walked than the 1st 
Marine Division on the 24th of April, 1951.”9 
IX Corps, to the left of X Corps on the line, received orders to mount a 
counteroffensive while X Corps held steady, and the Marines were charged with 
                                                 
8 Thomas said of the concept when asked his opinion of it in an interview: “Phony as a three dollar bill. It 
is an invitation to disaster. The Army lost a lot of people in Korea because it got a lot of small units 
scattered and isolated – failed to concentrate. A Marine infantry regiment could cut its way out of any 
encirclement; a Marine battalion would be safe, even if encircled, provided other forces were ready to go 
promptly to their relief.” – Interview with Gerald C. Thomas by Col C. W. Harrison, no date, located in the 
front of the Gerald C. Thomas Oral Memoir, page 2-3; Gerald C. Thomas Oral Memoir -- a leather bound 
transcript of MajGen Tomas’s “Career Interview,” conducted by Benis M. Frank, 1966, (Washington Navy 
Yard, U. S. Marine Corps Historical Center, Oral History Section): 742. 
9 Ibid., 748. 
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defending the left flank of X Corps on the line between it and IX Corps, as IX Corps 
advanced. The Chinese offensive had shot its bolt, leaving EUSAK a great chance to 
crush the CCF in Korea.10  
The offensive did not move quickly enough to satisfy Van Fleet or Ridgway, so X 
Corps was added to the assault on 23 May in a move to cut across the base of a CCF 
salient before the Chinese could withdraw. The plan didn’t work, however, because X 
Corps moved too slow and the Chinese withdrew too fast. Thus X Corps would continue 
the attack to the north. The 1st Mar Div drove north with its corps toward Yangu on the 
east end of the Hwachon Reservoir during this offensive and reached it on 31 May. 
Here was Line Topeka, and the Marines occupied a zone along it.11 (See Map #11) 
In this advance the Marine utilized their preference of using ample supporting 
arms to trade steel for lives, inflicting harsh punishment on the enemy while suffering 
little for itself. The estimates of enemy losses were 10,000. The Marines actually 
counted 1,870 dead and took almost 600 prisoners. Most of the killing was effected by 
artillery. The division’s own casualties numbered 83 dead and 731 WIA (Wounded in 
Action). “For at least one week the 1st Marine Division had fought by its book, and it 
suffered negligible casualties by pounding every objective with preparatory air strikes 
and artillery concentrations.”12 
Van Fleet, at this point, wanted to try some amphibious envelopments up the coast 
with the 1st Mar Div and 3rd Infantry Division, but these plans were vetoed by higher 
headquarters. At the time, intimations that the CCF and North Koreans wanted to 
negotiate had been sensed in Washington. And UNC wanted to simply drive forward 
                                                 
10 Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 1-37. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 18, 1-37. 
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and seize the Kansas Line (about fifteen miles north of the 38th Parallel), because 
peace talks were possible, and hold the UN gains at that level.13 (See Map # 12) 
General Thomas described the first plan for an amphibious hook in 1951, 
Operation Wrangler, as follows: 
Interviewer: An amphibious operation to be executed by 1st Mar Div was 
planned for 6 June 1951. The objective was to have been Tongchon, followed by 
a drive southwest toward Kumwha to link up with IX Corps elements driving 
northeast and cut off the escape of thousands of retiring CCF. Why was this plan 
abandoned? 
Thomas: Owing to Inchon and Wonsan, Almond was pretty amphibious 
minded, but this plan was “frowned” on by timid souls in Washington who were 
always disapproving plans giving as their reason – “The Russians might come 
in.” . . . The plan was to embark at Kansong, land at Tongchon, drive southwest, 
and occupy the high ground around Hwachon-ni (about 15 miles south west of 
Tongchon). An armored task force (187th Airborne plus some tanks) had been 
ordered on 25 May to push up the Inje corridor and seize Kansong on the coast. 
It got, however, only about four kilometers east of Inje. Later UN lines moved 
forward to include Kansong.14  
 
The 1st Mar Div needed time to regroup before another advance, but X Corps’s 
aggressive commander, MajGen Almond, ordered one anyway. Here, General Thomas 
of the 1st Mar Div mimicked his predecessor, MajGen O. P. Smith, by not pressing his 
regimental commanders to advance as fast as Almond wanted, until security and 
planning for new attacks were more mature.15  
Jagged mountains jutted harsh against the sky to the division’s north in as rugged 
and forbidding a piece of terrain as any in Korea. An extinct volcano also lay to the 
north, and the sharp peaks around it caused a big depression like a punchbowl, and 
gave it its name. High in the Taebaek mountains northeast of the Hwachon Reservoir, 
roads here were scarce and tactical difficulties many. The Rocky heights and steep 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 19-37. 
14 Interview with Gerald C. Thomas by Col C. W. Harrison, 3-4. 
15 Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 18-37. 
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ridges that rippled out from the peaks were a defender’s dream and attacker’s worst 
nightmare. And they were defended. In this area were some of the fiercest fighters the 
North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) had.16 (See Map # 13) 
June ushered in some of the harshest fighting of the war for the Marines as they 
drove north to the Kansas Line. Here the 1st Marines lost more men than it had in the 
Chosin Reservoir Campaign’s harshest month, December 1950. The Marine division 
itself had to pay the butcher 183 KIA (Killed in Action) and almost 2000 WIA to reach its 
objectives. The battle foreshadowed the fighting that would occur in August and 
September in the same area, because the Marines could not use artillery effectively 
because of the high peaks, deep valleys, and uncooperative nature of the terrain, and 
CAS was slow in coming, inaccurate when it got there, and low in quantity. 
(Furthermore, artillery use was limited due to imposed restrictions on ammunition by 
EUSAK.) Here the versatile nature of air power was the perfect supporting weapon, if it 
could be delivered as the Marines wanted it. With the right selection of armament, and 
the ability to attack a target from the best direction and angle, even the rear, CAS was 
what the situation called for. However, the Marines would end up having to do things the 
hard way with inadequate support, by going cave to cave, bunker to bunker, and pillbox 
to pillbox with hand grenades and rifle fire to eradicate the enemy.17   
To make matters worse, the NKPA enemy in this area was almost as reluctant to 
surrender as the Japanese had been in World War II. They held their positions to the 
last. The Marines would have to pay in blood to own their turf. One World War II veteran 
called it “the toughest fighting I have ever seen.” But that Marine had moved on by 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 12; Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 18-37; U. S. Pacific 
Fleet, “Third Interim Evaluation Report,” Chapter 15. 
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August and September, or he might have repeated that remark about the ordeal the 
Marine division then endured.18 
The Marines finally made their way to the Kansas Line by 20 June. Here they built 
bunkers to hold the phase line, conducted patrols, and settled down into defensive 
operations, and that was where matters stood when the Truce Talks broke out on 7 July 
in Kaesong, Korea (the first talk, however was not until 10 July).19 (See Maps # 14 and 
12) 
The Marines spent the rest of June and half of July on the line. Thomas and 
Almond again challenged the AF (Air Force) system of CAS (Close Air Support), and 
more plans for an amphibious landing were made by Van Fleet only to again meet veto 
from higher up.20  
Thomas later said of the amphibious operation: 
However, the spring offensive was generally a frontal attack, justified 
undoubtedly by reason of the fact that they were able to break through. A frontal 
attack is all right if you can make a breakthrough and then exploit it, but by the 
end of the summer the chance that – Van Fleet simply did not have the power to 
make a breakthrough, much less make a breakthrough and then exploit it. There 
was one operation that he took up with me, that had a wonderful prospect. In 
talking with him, we worked out plans that the First Marine Division, which was at 
the time in reserve, would move down the east coast of Korea, and there carry 
out a shore to shore operation and land behind the North Koreans up at the city 
of Kojo, which was about 30 miles behind the front lines. Now, the front lines 
abutted the sea on both sides of the peninsula. . . . But this plan to land behind 
the North Koreans offered splendid prospects. We worked it up, had completely 
staffed it. I went over with my staff to Seoul, the Eighth Army headquarters, and 
Admiral Tom Hill, the amphibious commander in the Far East came over with his 
staff, and we worked out the details. Everything was to be laid on about the 1st of 
September. We had a limiting date of the 10th of October, because on the 10th of 
October it freezes out there and it would not be wise to attempt a shore-to-shore 
                                                 
18 Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 25; U. S. Pacific Fleet, “Third Interim Evaluation Report,” chapter 15; 1st 
Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 2. 
19 Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 30-40. 
20 Gerald C. Thomas Oral Memoir, as well as interview with C. W. Harrison, no date, page 3. 
 34
operation. . . . The gave me the 1st . . . ROK Division, and they were to go on our 
right flank to the north as we went ashore at Kojo.  
. . . We were going to shuttle the troops around in 24 hours and land a 
whole division and then go back and pick up the ROK Division and land them 
behind us. The whole thing could have been done in 48 hours and we would 
have completely destroyed the right flank of the North Korean Army, I don’t think 
there’s any doubt about it. We would have been right in behind them.21  
 
Later in August, Thomas told Ridgway, on a visit by CINCUNC to the Marine area, 
“We’re still interested in that Kojo operation. . . . I can have my men aboard ship in 24 
hours.” Ridgway replied, “Well, Washington has absolutely turned thumbs down on it. 
They say if we carry out an operation like that Russia might come into the war.” Thomas 
did not believe this was a likely prospect. “[Russia] will come into this war when they 
want to come, and nothing that we do or don’t do is going to influence it.” Considering 
that the operation was only two divisions, it would have been a paltry excuse indeed for 
the Soviets to come into the war over it. More likely, Washington didn’t want to upset the 
North Koreans and endanger the negotiations – the Communists did not walk out until 
the end of the summer. (Some Marines probably thought the JCS and Truman 
Administration opposed a landing because it might bring more publicity to the Marines 
at the expense of Army divisions.)22 
 Said Millett of the amphibious operations: 
. . . Van Fleet did not win approval of his amphibious hook north to Tongchon, but 
his planners provided some more modest variants that might have put all or part 
of the 1st Marine Division within ROK I Corps area and closer to the air an naval 
gunfire support that Task Force 77 could provide. An offensive westwards from 
the coast might bring the Marines and the ROK I Corps in behind the fortified belt 
so well manned by the North Koreans. For almost 10 days, Van Fleet and Byers 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 877-78. 
22 Ibid., 879. It was the opinion of many in the fighting forces at the time and later that Washington had 
decided that to win against China and North Korea outright might bring in Russia, so D. C. would instead 
negotiate and avoid any more large military successes in Korea lest it anger Russia. Of course, such a 
view failed to take into account Washington and NATO’s concern for protecting Europe, and that Korea 
was, in Washington’s estimate, only a distraction to bog down UN military forces. 
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examined their contingency plans and ruled them out as too risky and subject at 
any moment to another Ridgway veto.23  
 
Almond was replaced as X Corps commander in July by MajGen Clovis E. Byers. 
July also brought relief for the Marine division for a time when the 2nd Infantry Division 
(Inf Div) took over the Marine sector and the 1st Mar Div moved to corps reserve. Here 
the Marines received replacements, rotated many veterans home, and trained. “We 
were in need of it [time in reserve]. We weren’t particularly tired, but our gear was 
getting worn. You can’t keep your trucks up, you can’t keep your material up. So we 
moved back into reserve and it gave us a chance to refurbish our equipment and also to 
do some training. Combat is a testing of training, but very often it’s not very good 
training, and you do a lot of things you’d rather not do.”24 
The training was to get ready for the potential landing, and after that was vetoed, 
to perfect night operations and small unit tactics. Other training was conducted to 
reduce the deficit of specialists in the division. In addition, thousands of Korean laborers 
were added to provide the logistics trucks could not in the trackless mountains.25  
General Byers, the X Corps commander, told General Thomas he wanted the 7th 
Marines [detached from 1st Mar Div] moved up to “‘back-stop’ the 2nd Inf Div in the event 
of a penetration.  Thomas was not enthusiastic but agreed provided he be permitted to 
move up and assume command of the 7th Regiment [7th Marines]. Thomas insisted that 
all Marines in Korea must fight under his command and not under Army command. He 
                                                 
23 Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 43. 
24 Gerald C. Thomas Oral Memoir, 869; Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 30-40. 
25 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” August 1951, 3; Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 30-40; U. S. Pacific Fleet, 
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particularly didn’t want to ‘loan’ a regiment to Ruffner, CG 2nd Inf Div, who, in Thomas’s 
opinion, would just delight in having a Marine regiment ‘chewed up.’”26 
The Communists had gained time to regroup in the negotiations, and so walked 
out of the truce talks in late August, accusing the UN forces of violating the neutral zone 
around Kaesong. The 1st Mar Div soon received a warning order to prepare to resume 
the offensive. It would be only a limited one, however, with the objective only to improve 
the location of the defensive line to gain better terrain. The Marine division found itself 
on 26 August moving to relieve the 8th ROK Division east of the Punchbowl. Its mission: 
to seize Corps Objective Yoke on the Hays Line.27 (See Map # 13) 
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MOVEMENT TO CONTACT 
 
 
This is my rifle. There are many like it, but this one is 
mine. It is my life. I must master it as I must master my life. 
Without me, my rifle is useless. Without my rifle, I am 
useless. I must fire my rifle true. I must shoot straighter than 
the enemy who is trying to kill me. I must shoot him before 
he shoots me. I will. 
My rifle and I know that what counts in war is not the 
rounds we fire, the noise of our burst, or the smoke we 
make. We know that it is the hits that count. We will hit. 
My rifle is human, even as I am human, because it is 
my life. Thus, I will learn it as a brother. I will learn its 
weaknesses, its strengths, its parts, its accessories, its 
sights, and its barrel. I will keep my rifle clean and ready, 
even as I am clean and ready. We will become part of each 
other. 
Before God I swear this creed. My rifle and I are the 
defenders of my country. We are the masters of our enemy. 
We are the saviors of my life. 
So be it, until victory is America’s, and there is no 
enemy. 
 
                                              --The Marine Rifleman’s Creed 
 
The Division had lost experienced men other than casualties by late summer 
1951. Many had “rotated” home. “By September of 1951 there were only 4,713 enlisted 
men remaining in the Division who landed at Inchon the preceding year.” Among the 
replacements added to the division was a high number of Staff NCOs, since the division 
had a shortage of these. Many of them were veterans of World War II. Between June 
and October 1951, the 1st Mar Div lost 14,721 men to casualties or rotation. This breaks 
down as: 11,637 rotation losses, 4,241 battle casualties, and 5,549 nonbattle casualties. 
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(The resulting total is considerably more than 14,000, but 6,706 casualties returned to 
duty.) To make up for the losses, the 1st Mar Div received 13,097 men as replacements. 
That is a turn over rate of over 50 percent in five months. 1 (See Charts # 11, 12, and 
13) 
Yet even so, the new men began to “belong” very quickly. “In mentioning the 
reserves, they were very closely integrated into our organization and after they had 
been with us for a few weeks, I can truthfully state that you could not tell a reserve from 
a regular.”  And “almost two-thirds of the U. S. Marines in Korea were reservists,” by 
June, 1951. The fighting was to be done by what one historian called a “new division.” 
That did not mean it was a less effective or efficient outfit, however; the Marine Corps 
did screen its reservists to ensure a minimum state of training before shipping them out, 
and they had many from which to choose the cream of the crop.2 
Jon Charles Genrich remarked: 
 
The new men were all taking hold of their duties as they had all been through 
advanced training in the states. Before this time half of our outfit had been 
reservists, many of whom had never been to a summer camp for training. They 
were good men, but I heard many stories about how some had never fire an M-1 
rifle before coming to Korea. They had trained them by loading rifles and firing 
them off the fan tail of the ship on the way over to Korea. Many did not even wear 
their helmets when going into combat. The new men seemed more able to adapt 
to rules and procedure. The older reservists were tough, hard-fighting men, 
which sometimes was more important in battle than the type of weapons or 
equipment being used.3 
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And the rotation policy, too, did not seem to diminish combat effectiveness 
among the Marines. Rather, quite the opposite was true (so claimed the 1st Mar Div 
anyway). “[The rotation policy] has been successful and is a most important factor in 
maintaining morale and efficiency. . . .” In fact, the rotation program was such a success 
in the division’s eyes that it elected not to participate in EUSAK’s Rest and 
Rehabilitation Program that rotated personnel to Japan for leave. (Marines usually 
stayed in the division for about nine months).4 
There was one caveat to this. The rotation policy did not apply to the KMC 
Regiment. Their only rotation, at least for the enlisted personnel, was on a stretcher.5 
For the 7th Marines at least, the rotation policy led to unit pride in one respect. 
“We didn’t do much but sleep and eat the first few days and then we heard the 13th draft 
would be coming in to replace our losses. I heard someone say, ‘That’s what the 
Chinese call the 7th Regiment the Ghost Regiment. They think they have killed most of 
us off two or three times, but we keep coming back with new Marine replacements.’ The 
7th Marines also carried the flag for the First Marine Division since they had fought the 
rear echelon against several Chinese divisions in the Chosin Reservoir pull back. We 
had a lot of pride to live up to for the men who went before us.”6 
 Several problems existed concerning the 1 Mar Div. One problem, according to 
MajGen Frank E. Lowe, USAR (an advisor and close friend of President Truman who 
was sent on an evaluation trip to Korea in late 1950 through early 1951), was that 
whereas in the Army there was an abundance of specialists and few fighters, the 1st 
                                                 
4 U. S. Pacific Fleet, “Third Interim Evaluation Report,” 15-3 to 15-27. 
5 Interview with Colonel KIM Yun Gun, Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps, 22 December, 
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6 Oral memoir of Jon Charles Genrich. 
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Marine Division in 1951 had an abundance of fighters and a deficit in specialists. Yet, 
the only shortcomings assessed by the Pacific Fleet in performance were that junior 
officers, when rotated in, would have benefited from a brief refresher course on tactics 
and military subjects before being assigned to combat. However, no criticism of their 
actual leadership or the quality of the officers themselves was voiced. Besides these 
detractions, there is no indication in the sources that the 1 Mar Div was any less a 
competent, battle-ready organization than it had been in 1950 (a time in which, many 
Marine historians agree, the division was at a peak and was perhaps the “finest” of any 
Marine fighting force ever assembled.)7 
The state of training of 1st Mar Div in 1951 on the eve of the September battles 
was as good as could be expected in the short interval of reserve time (July15 to August 
26), but the training conducted was intense and realistic. Much of it was at night since 
the CCF (Communist Chinese Forces) and NKPA favored night attacks.  “A minimum of 
33 percent of all tactical training will be conducted at night, stressing individual and unit 
night discipline.”8  
According to the Division Historical Diary, the objective of all the training was to: 
. . . Maintain each individual and unit of the command at a high state of 
professional training and tactical proficiency . . . and to refresh units and staffs in 
the principles of amphibious operations. . . . to increase proficiency in the use of 
combined arms and related services; to increase proficiency in amphibious 
techniques [there were plans, scrapped by higher headquarters, for an 
amphibious landing behind enemy lines]; to accomplish integration of 
replacement personnel into the various units of this command in a minimum 
                                                 
7 U. S. Pacific Fleet, “Third Interim Evaluation Report,” chapter 15; Allan R. Millett, Many a Strife, 306, 
315; Major General Frank E. Lowe, USAR. “Report of Mission, 2 August 1950--23 April 1951” (Frank E. 
Lowe File, Truman Papers, 1951); U. S. Pacific Fleet, “Third Interim Evaluation Report,” chapter 15; Allan 
R. Millett, Semper Fidelis, Chapter 16; Robert D. Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, Chapter 10. 
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length of time; and to develop technical and tactical proficiency in the individual  
Marine and the units of this command.9 
 
Subjects covered included “boat team training; mines and booby traps; tank-
infantry tactics; assault of a defended beach; tactical training of the individual Marine; 
battalion in the attack and defense; regiment in the attack and defense; platoon assault 
and reduction of fortified position; and the tactical employment and firing of all 
weapons.”10 
For example, the 1st Marines conducted a field problem on August 20 that lasted 
four days. It involved, “an attack and a retrograde upon CCF units. The problem was 
highly successful in that it exercised the staff in further integrating the actions of the 
companies and battalions into an even more smoothly functioning organization, and 
personnel in unfamiliar positions were given a chance to operate under near combat 
conditions.”11 
Another illustration of Marine training during the period, and the method by which 
Marines would assault defended bunkers in September, occurred on a “gloomy, dank 
and depressing day at the height of the Korean monsoon.” A platoon of Marines 
slogged up the muddy hills of their reserve area in column while water ran down their 
backs beneath their ponchos. “Their problem was a demonstration, a platoon assaulting 
a fortified position with supporting weapons.” The lieutenant detailed the purpose of the 
problem to the men: “Men, today you will witness the proper method of assaulting and 
securing a fortified position with a minimum number of casualties.” And blocks of TNT 
were set off on the ridge to simulate an artillery barrage (shells were in too short a 
                                                 
9 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” August 1951, 2-3. 




supply to use real ones in a training problem at the time). Three heavy MGs (Machine 
Guns) poured fire over the head of the advancing platoon as the attack commenced.12 
From defilade, rocketmen (armed with 3.5 inch bazookas) rose and fired into the 
opening of a pillbox. Then the Marines charged the position and “mopped up.” One 
veteran of ten months with the division said to a new private, “Get this, Mac. . . . that is 
the way we have been doing it. Working together as a team pays off.”13 
Being in reserve was not all work. In the evenings, movies were shown for the 
enjoyment of the troops. In the 1st Marines area, the men gathered in a rice paddy to 
see films “projected onto a sheet stretched between two posts.” Also, in every regiment 
and battalion, there was a heavy emphasis on organized sports for recreation and 
physical conditioning such as football, softball, baseball, and boxing. Sometimes 
competitions in various sports were held between battalions both for entertainment and 
fostering of esprit de corps. Some Marines may have even learned soccer or a “sort of 
rugby called ‘Ch’u-Ku’” from the Korean laborers.14 
The 1st Mar Div’s period in reserve also included patrolling and strengthening of 
defensive lines. For example, the 7th Marines on 7-8 August had one squad of Baker 
Company (1/7) patrolling while Able Company worked on defenses of the Wichita Line. 
(The Wichita and Switch Lines were two defensive lines the Marines constructed 
defenses on while in reserve. The lines were just north of Inje and south of the Kansas 
Line. These were built in case UN forces had to withdraw further south. The withdrawing 
                                                 
12 Public Information Document by Sgt. Gary Cameron, Marine Combat Correspondent, dated 23 August 
1951, National Archives: RG 127, Records of the U. S. Marine Corps, “Division of Information, Publicity 
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13 Ibid., 3. 
14 Oral account of PFC Lyle Conaway, in: Donald Knox, The Korean War: Uncertain Victory: The 
Concluding Volume of an Oral History (New York: Harvest/Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988): 295; 
Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, “Historical Diary,” 33. 
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forces could have already built defenses to pull back too. Another reason these were 
built is for a greater layer of defenses behind the Kansas Line to contain any potential 
Communist penetration.)  The construction consisted of such priorities as “clear fields of 
fire, defensive wire, tactical wire, open emplacements, covered emplacements, reverse-
slope trails . . . .” 15  
Other elements of the regiment likewise patrolled or conducted training. Most 
patrols resulted in negative enemy contact though one discovered the wreckage of an 
F4U Corsair plane (a propeller driven fighter-bomber aircraft used throughout World 
War II and Korea by the Marine Corps and Navy for Close Air Support). Others found 
caches of enemy ammo (some booby trapped), or the bodies of dead U. S. soldiers 
killed in earlier fighting (some of which also were booby trapped). Some of the soldiers 
found were wearing winter issue clothing and had not even been buried. Such was the 
fluid and desperate nature of the previous winter’s combat. The mission of these patrols 
was “to determine the extent of enemy activity and unusual civilian activity . . .” in the 
area. Such was a typical day in corps reserve.16 
The division was in reserve for only two and a half months before it was again 
committed to combat. For the men new to the division, that was not very long to “snap 
in,” as Marines called getting thoroughly acquainted with a new unit or weapon hands-
on.17 
                                                 
15 Seventh Marines “Historical Diary,” August 1951, Regimental Frag Orders 021400 and 071330; 
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 In late August, three of the division’s regiments were given warning orders to 
prepare for a move from reserve areas to assembly areas to organize for reemployment 
in the offensive. (For 3/7, their warning order on August 26 did not even include 
“destination, time, attachments [or] situation.”) The other units of X Corps had bogged 
down and the Marines were needed to relieve elements of the 2nd Inf Div and 8th ROK 
(Republic of Korea) Div so the offensive could get moving again.  From the positions 
formerly occupied by the units relieved, the X Corps plan called on the 1st Mar Div for 
“the execution of a limited objective attack to seize the high ground north of the 
Punchbowl and along the Inje-Changhang axis.” On August 31, the 1st Mar Div was to 
attack Yoke Ridge and take it for a new EUSAK defensive line forward of Line Kansas 
(to be called the Hays Line).18 (See Map # 13) 
The CINCUNC (Commander in Chief United Nations Command), General 
Matthew B. Ridgway, said of the area’s value: 
Another area the enemy held dear was an ancient volcanic crater we named the 
Punchbowl, about twenty-five miles north of Inje, and the same distance from the 
east coast, near the zone boundary of U. S. X and ROK I Corps. Its rim was 
nearly knife-sharp all around the edges, rising abruptly several hundred feet 
above the crater floor, and thickly wooded on every side. The enemy was solidly 
entrenched on the rim here and well armed with mortars and artillery. Much blood 
was spilled in the coming months to win control of this area. In the Eighth Army’s 
possession, it would shorten the line, provide better observation, and lessen the 
chance of strong enemy surprise attacks in that quarter. Once we had seized it, 
we never gave it up.19 
 
X Corps’s overall goal, dictated by EUSAK on 21 July, was to probe Communist 
positions and determine their strength, keep them off balance and unable to launch 
                                                 
18 Third Battalion, Seventh Marines “Historical Diary,” August 1951, 6; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” 
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another offensive, hone the edge of X Corps’s fighting units lest they become soft 
through inactivity, and improve the defensive line in the corps sector by “elbowing” 
forward to take better, more commanding terrain and remove sags in the line—in other 
words, straighten it out. Straighter lines meant shorter lines, and shorter lines meant 
less linear miles of territory to fortify and defend. It also meant fewer salients and 
bulges, which were more vulnerable to enemy attack, penetration, exploitation, and 
encirclement. Shorter defense lines furthermore allowed EUSAK to use fewer men to 
defend the line and pool the remainder in reserve to counter an enemy attack, or 
perhaps make one of its own if the truce talks produced no results.20  
The terrain north of the Punchbowl was also critical, because in enemy hands it 
could be used to observe the defenses on the Kansas Line to call in supporting fire on 
it. If this terrain were in UN hands, not only would the enemy be deprived of this 
observation, another advantage would be that the UNC (United Nations Command) 
forces could make it difficult for the enemy to launch attacks against the UN MLR 
(United Nations) (Main Line of Resistance) in this sector from yet more overlooking high 
ground.21  
Of course, the “ground-pounders” who fought there remembered the terrain 
differently. Jon Charles Genrich observed: 
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When I speak of “hills,” they should actually be called “mountains.” They were 
rough and rugged, covered with pines and other trees. Most of the hills on the 
east coast were only 3,000-4,000 feet high, but when starting at near sea level, 
that was tall. We soon learned that going up was easier than going down. When 
it got too steep going up we could go on all fours. The problem going down 
carrying 60 to 80 pounds was that if we lost our footing and fell, we knew we 
would probably only be stopped when we hit a tree 20 or 30 feet down the hill. All 
we could do was hope that we would survive.22 
 
X Corps first attempted to use only a portion of its strength to accomplish its 
objective, and because the truce-talks were still under way until August 23, only ROK 
units were to be utilized. It was during attacks in mid August that the 36th ROK 
Regiment attached to the U. S. 2nd Inf Div, and the 8th ROK Div, ran into problems, 
namely high casualties for minor advances, and formidable enemy resistance in heavily 
fortified, inaccessible terrain. This led X Corps commander, MajGen (Major General) 
Byers, after the Communists walked out of the peace-talks, to widen the attack to 
include the whole corps front. An attack by 1 Mar Div to the east of the Punchbowl 
would alleviate the difficulties these other X Corps units were having with “Bloody 
Ridge” to the west, drawing away NKPA firepower and resources, thus “relieving 
pressure” and helping that action to succeed. It was to this end that he set a new 
defensive/phase line, Line Hays, north of the Kansas Line. This line was the objective 
for the Marines’ assault.23 (See Map # 13) 
Monsoon season was heavy in Korea that year, and so the roads soon became 
choked with vehicles and equipment bogged down in the thick and ever abundant mud. 
Portions of the narrow, ill-kept, and sparse roads were wiped out in mudslides, and 
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bridges had been swept away due to flooding. It would be a laborious trek to get the 
Marine units to their assembly areas, and the speed of movement was impeded very 
much by the weather. Some units had to travel as far as sixty miles.24  
In what would normally have been only a five hour movement by vehicle, the 7th 
Marines and 1st KMC (the KMC regiment) took nearly three days to make the trek to 
relieve units of the 2nd Infantry Division, USA (U. S. Army), and the 8th ROK Division, 
and then ready for the attack. Departure was 27 August, and arrival was late 29 August. 
The 5th Marines (-) would follow soon after (that was the plan anyway). The Division did 
not have use of its other infantry regiment, the 1st Marines. 25  
This latter unit was in corps reserve and would remain so until September 11—as 
it turned out, however, the 1st Marines would be committed before the 5th Marines. While 
in corps reserve, the 1st Marines was not under the control of General Thomas but 
under X Corps. It would have to be released back to him for use in battle; and the 5th 
Marines in division reserve had to guard the division’s sector of Line Kansas, 
responsibility of which, the 1st Mar Div still had to maintain and man defenses of, even 
while the rest of its elements were engaged in combat to the north.26  
Despite the slow going, upon word that increasing enemy pressure had the 2nd Inf 
Div in possible need of immediate relief, “units of the Division continued the 
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displacement with every effort being made to expedite the move in order to be prepared 
for any change in the mission assigned.”27 
The first objective was one assigned by X Corps, hence it was called a “corps 
objective,” (an objective assigned by the division would be called a “division objective” 
and so on). Called Yoke Ridge, it resembled the jagged maw of an angry dragon in its 
topographical contours on a map. (See Map # 15) This ridge was made up of hills 930, 
1000, 1026, 924, and 702 on the east-west axis, and hills, 602, 702, 680, 755, and 793 
on its north-south axis. It would be part of the Hays Line, the next phase/defensive line 
in the plan for X Corps’s “limited objective” advance. Yoke Ridge, too, had the Soyang 
River at its back, and other knife edge ridges branched off from it. Pine and brush 
concealed a multitude of defensive emplacements on its slopes constructed from earth 
and logs. Direct pinpoint hits from heavy supporting arms and the assault of infantry 
Marines would be needed to reduce most of them; the enemy had no intention of 
fleeing.28 
In fact, the defenders, the 6th Regiment, 2d Division, II NKPA Corps, had orders to 
hold at all costs. North Korean officers that allowed their units to retreat had only 
execution as their reward. The enemy in the area was well armed and well supplied, AF 
(Air Force) efforts to render the opposite effect through interdiction notwithstanding. In 
artillery, the enemy had more tubes than the Marines by a ratio of 92 to 72 guns, many 
of them in large calibers. (The enemy also had a number about equal to the Marines in 
mortars and machine guns.) The NKPAs were also extremely accurate in the 
employment of  their artillery. While standing around a campfire one night in a rearward 
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area in September, one group of Marine tankers was hit with a pair of shells, one 
landing smack in the middle of the fire. The NKPA also had abundant ammunition with 
which to assault not only pre-determined targets, but also targets of opportunity.29   
The NKPAs had another favored tactic. They zeroed in their own positions with 
mortars and artillery from other positions. (Often, these pieces were hauled by pack 
animals.) More than one group of Marines, elated with the joy of victory in crushing the 
defenses of a formerly NKPA hill, suddenly found themselves under heavy, accurate fire 
from enemy supporting arms. The enemy also had watering holes zeroed in with 
artillery. Many KMCs (abbreviation meaning Marines from the regiment of the Korean 
Marine Corps attached to the 1st Mar Div) were hit while trying to fill their canteens.30 
The NKPA artillery fire usually came in twos and threes at the same range. This 
knowledge helped PFC George R. Pealer of Nevada get a wounded Marine to safety. 
The wounded Marine had been blinded and lost a foot in a landmine blast and needed 
immediate medical attention. Pealer took the windshield off his jeep, strapped the 
wounded man’s stretcher to the hood, and prepared to run the gauntlet of NKPA fire 
along the road to the rear. At the Soyang River, an enemy shell hit 100 yards to their 
front. Pealer hit the gas and passed that point as two more shells struck behind them. 
The trip was successful, and the wounded Marine was given aid at a field hospital. The 
NKPA also would infiltrate through UN lines and lay ambushes along roads. “The 
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ambush technique employed by the enemy consists of throwing hand grenades into a 
vehicle as it passes and then following up the grenade blast with small arms fire.”31 
 As for fortifications, the NKPA bunkers were strong and comparable to those of 
the Japanese on Tarawa, though on a smaller scale of strength (the Tarawa defenses 
also had concrete and were made to withstand NGF (Naval Gunfire), these in Korea 
were fortified against artillery and bomb attack). There was at least a rumor that the 
enemy was on constant orders to add one meter a day of earth to his emplacements. 
The enemy was confident enough in the strength of his bunkers that he often called 
down artillery fire on his own positions while yet in them. He often did this when Marines 
were almost atop them.32 
The tactical doctrine governing the NKPA forces was based on that of the 
Chinese and Soviets, particularly that of Mao Tze Tung and his “ten principles of war by 
which the CCF fight.” These tenets were very like the principles of Sun Tzu.33 
A EUSAK report on enemy tactics said: 
Since a large portion of the cadre of the North Korean People’s Army served with 
the Chinese Communist Forces in battle against the Japanese, North Korean 
tactics employed against United Nations Forces were similar to CCF and Soviet 
Russian tactics. . . . All Commanding Generals and other key officers of all North 
Korean People’s Army divisions were Chinese Communist Forces and/or Soviet 
trained. Many North Korean People’s Army noncommissioned officers also had 
undergone extensive Chinese Communist Forces training.34 
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Another report, this one form IX Corps headquarters, described the use of Sun 
Tzu in the enemy method of warfare: 
While new weapons have been added to their armies, the cardinal principles of 
warfare as laid down in SUN TZU’s “Art of War,” published in 510 BC, still 
constitute the fundamental doctrine of the oriental field commander. Where the 
enemy lacks firepower he attempts to gain superiority by massing his manpower; 
where the enemy must gain surprise to achieve success, he creates surprise by 
attacking across the most inaccessible terrain; where the enemy needs 
maneuverability he subjects his troops to grueling forced marches. Throughout 
these studies it is apparent that, in true Communist fashion, “the end always 
justifies the means.” Weapons and other equipment are valued above 
manpower—time is bountiful.35  
 
Thus the enemy the Marines fought had long training and experience in war and 
sound principles to guide him. Some of the troops were green, peasants forced into 
service as soldiers to replace heavy losses, but the Communist leaders, officers and 
NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers) were experienced and well trained. 
Another tactic of the NKPA encountered by Marines in this battle was an 
abundance of enemy mines, supplemented in danger in some locations by the 
unmarked mines left by the ROK units. Some were Soviet box mines, explosive charges 
in a wooden crate that could be buried underneath the ground. These could disable a 
tank and were usually undetectable by mine detection equipment because they were 
made of wood rather than metal. Some of these had dynamite charges beneath them in 
excess of 100 pounds. Other mines were everything from conventional anti-personnel 
mines, to the improvised type: mortar rounds buried fuse-up in the dirt, to Bangalore 
torpedoes (these last were usually captured from UN forces). The NKPAs liked to place 
mines in pairs on either side of a trail, but often left the trails themselves clear. The 
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Marines, seeking to avoid mines, would walk off the trails and get hit. “To make the 
mine more deadly the enemy has adopted the practice of burying two or three mines 
one on top of the other. Mines of this sort have blown wheels and various parts of 
equipment and bodies as far as 200 feet.”36 
By and large, the most commonly encountered anti-personnel mine employed by 
the CCF and NKPA is the serrated steel pipe type. These mines, filled with 1 ½ 
pounds of 60 per cent dynamite, have an effective bursting radius of 100 yards. 
These mines are used in hasty or deliberate minefields in front of defensive 
positions. This type of mine is put to additional use in the construction of booby 
traps.37 
 
The mines were in abundance to say the least. After the battle, on September 22, 
the1 Mar Div’s 1st Engineer Battalion checked over 1/1’s (1st Bn, 1st Marines) area and 
found 37 anti-personnel mines, and 1 booby-trapped M-1 rifle.38 
The NKPA also liked to booby trap their dead and “souvenirs.” One Marine, Floyd 
Baxter, remembered: 
We thought the path we had chosen for the trip had been cleared of mines, but 
we were cautious, nevertheless. I stepped over a body which had been burned 
by napalm. As an afterthought, I turned to warn the man behind me to leave the 
body alone, as it might be booby trapped. The butt of a burp gun stuck out from 
under the blackened body. Before I could speak, I saw the guy reach down for 
the gun. I yelled! It was the last thing the man heard. The concussion knocked 
me down, and the blast blew the other guy’s hand and most of his face off.39 
 
Another Marine, Ralph B. Steele, a BAR man with Fox 2/7, described the 
temptation such souvenirs offered: 
Well . . . the word came down that sergeant had stepped out and . . . he says, “I 
don’t want none of you guys fucking with them souvenirs . . . they might be booby 
trapped. Well, I looked [at this burp gun laying in the bush] and it was certainly no 
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booby trap. I mean, I could see it laying right there. And it was brand new. Man, it 
still had fresh oil on it and whatnot and boy is that tempting. . . .40 
 
Besides mines and booby-trapped corpses, the woods (this area was heavily 
timbered) were full of other lethal devices. Ralph B. Steele remembered: 
There’s a wire stretched across this path wired to a mortar round . . . actually it 
was wired to a grenade . . . the pin would come out of the grenade, detonate the 
grenade and the mortar round, and it was at about head high. Well, the guy two 
guys in front of me tripped this wire, of course yelled “Trip Wire!” Well, you’re so 
keyed up, I imagine I was on the ground before the word wire ever got out of his 
mouth.41 
 
Luckily for Steele, the device did not go off. Unluckily for a friend of his who came 
along later, the soldier that had rigged the device had planned for it to not go off on the 
first trip. The device was taped with electrical tape and the first time it was triggered, the 
grenade just twisted in the tape, the second time it could not twist anymore and so went 
off and killed his friend.42 
Another tactical problem for the Marines was caused by terrain, and the NKPA 
exploited it to the hilt. Many of the ridges in the area of the Punchbowl were 
perpendicular to one another, forming mutually supporting ridgelines that forced an 
attacker assaulting one ridge to receive enfilade or flanking fire from the other ridge. 
(See Photo # 1) “It was a mountain warfare variation of crossing the T that the Korean 
Reds were using against the Marines. Whenever possible, the enemy made a stand on 
a hill flanked by transverse ridgelines. He emplaced hidden machine guns and mortars 
                                                 
40 Transcript of Interview with Ralph B. Steele by Larry Ordner for the Library of Congress Veterans 
History Project, dated August 28, 2002. Transcript available online at: 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cocoon/vhp/story/loc.natlib.afc2001001.02616/transcript?ID=sr001. Website last 
consulted April 2007. 




on these ridgelines to pour a converging fire into attackers limited by the terrain to a 
single approach.”43  
One Marine approach to deal with this was “ridge running.” Major Gerald P. Averill, 
the S-3 (operations officer) of 2/5 (2nd Bn, 5th Marines) during September 1951, 
described how his CO executed such a technique: 
His method was to attack along the long axis of a ridgeline wherever possible, 
regardless of whether the ridge ran parallel to the direction of attack or 
perpendicular to it. Gain the high ground from the flanks and rear and then 
advance along the long axis, rolling up the enemy as you moved. Security 
elements, squads or fire teams could work down the finger ridges and clear them 
from the rear. The attack might be launched using a single company along a 
single ridge line or, by employing two or more companies, adjacent ridge lines 
could be cleared simultaneously. If the ridge line formed a cross-compartment, 
we would forego [sic] a frontal attack and, by a series of flanking actions, gain the 
high ground and attack along the narrow, hard-to-defend, long axis. Of course, 
he told us, there would be instances when we would be forced into a stand-up-
and-walk-in slugging match, but if we were careful and used the ridges properly, 
we would not get our noses bloodied too often.44 
 
The Punchbowl Offensive of Fall 1951, however, would be one of those nose-
bloodying occasions. On the tactical level, the terrain would dictate little maneuver, and 
the Marines would be forced to frontal assault many of the enemy positions.45 
The 7th Marines had to cross the Soyang River to get to their assembly areas. The 
river was high and the current was strong from flooding. Some battalions had to use 
amphibious trucks (DUKWs) to make the crossing.46  
                                                 
43 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 138; “Intelligence Study FMF,” 7 April to 31 August 1951, 
“Tactical Study of Weather and Terrain: Yanggu-Inje Area,” and “Tactical Study of Mandae-ri Area,” 
Marine Corps Korean war document CD collection, CD #15, page 7-8 of the latter, particularly. 
44 Gerald P. Averill, Mustang: A Combat Marine, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988):  215-16. 
45 However, speaking of the operational level, General Thomas said: 
. . . There’s nothing wrong with a frontal assault carried out the right way, where you seek out some 
enemy resistance and break through them, and Ridgway did that all the way up the peninsula. . . . You 
won’t find Army officers going to the sea. Army officers will always want to fight on land, just like they did 
at Okinawa [referring to the veto of a shore to shore operation there to get behind the Japanese 
defenses]. So they just battered their way up the peninsula, and there wasn’t anything particularly wrong 
with it because Ridgway had the strength to break through and exploit it. He made real progress after he 
took command of Eighth Army. . . . --Gerald C. Thomas Oral Memoir, 881-82. 
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Charles Hughes was a corpsman with How Company, 3/7. He was with the 
Marines waiting for DUKWs to take them across the river: 
On the 27th of August we got orders to move out and relieve ROK Army 
units on the Kansas Line. We folded up our tents and readied our equipment for 
the move, then sat around in a driving rain from the typhoon, waiting for the 
trucks to take us on and carry us to and across the shallow Soyang-gang River. 
But the trucks failed to arrive so we ended up eating our noon meal sitting on the 
crates and equipment we had readied for the move. We were compensated for 
our wait by plentiful hot food that the galley crews needed to get rid of before the 
move. But after the feast we continued to sit in the pouring rain waiting for the 
trucks until it was time for the evening meal. This time we were back to the old 
reliable C Rations. Still we waited, and it was not until 9 o’clock that evening that 
the trucks finally showed up, and it was 10:45 before we got moving. The 3rd 
Battalion was the last unit to move out, and in the meantime the downpour from 
the typhoon had grown even more intense. . . .  
. . . We didn’t reach the assembly area until 4 am. It was another two 
hours before we reached the battalion assembly area where we were told to stay 
on the trucks, and it was 7:45 before the convoy moved once again. The trucks 
were having a difficult time on the muddy rutted road, and finally had to off load 
us and attempt to back up and turn around and get out of there. Battalion officers 
were running up and down the long convoy trying to break the log jam and get 
the trucks moving. At about 2 pm the rest of us began to slog toward the Soyang-
gang to prepare for the crossing. The torrential rains by this time had turned this 
small mountain stream into a rapidly flowing swollen river. . . once more we 
waited. But we didn’t wait long, for soon the word came that the Ducks [DUKWs] 
had been delayed. So the battalion started to ford the river. . . . 
Two hours later How Company still had not made it across, and their 
attempt had taken a toll. The swift stream had carried Marines downstream and 
many of them reached the opposite bank far from the point where they entered 
the river. . . . [Some drowned.] 
The battalion spent the next three days drying out radios and equipment 
and recovering from that battle with nature, and after that we were back in the 
fight.47  
 
Jon Charles Genrich described C Rations:  
The C-rations were small cans of ham and lima beans, spaghetti, beans and 
weenies, sausage or hamburger patties packed in lard, and corned beef hash. 
We normally didn’t have a chance to pick, but had to take what was available in 
the box. A lot [of] the men wouldn’t eat corned beef hash or lima beans. . . . The 
                                                                                                                                                             
46 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 175-76; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” August 1951, 6. 
47 Charles Hughes, Accordion War: Korea 1951, Life and Death in a Marine Rifle Company, (Trafford 
Publishing: Victoria, BC, 2006): 275-76. 
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box also contained a couple of dry, hard, round crackers, cocoa, and toilet 
paper.48  
 
One other How 3/7 Marine recalled the rain in the move up to Yoke Ridge, and 
remarked “It started to rain the last day as we loaded up on the trucks. They drove for 
several hours in the rain and mud. We were all soaking wet sitting in the open bed of 
the ‘four deuces’ [4.2 inch mortar] trucks, as we called them. When they stopped and 
dumped us off to walk in the rain and deep mud, we realized that riding in the rain 
wasn’t really that bad.” That night was even more miserable. “We were hungry, wet, 
cold Marines, lying in a mud hole with the water soaking through the sleeping bag. 
Every ten minutes we would roll over and it would feel dry for a few minutes, but we 
could not sleep so we prayed for morning to come.”49 
August 30 saw two battalions of the 1st KMC at the line of departure -- the other 
battalion was still defending the Kansas line. The two KMC battalions would attack the 
next morning from Hill 755 towards Hill 924. (See map # 16) Similarly, two battalions of 
the 7th Marines were moving into place and ready to attack the next day. The First 
Battalion Seventh Marines (1/7) was on the east side of the river, near Tonpyong, in the 
emplacements of the 8th ROK Division (16th Regiment) atop a mass of hills. The 3rd 
Battalion, Seventh Marines (3/7) was organizing west of the river near their crossing 
point, while 2/7 relieved elements of the 8th ROK Division (23rd Regiment) on the 
Kansas Line. Mortar rounds from the enemy greeted 1/7 that night (29 August) in 
welcome, a small taste of things to come—twenty-nine rounds near a bridge on the 
MSR (Main Supply Route) to the south, and one artillery round destroyed an 
                                                 
48 Oral memoir of Jon Charles Genrich at KoreanWarEducator.org. 
49 Oral memoir of Jon Charles Genrich at KoreanWarEducator.org. 
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ammunition truck. Able Company received 100 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, too, on the 
afternoon of the 30th.50  
A small enemy probe was beaten back at 2221, August 29, by Item 3/7, and Baker 
Company (1/7) received SA (small arms) fire. Interestingly, one Marine sniper of Able 
1/7 hit two enemy at 900 yards range.51 
August 30 had its share of disappointments. A tactical air observer saw a target of 
opportunity, an enemy troop formation in the open. He immediately contacted the chain 
of command for air strikes, which filtered the request for air support to hit this enemy 
formation, up through the intervening levels to JOC (Joint Operations Center). Over 
three hours later, planes finally arrived, but the target of opportunity had been lost. This 
did not surprise the Marines; CAS (Close Air Support) for the entire Eighth Army was 
limited to only 96 sorties a day, and with the time consuming request system under the 
JOC, targets of opportunity could usually only be hit with planes if the target happened 
to show up while an air strike was already overhead, an all too infrequent occurrence.52 
Of significance was the fact that coincidental with this offensive, 8th Army and 5th 
Air Force agreed to limit close air support sorties of the entire front to 96 per day, 
applying the remainder to the interdiction program. This limitation continued 
through September [1951], despite heavy requirements for close air support by 
attacking UN divisions. As a result, less than 85 close air support sorties a day 
were averaged by aircraft under 5th Air Force control. This included those of the 
1st Marine Air Wing.53 
 
                                                 
50 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 176; U. S. Pacific Fleet, “Third Interim Evaluation 
Report,” chapter 15; Seventh Marines “Historical Diary,” August 1951, 6. 
51 Seventh Marines “Historical Diary,” August 1951, 6. 
52 “1st Marine Division Report on CAS,”, 1 Mar Div file dated 4 October 1951, “Report of Close Air 
Support,” Letter of CG (commanding general) 1MarDiv, MajGen Gerald C. Thomas, to CG Fleet Marine 
Force, Pacific, LtGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, dated 4 October 1951, enclosure one, (Marine Corps Korean 
War document CD collection, CD #15 of 25 (Washington, D.C.: Marine Historical Center, Washington 
Navy Yard, 2005, copy in my possession). Hereafter, the preceding document, which includes many 
letters on the subject of CAS from the time period, will be cited as “1MarDiv ‘Report of CAS.’” Also see 
chapter on Close Air Support. 
53 U. S. Pacific Fleet, “Third Interim Evaluation Report,” 9-14. 
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The Marine units also sent out patrols on August 30. One from the 1st KMC ran 
into a platoon-sized firefight at 1000. The enemy withdrew after a half-hour of combat, 
leaving three counted dead. About 200 rounds of mortar and 76mm fire hit the positions 
of the 7th Marines throughout the same day. Back on the Kansas Line, the 5th Marines 
had 14 men wounded by booby traps. Marines of 3/7 patrolled to Hill 602 with no enemy 
contact. Marine artillery fired 2,040 rounds by night-fall, August 30, in close and deep 
support. That night, mortar and artillery fire continued to pepper Marine positions and 
more light enemy probes were repulsed. The next day would begin the last offensive of 
the Korean War for the 1st Mar Div.54 
                                                 







 PHASE ONE: 
THE SEIZURE AND DEFENSE OF YOKE RIDGE 
 
Day One: August 31 
 
The attack orders came from division in the form of Division OpnO 22-51 (OpnO is 
short for Operation Order). The 7th Marines and 1st KMC were to be the attacking forces. 
Jump-off time (commonly referred to as “H-Hour” by Marines) would be 0600 on 31 
August. The LD (Line of Departure) would be an imaginary line from Hill 755 northeast 
almost to Tonpyong. (See Maps # 17 and 18) At the time, there was much talk from 
POWs taken in the sector that another large-scale Communist offensive was imminent, 
and the division knew that Yoke Ridge was being reinforced by the enemy, possibly in 
preparation for the offensive. POWs reported that the Communist attack was to begin 
as early as 1 September. Intel (intelligence) reported that as many as three enemy 
regiments were enroute to reinforce Yoke, and more artillery was known to accompany 
them. The division attack the first day was intended to push the NKPA off the right end 
of the ridge and cut off further enemy reinforcement to it, then roll up the remainder of 
defenders from east to west. Third battalion, seventh Marines (3/7) was to take the part 
of the ridge east of Hill 924 (Hills 602 and 702), “Division Objective 2;” the 1st KMC 
regiment, Hills 924 and 1026, “Division Objective 3.” “Division Objective 1” was to the 
east across the river; 1/7 had already occupied it without a fight. (See Map # 18)1 
                                                 
1 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” August 1951, Msg 301206K ; Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central 
Front, chapter IX; Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 40-41; U. S. Pacific Fleet, “Third Interim Evaluation 
Report,” chapter 15; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” August 1951, 6-8. The enemy was relieving the  II NK 
Corps with III NK Corps, of which the 1st NKPA Division was a part. 
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While the attack proceeded on Yoke Ridge, the 5th Marines was to continue 
patrolling the Kansas Line. The 1st Marines was still in X Corps reserve. Other elements 
of the division, such as the Division Reconnaissance Company, mopped up bypassed 
enemy to the rear of the forward-most area. The four available battalions (total) of the 
1st KMC and 7th Marines would have to go it alone for now.2  
The 1st KMC was anticipated to have the toughest job on 31 August, and even 
though they were Koreans and not Caucasian Americans, the Marine Division did not 
treat them any differently in its favoring them with “priority of air support” that day.3   
The 1st KMC added a good deal of firepower to 1st Mar Div. The U. S. Pacific Fleet 
“Third Interim Evaluation Report,” commented: 
This unit had been attached to the Division since 18 March 1951, and has played 
an important part in most of the Division’s operations. The 1st KMC Regiment had 
been organized and trained under U. S. Marine supervision and had the same 
basic organization as a Marine infantry regiment. It lacked only some of the more 
heavy and complex supporting weapons and equipment typical of a Marine 
Regimental Combat Team. During most of the period Marine artillery provided 
direct and general support to the 1st KMC Regiment. Attached U. S. Marine 
TACP provided close air support for the Koreans. . . . The 1st KMC Regiment 
provided the command of 1st Marine Division with a fourth infantry regiment of 
good quality and had an important effect upon the Division’s ability to deploy, 
maneuver, and attain its assigned objectives. . . . It thereby permitted better 
infantry deployment in the mountainous terrain where infantry strength was 
always of utmost value. It also permitted the Division to rotate and relieve Marine 
regiments on the line more frequently and to sustain its offensive momentum. 
The Division was able to maintain a regiment in reserve, and flank and rear area 
security were better insured.4 
 
 Also on the subject of the KMCs, General Thomas once assessed their value in 
glowing terms: “Oh, they were a fine fighting outfit. Oh yes. . . .They had good 
                                                 
2 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, chapter IX; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” August 1951, 1, 
7. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines was on the Kansas Line at the time and the 2nd Battalion of the KMC 
was, too. 
3 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 178; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” August 1951, 1, 7. 
4 U. S. Pacific Fleet, “Third Interim Evaluation Report,” 15-37. 
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commanders. I think maybe they’d been selected. Most of their commanders had been 
Japanese trained, you know. . . . But there wasn’t anything wrong with the Korean 
Marines. They did some of the best fighting that was done for us.”5 
On August 30, to prepare for the attack, the KMC regiment placed its 3rd Battalion 
(3/KMC) on Hill 793 halfway between Yoke Ridge and Line Kansas. From here, this 
battalion outposted one company at Wolsan-ryong, a mountain pass near Hill 755 (See 
Map # 16).6 
Two battalions of the 1st KMC were the assault battalions for the regiment for this 
first attack and they jumped off in column of battalions from Hill 793, sweeping by 
Wolsan-ryong to pickup the outpost company along the way. The 3rd Battalion KMC 
(3/KMC) was to take Hill 924 (which it called Mao Tze Tung Hill to stoke its Marines to 
greater aggressiveness and make them realize their honor was at stake) while 1/KMC 
passed beyond 924 to assail 1026 (called Kim Il Sung Hill by the Korean Marines). Their 
biggest troubles in the way of resistance shortly proved to be mine fields.7 
Ralph B. Steele described his unit’s encounter with these later in the battle:  
We come off this main stream and start up a little narrow path, and the word 
comes down we’re finding mines . . . but they got a guy up ahead, some 
volunteer with a bayonet is probing in this rocky path, and when they find a mine 
they take the ass wipe out of the C rations and they make a flag out of it and stick 
it where the mine is. . . . They’re only showing you the mines they find. There 
might be other mines there. . . . I stepped exactly where the guy in front of me 
stepped. So [we had] to keep calling constantly . . . “hold the interval, hold the 
interval. So I’m stepping right where he steps then they said take five and don’t 
get off the path. Squat right where you are. . . . So in the meantime they’ve been 
trying to get mortar rounds into this real narrow ravine, but the rounds are coming 
over and they couldn’t wiggle them in there. They were detonating on the bank 
                                                 
5 Gerald C. Thomas Oral Memoir, 872-73. 
6 Korean Institute of Military History, Korean War, Vol. 3, 151. 
7 Korean Institute of Military History, Korean War, Vol. 3, 260-61.; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” August 
1951, 7-8. Korean Marines had more than just honor at stake in the fight, however, for if they were 
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and on the hillside right over here next to us. All of the sudden there’s an 
explosion right behind me, damn near lifted my helmet off, you know, big 
concussion like this, and I thought Jesus Christ they’ve got a mortar round. . . . of 
course somebody behind hollers, “Corpsman!!” – well they didn’t say “corpsman.” 
Baumgartner was his name. We were told not to call “corpsman.” Call them his 
name because the gook would understand we have injured if they heard 
“corpsman.” . . . so [the corpsman] came down with his assistant . . . and turned 
out it wasn’t a mortar round at all. They guy walking either behind me or the guy 
behind him had unloosened his pack when they said take five and leaned against 
the embankment and leaned right on a land mine . . . that was a KIA right there.8 
 
The NKPA defenders offered only a smattering of mortar and machine gun fire 
initially. The ability of units in this area to maneuver was severely hobbled by the terrain 
and mud, and even forward movement was difficult. Because of toughening resistance, 
however, the 1st Battalion KMC (1/KMC) received orders in the early afternoon (1445) to 
pass through 3/KMC and continue the attack on Hill 924; 1026 would have to wait. 
Resistance increased, and troops bogged down by minefields were lucrative targets for 
enemy mortar and artillery fire.9  
Similarly light resistance greeted 3/7 in their attack, but it increased steadily with 
the advance. Morning found 3/7 dug in east of Hill 793. George, How, and Item 
Companies had moved out by 0600, but had to halt when an “adjacent unit” failed to 
move out on schedule. The attack was not really underway until 1005. They attacked 
Hill 702 through heavy minefields and at least one barrage from artillery and mortars. 
The First Battalion, 7th Marines helped in the assault from its position east of the river 
with supporting fire from mortars (Hills 660 and 516). By 1430, 3/7 was “receiving heavy 
                                                 
8 Ralph B. Steele Interview Transcript, Library of Congress. 
9 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” August 1951, 7; Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 178. 
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small arms and automatic weapons fire from well constructed bunkers on the objective.” 
A more detailed description of this action broken down by companies is as follows.10 
Item Company was to lead the attack against Regimental Objectives B and C (See 
Map # 18 for locations). How Company was to move out to the Battalion Observation 
Post (OP), prepared to support Item’s attack. George Company was to send one 
reinforced platoon to Objective A “to protect the battalion’s left flank and keep the two 
converging streams under observation.” Small tributaries of the Soyang-gang, each 
about 2,000 meters long and not visible on the maps included in this study, ran west to 
east just to the north and just to the south of Tonpyong.11  
How Company reached the OP at 0824 and Item Company was slogging through 
slippery mud towards Objective B and making difficult progress because of it. (George 
Company’s platoon would not reach its post until 1115). One platoon reached Objective 
B at 0850, but had to halt and wait while the rest of the company caught up. So far, the 
only enemy in sight were on Objective C. By 1000, Item was just to the north of 
Objective B and less than 200 yards from the eastern edge of Objective C. Item’s CO 
(Commanding Officer), 1st Lt Richard L. Shell, called in artillery preparations on 
Objective C that peppered the target at 1025 with a twenty minute barrage.12 
As the last round was on its way, Item surged forward against Objective C. 
Simultaneously, How Company began to move up behind Item to occupy Objective B, 
and 1/7 stepped up its supporting fires to harass the enemy on high ground to 3/7’s 
right. Within ten minutes Item began to receive heavy AW (automatic weapons) fire from 
                                                 
10 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” August 1951, 8; Seventh Marines “Historical Diary,” August 1951, 6; Lynn 
Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 178. 
11 Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, “Historical Diary,” August 1951, 8. 
12 Ibid. 
 64
enemy bunkers, but continued advancing west along the ridge towards Objective C with 
one platoon maneuvering along the southern slope (the left flank of the objective since 
Item was facing west). Soon Lt Shell reported that they had encountered heavy AP 
mine fields covered with MGs. He pulled back to near Objective B while calling in a 
heavy dose of 4.2 inch and 81mm mortar rounds to try and explode the mines. He then 
asked for artillery on Objective C but none was forthcoming. It was now 1148. To make 
up for the lack of artillery, the mortars deluged the objective with another barrage and 
Item bounded forward under this cover while the shells were still in the air. By 1215, the 
company was again being raked with enemy bullets. Apparently the mortars had not 
done the job on the minefield. Shell called in at 1225 to report that his maneuver 
elements could not advance due to mines and AW fire that kept his men from clearing 
them. Item again pulled back to near Objective B.13  
The NKPAs were clever. This minefield was one made up of 82mm mortar shells 
wired to hand grenades to activate the mortar shells. A burp-gun armed soldier was 
emplaced in ambush on each side of the mine-ridden trail to keep the Marines from 
clearing it, as well as to cut anyone down who might escape the mines. Too, an 
estimated sixty enemy resided on this portion of the hill in “new heavily fortified 
pillboxes.”14 
By this time, 1250, How Company was about 500 yards to the southwest 
advancing towards Objective B. Fifty minutes later, Item again received orders to 
“maneuver through the mines and press the assault.” Within ten minutes Item was once 
                                                 
13 Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, “Historical Diary,” August 1951, 8-9. 
14 Ibid., 31. 
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more within reach of enemy bullets and taking heavy fire, but this time they were taking 
the right flank of the objective, the north face.15 
Meanwhile, there was a tense situation for George Company’s 1st Platoon 
(George-1) on Objective A. An unidentified  squad-sized patrol was before their 
positions in a stream bed, lugging along a mortar. George-1 moved to intercept and set 
up an ambush, but it turned out they were just a lost element of the KMCs. No shots 
were fired.16 
Item was still in the thick of combat. At 1412 it had pushed to the crest of their 
objective but was still in the middle of a hot firefight. The Battalion OP, controlling the 
artillery fire to Item’s front, received word at 1430 to lift the fire so Item could advance 
further west along the ridge and clean up the enemy resistance. By 1525, the company 
had cleared the objective down to the saddle at the western end (between it and Hill 
924) and began to reorganize and dig in.17 
Just then How Company was told to advance on Hill 602, Objective D. However, 
the order was canceled forty minutes later by regiment before How was yet in sight of 
any enemy, in favor of consolidating a line of positions from Item Company on the west 
to 1/7 (visual contact rather than actual) on the east.18 
The order then went out that the next day would be mostly patrolling for 3/7, 
though the enemy would have other ideas as things turned out. Item was to patrol each 
of the three finger ridges of Objective Charlie; How was to send a squad towards 602; 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 9. 




and George was to patrol from a pass near Hill 755 to the head of the most northern of 
the two west-to-east tributaries bracketing Tonpyong.19 
While 3/7 was engaged, patrols from 1/7 east of the river ran into a two-hour 
firefight. The patrol withdrew at 1200 to call artillery on the enemy location. A 1/7 FO 
(forward observer) also had opportunity to call in artillery on an enemy battalion moving 
off Hill 673. The results were reported as excellent.20 
Casualties were not light that first day in the division, 3 KIA and 57 WIA (KMC and 
USMC both together). Among the wounded, however, was the KMC regimental 
commander, Colonel Kim Dae Shik (who would become Commandant of the KMC by 
1958), and a U. S. Marine advisor assigned to the KMCs, 2dLt James McGoey. They 
had hit a landmine on a trail running south from Hill 924. It was raining and the two were 
returning from a visit to the front lines that afternoon. The commanding officer (CO) of 
3/KMC, Colonel KIM Yun Gun, temporarily took command until he could be replaced by 
Colonel KIM Dong Ha, the executive officer of the 1st KMC. Even with this incident, the 
attack of the regiment was not delayed the following day, though it had to pull back to 
Hill 793 to regroup. About two thirds of the KMC casualties were from land mines. 
Enemy casualties were 129 counted KIA, 218 estimated KIA, and 233 estimated WIA 
with 14 prisoners taken.21  
These division casualty numbers seem distant and inhuman on the page, but they 
were people. Garlen Selmyhr described the first time he saw a dead Marine.  
The first time I saw a dead Marine it was when two casualties from another 
company were brought down the ridge line and place near my CP. They were on 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 26. 
20 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” August 1951, 8. 
21 Interview with Colonel KIM Yun Gun, 22 December 1958, page 2; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” August 
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stretchers and covered with ponchos. Both ponchos were bloody. They were 
about six feet away, and as I saw them, the wind lifted one corner of one of the 
ponchos and revealed a black leg. That surprised me, as I had assumed both 
were Caucasian. Here were two Marines. Both paid the ultimate price in service 
to their country and their Corps. Both were receiving the same care, respect, and 
attention. The blood on both ponchos was red, and I realized then that the blood 
of a black Marine was as red as that of a white Marine.22 
 
One stroke of good luck was had this day. The enemy NKPA II Corps, when hit, 
had been in the midst of turning over its sector to the NKPA III Corps. Thus the defense 
was not as organized as it might have been otherwise. However, the enemy on Yoke 
Ridge was estimated to number two regiments of 1,500 men each. The enemy in 3/7’s 
zone was thought to be the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 1st Division, III NK Corps.23 (See 
Chart # 14) 
Positions for the night were as follows. Item Company was on Objective C; How 
Company was 1,000 meters east of Objective B with its lines extending south to follow 
the line of the river; George-1 remained on Objective Able, while the other two platoons 
stayed in the vicinity of Hill 755.24  
Day Two: September 1 
September 1 began with 3/KMC passing through 3/7 (near Hill 602) to take up a 
position that flanked Hill 924 to its east. From here it was to renew the attack from a 
northeasterly direction along the ridgeline running from Hill 602 to 924. Simultaneously 
in a converging attack, 1/KMC assaulted from Hill 924’s southeast. Resistance was far 
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from light. Heavy losses ripped through the ranks from mines, mortar fire, and machine 
gun fire from mutually supporting, fortified enemy positions.25  
For 3/KMC, the attack was made with one company circling to take 924 in the east 
flank while the rest of the battalion “drove straight up the ridgeline from the south.” 
Unlike August 31, it was not raining and the supporting arms assigned the KMCs were 
able to be brought to bear more effectively. The enemy was dug in deep on the hill, and 
every ounce of firepower, from supporting arms to the infantry, was needed to blast 
them out of their positions. In addition, the KMCs put together a special raiding unit with 
flame-thrower operators (the first use of this weapon by the KMC Regiment, though the 
NKPA had had them in 1950). The flame-throwers poured liquid fire into bunkers and 
helped silence enemy MGs in critical locations. This allowed for a much more 
successful advance in the afternoon.26 
One 3/7 Marine observed the KMC attack: 
The Korean Marine Corps, or KMC as they were known, moved through 
our position and up the dogleg ridge to the left. They were moving up the ridge to 
higher ground to attack a hill in the distance. We could see the hill about a mile 
away and it looked almost straight up and solid rock. The artillery shells and 
many air attacks with napalm had left the face of the hill barren. We realized that 
they had a very difficult battle ahead of them without cover or concealment. . . . 
The KMCs continued to attack the big rock-faced hill a couple of times per 
day and they finally took the hill. They had many casualties and moved the dead 
and wounded down through our area. They would stop and show us their 
wounds and where bullets had hit their rifles. They were a fierce-fighting, proud 
group that wanted to live up to the U. S. Marines. They had shown us they were 
every bit as good as our outfit.27 
 
 Another Marine with the 7th Marines remembered one cultural difference between 
the two groups of Marines, U. S. and Korean: 
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I saw my first wounded which happened to be South Korean Marines and 
another thing I thought about is . . . our expression of pain has got a lot to do with 
culture . . . because I don’t think we hurt any less and they hurt any more, but the 
Koreans seem to really let you know he was hurt. He screamed and shrieked and 
when wounded Marines came off the line, very [cool] . . . and we weren’t trying to 
be tough guys. It was just that our culture doesn’t apparently do that . . . . 
[Beyond cultural differences, it would take some investigation, but maybe the 
Korean Marines did not receive morphine or did not have it available like the U. 
S. troops did.]28 
 
By early evening, elements of 3/KMC were within 200 yards of their goal, but the 
objective was not attained until 2100 that night (an enemy counterattack would 
recapture the hill before dawn). The 5th Marine regiment was ordered to give 2/KMC 
opportunity to assist its fellow KMC battalions; 3/5 relieved 2/KMC on the Kansas Line 
the evening of September 1 so this additional battalion could help the KMC Regiment 
make better progress in its attacks the next day. An air drop of twenty AF cargo planes 
resupplied the KMCs with rations and ammunition during the daylight hours.29 
It was a hard day for 3/7 as well. The Official History, as well as the 1st Mar Div 
Historical Diary for September, 1951 both state the Marines resumed the previous day’s 
assault against Hill 702, defended by the enemy in battalion strength. That is not the 
case for 3/7. It began with patrolling. Item sent out a squad-sized patrol at 0800. It 
immediately encountered intense enemy fire and was held up near Item’s left flank 
before it had even really begun. This patrol took fire for thirty minutes, then a enemy 
attack thirty men strong hit Item’s right front. Almost immediately thereafter an NKPA 
platoon hit the center of the company’s lines. The Marines opened up a storm of .30 
caliber fire searing across its firing lanes, triangles of death formed between each man’s 
aiming stake. The enemy attack  broke and faded away after only ten minutes of 
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withering steel and flame. At 0900 the NKPA began to hit Item’s center with mortar 
shells and SA fire. Five minutes later, How Company reported that the enemy was 
massing on Hill 602, and then was itself hit by a large attack about two hundred yards 
north of Hill 702, near Objective B, under support of heavy MGs and a deluge of 82mm 
mortar fire. Simultaneous to this, the Marines began to shell 602 with their 4.2 inch 
mortars (called “four deuces”) and artillery lasting until 0945, when an airstrike of two P-
51s (Mustang fighter-bomber plane) and two Ads (Douglas “Skyraider” plane) lit into the 
same hill.30 
Item Company took another assault in its left flank at 1025 with enemy SA fire 
even hitting it from the rear. An enemy element had circled around the left flank to get 
behind Item. Item promptly sent a squad to take care of this harassing force, which soon 
found and killed two North Koreans. That was the last of fire from behind this day. The 
enemy attack blunted on Item’s hard lines, but these NKPAs did not yet retreat. The 
fighting devolved into a short-range torrent of fire ripping both directions with the NKPA 
soldiers lying prone on the face of the hill just short of Marine emplacements. By 1045 
there were thirty dead Koreans strewn about Item’s left-flank position, some corpses 
even in the Marine lines and foxholes, looking like piles of rags as much as anything 
else. Blood, pieces of equipment, smoking bodies, dirty bandages, steel ammo clips 
from M-1 rifles, and brass rifle casings were everywhere.31  
The attack against How Company reached a crescendo about that same time. On 
the little hill just north of 702, none were left of the company’s defenders but the dead 
and wounded. Thirty yards short of this hill, How Company held its ground along the 
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ridgeline. First Lt Dwight A. Young was the Company CO. He “pulled his right flank 
platoon in and counterattacked to retake the thirty yards of ground.” The Marines swept 
to the top of the little hill to their front at 1055 and sent the NKPAs thereon into retreat, 
broken and bloodied.32 
To the west of 602 about 400 meters, Item Company spotted another enemy 
group massing at 1115 and called in artillery. Rounds screamed in and pounded the 
NKPA formation apart. Ten minutes later, however, How Company was again the 
recipient of an attack. The screaming NKPA soldiers made it within a few feet of the 
Marine fox holes before being cut down. How Company had reorganized itself just in 
time. POWs stated that their attack had consisted of 500 soldiers backed by no less 
than eight heavy MGs and multiple 82mm mortars.33 
George Company moved forward at noon to reinforce the hard-hit How Company. 
Soon after, an FO from Item Company broke up another group of about 100 enemy 
sneaking up a draw in front of Item’s positions, with a pre-registered artillery 
concentration that hit right on top of these troops and tore them to shreds. George 
Company reached How after 1400 as Item again fought off another twenty-minute 
attack, which was reinforced by another thirty enemy ten minutes later. Soldier after 
soldier fell to Marine fire, lying in heaps about the area. The NKPA continued to fight, 
continued to do their job, and called in mortars on Marine positions whenever they were 
not attacking. Yet again, the communists hurled themselves at Marine lines for another 
fifteen-minute firefight just before 1600.34 
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One Marine described an interesting aspect of the NKPA forces opposing the 1st 
Mar Div: 
We were getting our position in good condition to defend it against whatever 
troops came at us. One of the men spotted North Korean women on another hill. 
They set up knee mortars, fired at us, then moved to cover. The Japanese in the 
Second World War had developed and used knee mortars. I was surprised to 
hear that women were fighting on the front lines. We had heard of women 
carrying supplies for the North Korean Army, but not of their being involved in 
combat. . . .35 
 
At the same time, another flight of four planes came in for a strike at the ridgeline 
between How and Hill 602, an enemy route of approach. This was followed by a second 
four-plane strike at 1730 at enemy troops in the open and against some bunkers on 
602. Yet another strike followed, again on 602, at 1840.36 
The positions of 3/7 for the night were much the same as the night before. The 
Battalion OP was just southwest of Hill 516 along with the forward ammo dump. Fox 2/7 
was put under 3/7’s operational control at 1100 that morning. Its position that night was 
on Talsal Lyang, a village south of the LD, for two platoons. The other platoon was on 
Objective A.37 
NKPA troops had attacked from Hill 602 with as many as 500 men. Artillery fire 
and the airstrikes ended the enemy’s immediate enthusiasm for counterattack at dusk, 
but little sleep could be had because of enemy mortar and artillery harassment.38  
That night, the orders went out for the following day. The Marines of 3/7 were to 
attack and seize 602 with George Company, the least-hit company, in the assault. H-
hour was set for 0700. The Marines of 1/7 were again to patrol and support 3/7 with fire. 
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The 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7) again stayed on the Kansas Line, except for Fox 
Company.39 
On September 24, 1951, Sergeant Naun Juarez wrote to a corpsman that had 
been in his platoon about the Battle at Yoke Ridge: 
I just thought of writing and report to you how the Co. is doing. Did we step 
into shit? I thought I would never get out alive. We jumped off on the attack on 
the 31st of Aug. Item Co took its objective by 5 pm. How Co was to pass by Item 
Co and take ours, but it was too late to do it so we just tied in with Item Co. All 
night long we had incoming mail. Mortars and artillery. We had some casualties, 
not too many. But next day on Sept 1st all Hell tore loose at us. About 2 Bns 
[battalions] against 2 beat up Cos [companies]. 
Item Co had really been clobbered the day before. 
At about 0900 Sept 1st the 2nd Platoon was ordered to send 2 fire teams to 
the 1st Platoon which was badly shot up after stopping the gooks counterattacks 
time after time. At about 1000 I was ordered to take my entire squad and 
reinforce the 1st Platoon again. So we went in and joined the party. 
Things were really popping. A lot of excitement just like the 4th of July. At 
1300 I was told to pull 3 men out of anywhere and plug up the gap on the left 
flank. I took Brodeur, Lawrence, and myself. I couldn’t afford to take anyone else 
and leave a wide gap so I went myself. We were there about five minutes and 
mortars and artillery came in. Brodeur got hit in the leg and Lawrence got it in the 
gut. I got pieces on my back and on my left butt. Of the guys that you know that 
got hit were O’Brien, Noriega, Brodeur, Darchuck, and myself. We had two killed 
in action. Berryman and Kline. . . . 
. . . I got it the 1st of Sept . . . . All this took place up North east Central 
front, the famous “Punchbowl.” The darn mountains get bigger every time. You 
are lucky you got out of here. The gooks are making use of their mortars and 
artillery. . . .40  
 
A Marine machine gunner of 3/7, PFC James F. Yates, took a piece of shrapnel in 
the chest from an enemy grenade. This would have been fatal, but Yates found to his 
awe that the piece had lodged in the New Testament he carried in his breast pocket. 
This boded much religious significance to him, as the piece marked Luke 18:33: 
“Whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life 
                                                 
39 Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 3. 
40 Letter of Sergeant Naun Juarez to “Ollie,” September 24, 1951, printed in Charles Hughes, Accordion 
War, 278-279. 
 74
shall preserve it.” Yates already had one Purple Heart from action in May, but this 
experience made him unafraid in combat. “I suppose everyone is scared in combat, but 
I don’t think I’ll be afraid any more of being killed.”41 
A Marine with How 3/7, Jon Charles Genrich, recalled one hilltop action at Yoke 
Ridge that day: 
We . . . were told to disperse down along the hillside. Some of the 
company . . . moved on up the path . . . We spread out and the new men looked 
at each other as if to ask, “What is going on ahead of us?” We sat there on the 
hillside for about a half hour and then heard small arms fire and what sounded 
like mortars up ahead. 
. . . The Sergeant said, “Move out on the run up the hill. They have 
overrun our troops.” We moved up fast, ready to fire, and when we arrived we 
saw only two North Koreans left on the left flank. It seemed everyone fired at 
once and they went down. We saw more bodies lying around. The Marines were 
scattered out in shallow holes and seemed to be holding their own. The machine 
gun had been overrun and the gunner and assistant gunner were dead. 42 
 
Genrich related what the Marines of his squad did to prepare when they gained a 
hilltop on Yoke Ridge:  
The first thing we did was set up a perimeter for the next wave of the North 
Koreans. Big Mac asked me how my arm was and I said that it was pretty good. 
He threw me a sack of hand grenades. We later heard that Big Mac had beat 
down the first wave by throwing several grenades and rushing the Koreans firing 
until he had killed five or six. . . . The hole behind the gun [Genrich was an ammo 
carrier for a machine gun] wasn’t deep enough with the two dead Marines still in 
the hole. Big Mac told Richard to help throw their bodies up along the gun for 
protection so they would have more room to get behind the gun. . . . Big Mac 
said, “They’re dead men and nothing is going to hurt them anymore.”43 
 
The enemy was not long in seeing the Marines’ preparations had not been in vain. 
Genrich continued: 
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Before we had time to think or fully prepare, the next attack came at us. I 
was in a shallow hole about a foot deep and fifteen feet behind the gun. I raised 
up to fire my rifle but I couldn’t see the enemy because of the terrain. . . . I 
grabbed the sack of hand grenades, dumped them out, and started throwing 
them over the edge of the hill into the trees. I threw the first grenade to the right, 
one straight ahead, and the last to the left like mortars. I felt this was my mortar 
fire and kept throwing until the grenades were gone. I heard Big Mac yell as he 
was firing the machine gun, “This is the most fun I’ve had since my grandmother 
got her tit caught in the wringer. . . .” 
He had thrown grenades, fired his rifle to kill over half dozen North 
Korean, and had beat the last to death with his rifle butt. Some thought he should 
have gotten the Medal of Honor, but this requires an officer to write it up. They 
never seem to be around when one was needed. . . . 
We had beaten them back the second time, which had been difficult since 
they had come out of thick trees and brush only 20 yards down the hill . . . they 
were difficult to see until they were almost on our position. The Company 
Commander called in artillery from the rear command post and the first round 
was short. The white phosphorous exploded on our location. Several hit my leg 
and burned right through my dungarees and into the leg. I grabbed at the 
phosphorous to pull or knock them off and my index finger was burned. (I had no 
fingerprint for several years afterwards.) I then remembered to grab dirt to 
smother the phosphorous. . . After the artillery found the range they pounded 
them for what seemed like fifteen minutes. We stayed ready for the next attack, 
but it never came.44 
 
Patrols of 1/7 and the Division Reconnaissance Company both saw some 
combat, the latter screening the northeast quarter of the Punchbowl. The AT (Anti-tank) 
company of the 7th Marines was attached to Baker Company 1/7, of which one platoon 
included Lt. Eddie LeBaron, the future star quarterback of the Dallas Cowboys. It too 
saw action. “There was one particular bunker [on Hill 602] that we fired at all day [with a 
75mm recoilless rifle]. Artillery and air strikes were called in to help. Again and again we 
destroyed this bunker; and again and again, the North Koreans rebuilt it. By sundown it 
had been leveled to the ground, and we could no longer see it. That night the North 
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Korean rebuilt it again: When the sun came up, the bunker was back on that hilltop as 
good as new.”45  
The 3/7 Marines dug in deeper that evening to meet whatever might come. 
Marine Jon Charles Genrich remembered: 
We started to dig deeper foxholes and clear some of the brush in front of 
our positions. While we were digging, I noticed my Squad Leader Murph sitting 
down and digging around a large dud mortar round. I yelled over at him. “Isn’t 
that dangerous?” He just kept hitting the ground around the dud and never 
looked up. I said something several times, then tapped him on the shoulder and 
took the entrenching tool. I told a medical corpsman and he and an officer came 
over and took the squad leader away to talk to him. . . . 
[Later, Murph came back.] I was glad to see my squad leader back. It was 
explained to me that he had been worried about his younger brother at home. I 
understood that he hadn’t heard from him in awhile and he felt responsible for his 
brother. It was common for servicemen to worry about family, wife, or friends 
back home more than to be concerned about themselves.46 
 
The darkness was the NKPA’s friend. It hid its troops from observation and the 
accurate, observed, effects of UN supporting arms. Like the CCF, they favored night 
attacks. In the middle of the night September 1-2, NKPA soldiers assaulted the KMC 
unit atop Hill 924 and drove them from their positions.47  
That same day, the Commanding General of FMFPac visited General Thomas and 
the division. He and Thomas discussed the CAS problem as well as the fighting of the 
2nd Inf Div to the west, which fought to secure “Bloody Ridge.” He would remain in 
Korea until September 12, but not all of his time would be with 1st Mar Div. He visited 
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Vice Admiral Turner C. Joy, COMNAVFE (Commander Naval Forces Far East), and the 
1st MAW, as well, both to talk about CAS.48 
Casualties for the 1st Mar Div for September 1 as of 1800, were: 3 KIA and 29 WIA 
(not counting the KMCs – these losses were kept separate because it was American 
casualties that really concerned EUSAK and UNC, as well as Washington and the folks 
back home). That U. S. Marine losses were so low relative to the high number taken by 
the enemy is indicative of the costly nature of the enemy attacks. That U. S. Marine 
losses were low at all is remarkable given the intensity of the fighting. KMC losses were: 
18 KIA, 55 WIA, and 2 MIA: a total of 21 KIA, 84 WIA, and 2 MIA for the division as a 
whole that day. There were 72 counted enemy dead, and 218 estimated KIA, for a total 
of 290 KIA. The number of WIA for the enemy was estimated at 231.49 
Day Three: September 2 
Dawn brought the 1st KMC back against Hill 924 with a vengeance. Artillery from 
1/11 (1st Bn, 11th Marines) deluged the hill with 1,682 rounds of 105mm shells (that 
many were fired before 1800 that evening), and the KMC had their hill back before noon 
with 1/KMC and 3/KMC on the objective. But the day’s work was not yet done for the 
regiment. The 2nd KMC battalion, fresh from reserve, passed through its brother 
battalions and attacked towards its regiment’s next objective, Hill 1026. This would be 
the final part of Objective Three.50  
Morning saw 3/7 repulse an enemy counterattack on its positions. Enemy troops 
started infiltrating into Item’s left flank at 0700. The avenue of approach here had been 
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well zeroed-in with artillery and the FO let them have it. The shells screamed in like 
freight-trains and burst bits of North Korean soldiers everywhere with earth-shaking 
crashes. The soldiers hit by this concentration were so torn apart that the Marines 
couldn’t even tell where one man ended and another began to get an accurate count of 
the enemy KIA. They had to estimate, and their conclusion was that at least twenty 
more NKPA bodies had been added to the carnage around Item’s left flank. In addition, 
Item’s Marines noted seven enemy KIA in its area they had downed with rifle fire. That 
made at least twenty-seven enemy KIA in this one brief firefight with zero casualties on 
the Marine side. The NKPA WIA numbers were unknown.51 
Meanwhile, George 3/7 made ready for its attack. The Marines of 3/7 could not 
see the eastern slope of 602 from its lines, but 1/7 could, so at 0800, 1/7 called in 
artillery support on the east side of the objective. In addition, 1/7 sent Baker Company 
to a position just east of the river from 602 to bag any enemy who might try and flee 
when George Company assaulted.52 
The enemy was not done with Item Company, however. At 0923 more NKPAs 
were spotted heading for its left flank along the same body-strewn trails as before. The 
artillery was firing on 602, so this time the organic weapons of Item had a turn: 60mm 
mortars, light MGs, M-1 rifles, and BARs spat flame and steel into the foe before he 
could even mass for his attack. This assault was dispersed.53 
After 3/7 repulsed the enemy counterattack, (at 0900) George Company set out to 
attack Hill 602 (Division Objective Two) with How Company supporting the movement of 
George with its mortars and machine guns, supplemented by the Battalion Weapons 
                                                 




Company’s heavy machine guns (HMGs), fired in battery over the heads of the 
assaulting infantry.54  
At this point, 0935, the artillery from 1/7 stopped on 602 but 4.2 mortars and 
155mm and 105mm howitzers from 3/7’s direct artillery supports continued. George 
Company had stepped off earlier at 0900 past the little hill How Company had fought so 
hard for the day before just north of Hill 702. The area was dense with timber, offering 
George some concealment as it moved. An hour and a half later, George was still 
approaching through these trees and Baker 1/7 reported it was in position and ready for 
action. George could not be seen by other Marine units, but How Company had a good 
radio link and kept tabs on its progress. How was still on 702 at this point and directing 
the supporting fires against 602. The artillery was estimated to have demolished four 
enemy bunkers by 1054 with the 155mms.55 
Just then, the enemy livened things up with yet another attack on Item Company, 
this time the attack was at least a company of NKPA in strength. A storm of mortar and 
MG fire sprayed across Item’s front with the main push again targeting the left front. In 
addition there was a simultaneous attack on the left flank from the ridgeline leading 
towards Hill 924. Item kept its 60mm mortars popping amid the frontal force while it 
brought artillery with heavy “battery-three” rounds down on the flanking approaches. 
The enemy plunged head-long through this exploding steel, careless of his losses. The 
Marine riflemen gritted their teeth and filled the enemy soldiers with bullets and grenade 
fragments. The attacks withered away by 1154, but Item had taken many casualties. 
Many Marines had minor wounds and just bandaged them up and kept on with their 
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duties, but there were 2 KIAs, and 6 WIAs required stretcher evacuation. Even then, the 
enemy troops were still seen near the left flank. How Company got the order then to 
send a platoon to reinforce Item.56 
Meanwhile, George Company was in position to observe 602. There were many 
enemy milling about on the hill, probably preparing to launch another attack on Marine 
lines, so the advance held up long enough for How Company to deluge the objective 
with more supporting fire called in from the 11th Marines. Every NKPA killed before the 
assault by artillery, CAS, or mortars was one less to deal with in close combat and one 
less to fire on the advancing infantry; 105mm artillery, 4.2 inch mortars, and an airstrike 
consisting of napalm and rockets pounded into Hill 602. A little later, a second air strike 
smote the hills across the river to the north of 602.57 
Soon after, at 1323, George Company noticed an enemy company approaching its 
left flank through a draw. These Marines doused the Koreans with 81mm mortar fire, 
then turned 155mm artillery from off of 602 to hose this new threat. The troops in the 
draw withdrew to the northwest. George Company was ready to assault at 1350 from 
the treeline 100 yards away from 602’s crest. Captain Robert C. Hendrickson, the CO, 
ordered nine rounds of 4.2 mortar fire from each tube in support. “As the last of these 36 
rounds were in the air and with the enemy seeking cover, two platoons assaulted in a 
charge that carried over the top of Hill 602 and completely surprised the enemy.” The 
company had concealed itself in the trees before the attack and the NKPAs on 602 did 
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not even realize they were there. The defenders were “completely” routed from the hill, 
with few friendly losses. The objective was secure at 1430.58 
As one fire team of Marines approached an enemy bunker, a Communist hand 
thrust forward from the aperture holding a grenade. “Presento,” said the NKPA soldier 
within. The Marines thought the word meant “present” as in the command “present 
arms.” One Marine obliged with an armed hand grenade, followed by others from the 
rest of the fire team lobbed into the bunker. After the explosion, the Marine muttered, 
“presento to you too, bub,” and continued with the assault.59  
POWs taken reported that seventy soldiers were defending 602 at the time, but 
Hill 602 belonged to the U. S. Marines now. That meant that two of the division 
objectives were in hand, Objective One and now Objective Two. All that now remained 
was Objective Three, Hill 1026.60 
 In support of 3/7, 3/11 laid down 1,400 rounds of artillery.  The 1st Battalion, 11th 
Marines similarly fired 1,682 rounds in direct support of the 1st KMC. (The 11th Marine 
Regiment, the division’s artillery regiment, was also reinforced during this battle by the 
780th, 937th, and 196th Field Artillery Battalions of the Army. One battalion of artillery 
was usually assigned one regiment of the division to directly support. The total amount 
fired for the last twenty-four hours by all these artillery units in total was 8,400 rounds. 
That exceeded the “Van Fleet Day of Fire,” a prescribed amount of shells to be fired 
each day whether targets existed or not, by 40 percent.) It took the repulse of three 
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attempts to push 3/7 off its objective by company-sized enemy assaults to convince the 
NKPA to cease contesting Hill 602 that afternoon and night.61 
All through the fighting, ammo bearers struggled to keep the front lines supplied. 
The North Koreans, however, had the Marine supply routes registered for accurate 
mortar fire. PFC Troy Hamm of the 7th Marines AT Company (one platoon of 75mm 
Recoilless Rifles was attached to 3/7 for the assault) remembered: 
One Day after many trips [to bring ammo up to the lines], I was very weary. The 
North Koreans began to hit our path to the supply point with mortars. I was 
knocked down by the concussion. When I picked myself up, I discovered a hole 
in my hand. I wrapped the wound and continued down the hill to pick up more 
ammo. The enemy fired on us the whole way. At the resupply point I smelled 
exploded powder [cordite?] and an odor that was new to me. An incoming round 
had made a direct hit on one of the guys, and pieces of him were scattered over 
the area.62 
 
Fox 2/7, at 1600, moved up behind Item and How 3/7 to bolster the line.  
While 3/7 went through the preceding events, 2/KMC had battled towards Hill 
1026. It was still 800 yards away when night fell. That night the enemy probed the 
Marine lines at the front. Even the 5th Marines back on the Kansas Line saw some 
activity that night.63  
The S-3 (Operations Officer) of 2/5, Major Gerald P. Averill, and the Battalion 
Commander, Lt Col Houston Stiff, observed the 7th Marines in the attack. Their 
conclusions would help 2/5 in its own attack later in the month. In addition, “the heavy 
casualties taken recently by the 1st KMC Regiment from anti-personnel mines served as 
a warning to personnel of this battalion.” Averill’s opinion of the 7th Marines in the attack 
was that, though courage was not lacking, the unit had “lost considerable initiative 
                                                 
61 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 179; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 6-7; 
Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 5. 
62 Oral account of PFC Troy Hamm, in Knox, Uncertain Victory, 295. 
63 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 179; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 6-7. 
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during the prolonged period of reserve . . .” resulting in “a loss of momentum which 
resulted in excessive casualties.” He also thought these Marines showed insufficient 
training. The effect of a reserve “letdown” was not confined to the 7th Marines. The CO 
of 2/5 also admitted that his battalion had had some increased inefficiency due to the 
period of reserve and rest. He ordered his companies to train hard to regain their cutting 
edge.64 
Casualties for the day were 5 KIA and 75 WIA in the 7th Marines, and 70 KIA or 
MIA, and 274 WIA for the KMCs. The enemy lost 460 counted KIA and 15 prisoners. 
Estimated enemy KIA numbered 609 with 345 WIA.65 
Division headquarters received orders for a new EUSAK plan called Plan Apache, 
that day. IX Corps was to seize a new phase line, Line Etna. This plan was to involve a 
task force composed of some elements from the Marine Division moving to ROK I 
Corps area and attacking north along the east coat from Kansong to Kobong-ni. The 
attack would be supported from the sea by NGF. The division was supposed to 
immediately start planning for the operation. Planning commenced, but Task Force Able 
(the executing force for the plan) was never formed because the plan was canceled 
farther up the chain of command from X Corps. The division was notified of the fact 
September 8.66 
Day Four: September 3 
About this time, Ralph B. Steele arrived at the front with the 12th Replacement 
Draft: 
                                                 
64 “Historical Diary,” of the 2nd Battalion 5th Marines, September 1951, 5, 15, 2, 23. 
65 Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 42; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 7. 
66 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 2; 1st Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September, 
1951, Operational orders and plans for this operation are in the appendices of the diary. 
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. . . the Marines were engaged in the east-central [area of Korea], which 
turned out to be a very beautiful area, mountainous, wooded, a lot like West 
Virginia. . . . We’re in trucks, dusty ride . . . then we turned north. We’re going 
over these mountain passes and so on and so forth. Finally—the only way you 
can tell you’re climbing or going down is by hearing what the engine on the 
truck’s doing, you know . . . of course we were facing each other, bouncing 
along. Suddenly there’s brilliant, brilliant blue flashes on both sides of the truck in 
these rice paddies, and then out of these flashes are shrieks and, you know 
crashes and shrieks. Well, right away I knew I heard artillery, but if you hear a 
whistle or a shriek and then a boom it’s coming in. When it goes boom and 
shrieks it’s going out, well it still shook us up pretty good, you know and Jiminy 
Christmas. I look across, the guy across from me during one of these blue 
flashes, and we had been running like I said in the trucks and our faces are 
coated with dust. And there’s rivers underneath both of his eyes. He’s crying, you 
know, tears are coming out of both eyes. . . . 
We stopped, turned out to be the regimental CP which had just been set 
up on a timbered slope and they took our weapons and ammunition away from 
us. Smartest thing in the world. You know, green people up there. And of course 
we weren’t on line yet. We’re just back from the line. Then the first time looked 
across at some ridges right over there and they were illuminated by flares, and I 
could hear pa pa, pa pa pa pa pa, pa, gun fire. Then it would be quiet for a while 
and then pretty soon ___ flare burst, float down and hear pa pa, pa pa pa pa pa. 
Then it dawned on me tomorrow night I’m going to be up there where the pas are 
going on . . . This is going to happen . . .I was still excited. Eager, but the main 
thing was I didn’t want to let anybody down. That really bothered me, that I would 
in any way let anyone down.67  
 
The Marines of 3/7 had a short break from fighting. They spent the morning 
digging in to Hill 602 (a company-sized patrol base was set up there). The KMCs were 
not so lucky. They resumed the attack against 1026 at 0400 while it was still dark. The 
7th Marines did provide them with some relief, however, because 2/7 was released from 
regimental reserve to take over the defense of Hill 924 from the 1st KMC.68 
                                                 
67 Transcript of Interview with Ralph B. Steele, Library of Congress. Mr. Steele went on to analyze the 
phrase “shots fired in anger.” “[They were not] fired in anger at all. We’re all professionals. We don’t kill 
the Chinese [or North Koreans] out of anger. We kill them out of professional . . . That’s our job. We’re 
professional people. The same with these artillerists. They’re not firing at the [North Koreans] out of hate . 
. . they’re on a firing mission.” 
68 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 179-180; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 
7. 
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The attack of the Korean Marines was apparently launched at the same time as 
that of the enemy, for 2/KMC in the advance ran head-on into a large number of NKPA 
who were also attacking. The situation was in doubt for almost four hours, but the 
enemy attack was repulsed and the KMCs dug in and regrouped on Hill 1026 (Division 
Objective 3). In the last push for possession of 1026, a rifleman of the 2nd platoon of 
2/KMC’s 5th company managed to infiltrate forward to silence a MG bunker with a 
grenade. At the same time, the leader of the 1st Platoon, Lt Son Jin Ch’on, who had led 
the assault and suffered from shrapnel wounds in over fifty places, bolstered the will of 
his men. He stood up, ignoring enemy fire, and raised a bloody right hand. “1st platoon 
assault!” he cried, and the Korean Marines made a successful final rush on the summit 
of the hill.69 
 The NKPAs were not content to leave the fight yet. Another two hour fire-fight 
commenced when an enemy reinforced company attacked the KMCs shortly after noon. 
But in the end, the Korean Marine Regiment held its territory, even moving to take Hill 
1055, 700 meters to the north of 1026. After that, 2/KMC moved west to occupy Hill 930 
because it “had been added to Objective Three during the day.”70 
Casualties for September 3 were: 9 KIA and 22 WIA for the 7th Marines, and 13 
KIA, 55 WIA for the KMCs. Enemy losses that day were estimated to total 294 KIA, 280 
WIA, and 10 POWs.71 
Thus ended Phase one of the battle with Yoke Ridge in Marine hands by 1800 that 
night. The Marine attack had helped relieve enemy pressure on the 2nd Infantry Division 
                                                 
69 Korean Institute of Military History, Korean War, Vol. 3, 153; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 
1951, 8. 
70 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 8; Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 180; 
Korean Institute of Military History, Korean War, Vol. 3, 154. 
71 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 8. 
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and 5th ROK Division to the west. “The constant pressure which the Division had applied 
to the enemy on the Hays line proved beneficial to adjacent units on the left during the 
period. The 35th ROK Regiment, 5th ROK Division advanced unopposed from Kansas 
line positions to Hill 450 . . . in the northwest quarter of the Punchbowl, approximately 
3,300 meters south of Hill 1026. Over on the western rim of the Punchbowl, the 2nd 
Infantry Division seized Hill 1181 . . ., approximately 4000 meters southwest of Hill 930, 
with only light resistance reported.” (See Map # 19) Casualties taken in the battle for the 
ridge amounted to 15 KIA and 128 WIA in the 7th Marines, and 95 KIA, 2 MIA, and 367 
WIA among the KMCs. This was a total of 110 1st Mar Div KIA, and 495 WIA. Enemy 
losses were higher. Marines counted about 900 dead (estimates for KIA and WIA were 
552 of the former and 756 of the latter) and took 50 prisoners. These are staggering 
losses when one considers a NKPA regiment in total numbered only 1,500 men (a 
Marine Regiment numbered more than twice that). The 3rd Regiment, 1st Division of the 
NKPA III Corps was shattered by the battle. It had to shift into reserve on the hill mass 
to the north while the 14th Regiment built up defenses along the same hill mass. It would 
not be possible for the North Korean to maintain a war with those kinds of losses and no 
reciprocal gains in territory (they had no “endless hordes” like the CCF). Soon, they 
would have to head back to the negotiating table along with their CCF brethren. 
However, the toughest fighting of the period for the U. S. Regiments of the 1st Marine 
Division was yet to come.72  
Jon Charles Genrich remembered how suicidal the enemy could be: 
                                                 
72 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 8; Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 180; 
1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 8, 31-32; Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 42; Lynn Montross, 
et al., The East-Central Front, 180; Korean Institute of Military History, Korean War, Vol. 3, 154. 
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We moved up to the Kansas Line for a couple of days and to bury a pile of 
Chinese [North Koreans?] that had a very ripe odor. They had been lying there 
for some time. I was reminded of late summer and the six hundred Chinese 
soldiers who had marched up a hill while tanks and machine guns fired on them. 
After it was all over, our troops discovered that the Chinese all had new uniforms 
and were sixteen or seventeen years old. They also had drugs on them and must 
have been stoned out of their minds. They never took cover or stopped marching 
until they were all dead.73 
 
As far as CAS went, requests for air strikes had been made almost two days in 
advance for this battle, but only 12 planes were given the missions by JOC (their 
emphasis was still on Operation Strangle). This did not include emergency requests 
made in the actual fighting, but those had their own problems. An example of how the 
intervening layers of bureaucracy complicated things also occurred in this fight. The 7th 
Marines requested emergency air support to break a heavy enemy counterattack, but 
the X Corps’s intelligence officer on Byers’s staff canceled the request. He didn’t think 
there was really any counterattack going on. To the Marines on the line staring 
screaming North Koreans in the face over the length of a bayoneted rifle, this was an 
outrage and gross failure of the system to work to help them succeed in their mission.74 
In summary, the Marines had taken their objectives with hard fighting, but the ratio 
of casualties by far favored the UN forces. The Communists had lost valuable men, and 
territory as well. U. S. firepower and morale were superior and gave the Marines a 
distinct edge. Furthermore, they probably outnumbered the enemy on the ridge (though 
this cannot be absolutely determined with out documents from the NK side). (See Map # 
13 for the amount of ground gained.) 
 
 
                                                 
73 Oral memoir of Jon Charles Genrich at KoreanWarEducator.org. 






(PHASE TWO:  
KANMUBONG RIDGE) 
 
BLOOD FOR RIDGES 
 
 
Close-in fighting decided the issue on every hill. 
 
                                                             --1 Mar Div. Historical Diary  







The division had to take some time out starting September 4 to move more 
ammunition forward. Narrow roads, mud, and enemy mines as well as a shortage of 
needed trucks caused the delay, and the fact that the division railhead was ninety miles 
to the rear did not help. It took six days to build up a big enough ammo dump nearer the 
front lines in order for the attack to resume, partly because of the “extraordinary” 
amount of artillery shells the Marines had used up in the fight. A reserve supply of 
ammo for at least ten days was needed (fifty to sixty trucks a day). This was because 
trucks would be needed to rotate 2,000 Marines home by 15 September. (So in the 
case of this battle, and at least in this one aspect, the rotation policy did interfere with 
combat efficiency.)1  
                                                 
1 U. S. Pacific Fleet, “Third Interim Evaluation Report,” 15-48; Gerald C. Thomas Oral Memoir, 896; 1st 
Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 7. “In fact, the estimates for shells fell short of the actual 
expenditures, 24,000 tons (874,000 rounds) for X Corps in September 1951. Intelligence officers believed 
that X Corps would need every shell it could find.” --Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 43. 
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The division was very committed to keeping the rotation process consistent and 
dependable to ensure high front-line unit morale. Also, Marines did not have to spend 
their entire time with the division in a front line unit. Many who had been in a rifle 
company for a few months had the option of rotating to a rear area job.2 
Up at the actual front, however, there were no roads. The Korean laborers 
attached to each unit, a few hundred per infantry battalion, had to haul ammo and 
supplies to the Marines on “A-frame” packs. These Koreans were part of the Korean 
Service Corps (KSC). It was a half day trek by foot from the typical battalion supply 
point. Helicopter and air drops supplemented this system. However, “resupply by 
helicopter could be had only in emergencies and when the regular supply routes were 
either exhausted or not trafficable.”3 (See Photo # 2) 
Throughout the interim period, action occurred at night in the form of enemy 
attacks on Marine positions. In addition, mortar and artillery fire hit both at the front and 
in rear areas, so the period was anything but quiet.4 
Plans were already being made for a second phase of the attack. It would be 
necessary to seize the ridges to the north of Yoke, because the ground there 
commanded that already taken, and to inflict greater casualties on the North Koreans in 
that sector. This ridge-mass was also important because a foothold there would allow 
UNC to hold the enemy in check on the ridges branching off of the hill-mass and block 
                                                 
2 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 181; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 7; 
Burton Anderson, We Claim the Title, 306. 
3 1st Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 17; Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central 
Front, 181; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 7. For example, the 1st Marines at the close of 
August had 1,160 South Korean laborers attached -- 1st Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” August 
1951, 2. 
4 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 1. 
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attacks south towards the Hays and Kansas Lines. D-day was to be 11 September.5 
(See Map # 15) 
The lull was tactically unfortunate because enemy units moved south into the 
sector to the division’s front in force despite efforts by the Marines to, “patrol vigorously 
to the front to maintain contact with the enemy and prevent his reinforcing defensive 
positions.” (“Spike” Selmyhr stated  that he hated the term “maintain contact,” “because 
what it really meant was that we moved toward their positions until we received fire, and 
then immediately withdrew to report where it came from.”) One enemy unit was the 2nd 
NKPA Division, III Corps. This unit fortified Hill 673, though some fortifications already 
existed there, and put in many mortar emplacements. It would take flamethrowers, 
satchel charges, grenades, tanks, rifles, automatic-weapons, and Marine blood to get 
them out.6 (See Photo # 3) 
Jack L. Cannon was one Marine who would have to help take it. “We had looked 
at this hill and wondered how long it would be before the division had to attack it and 
what it would be like. . . . [Soon] we were going to find out. The 91st Regiment of the 45th 
North Korean Army [Division, actually] would be annihilated here on 673 and Ridgeline 
749, and we would lose a lot of good men in the process.”7 
The rifle companies spent the time patrolling forward of their lines and 
consolidating defenses on Yoke Ridge. If heavy resistance was encountered, like one 
patrol of the 7th Marines near Hill 673, the patrol would withdraw and call in supporting 
                                                 
5 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 180; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 8, 
11; Korean Institute of Military History, Korean War, Vol. 3, 154. 
6 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 1; Garlen L. “Spike” Selmyhr Interview, 2000; Lynn 
Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 182; “Tactical Study of Mandae-ri Area,” July 1951, 6; 1st Mar 
Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 8-14. 
7 Jack L. Cannon, “Attack on Hills 673 and 749,” Leatherneck 72 (March, 1989), 23. 
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fire on the enemy position. In the patrols, accurate enemy 76mm fire was sometimes 
encountered (a high velocity, flat trajectory artillery piece with a noise like a banshee 
and a blast so loud one thought the world had shattered). The assaults to squelch the 
sources of that fire would be no picnic.8  
Men were still wounded on patrols, though they were not technically part of the 
major “battle.” Jack L. Cannon was one such: “I was a sniper and on September 6 was 
covering for a patrol from “Baker” 1/7 that was pulling back. The heavy machine guns 
firing across the valley were Maxims on wheels. . . . The first of my three wounds—this 
one in my legs—was taken . . . from machine-gun crossfire between Hills 673 and 
854.”9 
Ralph B. Steele, now a BAR man with Fox Company, 2/7, described a patrol: 
They sent a patrol out, and we were . . . high on a ridge. It’s all timbered and it 
goes down way down into a valley. It’s timbered, too. There’s a river down there 
and you can only occasionally see the river through the trees. The other side, 
those slopes were all enemy. We sent up a trail over there what they call a 
reinforced patrol. It’s probably a squad of guys which would be 12, 13 guys plus 
a machine gun section, so you got 20 some guys and then with the corpsmen 
you’re like 30 guys across the river. . . . and they got a big pack radio SCR300 
with them. . . . everybody knows that patrol is out and it’s going to be a 
dangerous patrol because it’s one of those ridiculous orders I always thought 
was, it was a recon patrol but you keep moving towards the enemy until they 
shoot at you, and then you count the weapons and what caliber they’re shooting 
at you with. In other words, walk until somebody takes a shot at you and then lay 
down and count the weapons.10  
 
Though the casualty numbers were usually small on such a patrol, the action could 
be very intense and still get a person very dead. Steele continued: 
So anyway, they’re out there and  . . . we start hearing pa pa pa , pa pa pa pa 
and the radio crackles on and it says that they’ve been taken under fire and they 
                                                 
8 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 8; Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 180, 
182; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 8-14. 
9 Jack L. Cannon, “Attack on Hills 673 and 749,” 24. 
10 Transcript of Library of Congress Interview with Ralph B. Steele. 
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got a wounded. . . . More fire going on. Pretty soon we hear WIAs, they got KIAs. 
Now they got a critical situation. They’re pinned down and they can’t get out. . . . 
it was a different platoon than what I was a member of, but . . . they said “hey I 
need some volunteers.” They were going to take a squad from that platoon to 
actually make the relief, but they was picking up casualties so fast they needed 
volunteers for litter bearers. . . . if I’m needed, I’m going. So my buddy and I 
grabbed a litter, and I would imagine another 15, 20 guys lead out down this trail 
clear down to the bottom and we . . . make a little perimeter down there and they 
were starting to withdraw.11  
 
Again, the reports are dry and may mention a patrol, even one that saw heavy 
action, in just a single sentence, and it is hard from that to know the human side of such 
a thing from them. Steele went on: 
These guys were trying to get out from underneath this fire and they came over 
the lip. There’s a river had made a horseshoe there and a bank on the far side – 
say the river is about 15, 20 inches deep and it was probably eight or ten yards 
wide. And the guys are coming over the far bank and they were just sweat 
stained and filthy dirty and their eyes were all bulging. I mean, they were terrified. 
These guys been getting . . . guys knocked down all around them. They came 
over to the edge, and I’m on the side of the bank and the sergeant in charge of 
that deal shouted down in general says, “We can use some help over there.” 
Again, that’s what I’m here for if I’m paid the big money . . . 80 some bucks a 
month. So I started across this damn stream and here again, you’re a youth [a 
teenager]. I can hear—and bullets don’t zing when they go by like they do in the 
movies. They snap. . . They crack. . . I heard snap, snap, snap. Well, I thought, 
“holy shit I’m being shot at.” And I looked around, the other guys didn’t seem to 
be paying much attention to it, and then right in front of me as I got to the other 
side and some bull rushes and _______ I saw two sparks, ptue ptue, you know, 
come up, and I remember I don’t think that much about it . . . . I was so green . . . 
.12 
 
There were also all the horrors and tragedies of war on such a patrol. Steele saw 
his first dead Marine that day: 
. . . so I got over to the bank and here come a litter over this—by now they’re just 
sliding down the bank and they were dusty and they were getting across the river 
and they were starting up the other side trying to get into safety . . .we were 
being shot at but they were in the horseshoe. They were shooting down the river. 
Here come a litter, and so a boy I eagerly reach up there for the litter and I bring 
it down and I could see the top of the guy’s head was all sweat matted. Then the 





____ form by the canvas formed by the V of the weight of the body blood 
coagulated . . . ran out and ran on the grass . . . the bull rushes and whatnot. I 
thought, “Man, this guy is KIA.” . . . I handed him by and I looked at his face, 
which I always try to avoid looking at somebody like that. He had taken four 
bullets right through the forehead from a burp gun and the face was intact but 
everything below the face was—the face just floated on a—kind of a crust, and I 
thought, “Jiminy Christmas,” but, you know, again, if I was to see that today I 
would probably lose my supper. That was not my emotion. My emotion was, what 
is his parents doing this moment?13 
 
Such was a patrol action for the Marines of 1951, an event huge in the life of those 
who survived it, but as much as completely forgotten by anyone else, especially the 
“history books.” 
One other patrol resulted in 8 MIA. However, most of thee men made it back to 
friendly lines.14  
Jack C. Walker was one of those men: 
One of the officers of Able Company Seventh Marines was briefing the 
men of the First Platoon. 
“Men it is unlikely that you will see ‘Charlie’ [the enemy] today as it looks 
like he pulled back from 673 so your job will be to go up there and blow up his 
positions so he won’t have positions to return to in case he decides to return. It 
should be a very routine mission. . . . 
. . . my good friend always joked: Its hell to be on the “1st.” anything! For 
example if a tough assignment came up in Regimental Headquarters, some 
general would say. “Let’s give that to the First battalion!” Then the First battalion 
commander usually said. “Let’s let Able Company have that one!” In the 
Company CP, they would say. “The first platoon can handle this!” Then, you 
guessed it! “Hey, first squad get that first fire team up here!” Well we think that is 
how our fire team was chosen for the point of that patrol . . . on that day in 
September. 
We passed through Baker Company lines into “No Mans land.” As we 
crossed the edge of the valley, there was a shallow stream off to your left and in 
the middle of the stream was the remains of a dead gook. I recall that 
unmistakable, sickening, sweet smell of death. You think of “Charlie” as being 
short normally but this guy was close to seven feet tall. His decaying flesh was 
black and they eye sockets empty. . . . 
As the point arrived at 673, I was about 20 feet from a huge bunker and it 
appeared that there was nobody home. And then as the old saying goes, ALL 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
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HELL BROKE LOOSE!!! Machine gun fire was coming from all directions. Bullets 
whizzed around us cutting trees and branches . . . many times in the past I have 
asked myself; “why didn’t you charge up that last 20 feet and throw a grenade 
thru [sic] the aperture of that bunker? . . . The answer I always get is: “Because I 
was scared out of my wits, you sill sonofabitch! . . .” 
Anyway, I scrambled back a few yards and hit the deck. I lay on my back, 
pulled out, and lit a Camel cigarette. I listened to the bullets whizzing overhead. 
The firefight lasted about 2 Camels and the abruptly stopped. I waited another 10 
minutes and started making my way back to the platoon. The platoon had left so I 
decided I would also and started down the hill toward the valley. Shortly two 
shots rang out towards me from 673. Then the voice (in gook English) yelled, 
“HALT!” I thought, “that sonafabitch missed me twice and now he wants me to 
HALT? Screw you Charlie! I was moving on! Pulling a Hank Snow! [A popular 
song at the time was I’m Moving On by Hank Snow.] 
I ran on down the hill about 100 yards and stopped. . . . I felt sure they 
would come down looking for me so I lay down by a large tree and waited. I 
guess I was there about 15 minutes and during this time talked to God and 
Jesus, and anyone else who would listen! I made every promise I could think of I 
said “if you can only get me out of this mess I will go to church every Sunday and 
any other time you are open!” 
. . . In a few minutes this gook appeared at the same spot I thought he 
would. . . . I didn’t think he saw me because of his casual manner and was pretty 
sure that they thought I was already back in Corpus Christi, Texas by then! . . . I 
leveled my M1 at him and squeezed off a round which hit him in the stomach 
chest area and knocked him down screaming! A terrific feeling came of 
contentment ran through me and at that moment, the fear was gone. . . . 
I reached the rice paddies, which were terraced down to the bottom of the 
valley like giant stairs. . . . Burp gun and machine gun fire followed me as I ran 
across the paddies. At each drop off, I would crawl one way or another 20 feet or 
so then take off running again. My helmet fell off in the middle on one of the 
paddies. That helmet had some letters from a girl in Corpus. As the machine gun 
fire increased, the importance of the letters decreased. I decided not to return for 
the helmet. 
. . . It was almost dark now and I decided it might be better if I waited until 
morning to go up the hill. So far my day was going pretty good and I didn’t want 
to end it by accidentally being killed by the U. S. Marines. 
. . . At about 6 AM I thought it might be safe to make my way back up the 
hill. I yelled at Baker Company my name and company. It seemed like a long 
time but they finally signaled me to come up. 
I got about half way up the hill and there was an explosion under me. 
When I opened my eyes I was standing in a huge hole! . . . I didn’t have a scratch 
on me, but I didn’t hear too well for a while. Maybe it was my talk with God and 
Jesus the day before. . . . 
Baker sent two Marines down to guide me up the trail and through the 
minefield. I was taken to lt. Eddie Le Baron for debriefing. . . . 
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[They] then asked me if I needed anything. I said yes I wanted to be 
baptized immediately! I felt that Baptizing was a lot like bulletproofing. . . .15 
 
The interim period also saw Marines conduct cold weather training and survival 
classes. One officer in each company was appointed to be a “Cold Weather Officer,” in 
charge of making sure their unit was up to par in that area. The lessons of the Chosin 
Reservoir were not taken lightly in 1951.16 
For the 1st KMC, the lull meant the establishment of a company outpost on Hill 752 
atop a pass a half mile beyond Hill 930 of Yoke Ridge. To the KMC’s left was an ROK 
Division and the Korean Marines could hear the Communists hit this unit almost every 
night. Much work was done, too, on readying the Hays line, newly won, into a suitable 
defensive network of gun emplacements, trenches, barbed-wire, and bunkers.17  
Total casualties for the interim period incurred and inflicted, were: 70 WIA, 24 KIA 
and 0 MIA for the KMCs; 116 WIA, 6 KIA and 2 MIA for the rest of the division; and an 
estimated 276 KIA for the enemy as well as 68 POWs. These were not light—though 
the 1st Mar Div looked on the period as an interim, the enemy continued his probing 
counterattacks and infiltration actions unabated. The losses were a stiff price for the 
necessary time to resupply artillery and ammunition, ready again for the offense, and 
strengthen the defenses on the Hays Line, but the terrain left little choice.18 
In corps reserve, men of the 2nd Battalion First Marines received a pep-talk from 
their CO, LtCol Franklin B. Nihart, prior to moving north to join the rest of the division in 
combat. PFC Lyle Conaway remembered his remarks: “‘Men,’ he said, ‘I don’t know 
                                                 
15 First person account of Jack C. Walker, “A Day in September,” found at: http://www.1-
7marineskorea.com/weremember/day_in_sept.htm. Website last consulted April 2007. 
16 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 1, 13. 
17 Interview with Colonel KIM Yun Gun, 22 December 1958, page 3-4. 
18 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 8-14. 
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where we’re going, and I don’t know when, but I’m sure it will be soon. One thing I do 
know, there will be a lot of Purple Hearts given out. . . .” There would be many Purple 
Hearts indeed.19 
Day One: September 11 
The next attack orders came early on 9 September in the form of Division OpnO 
23-51. The 7th Marines were to commence a night attack at 0300 September 11 to take 
Hills 673 and 749, defended, it was thought, by approximately one NKPA regiment 
(1,500) men. These hills were designated Objectives Able and Baker. The 7th Marines 
was to also be sure and maintain contact with the 8th ROK Division to the east (which 
would seize Hill 854). The 7th Marines broke this order down into its own checkpoints to 
be seized consisting of Checkpoints 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. (See Map # 20) Checkpoint 1 was 
Hill 680; 2, Hill 673; 3, the southern part of Hill 749; 4, the big finger extending 
southwest from 749; and 6, the northern portion of 749’s summit. The regiment was to 
then defend these positions until the 1st Marines had passed through.20 
After Division Objectives Able and Baker had been secured, the 1st Marines, fresh 
from X Corps reserve and returned to parent control, were to pass through and relieve 
the 7th Marines, and then seize a third objective on order, Division Objective Charlie, the 
ridgeline northwest of and including Hill 1052. The 7th Marines would then move into 
reserve at Wontong-ni, “not to be committed except on X Corps authority.” Objective 
Dog, a fourth objective, was Hill 812. It would be the goal of the 5th Marines, but that 
                                                 
19 Oral account of PFC Lyle Conanway, Fox Company, 2/1, in: Knox, Uncertain Victory, 295-96. 
20 Seventh Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, Operation Order 14-51; 1st Mar Div, 
“Historical Diary,” September 1951, 2, 13. 
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was a latter amendment to the present plan. All of this amounted to a three prong, 
“ridge-running” approach.21 (See Map # 21)  
The 5th Marines was to leave a company on the Kansas Line and move to division 
reserve on the Hays Line (the newly won Yoke Ridge) behind the attacking 7th Marines. 
Meanwhile, the 1st KMC was to patrol the division left aggressively enough to distract 
the enemy on Division Objective Charlie. The 11th Marines was to move forward to 
support the attack of the 7th Marines with its artillery fires.22  
In support of the 7th Marines was the 1st Tank Battalion (organic to the 1st Mar Div), 
the 1st Engineer Battalion (also organic to the 1st Mar Div), and 3/11 in direct support. 
(General artillery support would be furnished by the rest of the 11th Marines and the 
937th and 196th FABs (field artillery battalions). Company “C” of the 780th FAB added 
additional firepower to the later unit with its eight-inch howitzers, each of which fired a 
whopping 200lb shell packed with HE (high explosive).23 
The assault battalions had a daunting job ahead of them. They had to assault 
forward down into a narrow valley, cross a tributary of the Soyang River, and attack 
uphill against heavily fortified North Koreans who were not even a little bit eager to 
vacate their abode.24  
The night before D-day, the Navy chaplains attached to the various Marine units 
had services. Men prayed and prepared for battle. The morning dawned with mist and 
fog shrouding the valleys of the Taebaek Mountain Range. Marines, like in the Pacific, 
                                                 
21 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 2, 13; 1st Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” 
September 1951, 2, 11-12; Fifth Marines “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 2.   
22 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 182; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 2, 
14. 
23 Interview by phone between myself and Sergeant George Ellis, 780th FAB, Battery “C”, March 20, 2007, 
tape in my possession. 
24 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 183; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 14. 
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received the traditional breakfast of steak and eggs. The men were dirty. Due to a water 
shortage, it was very hard to keep clean on the lines and most bathing was done with a 
wet rag out of a helmet shell (or, occasionally, in the river, though there were warnings 
against this because of a fungus men could get in their ears). They got to change 
clothes only rarely, but their morale and dedication were high.25 
Spike Selmyhr, a platoon leader, received word that the father of one of his 
Marines had died. He called the lad aside and told him the news as gently as possible, 
and that they could not get him home for the funeral but would give him leave as soon 
as possible. The Marine replied, “Lieutenant, I will try not to let this bother me in doing 
my job tomorrow.” Selmyhr reflected about this, “makes you realize what is meant by 
the term, ‘Duty, Honor, Country.’”26 
Ralph B. Steele described the preparation fires for the attack: 
. . . There’s four guys in a hole and we got 25 percent watch. One guy awake at 
all times. . . . So I take my watch, get off watch and they’re firing –we didn’t know 
it then but preparing for tomorrow’s attack. . . . Our artillery was firing. Shells 
weren’t going over our heads because the target was quite a ways away. . . on 
the hill 673, 749, in that area. Ground’s rumbling. It’s a lot like the flashes and the 
rumble are a lot like a summer thunderstorm coming. . . .27  
 
Though warm or even hot and humid during the day (about 80 degrees most 
days), the Korean autumn was setting in with colder and colder nights so that frost even 
sometimes formed on the ground in the mornings. And the rain was still present. As 
unpleasant as this was to the individual Marine at the time, rain in tactical situations 
                                                 
25 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 14; Burton F. Anderson, We Claim the Title, 343; 
Interview Transcript, Garlen L. “Spike” Selmyhr, 2000. 
26 Interview Transcript, Garlen L. “Spike” Selmyhr, 2000. 
27 Ralph B. Steele Interview Transcript, Library of Congress. 
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usually favors the attacker. It conceals movement and deadens sound thus facilitating 
surprise in an attack, the heavier the better. The same is true for fog.28 
 One 7th Marines PFC, Troy Hamm, remembered his unit’s move on the night of 
September 10-11: 
We moved out early, wet and cold. All night long it had rained like I’d 
never seen before in my life. We sat in a wide open field all night. The old 
ponchos we wore funneled the water down our spines and out the seat of our 
utility trousers. To add to this misery, when we moved out, we carried the weight 
of our packs—a packboard with two cased 75mm RR rounds, a waterproof bag 
containing our winter and summer sleeping bags, three days’ supply of C rations, 
and extra boots and utilities. I also carried an M-1 rifle and plenty of .30-cal 
ammo. The load was so heavy that when we stopped I had to position the 
packboard above me on the side of the hill so I could get under it enough to 
stand up without falling backward.  
As we got closer to Hill 673, the sounds of firing grew louder. The roar of 
artillery—ours and theirs—and frequent air strikes marked our progress forward. 
By now I was so keyed-up, I forgot the weight of my pack. 
Late in the day, five of our M26 tanks came up and supported us. Just 
their appearance and the noise they made boosted our morale.29 
 
Kanmubong Ridge was the name of the heights the Marines would attack. 
Consisting of Hills 812, 980, 1052, 673, 751, 680, and 749, this was a murderous piece 
of terrain by any estimate, consisting of, “highly organized defensive positions built 
around a multitude of earth and log bunkers and supported by heavy deployment of 
artillery of all calibers.” (See Map # 22) The 7th Marines had to take it, however, to allow 
X Corps to be able to attack the NKPA MLR (Main Line of Resistance) thought to be 
over two miles north beyond it—as it turned out the Kanmubong complex was part of 
the enemy MLR--and to maintain better defense of the Hays Line.30  
                                                 
28 First Battalion, 5th Marines, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 9. 
29 Oral account of PFC Troy Hamm, in Knox, Uncertain Victory, 296-97. 
30 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 2, 14; Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 
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The method to the approach was that the 7th Marines would seize Objective Able 
on the eastern tip of the ridge and assault along the top of the ridge to Objective Baker. 
“. . . The narrow axis of advance would limit the assault to one regiment at a time.” From 
the amount of forces allocated to each objective, the Marines clearly underestimated the 
amount of resistance the enemy would put up as well as the amount of time that would 
be required to take the objectives, but then, “intel” at the time estimated this area to be 
only an OPLR (outpost line of resistance) for the enemy. Night “harassing fires” began 
at 2100 September 10 on the checkpoints to be assaulted the next day. These fires 
would increase as the attack progressed, lifting just ahead of the infantry and under 
control of FOs (forward observers).31 
One Marine who was in Baker Company, 1/7, said of the enemy bunkers on Hills 
673: 
This hill had been pounded by our artillery and mortars so much that the trees 
were nothing but stumps. The few that were left standing were nothing but 
skeletons. The slopes had the consistency of powder. When you walked, you 
sank into the ground up to your ankles. You thought, “Lord, how could there have 
been that much opposition alive up there after that?” But after reaching the top, 
two days later, you could see how they managed. Bunkers, with four to six feet of 
dirt and rocks on top of logs, had connecting trenches. There were also trenches 
leading from the bunkers and the forward slope to the rear of the hill for 
evacuating the dead and wounded and also for bringing in men and supplies. 
This kept them from exposing themselves to our fire.32 
 
These were the types of positions that only napalm and rockets from a Marine 
plane, flying so close to the trees that they nearly scrape the bottom of the Chance-
                                                 
31 Joseph H. Alexander, “Kanmubong Ridge: Final Marine Offensive of the Korean War,” Leatherneck 84 
(September 2001), 18; Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 183; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” 
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32 Jack L. Cannon, “Attack on Hills 673 and 749,” 22-23. 
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Vaught F4U Corsair, were able to neutralize reliably. The only weapon that could and 
would ultimately destroy every one was the rifleman.   
The battalions were atop Yoke Ridge before the attack from Hill 602 to Hill 924 
and along the Hays Line east of 602 to the river. The Marines of 2/7 were on the Hays 
Line, the companies end to end in a line of defensive positions (two companies forward 
and one in reserve) from about Hill 924 eastward to 3/7’s positions (starting at Hill 602). 
The Third Battalion, 7th Marines, too was on the Hays Line to the right of 2/7, 
sandwiched between Hill 602 and the river.33 
For September 11th, D-day, 2/7 had the job of patrolling on the regiment’s left in 
constant contact (“buttoned up”) with the KMCs, and of maintaining defenses on the 
Hays Line minus Easy Company, which would be the regimental reserve. The purpose 
of the patrolling was stated to be “to deny the enemy routes of approach to the 3/7 zone 
of action. . . .”34  
 The assault battalions were 3/7 and 1/7. The Marines of 3/7 had the job of taking 
Regimental Checkpoint 1. This was Hill 680. (See Map # 20) The other Checkpoints 
were to be the task of 1/7. The CO of 3/7, Lt Col B. T. Kelly, had How Company move 
out at night (0230) before the assault and to attack at first light, but the weather did not 
cooperate. Despite the rain, the NKPA enemy discovered the Marines before they were 
close enough to assault by surprise. Probably some unfortunate had triggered one of 
the many enemy mines. A hot fight ensued stopping the assault company halfway up 
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680 (which some of the men of How Company would call “Sanguine Hill”) from the 
southeast approach.35 
We fanned out to move up fingers of this mountain of 30 to 35 degrees. 
We moved carefully. When we were about halfway up, the shit hit the fan. James 
Dettmen and I were together. We took everything, 81[2]mm mortars, burp guns, 
.50-caliber machine guns—every bit of it. Small arms, you name it! When 
someone tells me what hell’s like, I’ve been there. Sheets of dirt, rock, and tree 
fragments rained upon us. We had gooks all around. There was only one thing to 
do—fight forward or fight backward. 
Dettman and I hit this depression together. I look out, right into the mouth 
of this machine gun. The gunner is trying to take me out. James and I pooled our 
resources and put ourselves back to back. We were in a crossfire. Anyway you 
moved they were going to get you. The water jacket on the .50-caliber trying to 
get me looked big as a saucer. If I could hit that thing, the barrel’s heat would 
make it sway out of commission in no time. For the moment the depression is 
shielding us. The .50-caliber’s fire is bouncing off and over us by inches. . . . 
While I take out this machine gun, Dettman keeps ‘em off our ass and talks to F-
80 Saber jet pilots providing air support. . . . 
I’m getting hotter then something hits me. “Oh my God! I’m hit!” 
James looks at me. “You’re hit bad.” 
I feel the depression in my head where my eye used to be. I could see 
nothing. My nose was gone. I can’t see! 
. . . I didn’t lose consciousness and wasn’t scared. I prayed. . . . 
[Soon, Moore made it to a corpsman.] It was Doc Willie Stewart, navy 
corpsman, and he packed the cavity in my cranium and gave me a vial of 
morphine.36 
 
Broken down by companies, 3/7’s assault that day proceeded as follows: How 
Company stepped out at 0230 to take Checkpoint 1. The night was dark and rainy, 
making for much mud and slow going. How stepped into a hornet’s nest of death and 
fire by 0738 at the southern tip of 680. At 0830, How began to take heavy mortar fire. 
                                                 
35 Seventh Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, Operation Order 14-51; Lynn Montross, 
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Within ten minutes, it had several wounded, two of which were platoon leaders. One of 
the officers hit was Lt. Tom Carline, the leader of the 3rd Platoon.37  
Charles Hughes was a corpsman with How Company 3/7. He later recounted the 
experiences of the Marines of 3/7 in the assault on Hill 680:  
At 0230 they moved out in the dark on this rainy, foggy night and made their way 
single file down the rocky trail leading to the creek below. Visibility was so bad 
each man had to hold his hand to the back of the man in front in order to keep 
the company together, and the steep rocky trail caused many men to stumble 
and fall in the difficult descent to the valley below. [In addition, searchlights cast 
the hills ahead into stark relief and eerie, shifting shadows.] By the time How 
Company had reached the creek and was ready to begin the assault on 680, 
daylight had come. . . . 38 
 
One artillery FO with How Company was Sergeant Jim Dettman. He later wrote a 
letter to his radio man about the events of that day: 
I with Lt. Young marked concentrations on the objective, possible mortar 
positions and possible troop concentrations. When we jumped off, to call in 
artillery all I had to do was shoot a new azimuth. . . .  
. . . We were about half way up the ridge when we saw 4 or 5 gooks sitting 
around a fire. One of them got up and started to urinate when he saw us. He 
yelled and all hell broke loose.39 
 
The account of Charles Hughes continued: 
 
When the curtain of fog lifted they were fully exposed to the enemy above 
who had them in the sights of their heavy maxim machine guns, burp guns and 
rifles, and they cut loose at the Marines of How Company with blistering 
effectiveness. . . . Within less than an hour there were many How Company 
casualties, including two platoon leaders. 
One of those two was the leader of the 3rd Platoon, Lt. Tom Carline, who 
lay exposed to the enemy fire with an almost certain likelihood of being killed. 
When Hoagy Carmichael [“Hoagy” was his nickname, after the singer] spotted 
him he dashed through the mortar rounds and gunfire, picked up the lieutenant 
and carried him to safety. . . . he later received the bronze star.40 
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The battalion sent Item Company to attack from the southwest to lift enough 
enemy pressure that How Company could move forward. How Company then infiltrated 
towards the crest while receiving heavy machine gun and mortar fire. They were fifty 
yards from it when enemy fire pinned it in place again. Item Company in the confusion 
had moved to How Company’s part of the hill, so the attack, instead of a converging 
movement from two directions, became one from a single direction.41 
One Marine machine gunner, Jon Charles Genrich, remembered How 3/7’s attack 
that day: 
In the dim morning light we started up the ridge on the trail. The climb was 
very steep the first several hundred yards. We were spaced out about ten feet 
apart, which didn’t seem like very much space as we followed the path. After 
climbing about half an hour, we stopped and everyone took a little break. We 
figured they must have had a patrol scouting ahead of the company. I was 
somewhat surprised as this didn’t seem like the way we had been taught to 
advance on a hill. . . . We proceeded up the trail, unable to see much for about 
half a mile because of the tall trees and wooded area. Then everything happened 
at once. The enemy pinned us down with automatic gun fire, trimming limbs from 
trees and pounding us with mortars, mostly hitting the main body of the company. 
It reminded me of an amphibious landing on a beach as they let the first few 
waves “land” and then tried to blow the remainder out of the water. The few 
closing in on the enemy were in a heavy ground fight. 
We had heavy automatic fire coming from our left flank and mortars 
exploding all around. We hit the deck and the little branches rained down on us 
from the heavy firepower chopping up the trees. They yelled, “Machine guns up” 
and the squad leader, gunner, and assistant gunner moved out up the path. . . . I 
grabbed an extra can of ammo, dropped my pack, and started running up the 
path with my rifle and three boxes of ammo. Gunny Sergeant Studebaker yelled, 
“Get down. You’re going to get hit.” I yelled back., “They don’t have ammo for the 
machine guns,” and kept running. Brave? No. I was just doing my job. The limbs 
and twigs kept falling all around, but I felt the squad was depending on me. 
I didn’t know how far ahead they had gone but I finally caught up with 
them. They had the gun set up on the left flank, firing at a smaller ridge about 
200 yards away. I dropped the ammo and told them I didn’t think the rest of the 
ammo was coming. Murph said for me to get back behind them and start digging 
a hole as they needed cover. They hadn’t been able to dig in yet as the 
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exchange of fire was heavy with J. B. and Richard on the gun. I started digging 
but it was mostly solid rock with just a little dirt. In what seemed like hours, but 
was more likely about ten minutes, I had a hole two feet deep.42 
 
It was now past noon. The engaged companies waited in place while supporting 
arms (artillery and mortars) worked over the objective. Finally, airstrikes added napalm 
and strafing to the mix. The Marines then made two assaults, but each time the enemy 
sensed the supporting fires had lifted and came up out of their emplacements. The 
Marines ended up being pushed back down the hill to near their starting points. 
Darkness found the assault companies dug in (with some shifting of positions) 300 
yards short of the objective to await the next day.43 
More technically, the above actions proceeded thusly: At 0908, Item Company, 
while How was under heavy mortar fire and had just lost two platoon leaders, was 
ordered to move up near George Company on Hill 602, prepared to go to How 
Company’s aid by assaulting the 680 from the opposite slope from How Company. 
Baker 1/5 had taken How’s position on the Hays Line at 0530, then was given 
responsibility for the entire section of the 7th Marines’s sector of Hays, the section from 
602 east to the river. How Company reported at 0915 that it was still in a hot fight and 
could not get closer than fifty yards to the crest of Hill 680. Even the CP of the 81mm 
platoon received heavy enemy 82mm mortar fire and lost some men. Item Company 
then got word to jump off in the attack as soon as an airstrike arrived to soften its part of 
the objective. Item, too, took enemy 82mm mortar fire. However, the airstrike did not hit 
until 1355. Immediately thereafter, Item jumped off to help How Company and both 
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companies were in a thick engagement against NKPA emplacements staring down at 
them across a steep, hard-to-climb slope that would give even a climber unharassed by 
bullets and shells pause.44 
Charles Hughes’s account continued: 
Roy Westerman, a young Marine from Arkansas following Lt. Carline up 
Sanguine was hit in the waist and stumbled to the ground. When he checked to 
see where he was hit he found the bullet had struck an ammo clip on his belt and 
in his hurried search he could find no wound; so he picked up his M-1 and 
continued to move up the hill. Almost immediately he was hit in the head and 
everything went black. . . . The Marines who saw him on the ground lying still 
with such a terrible head wound believed him to be dead. A corpsman did get to 
him and put a battle dressing over the wound and pulled his cap down over his 
head to staunch the flow of blood, but even he could not have given Roy much 
hope for survival. [However, Roy did survive. Later he found out the first hit had 
wounded him after all.]45 
 
Shortly after 1400, both companies fell back to the LD to let supporting arms give 
the hill another good working-over with artillery, heavy mortars (the 4.2 inch “chemical” 
mortar), and when available, airstrikes. Two more strikes from planes did arrive and 
blistered the slope with storms of napalm, strafing with .50 caliber machine guns (the 
F4-U Corsair, the most commonly utilized plane for CAS by the 1st Mar Div, carried six 
.50 caliber machine guns), and shattering blasts from rockets. At 1504, the two 
companies again sprung over the LD into the attack. This time, “a few men reached the 
top, but the casualties were so heavy that both companies were denied a hold on the 
objective.” They pulled back to reorganize 100 yards from the top. George Company 
minus one platoon left on 602, pushed forward to support its brother units at 1651, 
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attacking up the southwest slope of 680. Its other platoon would join the fray as soon as 
2/7 could send a force to relieve it.46  
It was during the actions of 3/7, September 11, that PFC Joseph L. Giovannucci 
distinguished himself. Giovannucci was an Assistant Machine Gunner in How 3/7. He 
was wounded in the right hand in his company’s assault on Hill 680, but he refused 
evacuation and “continued to aid in delivering devastating fire against the enemy in the 
face of intense hostile mortar, automatic-weapons and small arms fire.” Giovannucci 
stayed for over four hours, ever refusing evacuation, and was wounded again by enemy 
grenade fragments in both legs and feet. “Despite severe pain and loss of blood, he 
continued to assist in firing his gun until ordered to be evacuated and, by his aggressive 
fighting spirit and fortitude, served to inspire all who observed him. His outstanding 
courage, daring initiative and steadfast devotion to duty were contributing factors in the 
success of his company. . . .” Giovannucci was the first of eleven Marines who would 
receive the Navy Cross during this battle, the nation’s second highest award for bravery 
in combat.47 
Item company took one small counterattack at 1720, which crumbled and fled 
under the blistering fire of the Marine weapons. Twenty minutes later, How and Item set 
up defensive positions in perimeter on the southeast corner of 680. George reached the 
river and began crossing at 1835, but it was too close to dark to start an attack. 
Therefore, this company dug in on the low ground just north of the river between Yoke 
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and Kanmubong Ridges to be in position to attack at first light. All evening saw enemy 
76mm artillery and 82mm mortar shells bombard the companies of 3/7.48 
BAR man Joe Sipolski was there that day as well: 
I often think of that day 11th September. I remember that night march to 
Sanguine. That empty, tight knot in my stomach was a little tighter that morning. 
It didn’t take long to get in the fight. It looked like half the 1st Platoon was wiped 
out in minutes, as the wounded were working their way through our position. It 
was not a morale builder. I was working my way to the right of the main finger 
and was surprised to see how close we were to the bunkers above. I tried to get 
a few shots off but my BAR was jammed. As we worked our to the right up the 
hill, all hell was breaking loose. I hit the ground, but obviously not in a good spot. 
Shrapnel hit me in the shoulder and a bullet hit my left forearm and traveled nine 
inches up through my arm. I worked my way back to the wounded area, was shot 
up with morphine, and later started the trip back down the hill with another 
Marine who had a bullet wound through his thigh. He had just been with How Co. 
for 5 days. . . . [After the battle, a division order went out that no new 
replacements could be put into combat until they had been with their unit at 
certain number of days.] 
It was just starting to get dark when I reached the first hospital tent. . . . I 
walked into this tiny room in the tent, just enough room for three operating tables. 
On the first table was a Marine who appeared to have a bullet hole clean through 
his chest. He was sitting up. On the table to the right was a Marine with his foot 
hanging only by the skin. On the center table was a Marine lying half propped up 
with 2 doctors working on him. His face had been blown open and I could see 
inside his head. The docs were talking to him as they worked , and he was trying 
to answer back with gurgling sounds. . . . 
I walked out of the room and told a corpsman, “I don’t belong in there with 
those Marines; they’re fighting for their lives. . . .” I was loaded on a truck and 
sent back to the larger hospital in the rear . . . .49 
 
 
Later that day, Genrich was ordered to go see what had become of the other 
ammo bearers and he dashed off to where he had left his pack to see. 
They were no longer at that location. I was told some men were carrying 
wounded down the hill. I gathered up about four cans of ammo and my pack, and 
it was all I could do to lug them back up the hill. The distance seemed much 
further with the load. . . . I noticed we were only about 40 feet from the edge of 
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the trees going up the hill. In front of the trees was barren, clay-like ground for 
about 75 yards to the top where the tree line started again. 
Several attempts had been made by rifle squads to rush up the hill, I was 
told, but they had been shot up pretty badly. . . . While I was coming back up [the 
hill] I saw J. B. coming down the hill with part of his hand shot off. He had also 
been hit in the shoulder. . . . he had to lie all night at the bottom of the hill before 
he could get medical aid the next morning. He was lucky that he didn’t bleed to 
death. 
. . . When I got to the gun, Richard was firing. I jumped down in the hole to 
help load the gun and assist him. The mortar rounds seem to mostly be hitting 
back down the hill, but we had a half dozen hit close and throw rocks. . . . . I 
heard later that a sergeant and a private in a foxhole back down the hill had a 
direct hit by mortar fire. We heard they picked them up in a body bag, not 
knowing how to separate body parts. 
. . . I may have wasted several hundred rounds the next hour, as I started 
firing for where I thought [the enemy] could be concealed. There were several 
groups of heavy brush about 30 feet long and six feet high still covered with 
heavy foliage. I searched and traversed back and forth at different heights firing 
bursts, and then fired up in the trees the same way for possible snipers. It 
seemed to quiet down for a while after that. Maybe the enemy was waiting for me 
to use up the ammo.50 
 
Genrich then related that his unit dug in for the night. 
There was a little rise to the left of us and I couldn’t see any of our men, 
but could hear them firing. To the right about 20 yards away were two riflemen in 
a small hole. They were about ten feet from the edge of the treeline before the 
open ground area going to the top of the hill. This was all we could see from our 
position, but we could feel and hear other Marines around. 
The darkness started to settle in and I ate my last can of C-rations, which I 
would have saved had I known it was the last food for four days. . . . Richard . . . 
told me of the heavy casualties. The only officer left was the new 2nd Lieutenant 
from Brooklyn who had joined Howe Company about five days after I had arrived. 
I went from ammo carrier to gunner in about five hours. The assistant 
gunner became the squad leader as we were the only two left in the squad. 
Richard was a little depressed for the first time. He said they outnumbered us 50-
to-1 and could overrun us anytime they wanted. I was young and new and said, 
“Never! We’re Marines. Nobody can beat us!” This was some of the brainwashing 
leftover from stateside training. I told Richard that I had to take a crap and I was 
going to go down the hill in front of the gun. He told me to do it on top of the hill 
near the foxhole. I said that I didn’t want to smell up our area and went about 20 
feet down in front of our hole. We later heard after the hill was secured that they 
had over 2,500 land mines on the hill and not one Marine stepped on one. I 
guess they didn’t expect us to use the path on the way up the hill.51 
                                                 





Night positions for 3/7 were as follows. George was in a long irrigation ditch just 
north of the river. How and Item were in defensive positions near the top of 680. The 
night was no picnic for 3/7. “The first night about 2200 hours they started heavy mortar 
fire and it shook the ground all around us. We knew we couldn’t sleep at night anyway, 
and learned the ones that we heard before they hit would miss us.”52 
The attack of 1/7 on September 11 was towards Hill 673. Baker Company was on 
point and stepped out at 0300. Able Company followed in close support. Charlie was 
the reserve, but close at hand. Charlie and Baker began taking SA fire at 0730 from 
Check Point 2. By 0825, Baker was pinned down. Able was in column behind Baker and 
began deploying eastward. Able and Baker surged into an attack at 1100 under heavy 
SA, AW, artillery and mortar fire. Dust, mud, blood, and exploding steel filled the air. 
Each explosion was a flash and then a KRAAAKOOOOM like the sound of a gunshot 
only deeper and elongated to ten times the length in duration. It was also many times 
louder. The smells of cordite, sweat, dirt, and death were heavy. The Marines pushed 
on with parched throats and smoke-stung eyes. Some felt the fragments or bullets that 
hit them like the kick of a mule or the smash of a hammer. Others, even badly wounded, 
didn’t feel the metal that pierced them at all, only realizing they were hit when their 
strength began to bleed out with their life. Concussions lifted men from their feet or 
pushed them hard against the earth, tore off helmets, or knocked over kneeling 
corpsmen tending wounds. The sound of gunfire was a constant ripple, an unrelenting 
staccato like the drumming hits of a hard hail on a tin roof. The fire became so a man 
could no longer stand it lest the fabric of his mind shred apart like rents in wet paper and 
                                                 




Baker pulled back from the objective at 1210. Supporting arms would have to further 
pound the enemy bunkers. Able and Baker Companies leapt forward again together at 
1545 again to dash through steel, hit the dirt, lay down some covering fire for the next 
fireteam to do the same, then get up and do it again when that fireteam’s bellies found 
the earth. But they were pushed back at 1700. Baker disengaged under artillery 
covering fire ten minutes later.53 
By 1745 Charlie joined the attack and then made a night assault through mines 
and booby traps. Soon it too had to fall back to defensive positions. Total losses for 1/7 
this day were 68 WIA and 4 KIA.54 
 In the AT section attached to Baker 1/7 was PFC Troy Hamm. He remembered 
the approach to Hill 673: 
We began our assault on Hill 673 early the next morning [11September]. 
Our guns were to knock out a large enemy machine-gun bunker. This particular 
gun was in such a strategic location on the hill that if it wasn’t knocked out we 
would lose allot of men. 
My squad was ordered to move up as close to the bunker as we could, 
then set up and fire on it. Without warning, the machine-gun opened up. I 
flattened out like a lizard. I was only 150 yards away from its muzzle. 
A Marine above me on the hill was hit by the first burst. He was already on 
the ground when the rounds ripped down his back and whistled over me. Our 
squad leader yelled, “Ammo up!” The gun had been set up and was ready to fire. 
Before we could move, another squad farther back fired at the bunker; its first 
round went right into the bunker. A flamethrower was sent forward and finished 
off the position. When I walked past it, I saw it had been constructed of logs, plus 
about ten feet of dirt, which is why the artillery and air strikes had been unable to 
neutralize it. 
When we took the hill, we found some Marines who had been captured. 
They had their hands tied behind them, and had been brutally murdered. [These 
may have been KMCs.]55 
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Jack L. Cannon was attached as a sniper to Baker Company 1/7: 
The company saddled up at 0400 after our artillery support (2/11), along 
with our mortars, had begun pounding 673 and 749. The firing continued as we 
moved down across the Soyang River. . . . After we waded the river, we began to 
climb up a sharp ridge or finger leading up to the base of 673. Our 105s, “Four-
Deuces” (4.2-inch mortars), and 81mm. mortars worked on 673 and 749 for 
about three hours until we were in position in front at the base of 673. . . . A short 
time later, at about 0800 all hell broke loose. . . . The North Koreans put up a 
suicidal and fanatical defense. They were well dug in, with excellent fields of fire, 
and were well-supplied. They held high ground and had good cover and 
concealment. They had planted antipersonnel mines every damn where they 
thought you might step. There would be bayonet and hand-to-hand fighting here, 
too. . . . 
Some parts of the hill were so steep that the North Koreans didn’t have to 
throw grenades. They would just pull the pin or yank the string in the handle to 
ignite the fuse and then roll the grenades down the slope.56 
 
 The assault of 1/7 also became bogged down under the heavy enemy fire. These 
Marines had to dig in at nightfall (2330 after Charlie’s night assault was repulsed by 
heavy fire).57 
The day had cost the whole division 11 KIA and 59 WIA, and 9 WIA among the 
KMCs. Enemy losses were: 25 counted KIA, 35 estimated WIA, and 6 POWS. These 
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THE 1ST MARINES ARRIVE 
 
Day Two: September 12 
Colonel Herman Nickerson, CO 7th Marines, came up with a plan. He sent his 
reserve, 2/7, to make a night movement past 1/7’s left flank into the enemy’s rear (the 
enemy on Hill 673, a whole regiment). Thus 1/7 would be to its front and 2/7 would be to 
its rear to cut off retreat. When September 12 dawned, two 2/7 platoons were in place 
for the assault. “The Marines in the Korean War were no longer content to yield the 
night to the enemy as had been the norm in the Pacific war. Inspired by the now-
legendary cross-country night march of LtCol Ray Davis and his 1/7 in the relief of 
Toktong Pass the previous December, the 1st Mar Div had made low visibility operations 
a priority subject in its training programs.”1 
Ralph B. Steele of Fox 2/7 remembered one moment of the advance: 
So next morning we take off and we’re moving into that valley and we get – we’re 
coming off the line or off this particular line east – we’re marching east. My buddy 
said if . . . we get down to that stream and we turn right we’re going into reserve. 
Still hadn’t dawned on us attack was imminent. If we tuned left or north we’re 
going in the attack. Well, we saw the column down there making a left turn . . . 
heading for the attack.2  
 
The enemy had no clue what hit them. The Marines of 2/7 crushed many NKPA 
troops atop 673, and victory would have been complete for that objective, save heavy 
land mine concentrations between the two Marine battalions kept them from fully closing 
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the trap. The battle on Hill 673 turned into an exchange of grenades as 1/7 inched up 
the hill against heavy resistance, making the crest after 1400 that afternoon.3 
Charlie Company stepped out at 0635 toward Hill 673 and had already found 
enemy resistance by 0640. Able and Baker were prepared to assist Charlie, but 
received an estimated 360 rounds of mortar and artillery incoming. The plan was for a 
“frontal assault and double envelopment using all three companies,” (a dangerous 
maneuver because there is a strong potential in it for fratricide). By 0930, Charlie had 
only advanced about 200 yards. In coordination with Able and Baker Companies, the 
elements of 1/7 finally reached the top of 673 by 1415.  
The battle was ugly and deadly. Also with Baker Company, 1/7, was Jack L. 
Cannon: 
As I was going up the front of 673 on September 12, I passed a Marine with a 
mortar round embedded in his chest with just the fins sticking out. I think he 
might have still been alive. It hadn’t exploded. A little further on, I passed a red-
headed Marine whose face I knew (I didn’t know his name), lying on his back, 
with his head downhill. He had a .51-caliber hole in his forehead and the back of 
his head was gone. . . . At about 1030, a flame thrower operator was going up 
the same way I was now going. His target was a bunker that was directly in our 
path. This Marine stopped within 25 feet of the bunker, then torched it, frying the 
occupants inside. I didn’t think he would make it—but he did. I watched him all 
the way.4  
 
The Marines also received supporting fire from tanks. Cannon described 
their actions: 
Tanks from either “Charlie” or “Dog” company were firing from 
approximately 1,200 yards to our right rear into bunkers where heavy machine 
guns were located. Those tankers were damned good. They were putting high 
explosive rounds [90mm] into a 20-inch aperture to knock out those Maxims 
(machine guns). 
As the men in the assault platoon were nearing the top of 673, the 90mm. 
tank rifle rounds were clearing their heads by about 40 feet. The skipper was 
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yelling into his radio for them to lift their fire. One bunker, on a little knob that 
jutted out from the right side of 673, had one of the machine guns that were 
giving us problems. One tank round went into the aperture. Maxim and crew went 
straight up through the logs, dirt and rocks, about 50 feet in the air.5 
 
Sergeant Frederick W. Mausert was a Squad Leader in Baker, 1/7. His company 
was pinned down and getting decimated in a hail of murderous enemy machine gun, 
artillery, and mortar fire. Mausert leapt from cover and ran through the dense minefields, 
enemy rounds striking all around him, to move two badly injured Marines to cover. He 
received an excruciating head wound in the process, but refused evacuation. He 
insisted on staying with his squad. His platoon was ordered to assault a few minutes 
later, and Mausert led his men “in a furious bayonet charge against the first of a literally 
impregnable series of bunkers.” He fell to the ground stunned when a bullet hit his 
helmet, but was back up a moment later, still driving forward. He personally knocked out 
one machine gun nest and helped destroy several other emplacements. He reorganized 
his men for a “renewed fight to the final objective on top of the ridge.” He then, “boldly 
left his position when the enemy’s fire gained momentum,” making himself visible to the 
enemy to draw their fire off his men so they could get into position for the assault. He 
charged alone into the teeth of the machine gun fire. He was severely wounded again, 
but still refused aid. He again led an assault to “the topmost machine-gun nest and 
bunkers, the last bulwark,” of the enemy. He once more leapt into “the wall of fire,” and 
wiped out one more MG before being mortally wounded. His “fortitude, great personal 
valor and extraordinary heroism in the face of almost certain death, had inspired his 
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men to sweep on, overrun and finally secure the objective.” He would receive a 
posthumous Medal of Honor.6 
The double envelopment had proven successful—the companies had made much 
progress. At 1800, 1/7 had dug in atop 673 for the night. These Marines counted at 
least 30 enemy KIA on the slopes of the wooded hill. In addition, 1/7 estimated another 
185 enemy to be KIA plus a large number wounded. The unit also captured three POWs 
who were from the 2nd Regiment, 1st NKPA Division, III Corps. The First Battalion, 7th 
Marines alone had sustained 35 WIA and 16 KIA this day.7 
Cpl Charles Rust was part of Baker Company 1/7. Rust was a Fire Team Leader, 
and as such, led his fire team against bunkers on 673, knocking out the first of four with 
grenades. He was hit in the arm but refused evacuation and continued to assault enemy 
bunkers. He took up a BAR and used a tree stump to support its weight because of his 
injured arm. His fire was deemed accurate and effective in covering the advance. He 
neutralized an NKPA machine gun nest and then joined the final assault on the hill. His 
squad leader fell to fatal wounds, and Rust took over as squad leader. He charged 
through machine gun fire and a heavy concentration of enemy grenades in an attack 
that lifted enough enemy pressure that his unit secured its objective. Mortally wounded 
in the attempt, Rust fell at last. Charles Vernon Rust was awarded a posthumous Navy 
Cross.8 
PFC Troy Hamm described the first night on Hill 673: 
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We moved up the hill and learned quickly to walk on the trails that the 
North Koreans had used; the rest of the hillside was covered with land mines and 
booby traps. 
That night we sat our gun on top of the skyline in a bomb crater. Five of us 
move back to another large hole. There were no trees, bushes—not even twigs. 
The whole mountaintop was bare, the soil, from the pounding it had received, 
was like silt. 
We began catching incoming rounds. We heard the POP in the mortar 
tube, then along the ridgeline to the right, POW! We began to count the 
explosions and soon realized they were coming closer; the North Koreans were 
walking the rounds toward us. We hunched as low as we could get. The next 
round hit to our left. The one after that exploded to our right. They had bracketed 
our hole. The next round would land on top of us. We prayed out loud. A round 
hit next to us. One guy screamed and began to run. The section leader reached 
up and tripped him. We held the man down. I held my breath and waited. 
CRASH! A flash of light. I could smell and taste the powder. We lay in a heap for 
I don’t know how long. A lieutenant had been hit. He had shrapnel in his back, 
head and legs. We lay in that hole all night. It was very difficult to evacuate the 
wounded.  
We got word later that we would be relieved by the 1st Marines. We had 
lost too many men to effectively resume the attack in the morning. [The relief 
would not begin to occur until the next night. There would be another 7th Marines 
attack the next morning.]9 
 
Later that day, 1/7  began to help with the assault on Hill 749, but because of low 
ammo, had some delays. Jack L. Cannon was still with the action: 
As we . . . secured 673 and continued the attack out on Ridgeline 749, we 
were low on ammunition and extremely low on grenades. Some of the men were 
going back to the bunkers on the face of 673 and gathering up North Korean 
grenades and “potato mashers” . . . Some of them still had wet paint. I had gone 
back to the bunker which was to the left of the one that the flame thrower 
operator had cooked. I set my rifle down outside the bunker and went in to get 
grenades. This one had a “T” entrance. That is, as you entered, you went back a 
few feet and could then go either right or left into it. 
As my eyes were adjusting to the dimness, I saw an enemy soldier with a 
“burp gun” cradled in his lap, sitting against the wall. I was sure I saw him blink. 
There was no time to think about it; I had to close the gap between us as fast as 
possible and at the same time unsheathe the commando knife (Fairburn-Sykes) 
that I always carried on my belt. I drove the knife into the chest area and was 
surprised how easily it slid to the hilt. He had been hit in the body earlier, so he 
couldn’t move too fast. . . .10  
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The soldier’s little red ID book showed he was an NCO and had been in the North 
Korean Army fifteen years. He had been wounded six times in his career.11 
Mines caused many casualties, they were everywhere in the area, but not all were 
the buried, contact-type in activation. Many were triggered by trip wire. Jack L. Cannon 
continued: 
While walking away from that bunker, I felt a tug on my boondocker shoe and I 
froze in mid-stride. There, caught in the sole, was an almost invisible green trip 
wire, which led to the largest (it seemed at the time) antipersonnel mine I had 
ever seen. When I stopped, I had already pulled the pin halfway out. I got the 
wire off my boondocker and the tension off that trip wire. Then I marked it so 
someone else wouldn’t screw up and hit it. It took me quite a while to settle down 
after that little episode. I thought, “Damn, we take this hill and then I get killed.”12  
 
 And even after a hill was completely secured, the enemy would still send 
in incoming. Taking cover could prove to be a most unpleasant experience. “The 
stench from North Korean corpses was everywhere. We had to use some of the 
bunkers still filled with corpses in order to avoid getting killed by their mortars and 
artillery, as they began to shell the hill they had just gotten knocked off.”13 
September 12th also brought success to 3/7 against Hill 680. How and Item 
Companies attacked up the same southeast part of the hill, while George Company 
converged up the other side from the southwest. The latter company had to demolish at 
least seven bunkers still occupied by enemy troops.14  
Thinned ranks were evident throughout 3/7. Genrich remembered: 
The word was out that we were surrounded and they would be dropping 
ammo from planes, but no food or water. One of the guys found a water spring 
down the hillside and they went down in the dark to fill canteens. We were told 
that only about 35 men were left on the hill. Why be concerned? I still felt we 
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would come out on top. The second day we had a little sporadic fire, but with the 
planes overhead it was much calmer. They dropped ammo to us, but two-thirds 
went into enemy occupied areas. . . .  
The Lieutenant was going to take one rifleman down the hill to try to make 
it to headquarters. The company commander in his absence would be a corporal 
from one of the rifle platoons. We still had a sergeant left in third section machine 
guns, but they were only attached to the company so not in the direct line of 
command. I must admit in my mind that I felt the Lieutenant was bugging out 
while he still could and I didn’t expect him to come back.15 
 
Genrich related another experience: 
I was sitting behind the gun [that] morning and the sun had been up about one 
hour when I saw North Koreans jumping up and running. It had been so quiet 
that I was very surprised and started shooting as two, then three more, jumped 
up and ran toward the higher part of the hill. . . . I hit four or five but it should 
have been a dozen. Since I had been caught by surprise, my accuracy was not 
as good as it should have been. Then I saw several more figures under a couple 
of huge shade trees at the far end of the ridge where it had a steep drop off. I 
turned and fired several bursts at the figures in the shadows and then I saw a 
couple move into the sunlight. They were Marines and I stopped firing almost in 
shock. I later found out that they were from George Company. We were on the 
front perimeter and some of our troops hadn’t been told that Marines were 
coming up the other ridge on the attack. Richard got back and I told him what 
had happened. He said, “You had no way of knowing.” I prayed to myself that I 
hadn’t killed any Marines.16 
 
Broken down by companies, that day’s action for 3/7 against Hill 680 proceeded 
as follows. The platoon George Company had left on 602 received orders at 0230 to 
join the rest of the company to be prepared for the coming day’s assault. George 
stepped out in the assault at dawn and was almost at 680 by 0600, but did not make 
contact with the enemy until 0830 that morning. George’s commander maneuvered his 
men in a double envelopment, which succeeded in moving his men up the final 500 
yards of the hill in “fast moving attack that never lost its momentum. Expertly moving fire 
teams and squads quickly reduced seven active bunkers by the use of organic weapons 
and hand grenades.” The left platoon’s point fire team rushed a key machine gun 
                                                 




bunker on the “first pinnacle of the objective” at 0950, chucking grenades through the 
apertures and spraying the interior with bullets after the CRUMP, CRUMP, CRUMP and 
spray of dust that announced the grenades’ lethal detonations. This platoon then 
organized to repulse enemy counterattacks and await reinforcement. Soon after, the 
“right flank platoon passed through the position.” “Since the North Koreans had taken 
off, we grabbed the gun and raced up the barren open area to try and beat George 
Company to the top of the hill. This is something that I had heard when I first arrived—
that machineguns in final assault of a hill tried to be the first to the top. They had been 
on several hills before and we were trying to be the first on this hill. Several riflemen 
beat us to the top before George Company made it up the hill. We were happy it was 
part of our Howe Company.”17 
 George Company had made it to the crest of Check Point 1, and How and Item 
moved up to form a perimeter. Soon after, at 1115, these Marines had to fight off an 
enemy counterattack against George’s left. They then reported their objective, 
Checkpoint 1, Hill 680, secured as of 1115. However, the enemy harassed the Marines 
with heavy incoming the rest of the day until dusk causing many casualties. The 3/7 OP 
alone received over seventy rounds of incoming just during the afternoon.18  
On paper, that does not sound like many, but to a man hunkering for cover when 
he hears the shriek of a shell and suffering through the consummate CRASH and 
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shaking of the ground, praying all the while he survives, seventy shells can seem like a 
million and destroy a man’s nerves. More than one combat veteran has broken under 
less pressure. In a barrage where no one was injured for instance, “an 82mm mortar 
shell landed in a foxhole beside the Marine occupant and failed to explode; the nervous 
strain was so great that this Marine was evacuated to the rear aid station.”19 
Genrich recalled setting up defenses that night: 
Once we were on top [with] George Company, what was left of How 
Company set up defenses. We had a large hole on the reverse slope that gave a 
good field of fire for the machine gun. . . . 
Someone came up with a couple of trip flares and I talked a Marine into 
going with me down the hill. I needed his rifle for protection. We went about 75 
feet. We were on the side the enemy had retreated from and most likely the way 
they would come back in a counter attack. It was just starting to get a little dark 
and I set the trip wires for the flares in two open areas between trees.20 
 
That night at 2250, How Company repulsed a fifteen minute enemy counterattack. 
Jon Charles Genrich described this, too: 
We crawled into our foxholes and took turns catching an hour of sleep 
each until about 2300 hours, when somebody thought they had had heard a 
noise. We were all alert when we heard a bugle start to blow a charge. I laughed 
with disbelief because they had told us about the blowing of bugles before a 
charge during advance training. The next minute one of my flares went off and 
everyone started firing down the hill. Then the second flare went off. I felt better 
about my contribution to the battle. I was satisfied that my flares had both worked 
and had given us a little light the first minute or longer. After I fired off my eighth 
round clip, I reloaded and decided to wait just in case some Koreans broke 
through on our flank. I thought I might need a full clip to protect the machine gun. 
The new Lieutenant was running up and down the ridge, throwing bandoleers of 
ammo to the men while the firefight was going on. I felt that maybe I had judged 
the Lieutenant too hard over the last two days. 
We sat back and waited for the next charge while the artillery lay in a 
barrage. The first two or three rounds were short rounds that hit the tree tops with 
an air burst. Several men were hit with shrapnel and I heard more were hurt in 
George Company. This was not too surprising as the maps being used in many 
areas had been made by the Japanese during their occupation of Korea. Several 
errors were often found in maps when trying to drop artillery shells just over the 
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ridge. A few feet of height or tall trees could cause rounds to explode in tree tops 
above our troops. The second charge never came, so maybe the artillery had 
zeroed in on their troops who were further down the hill organizing for the second 
charge, which was normal. 
The rest of the night was quiet. We received some food. The first C-rations 
were all fruit cocktail and I had two cans and felt stuffed. I have always liked fruit 
cocktail ever since that day. . . .21 
 
 The remainder of the night was quiet for the Marines on 680, except for incoming 
shells. However, even sporadic shellfire in the dark of night is enough to make the night 
sleepless and hectic. “We heard that we were no longer surrounded and hoped to have 
more ammo and food delivered the next day. We were told Item Company had moved 
up the hill to move through our positions. I never saw Item Company so they must not 
have made it up to where we were located. The Lieutenant who had gone down the hill 
the night before returned sometime during the night, but I was not aware of it until later 
the next day.”22 
One Marine of Item Company distinguished himself that day. 2nd Lt. George H. 
Ramer, Platoon Leader of 3rd Platoon, “fearlessly led his men up the steep slopes and, 
although he and the majority of his unit were wounded during the ascent, boldly 
continued to spearhead the assault.” The slope became even steeper near the summit 
and going was slow. The enemy, now within grenade range, began to lob a hail of these 
missiles into the already thick fray. Nevertheless, Ramer charged on and destroyed one 
bunker with grenade and carbine fire. He and his remaining eight men captured the 
objective, Hill 680. “Unable to hold the position against an immediate, overwhelming 
hostile counterattack, he ordered his group to withdraw and single-handedly fought the 
enemy to furnish cover for his men and for the evacuation of three fatally wounded 
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Marines.” Ramer was badly wounded himself for the second time, but refused aid. 
When his men returned, he made them take cover, while he continued to defend 
against the enemy. He was eventually overwhelmed and mortally wounded. He would 
posthumously receive the award of the Medal of Honor, the nation’s highest award for 
bravery in combat.23 
After the attack in the morning had failed to completely wipe 673 clear of 
defenders, 2/7 had been turned north to attack Hill 749 while 1/7 had completed taking 
673. It was a tough fight, but by 1700, Objective Baker was thought to be secured. That 
estimate was wrong. Only one knob of 749 had been attained. Hill 749 had dense 
woods cloaking its slopes and these masked other defenders. Other NKPA still manned 
bunkers between 2/7 and 1/7 in bypassed positions. Hard fighting would be required to 
secure these areas. Furthermore, much of the large hill was yet to be traversed by 
USMC feet.24 
Broken down by companies, the Marines of 2/7 assaulted thusly, after turning 
towards Hill 749 while it was still relatively early in the morning (0900): the battalion 
moved out that morning in column up a draw. One airstrike was reported to hit Hill 749 
with “good results,” meaning it appeared to the FAC (Forward Air Controller) to have hit 
the target with good coverage. 
Jon Charles Genrich related the experience of ground Marines when an airstrike 
was overhead: 
Daybreak brought constant aircover from the Army, Navy, and Marines 
from daylight to sundown. We had Mustangs, Corsairs, and I believe some 
hellcats. As one group left, the next group arrived. They dropped bombs and 
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napalm and fired 20mm’s and machine guns at the enemy positions. Some of our 
guys thought they were being hit when the empty 20mm casings fell on them. 
We had yellow and red banners lying out on the barren area so they would 
know where we were located. They flew so low they almost touched the tops of 
the trees and we could see their heads like the size of a softball in the cockpit. 
The jet fighters were not useful at low levels because hills, 3,000 feet high were 
only six to eight hundred yards apart. . . . When the jets were used, they would 
drop their payload from a couple thousand feet up and were not very accurate at 
hitting targets.25  
 
 Easy leapfrogged ahead with Dog Company providing cover and began receiving 
enemy SA fire from both flanks at 0900. It then encountered mines at 0950. Dog 
Company, too, took enemy fire and grenades from then until the end of the day. Another 
airstrike, this one with “excellent results” hit the objective at 1045. A platoon from Dog 
was dispatched to stop enemy fire that had been striking Easy and Dog Companies 
from a draw. Fox moved separately at 1315 to “nose between Check Point 2 and Check 
Point Three.”26  
Ralph Steele was with Fox Company that day: 
. . . looked to me arbitrarily we depart from this path and we started up almost a 
vertical hillside. Again, it’s timber. And it was one of the toughest days of my time 
in the service scaling that . . . almost vertical hill. You’re grabbing at trees and 
whatnot and . . . of course there’s saliva and you’re getting exhausted and 
everybody’s out of breath so nobody ahead of you says a word, but all of a 
sudden . . . I looked up and I’m looking at a Gook right in the face. . . . it was so 
horrifying I couldn’t understand what I was seeing because everything on his 
head was in the wrong place. Well it turned out he had been shot just a few 
minutes before and slid down upside down and his arms are stretched out. . . . 
I’m [looking] at his face upside down. I remember he had a little mustache. His 
eyes were open. I remember him being jaundice. Really yellow looking eyes. I 
about crapped out when I saw that. But I didn’t holler to the guys down the line, 
hey, there’s a body here because . . . I didn’t have any breath to spare. . . . I 
knew it was getting close to combat now because a few more paces and there 
was a Gook propped up against a tree with his jackets open and probably 
somebody from G2 . . . had been designated to go through the uniforms to find 
out if there was any information. But he had been shot in the chest and he was 
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still alive. . . . he was breathing real heavy but there was big pink bubbles coming 
out. Well I had been taught that that’s a lung. . . . ain’t going to last long when 
that’s happening.27 
 
By 1515 Dog and Easy were on the trail in the draw between Hills 680 and 673.. 
Fox Company at 1610 was on the knob of the ridge between 673 and 749. Then Easy 
and Dog moved up 749 together to attack from the west (meanwhile Fox moved 
towards them from the east). 
Ralph B. Steele remembered the attack: 
Then within another 50 yards or so we came to the crest of a ridge and . . . 
when you get to the crest of the ridge over in Korea . . . [it’s usually] stripped of 
trees from napalm strikes and artillery and then Gooks had chopped down some 
of the trees to make bunkers. So it was all . . . [clear] of trees, and about that time 
they wanted us to do was get on the other side of the ridge because we were 
going kind of east really and then we would turn and go north. Well, as we 
started to move out a bunch of mortar fire hit on the ridge that we were going to 
occupy, so our lieutenant very wisely says we’re not going to do that. What we’re 
going to do is we go over one at a time they’ll get us one at a time. He said when 
I give the word we’re going over all at once. . . . 
. . . he was counting. It took about five seconds after they fired a round 
before they kicked the breech open, got another round inserted, pulled the liner, 
took about four to five seconds. So when the round hit . . . [he] said go, so the 
whole platoon at once – and you know when you’re running like that it seems it 
takes you five minutes, but we cleared the crest just as the 76 round hit . . . [and 
we’re] so relieved everybody’s giggling and laughing. We jumped in a hole. We 
were all laughing about it, and one of the sergeants says, you know this is the 
second time this has happened to me. . . . but we moved out . . .28 
We were starting to come up on more and more debris of battling, a few 
things struck me. One was there was a machine gun, American machine gun box 
metal [ammo can] and there had been a concussion next to it . . . and it pushed 
the sides of that box in and all the bullets on the belt had poked through the 
metal of the side of the box . . . the guy that was carrying that, he was gone. 
Then one of those horrifying things . . . I . . . just turned 20. . . . here’s three 
Gooks in a trench and a round had hit and they were buried partially, but they 
were looking out over this valley right there and a round had gone through, a 
large round [cavity] I looked at their faces because [I was young ] and you always 
get curious. . . . I could look right through the eye sockets and see the side of the 
bank behind it. What the heck. His head was gone just his cervical was sticking 
up and his head, his face. . . . the remark when my buddy was walking right 
                                                 




behind me was same as mine, well there’s three Gooks we don’t have to worry 
about.29 
 
 Elements of these two companies were on the objective at 1710, but experiencing 
heavy enemy fire in an area rife with mines. Easy Company believed it had secured 
Checkpoint 6 at 1740. The companies were arranged around the lower nose of 749. 
Dog and Easy dug in for the night at these locations at 2000. Fox was still moving with 
Easy supporting the movement with its fire. Fox at this time was on the southwestern 
nub of 749’s main plateau. It dug in soon after.30  
Steele described Fox’s perimeter that night: 
So then we formed up, made a perimeter that night. . . . We made this real tight 
perimeter and we were out from the rest of the line. We were by ourselves. We 
had . . . very good company commander and the Gooks attacked us that night 
about four times. Well, it was . . . pitch black . . . and we could hear the Gooks 
down in this ravine, hear them chattering . . . whoever their leader was was 
giving them a kind of pep talk apparently because you hear them cheer, and then 
he would blow a whistle and I could hear them crashing through that second row 
of timber. We started firing down into the ravine and the –what saved us then 
was our mortars were zeroed in on that thing and they called in mortar rounds, 
and that would break up each one of these attacks. But I remember at the time I 
was in a hole with . . . an squad leader sergeant, and I remember thinking how 
bad I didn’t want to be there. That if I had it on my own, I would get up and run as 
fast as I could run and run all the way back to Elkhart, Indiana, but the other thing 
plays at the same time. That really wasn’t an option . . . I could not let these guys 
down. That was the main thing.31 
 
During the assault, PFC Donald A. Daigneault was with Dog Company 2/7 as a 
BAR man. His squad was to cover Dog Company’s assault on Hill 673, but the squad 
found an “intricate net of anti-personnel mines and booby traps,” and several of the 
Marines went down. Daigneault noticed that NKPA troops were about to descend the 
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ridge and hit his squad while they were still stuck in the minefield. Though Daigneault 
himself bled from his own mine-inflicted wounds, he crawled through the rest of the 
minefield to meet the NKPAs and draw their fire away from the other wounded in his 
squad. Bursts from his BAR tore into seven enemy soldiers, killing four and wounding 
three others. Their companions turned tail and headed back up the ridge. Thereafter, 
Daigneault refused evacuation for his own wounds until he was sure the enemy was not 
coming again against his squad. “He was responsible for saving the lives of his 
comrades and for the accomplishment of his unit’s Mission.” For this act, Daigneault 
would be awarded the Navy Cross.32 
One Marine of Fox 2/7, Jim Swartzwelder, later recalled that day: 
At the time, I was a squad leader. Right in front of me was one of the 
ammo carriers for the machinegun outfit, a guy named Jamie Marsh. They 
had told us to stay on the trail because each side was mined. So we were 
working our way up the trail, and as you go up, it’s stop and go, stop and 
go, [like and accordion] because its so slow going up these trails. Finally 
we stopped and Jamie turned around and sat down—right on top of a 
mine. It just blew him to pieces. It blew me off of the trail, down into a gully 
and a small stream, which ran down the draw. And it wounded me, also. 
Fortunately for me, certainly not Jamie, he took all the blast . . .33 
 
 Mines continued to be a problem even when Marines knew their location. One 
Marine described a night march with trip wires over the trail. “At one point each man had 
to hand a trip wire to the next man who had to then step over the wire, which was 
attached to a mine beside the trail.” If that was not a nerve-wracking experience, 
nothing was.34 
Through September 12, 1800, Phase Two (so far) of the battle had cost the 
Marines 22 KIA and 250 WIA. The two days had been costly, and it seemed the 
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Marines had taken the short end of the stick in blood. The enemy had given almost as 
well as he had received. Enemy dead actually counted numbered 30, and 22 prisoners 
were taken. Many more were estimated as KIA; the Marines had not yet had the luxury 
of time and absence of intense fire to go around and count so it is possible the enemy 
had taken greater losses.35 
All through the day mortar fire struck the Marines. It hit even in rear areas and the 
enemy was very accurate with it. Burton F. Anderson recalled: 
I went back to my hole after talking to Brydon and settled in for a C-ration 
fruit for breakfast. Some time after 0800, the Doc, one of our corpsman [sic], 
came over to brag about his son. He stood beside my hole, telling me about his 
new baby boy that he had never seen and reading from a recent letter from his 
wife. He was a very proud papa; he knelt down to show me pictures. . . . Since 
the hills were alive with gooks, it is not surprising that spotters, gook observers, 
were behind our positions. This would have to be an explanation for a salvo right 
on target, particularly on the reverse slope. And yet the gooks would zero in their 
positions by mortars and artillery before a heavy attack. Of course, we were in 
holes the gooks had occupied the day before.  
In any case, without warning, a gook mortar barrage salvoed into our 
positions. . . . After the explosions, I felt a stinging in my back [flak vests were not 
yet issued regularly and were still being tested]. With one hand, I reached around 
and could feel pieces of metal. When I looked my hand was bloody. Then I 
realized that the corpsman was lying there outside my hole, face down. The 
same mortar that landed beside my hole, landed at his feet. The front part of his 
body had been gutted; he was killed instantly. I looked down hill at the mortar 
section. Most of them had been blown out of their holes. The barrage was a 
direct hit. In an instant, most of the mortar section were [sic] killed or wounded.36 
 
The evening of September 12 marked the arrival of the 1st Marines at the front. 
(They had been released from X Corps reserve on September 10. They were to have 
been part of Task Force Able, but because that task force was never assembled and 
Plan Apache had been canceled, the 1st Marines was released back to parent control.) 
This Marine regiment relieved the 7th Marines, which was hurting from the previous 
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fighting. Marines of 3/1 and 1/1 took over the areas of 3/7 and 1/7 near Hill 673 (2/1 
relieved 1/7 at first then moved to relieve 2/7). The 7th Marines would then go to corps 
reserve located at Wontong-ni where the roads from Inje and Kansong met.37 (See Map 
# 13) 
The Second Battalion, 7th Marines, however, was in contact with the enemy and 
dispersed; one of its companies was separated from the others by terrain and the 
enemy around Hill 749. Mortar and artillery fire were frequent on its positions. Thus 2/1, 
which was to relieve 2/7, could not effect that action in light of the tactical situation (one 
company was reported as on the “nose” of the ridge, north of 749, and the other was 
reported to be on the second “nose’ north of 749. (See Map # 23) Another company 
was south of the hill and trying to reunite with the ones to the north). So 2/7 was passed 
to control of the 1st Marines, and scheduled to revert to parent control the next day (the 
tactical situation would delay this revert, however).38 
Enemy mortar fire came in during 2/1’s approach march between 1600 and 1700 
that evening, causing four casualties. Thereafter, 2/1 tied in with 2/7 for the night. The 
1st Battalion, 1st Marines was designated regimental reserve. The next day’s combat for 
this regiment would fall primarily to the 2nd and 3rd battalions, but Able Company 1/1 
was attached to 2/1 the next day to reinforce it.39 (See Map # 24) 
The movement of the 1st Marines was not without the horrors of combat. PFC 
Floyd Baxter of Weapons Company 1/1 remembered: 
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When we entered the valley, a young guy named Brun, who had married just 
before coming to Korea, was in front of me in the column. There were tanks lined 
up on our right. I should have known then that we were in for trouble. Tanks 
almost always drew fire. We went down the road some ways when all hell broke 
loose--enemy seventy-sixes, at regular intervals, came screaming in. One of the 
first blasts knocked my helmet off. I thought, Now I’ve got no place to hide. Then 
it was run and hit the deck, run and hit the deck. A shell exploded to the left. I 
looked up, Brun was already on his feet and running. I jumped up and followed. I 
ran about ten steps when I heard another shell coming in. This one didn’t whistle; 
the sound was more like someone blowing between his teeth. Brun dove to his 
right, I jumped to my left. He never knew what hit him; the blast caught him full in 
the chest. The Marine behind me went to pieces. I believe he finished his tour in 
a rear-echelon administrative job.40 
 
PFC Frank J. Davidson of 1/1’s Heavy Weapons Company, too, remembered the 
move up: 
We approached the line in the night, and we could see the flashes and 
hear explosions nearby. My stomach was knotted. This was my first experience 
in actual combat, and I had no idea what was happening or what we could 
expect. 
With all the noise and the explosions so near, I had a mental picture of 
incoming enemy artillery. The night just seemed full of it. Until we got close 
enough to see the guns, I didn’t realize that we were moving up through our own 
artillery positions, and what I was hearing was our own guns firing.41 
 
 Of the experience of being relieved, Genrich, with 3/7, remarked: 
  
The next morning they were talking about Howe Company being ready to 
move off the hill into a reserve area. They started letting the Marines from Howe 
Company go down the hill the way they had come up four [sic] days before. The 
Lieutenant from George Company said they didn’t have a machinegun to fill our 
position and could we wait until they had another gun available. Richard and I 
stayed until another machinegun relieved us and we then went down the hill. I 
was carrying my machine gun down the hill I had heard that there were 27 left on 
the hill in Howe. Another source said 35 and one book said 45. This must have 
included all the stretcher-bearers who never made it back up the hill. Even today 
I can still picture every hill and where each man was located around me in the 
battle for Bloody Ridge. 
An article in LIFE magazine my sister had read said the troops had looked 
old and haggard coming off the hill. I know that I was all smiles and even skipped 
a little going down the hill with the gun on my shoulder. When we got to the river 
there were amphibious DUKWS waiting to take us down the river. Richard and I 
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were the only ones on ours besides the operators. Most of the company had left 
a couple of hours earlier so we arrived later at the reserve area and didn’t march 
in with the company or make roll call.42 
 
Day Three: September 13 
 
The attack plan for the 1st Marines was set forth in Regimental OpnO 20-51. This 
order was issued on September 12, and set a timeline for relief of the 7th Marines to be 
completed by 2400. The First Battalion, 1/1, was initially to be in regimental reserve, 
ready to assume mission of either 2/1 or 3/1 as ordered. For September 13th, 3/1 and 
2/1 were to attack towards the objectives 2/7 and 3/7 had been fighting for; 2/1 to seize 
the rest of Hill 749 (Division Objective Baker) and portions of the ridgeline that included 
Hills 812, 980 and 1052 (Regimental Objective Roger); 3/1 to attack and take an 
unnamed Hill between Hill 751 and 812 -- part of a finger ridge than ran up to Hill 1052 
from the southeast --, and Hill 751. H-Hour was set for 0500.43  
Complications in the tactical situation meant that the 1st Marines, originally slated 
for an H-hour of 0500, September 13, had to wait until 0900 to attack. In addition, 
ammunition had to be moved up to the front for the regimental assault to begin and 
roads had been blocked by the enemy, and “movement of all units to their assigned 
positions was very slow due to heavy evacuation traffic on the trails and difficulty in 
locating guides and prescribed routes at night.” One company of KSCs (Korean Service 
Corps) was added to help the regiment move supplies forward, 240 men. One 
technological innovation, however, kept the delay to a minimum.44 
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Casualties throughout the Korean War in the Marine division had been extracted 
by helicopter as well as land transport, and in the rugged mountains north of the 
Punchbowl, helicopters were a godsend. However, these “whirlybirds” could only lift two 
wounded men at a time, usually in external litters. There was delay because of the 
heavy numbers of wounded waiting to be taken to field hospitals or battalion or 
regimental aid stations in the rear (but the choppers made up for the delay and then 
subtracted from it by moving tons of supplies forward as well). The “chopper” helped 
save many wounded Marines who otherwise would have died. One estimate was that 
as little as thirty minutes passed from a Marine’s actual wounding to the time of his 
arrival at a triage point over seventeen miles to the rear. (If he was one of the lucky 
ones who got to be evacuated by chopper. Chopper evacuation was not always or even 
usually the method utilized in combat.)45 (See Photo # 4) 
Wadie Moore received both stretcher and helicopter evacuation: 
“‘Wrap him in a poncho,’ Doc said. Then it was bumpity-bump-bump down 
that hill with somebody dragging me in that poncho. Oh, it was cold! Surely this 
ride will be over soon. Then we came to this stream and the communists were 
throwing mortars into that thing until you’d think they were going to blast all the 
water out of it.” 
After being dropped and abandoned by his Blue Boy porters, Moore heard 
the sergeant directing the helicopter evacuation of wounded holler, “Get that man 
floating downriver—get him !” Marines dragged him to the side of the water and 
soon he was strapped in a basket whizzing through the air on the 90-mile trip 
back to adequate hospital care for the seriously wounded. 
“In those days the choppers were so frail they had to have a dummy for 
ballast opposite the wounded. It wasn’t necessary in this case as my old friend 
Ed DeFlice served that purpose. We shared the coldest ride of our lives.”46 
 
That same day, Operation Windmill I (named after the code name for 3/1), the first 
battlefield helicopter resupply operation in any war, commenced when helicopters 
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brought a whole day’s worth of supplies to 2/1, bypassing seven miles of harsh terrain. 
It took 28 flights, but this was accomplished in only 2.5 hours. The amount of supplies 
amounted to 18,848 pounds essential to the assaulting battalions. Meanwhile, seventy-
four casualties were evacuated via the return trips.47  
“Making their deliveries close to the top and on the reverse slopes of high terrain 
the helicopters greatly aided the attacking units.” However, this was not something the 
infantry could count on every day. “Resupply by helicopter could be had only in 
emergencies and when the regular supply routes were either exhausted or not 
trafficable.”48 
The usual method of extraction for wounded was by stretcher. PFC Frank O. Hart 
was a Marine with 2/1 that day: 
Before we relieved the 7th Marines on Hill 749, we were pressed into service as 
stretcher bearers for them. I was helping carry a stretcher with a man who had a 
serious leg wound, and as we were carrying him we kept getting stray rounds of 
small-arms fire. A spent round hit the wounded man’s good leg and just dropped 
into the stretcher without doing any damage. I thought at the time how ironic it 
would have been for this poor guy to get hit in his good leg just as he was being 
carried out, presumably getting out of harm’s way.49 
 
 Before being relieved this day, elements of 2/7 went again into the attack to 
contact the rest of 2/7’s elements still on the hill. Fox 2/7 stepped out at 0500. At 0545, 
the report was received that 2/1 was moving in to relieve them from Hill 673. Fox and 
Easy were trying to close the gap between themselves to create a perimeter and were 
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still attempting this movement at 0700. Enemy fire was heavy and bogged the units 
down.50 
Ralph B. Steele was with Fox in the assault: 
Then the next morning we jump off and we—again, we don’t know what 
the situation [is]. We don’t know if the Gooks had pulled out or what until. . . . 
Well, it turned out they hadn’t, so we had to make an attack and we came up. . . . 
A Napalm canister burned up, tin was there and we were being brought up and 
we were trying to envelop this positions, and the lieutenant was releasing the 
guys one at a time. And to me this was the moment of truth because when these 
guys would run across there you could see the dirt popping up from being fired 
from this bunker. . . . We had a machine gun back here that was firing into that 
bunker. When [the lieutenant] heard that machine gun fire he would release us. 
That way momentarily they ducked and we would have a better chance of getting 
across. Again, the same lieutenant that released us in mass in another tactical 
situation. That’s why those aren’t dumb guys that are wearing—for the most part 
wearing those bars. This guy was clever. He had a different tactical problem, and 
nobody’s coaching him. We’re 18, 20 year old kids and this guy’s a 23, 24-year 
old man. . . . So anyway, that’s me running here and I thought because they 
couldn’t get their guns depressed, if I can get to that Napalm tin, I’ll have it made.  
. . . So we got there. Here’s where a brave thing happens. This is what 
makes boot camp training professionalism absolutely witness to good training. 
We were pinned down. I and the rest of our squad had our heads as close to the 
ground as we could on account of this bunker firing, but the platoon sergeant 
came up on his knees and commanded return that fire. We jumped up or stood 
up, stand up, came up on our knees as one and returned that fire and got fire 
supremacy. Would I do that today? I would say are you nuts? . . . No. Training. 
Number one, tremendous act of bravery. I mean, that’s –command initiative from 
a sergeant, doesn’t get any medal, you know. And he’s right in the face of that 
fire commanded to us, return that fire. Again, our training was so good we didn’t 
think except to return that fire.51 
 
 Fox finally contacted elements of 2/1 at 1220 and began heading for the rear. Dog 
attacked at 1430. It and Easy were “continually receiving heavy enemy mortar, small 
arms, and automatic fire.”  
The Marines of 2/1 were supposed to relieve the rest of 2/7, but these elements 
(companies Dog and Easy) were thought to be on the reverse slope of Hill 749. Both 2/1 
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and the last companies of 2/7 had a hot fight on their hands for the rest of the daylight 
hours. Clearly 749 was no enemy outpost, but a key position in his MLR.52 
Dog contacted 2/1 at 1825, and 2/1 reported it had relieved all 2/7 elements. 
However, withdrawal of Dog and Easy was impeded at 2200 by heavy enemy incoming. 
It took them an hour and a half to finally start for the rear.53 
From the perspective of 2/1, the same action described above for 2/7 was reported 
as follows. The relief of Fox 2/7 (the company on the south part of 749 – see Map # 23) 
by 2/1 ended by 1100. (Whereupon Fox 2/7 began to withdraw), but 2/1 ran into at least 
one enemy counterattack at 0820 while getting there. The passage of lines (and relief) 
by 2/1 through 2/7 began by 0915.54  
Subsequently, 2/1 commenced the assault at 1200 with Easy Company in the lead 
supported by “a very close air strike, 81mm mortars and HMG platoon. Tanks were 
firing on located enemy bunkers on south slopes of Hill 812 and Objective BAKER.” 
Going was rough right off the bat. Easy Company “gained the crest of Hill 749 at 1210 
and was driven off by murderous enemy mortar and hand grenade fire. At 1230, 2/7 
coordinated close in support of 2/1’s attack on Hill 749 with the aid of 60mm mortars 
and small arms.”55 
Adequate air support did not arrive to help 2/1 in its assault. “After the jump off it 
was immediately apparent from the heavy volume of mortar, automatic weapons, small 
arms fire and the hail of grenades employed by the enemy, that further air strikes would 
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be essential. The 2dBn was receiving very heavy casualties at this time. Air did not 
arrive on station, so the battalion resumed the attack on Hill 749 at 1430 and continued 
to meet a fanatical enemy defending his positions to the death.” While CAS was no 
genie in the bottle that would make any assault bloodless, it was an effective weapon 
that could have further softened the objective and saved some lives by exchanging steel 
for blood. And the greatest benefit of all was that it scared the enemy into keeping his 
head down longer and more effectively than anything else—the NKPA were very fearful 
of Napalm—and this saved more friendly infantry lives in an attack. “. . . then they called 
in the planes and they didn’t even have to make a strike. They just started orbiting the 
neighborhood and then of course the Gooks fell silent then because they didn’t want to 
be on a Napalm attack.” They NKPA were not nearly as afraid of artillery as they were 
of air strikes. CAS was a very effective, morale-crushing weapon. “Enemy morale [was] 
poor, afraid of napalm bud adequate[ly] dug in against artillery. . . .”56 
Hill 749 was still an enemy-manned fortress. “The enemy were emplaced in 
camouflaged bunkers, well over-headed and connected by trenches; in addition many of 
these positions were tunneled, giving the forward and reverse slopes of Hill 749 a honey 
combed effect.” The tunnels could be used by an enemy to re-man a bunker even after 
the Marines thought they had knocked it out. Furthermore, the forward slope defenses 
were only partially neutralized by 3.5 inch rockets (bazookas) and artillery.57 (See Photo 
# 5) 
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Besides the mines, Hill 749 was one tough defensive network. It was part of one of 
the “T’ shaped ridges, and the enemy had taken maximum advantage of the terrain in 
his defense. The right-angle ridges were murderously effective defensive bulwarks 
providing a strength similar to that of inland defenses on Iwo Jima, Peleliu, and 
Okinawa. “Attackers fighting their way up the leg of the ‘T’ came under deadly crossfire 
from the head of the imaginary letter—a transverse ridgeline bristling with mortars and 
machine guns positioned in bunkers.”58 
Even in the hell of this battle, some Marines still had a sense of humor. Navy 
Corpsman Joe Havens with 2/1 remembered: “The first North Korean I saw was a dead 
one. Left so we newcomers would see him, he was propped up in a sitting position in a 
bend on one of the trails on Hill 749. He held in one hand a dead man’s poker hand of 
aces and eights.”59 
Some reports from other elements of the division deemed support from both air 
and artillery adequate that day, but past a certain geographic point, 2/1 could not utilize 
either freely lest they inadvertently hit 2/7’s remaining men. The “cannon cockers” of the 
11th Marines (and X Corps artillery like the 780th FAB, Battery “C”) expended 2,133 
rounds of artillery. Marines used 4.2 inch mortars abundantly that day as well. These 
fired 261 HE (High Explosive) and 28 WP (White Phosphorous “Willie Pete”) rounds in 
the day’s fighting. Engineers helped the advance by clearing mine fields. Charlie 
Company 1st Tank Battalion, fired 720 rounds, which resulted in the destruction of six 
NKPA bunkers.60 
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Tanks also provided valuable, “bunker busting” capability where they were able to 
be moved into supporting position in the steep, rocky terrain. The 1st Mar Div had a 
battalion of tanks organic to it, the 1st Tank Battalion (1/Tank), and their 90mm guns 
could provide flat trajectory, highly accurate fire on targets far beyond the range of 
mortars and recoilless rifles. However, in this area northeast of the Punchbowl, tanks 
were limited by terrain as to the amount of support they could offer.61 
Easy’s resumed attack had the “maximum support of 81mm mortars, light and 
heavy MGs and fixed bayonets.” At 1500, 2/1 plunged through a “hail of enemy hand 
grenades, mortar, small arms and automatic weapons fire to encounter the enemy in 
their positions.” This fighting entailed bayonet and hand to hand combat in order to 
secure the summit of 749, “the southern extremity of the 1st Marine Division’s Objective 
BAKER.”62  
The Marines of 2/1 made the crest with generous use of grenades and small arms. 
Grenades hissed as their fuses ignited, BARs growled their guttural ire and spat out 
streams of full-auto .30-06 slugs, M-1 Garand rifles “pinged” as their 8 round clips 
ejected from the rifles and bolts snapped shut on fresh loads. Smoke and dust and mud 
and fire stung the eyes and chocked in the throat as men tried to breath in a red cloud 
of fury. Men closed with the enemy in narrow trenches and muddy gun pits to contest 
for one another’s lives with the butt of a rifle, or the honed steel of a bayonet punching 
through a dirty cotton uniform to eviscerate the soft flesh beneath. Dark blood splattered 
wetly on rocks and stained the earth with a new sticky mud as old as humanity. Grimy, 
bone-weary Marines with parched throats and eyes ancient for their youth emerged 
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survivors from the fray and tried to gather the will and scrape up the energy to do it all 
over again if the enemy should counterattack (he usually did). “Ammo up!” the call went 
out. Bullets were more important than water. Marines lowest in rank gritted their teeth 
and staggered off for the supply point. The others shook all too light canteens for a 
precious few drops to drink and cut their intense thirst. But in the Korean War, the 
Marine Corps enforced “water discipline,” meaning it was strictly rationed and scarce, 
men could not drink their fill. This may seem ironic since the Marine Corps in later times 
would demand that each man drink almost constantly to “hydrate.”  
The Marines were now on top, but Hill 749 was far from secure. The wooded 
slopes contained many more enemy fortifications. And with 2/1 on the summit, the 
companies of 2/7 on the reverse slope were less than 400 yards away. Nevertheless, it 
was not until 2025 that the mission to relieve these companies could be effected. The 
Marines of 2/1 would have to again dispute every inch of intervening ground with the 
determined enemy in “fierce bayonet and hand to hand combat.” Even then, an 
estimated 80 enemy remained hidden in bunkers about the hill. The 2nd Battalion 1st 
Marines would need to reorganize and ready itself to fight on. Soon it was apparent that 
the remaining elements of 2/7 were not where they were reporting themselves to be. 
Confusion among its leaders in the fog of war had led to the mistake. Marines of 2/1 
finally found the rest of 2/7 to the left and rear of its lines when they had expected them 
at their front.63 (See Map # 23)   
Dog Company passed through Easy 2/1 soon after the former had made the crest 
of 749, and pushed the attack, still trying to make contact with the missing elements of 
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2/7, reported to be to the front of 2/1 (they were actually behind at this point). At 1612, 
Dog “was engaged with a fiercely resisting enemy,” but was moving forward slowly. 
However, it could not use maximum supporting arms for fear of hitting the still missing 
elements of 2/7. Soon, enemy counterattacks hit the Dog Company Marines from the 
ridgeline leading north from 749 towards 812, but by 1820, Dog Company found 2/7’s 
last elements. These were located to its rear, not its front, and had moved to meet them 
from the southwest. “At this time, it became evident that there was, in fact, no friendly 
elements of 2/7 on the high ground of . . . [Hill 749] as had been continually and 
specifically reported throughout the course of the day.”64  
Dog Company received orders at 1830 to hold ground gained, “and to register in 
supporting arms immediately in order to repel any expected counterattack in strength.” 
Companies Easy and Fox 2/1 moved forward then to tie in a perimeter defense with 
Dog. (See Map # 25 for positions.) Positions were dug in by 2000. The elements of 2/7 
left for the rear at this time. Just among 2/1, the casualties were heavy (4 KIA and 224 
WIA).65 
With the mission to relieve 2/7 done, the elements of 2/7 under control of the 1st 
Marines were released back to them at 2025. That night, 2/1, too, fought off enemy 
counterattacks. Come morning, it would resume the assault.66 
PFC Frank Hart of 2/1, described digging in that evening on Hill 749: 
After we secured Hill 749—we gave it our own name, Bloody Ridge—in 
the late afternoon of September 13, we had to dig in to receive the expected 
counterattack from the gooks. My Bunkie, Tom Hull, and I had a long discussion 
about where we should dig. I was sure I had just the perfect spot. A huge 
hemlock tree had been uprooted by artillery fire, and I was trying to tell Tom that 
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this was the A-1 spot because we could use the tree trunk as a natural parapet. 
But Tom was adamant and kept insisting that we dig in about twenty feet behind 
the uprooted tree. 
I just couldn’t understand his reasoning, but after arguing about it for ten 
minutes I gave in—mainly because he had been in Korea for about two months, 
and I had just arrived. 
Five minutes after we started digging, two Marines from our platoon came 
along and spotted that big uprooted hemlock, and they said, “That’s the perfect 
spot” and started digging. 
About an hour after we were all dug in, a gook artillery barrage began. 
These two Marines who had “my” hemlock tree took a direct hit from a mortar. 
One of them was killed outright, and the other was barely breathing when we dug 
him out. I doubt he lived. I just thank the Good Lord for giving Tom Hull the 
persistence to talk me out of it. 
The gooks were artists with mortars. They probably had that hemlock tree 
registered and were just waiting for some Marines to move in.67 
 
The Third Battalion 1st Marines (3/1), to 2/1’s left (on Hill 680—they had finished 
the relief there of 3/7 at 1235), was slated to take Battalion Objectives 1, 2, 3 and 4, 
which were stepping stones to taking Hill 751 (Regimental Objective Sugar), and the 
ridgeline that included Hill 1052 (Regimental Objective Roger), but this mission was 
complicated by the fact that strong enemy firepower still remained on 749. (For 
positions, see Map # 26.) These enemy emplacements could subject a force attacking 
751 to first oblique, then enfilade flanking fires as it advanced. (This fire, because of the 
height of the enemy emplacements, would be plunging as well as grazing fire with the 
beaten zones being just about anywhere an attacking Marine could hope to hide.) The 
attack was scheduled for 0900 but was delayed by regimental order “pending air for 
further reduction of enemy positions,” and “by order of the Regimental S-3 because the 
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2nd Battalion was unable to effect relief by that time” – the two battalions were intended 
to attack concurrently and with coordination, not piecemeal.68  
The attack did not resume until 1315. The air support, as usual, was late and 
ineffective. Nevertheless, 3/1 attacked towards 751 and encountered heavy 
concentrations of AP (anti-personnel) mines, though enemy fire was light at first. 
George and Item Companies were in the lead. How Company remained in Battalion 
Reserve on Hill 680. Item was to seize Battalion Objectives 1 and 3; George, Battalion 
Objectives 2 and 4. The enemy resistance remained light for Item until 1600. Thereafter 
enemy fire became so intense it brought the Company to a halt. George Company on 
the other hand found extensive booby traps and mines in its area. It, too, met heavy fire 
as it neared it objectives and was ordered to dig in for the night in its present positions 
at dusk, about 400 yards short of Objective 2.69 (See Map # 25) 
Item Company continued its attack and “was able to envelope the enemy positions 
on Objective 1 shortly after dark . . .” But by 2030, Item too had dug in for the night.70 
Spike Selmyhr of George Company, 3/1, was wounded that day. It was his most 
vivid battle of his Korean service. He recalled about the enemy that “The enemy that I 
saw were young, generally tenacious and determined fighters. They fought differently 
than us in that they seemed to have less concern for any casualties they might suffer in 
a headlong charge. Not too much finesse.”71   
He went on: 
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There were heavy concentrations of small arms and automatic weapons fire 
skillfully used to cover avenues of approach to their [the enemy] positions. They 
made good use of camouflage, and were tenacious in holding their positions, 
although there was little initiative on the part of subordinates. During the attack . . 
. [against Kanmubong Ridge], my platoon was driving along a very narrow ridge 
line covered with trees and brush. We began to receive small arms and 
automatic weapons fire on Hill 751, and I moved forward to encourage the men 
and to direct their fire and maneuver.72 
 
He exhibited a great example of one principle of leadership on the small-unit level, 
that the officers should be up front: 
A major difficulty in battle is the total confusion of noise, shouting, the crack of 
bullets, and making sure the troops know where their officers are and that they 
are sharing their danger. If the officers are all down behind rocks, trees, etc., and 
say “Go get ‘em” or “charge,” no one is going to go. However, if as the leader one 
stands up and says, “Let’s go,” they will all go. The tough part is that when the 
first person stands up (the officer), he feels as if a large bull’s eye has been 
painted on his body.73 
 
Many Marine Lieutenants were felled in such a way, but someone, even if it was 
an NCO and not an officer, was expected to fill that role if an officer fell to enemy fire. 
Selmyhr’s account continues: 
When the firing intensified, I threw myself down into the prone position and 
received a bullet in my left shoulder. There was not a lot of pain, and when I tried 
to move my arm I found that it worked fine, so I again moved forward behind the 
leading squad. The firing was pretty brisk, and the troops were doing well in 
returning the fire and in moving to covered and concealed positions. Maybe ten 
or fifteen minutes later, I saw a North Korean come out from behind some rocks 
and start to point his rifle at me. He was about 30 yards away from me when I 
shot him. I had reacted to the small arms and automatic weapons fire from the 
enemy by directing the fire of my troops and encouraging them, and by dropping 
the enemy I faced. After that, I was in a prone position looking for a target. I 
picked what I thought was an arm or shoulder of an enemy and as I moved my 
head to the right to look through my sights (about 2-3 inches), I took a bullet that 
entered my left cheek and in grazing fraction exited behind my left ear, taking out 
part of the mastoid bone. The shock was as if someone had hit me with a 
baseball bat. No pain, but lots of blood. I do not know whether it was a stray 
round, a machine gun round, or a rifle round. God knows why, but I tried to stand 





up and discovered that the damage to my inner ear was such that I had no sense 
of balance. I immediately fell down. 
At that time, Sergeant English from the machine gun platoon came out 
and said, “Lieutenant, put your arm around my neck and I’ll walk you back behind 
the ridge line to first aid.” I told him to get the hell out of there as bullets were 
flying around us. He ignored the remark, and with my arm around his neck we 
walked back maybe 25-30 yards with bullets kicking up dust around our feet and 
clipping leaves from the trees overhead. Neither of us was touched again. “War 
Hero” is a term tossed about too freely, in my opinion. A war hero to me is 
someone who does something beyond the normal. He does something 
dangerous that he might not normally choose to do to execute a mission or to 
save another Marine, but it must be above the normal responsibilities. Sergeant 
English fits that perception. He came out to assist me under a hail of small arms 
fire when I was hit. 
. . . We got to a corpsman who took off my helmet, looked at my head 
wound, and then covered his face with his hands and said, “Oh MY God!” I took 
that as a discouraging word. I had no idea how badly I was hit. I just knew I was 
bleeding a lot. He bandaged me up and they put me on a stretcher to evacuate 
me. I refused to go until some of my men who had been wounded were taken 
away first. Evacuation of the dead was not a priority at that time. . . . I was damn 
lucky, even though I had been wounded. The instant I was hit in the head, I had 
just moved my head to the right about two or three inches to look through the 
sights of my weapon. Had I not done so, that shot would have been right 
between the head lamps. When I was evacuated, I really hated leaving my 
buddies behind. . . .74 
 
After that, the Lieutenant who had replaced Selmyhr was killed the next day. (This 
man’s wife gave birth to a son a month later.) The man that replaced him fell WIA the 
day after that. Selmyhr’s evacuation took over seven hours via Korean stretcher 
bearers. (Not all wounded got to be evacuated via helicopter.) He was then flown by 
plane to Seoul, then by train to a MASH hospital. They did not treat his wounds properly 
there, and his shoulder almost developed gangrene. From there, he went aboard 
another train to Pusan and the Navy Hospital ship Repose. Eventually, he was taken to 
Yokosuka, Japan, and a Navy hospital.75 





Platoon Sergeant William Gaul of Item Company 3/1 had led his platoon well that 
day. His platoon had been on point through the “torturous drive by his company against 
a fanatically defended, enemy-held key position on commanding ground.” Gaul lost no 
men in getting to the base of the objective, though his men inflicted heavy losses on the 
enemy, and he exposed himself time and again to enemy fire while spearheading an 
assault up almost 800 yards of steep slope. His example encouraged his men, and he 
ever exhorted them to push on.76  
After dark, while it was still evening, and before the Marines of 3/1 had secured 
defensive positions (they were still advancing on the hill), the assaulting units were 
pinned by a swarm of flashing green tracers from enemy machine gun fire, “emanating 
from a strategically located and seemingly impregnable bunker.” Platoon Sergeant Gaul 
was again an example of courage. He charged the bunker and lobbed grenades 
through the ports, killing two NKPA and wounding six others. His men were then able to 
continue the advance.77  
Later, another platoon needed supporting fire and Gaul immediately set up a LMG 
(Light Machine Gun) and fired effectively enough for that platoon to advance. 
“Consistently maintaining superb control to assure maximum fire power and, at the 
same time, provide the best possible cover and concealment for each individual, he 
pressed on in his unfaltering determination to overrun and destroy the aggressors and, 
after the objective had been seized, hastily positioned his men in a defensive perimeter 
and continued to direct their efforts in driving off each succeeding counterattack 
                                                 




launched by the enemy.” Gaul was mortally wounded in repulsing enemy counterattacks 
the night of September 14.78 
 Nightfall did not mean a truce between combatants in Korea. The Marines had 
mortar fire incoming throughout, besides the multiple enemy assaults of company 
strength on 3/1’s positions. Ten counterattacks by over 300 enemy kept the 3/1 Marines 
embattled, and these were finally repulsed with heavy combat. At 2100 both George 
and Item Companies were hit by what were estimated as platoon-sized enemy attacks. 
(Later, when dead enemy officers were found, it was discovered the attacks were of 
company strength.) Item Company would have three such attacks before 0030, while 
George Company received seven, the last being at 0430. In the meantime, How 
Company, which had moved west from 680 to dig in for the night about a thousand 
yards east of George Company, took artillery fire on their positions during the night.79  
As intense as the action was for the defenders, the attackers were cut down in 
heaps. “The fighting was so bitter that the slopes in front of the 3rd battalion positions 
were littered with enemy equipment and enemy dead at light of dawn.” The enemy 
casualties in front of 3/1 were: 90 counted KIA and an estimated 170 WIA. Friendly 
casualties for the entire previous day for 3/1 were 7 KIA and 46 WIA.80 
It was around September 13 when the enemy saw need to relieve the 1st NKPA 
Division due to the abundant casualties sown within its ranks by the Marines. The 91st 
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Regiment, 45th NK Division was ordered to counterattack and take back the ground lost 
the last few days.81 
Enemy losses for the day were 14 counted KIA, 85 estimated KIA (those from the 
night’s actions would be counted the next day), 60 estimated WIA, and 19 POWs. The 
Marine Division reportedly lost 12 KIA, 88 WIA (and 5 WIA among the KMCs).82 
However, there is discrepancy in these numbers. Just one battalion, 2/1, reported 
its losses for the day as 4 KIA and 224 WIA. Given that the battalion was a smaller unit 
and probably therefore had a better idea of how many it had lost, it is probably safe to 
assume that 2/1 knew how many losses it had (the Historical Diary for the month was 
written weeks later when dual reports and confusion of combat had had time to be 
ironed out). Possibly, too, the 2/1 assessment had included Marines who had been hit 
but just bandaged themselves and continued fighting, and the Division report was just 
casualties actually evacuated. (Yet the discrepancy is worsened when one notes that 
the Regimental Historical Diary for the 1st Marines lists the number of casualties for the 
day for the entire regiment as only 3 WIA, a grossly inaccurate statement in light of the 
battalion reports.)83 
 With the casualties for the day from the rest of the 1st Marines’s battalions added 
in, the total of losses climbs to 270 WIA, and 11 KIA. Then the 7th Marines’s known 
losses (the only losses recorded are for 2/7) raise it again, this time to 18 KIA and 357 
WIA. If a similar underestimation of casualties taken in the division is true of even just a 
few other days in the period, then the losses for the battle may very well be drastically 
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higher than even General Thomas realized when he told the AF that inadequate CAS 
had cost him lives. 
However, in the case of at least one Marine, the KIA count could be erroneous, “I 
usually received three or more letters a week and couldn’t understand what was wrong. 
Everyone was getting mail but me. It had been a week or over since last mail call. I 
waited a few more days then went and complained. About two days later, I received 
about seven letters marked KIA on them. I guess that since we came back late and 
never made roll call, they thought I was a casualty.” But, it should be noted again, the 
Historical Diaries were written a month after the actions involved, so time was there to 
correct such errors in the final report.84 
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CHAPTER 8  
 
TO HOLD BACK THE NIGHT 
 
Day Four: September 14 
The 1st Marines opened its bloodiest day of the battle by resuming the attack at 
0830 and 0900. The order was given in Regimental Frag Order 132247. It basically 
stated to continue the attacks of the previous day with 1/1 moving forward to an 
assembly area in preparation of passing through 2/1 to continue the attack. Enemy 
artillery and mortar incoming was accurate and plentiful, while machine gun fire 
peppered the air above the Marines with slashing green tracers, the Communist 
signature. The bunkers in this area were densely spaced and mutually supporting with 
interlocking fields of fire. Against this steel rain, 2/1 and 3/1 infiltrated forward, 2/1 on 
Hill749, 3/1 towards 751. The 1st Battalion moved to an assembly area, then to a point 
near Hill 673 where it would dig in for the night. It would still be regimental reserve for a 
while. (Able Company 1/1, which had been attached to 2/1 since 2225 the night before 
for defensive purposes, reverted to parent control at 0900.)1 
For 2/1, the attack was once again on 749. The northern portion of 749 was 
wooded, heavily covered with foliage, and this presented a painful problem. The 
bunkers among the trees each had to be eliminated. The Marines of 2/1 had to take 
them one at a time. The Marines of Fox 2/1 passed through Dog Company to lead the 
                                                 
1 1st Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, Frag Order 132247; Lynn Montross, et al., The 
East-Central Front, 191; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 17-18; 1st Marine Regiment, 
“Historical Diary,” September 1951, 15. 
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assault. They “jumped off” at 0930, and met heavy resistance. While Fox attacked, Easy 
2/1 moved to the spur of 749 leading south east to secure the right flank.2 
“Heavy frontal and flanking” small arms and automatic fire scythed into Marine 
ranks from the head and leg of the “T” shaped ridge line. The direction of the attack was 
to the northwest where the ridgeline ran towards Hill 812. “This attack moved North 
along the ridge line leading from Hill 749 in the face of a most stubborn enemy and well-
emplaced bunkers mutually supporting, and, together with the cross-fire of the enemy 
thus emplaced and extremely difficult terrain the forward movement of the attacking 
elements was stopped at 1530.” The attack ground to a halt. The enemy called in 
mortar and artillery fire on his own positions every time the Marines got close. After the 
attack bogged down, 2/1 called in every scrap of artillery and air it could allocate to 
deluge the objective before continuing the assault.3  
Corporal Matthew Dukes of Fox Company, 2/1, moved with the point platoon as a 
Fire Team Leader to root out a sniper that had fired on his men. He charged forward 
alone in pursuit of the sniper. A bullet hit him in the face, ruining his left eye, but 
nevertheless, he maintained his assault, crawling across forty yards of open terrain. He 
then single-handedly destroyed the sniper with shots from his M-1 rifle. He was bleeding 
profusely by this time but refused to seek aid. He continued with his unit in the assault 
and helped seize the hill and dig in. Only then did Dukes start back towards an aid 
station. Enroute, he spotted another wounded Marine in an exposed area. Dukes 
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Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 7. 
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braved intense enemy fire to reach the fallen Marine, and lifted him on his back to 
cover. Corporal Dukes would receive the Navy Cross.4 
Another Marine was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for action that 
day. PFC Edward Gomez was an Ammunition Bearer for Easy Company, 2/1. He 
continuously exposed himself in the assault of 749 in order to keep his MG well supplied 
with ammo. Three enemy soldiers leapt from a bunker right in front of his gun crew, 
turning machine gun fire toward Gomez and the other Marines. Gomez dropped to one 
knee and tossed a grenade in their midst, then ripped a burst into them from his 
carbine. He was heard to holler, “If Third Section can’t take this mole hill, nobody can!” 
The Marines made it to the top of the hill and began to dig in among enemy bunkers 
some of which proved to be still occupied, or reoccupied via underground tunnels. His 
section came under intense fire from these positions.5 
“As his squad deployed to meet an imminent counterattack, he voluntarily moved 
down an abandoned trench to search for a new location for the gun and, when a hostile 
grenade landed between himself and the weapon, shouted a warning to those around 
him as he grasped the activated charge in his hand. Determined to save his comrades, 
he unhesitatingly chose to sacrifice himself and, diving into the ditch with the deadly 
missile, absorbed the shattering violence of the explosion in his own body.” One Marine 
remarked about Gomez, “Well, the cops in Omaha will be glad to hear that Lefty Gomez 
                                                 
4 Navy Cross Award Citation for Matthew D. Dukes. 
5 Public Information Document by Corporal Louis Jobst, Marine Combat Correspondent, dated 2 
November 1951, National Archives: RG 127, Records of the U. S. Marine Corps, “Division of Information, 
Publicity Articles Relating to the First Marine Division in Korea, Final Copies, Oct. 1950-Feb. 1952.” 
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is dead.” But on the contrary, Omaha was very proud of Gomez and has even named a 
street after him.6 
Gomez had had premonitions of his death. He told buddies in his outfit that he was 
going to win the Medal of Honor and wrote home to his mother that he would die in the 
next action and: “I am not sorry I died, because I died fighting for my country and that’s 
the Number One thing in everyone’s life, to keep his home and country from being won 
over by such things as communism.” He added for her to tell his father that he had died 
like the man he wanted him to be.7 
Marine PFC Robert G. Baumeister said of Gomez’s action, “I lived with the guy 
night and day. You always felt that there was something different about Ed. He was 
cooler and more intent than most under attack. I was in that trench. I will be indebted to 
him for the rest of my life. I’ll never forget Ed . . . nor will anyone else who fought here.”8 
Oscar Franco was a foxhole buddy of Gomez: 
The day that my buddy, Edward Gomez was killed, we were on the push. I 
know “Dog” Company had been hit bad and we were called forward. We got into 
a hot fire fight and we were losing men. What I remember is that we set up our 
gun and started firing for about five or six minutes. Then the Chinese [North 
Koreans] started throwing grenades at us. . . . 
Going up Hill 749, he [Gomez] had thrown back a grenade that had landed 
among us. Then he shot at three Chinese [North Koreans] that charged at us. 
When they threw that grenade at our gun emplacement, Gomez picked it up, 
pulled it into his stomach, spun his body away from the gun and fell on it. He 
save my life! 
I don’t remember anything that happened after that. “Fanel” Gallardo (“E” 
Company member) says he saw me being brought down from the hill. I had 
Gomez’s blood on my face. He says he tried to talk to me but I wouldn’t answer. 
One of the guys that was helping me told him I couldn’t hear him – that I was out 
of it – in shock. . . . 
                                                 
6 Medal of Honor Award Citation for Edward Gomez; Oral account of Lyle Conaway, Fox Company, 2/1, 
in Donald Knox, Uncertain Victory, 301. This citation and the Medal are now located in a Museum in 
Omaha, Nebraska. Gomez also has a street named after him there. 
7 Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 51; Lyle Conaway in: Knox, Uncertain Victory, 301-02. 
8 Public Information Document by Corporal Louis Jobst, 2 November 1951.  
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They say that when Gomez got it, I picked up a carbine and tried to take 
the hill by myself. I don’t remember that and I don’t have any medals to prove 
that. Two-and-a-half months later, I came to in a hospital in Japan.9 
  
One Marine PFC in the 1st Marines, Floyd Baxter, remembered Hill 749: 
We had our version of Bloody Ridge, a place where men reached down in 
themselves and did the impossible—they survived. When the objective [Hill749] 
was finally taken, we began to dig in our eighty-one [mortar]. A guy by the name 
of Jack and I were filling sandbags. Enemy mortars began to fall around us. Jack 
found a shallow foxhole. A round landed about ten yards away. The blast didn’t 
hurt him, but he was so wedged in the hole, I nearly had to pry him out of it. 
I believe Hill 749 will be remembered by men who were there as the battle 
that was won with bayonets and rifle butts—and on a couple of occasions, with 
bare hands.10 
 
That evening, the Marines of 2/1 called in air strikes and one arrived and 
performed well. However, “another one was needed if the 2dBn was to advance.” The 
second strike never showed up so 2/1 consolidated and dug in for the night at 1830. 
Casualties for 2/1 this day were 17 KIA and 109 WIA.11 (See Map # 27) 
Unrelenting combat had brought 2/1 about 300 meters further forward by nightfall, 
securing yet more portions of the 749 Hill Mass and this relieved pressure on 3/1, still 
fighting to capture 751 after dusk. The latter battalion clawed its way to the summit 
(though the entirety of the hill was not yet completely secure).12 
The day’s attack for 3/1 proceeded as follows. An air strike had been called for 
3/1’s jump off that day and it was effective. Enemy resistance was lessened, showing 
that CAS did indeed destroy enemy bunkers when it was present and of good quality. 
Item Company remained on Objective 1 while George surged forward to secure 
                                                 
9 Oral memoir of Oscar “Challo” Franco at: http://parentseyes.arizona.edu/ecompany/ocf.html. Website 
last consulted April 2007. 
10 Oral account of PFC Floyd Baxter, in Knox, Uncertain Victory, 306. 
11 1st Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 15. 
12 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 191; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 17- 
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Objective 2 (part of the Hill 751 hill mass) as soon as possible. “From 0715 to 0810 two 
successive air strikes were run on enemy bunker positions on objective 2, and at 0830 
‘G’ Company continued the attack, running into moderate to heavy small arms, 
automatic weapons and mortar fire by 0910.” Item Company repulsed a light probing 
attack at 1015, but continued to take enemy sniper fire from the front and the right flank. 
George continued its advance and enemy resistance began to slacken. George 
reported Objective 2 secure at 1400 and that there were 30 enemy KIA about the area 
that had been taken out by the “excellent air strikes” earlier that day. Item Company 
took a strong enemy counterattack from its front and both flanks at 2250.13 
During the assault in the dark by 3/1, Sergeant James B. Southall of Item 
Company 3/1, led assault elements of his platoon up the steep, fire-swept slopes of Hill 
751, on which little cover or concealment was to be found. Southall exposed himself to 
enemy fire in his attack to help eliminate the enemy from his well-entrenched positions. 
He ripped out rounds into the enemy from his .30 cal carbine, felling numerous NKPA. 
Then his weapon ran dry. He refused to fall back and get more ammo. Instead, he 
shouted his men onward with encouragement in the final assault on the hill. Southall 
directed coordinated machine gun fire, red Marine tracers flicking out in long streams 
against the black night and lapping at bunker firing ports and the enemy flesh that hid 
within them. His unit rose, inspired by Southall’s example of courage, and charged the 
last 100 yards of the slope to crush the remaining defenders. Southall was hit badly in 
the wrist but refused evacuation. He remained with his platoon and organized a hasty 
defense, lest the enemy return in counterattack. Sure enough, the NKPA came back to 
                                                 
13 Third Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 4; 1st Marine Regiment, 
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retake the hill, and Southall helped repulse several attacks. His actions were 
instrumental in the success of his battalion. He would receive the Navy Cross.14 
Charlie Company, 1/Tank (1st Tank Battalion), helped by firing 400 rounds on 
enemy bunkers that day. Again, the 11th Marines did as much as the terrain allowed, 
firing 3,029 rounds, but enemy positions on reverse slopes were almost impossible to 
hit with a direct enough an impact to demolish them.15 
The night proved to be chilly. “The second night we spent on 749 was quite chilly. 
September evenings were growing cooler, and this night was the chilliest I’d known in 
Korea. Our packs had been left behind when we were ordered to attack the hill, and all 
[we] wore [was] our utilities.”16 
That night two enemy counterattacks crashed and broke on 3/1’s positions, which 
held firm (one was the attack on Item Company mentioned earlier). The enemy suffered 
many casualties.17 
The CO of 1/1, Lt Col Horace E. Knapp had been wounded that day while visiting 
his front lines. After his evacuation, his executive officer, Major Edgar F. Carney took 
over temporary command. (Noon September 16 would see Lt Col John E. Gorman 
replace Major Carney in command of 1/1. Afterall, the Tables of Organization specified 
a LtCol, not a Major, as the authorized rank to command a battalion.) Luckily that night 
would prove to be a quiet one for this battalion. All the other battalions of the regiment 
received counterattacks, some in company strength, and incessant incoming. 
Preregistered artillery and mortar concentrations were key to repulsing the enemy 
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16 Oral account of PFC Frank O. Hart of Dog Company, 2/1 in: Knox, Uncertain Victory, 300. 
17 1st Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 15. 
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attacks. “The skillful preregistration and quick adjustment of friendly artillery helped the 
defending Marines to disperse the enemy and inflict heavy losses.”18  
Ralph Steele experienced one example of such preregistered fire, already 
mentioned earlier: 
We had . . . very good company commander and the Gooks attacked us 
that night about four times. Well, it was . . . pitch black . . . and we could hear the 
Gooks down in this ravine, hear them chattering . . . whoever their leader was 
was giving them a kind of pep talk apparently because you hear them cheer, and 
then he would blow a whistle and I could hear them crashing through that second 
row of timber. We started firing down into the ravine and the –what saved us then 
was our mortars were zeroed in on that thing and they called in mortar rounds, 
and that would break up each one of these attacks.19 
 
The Korean Marines of 1st KMC spent the day, as every other day since Yoke 
Ridge had been captured, patrolling forward and west of the Hays Line. They took 4 
POWs that day.20 
Total losses for the day were: 39 KIA and 463 WIA among the American Marines 
with none reported from the KMCs. The enemy lost 460 estimated KIA and 405 
estimated WIA. The Marines captured 7 POWs. In addition, a delayed report (from 
another period, probably the day before) showed 325 enemy KIA, 245 estimated KIA, 
and 295 estimated KIA.21  
For the 1st Marines, the day was a bloody one. 13 KIA were incurred and 316 WIA. 
In addition, 25 NBCs (non-battle casualties) were taken in the regiment. Sometimes 
these were due to accidents, sometimes sickness—though if sickness, it had to be 
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20 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 18. 
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something fierce indeed for that man to be allowed off duty in time of imminent or 
ongoing combat.22 
 The division intelligence section reported that the enemy was trying desperately to 
keep at least a division of men as a striking force in the area. This meant they would 
probably counterattack in force soon (the previous attacks were of a smaller scale). This 
“intel” proved correct. The following night, 15-16 September, would be a harrowing 
one.23 
 
Day Five: September 15 
Before dawn, Item Company 3/1 had to fight off an enemy counterattack of 100-
150 enemy. These NKPA were repulsed at 0105. Item used their supporting arms to 
good effect. It called in “extremely heavy artillery fire,” to bracket its position with 1,259 
rounds fired during “a single one hour period for the company.” George, too, repulsed a 
light probing attack with artillery fire. Then at 0650, George Company spotted fifty 
enemy in the open on the ridge running between Hills 751 and 1052. The excited FO 
quickly brought in mortar and artillery fire for a satisfying reported 30 enemy casualties 
resulting. The light of dawn illumined a field of carnage around Item Company’s 
positions. Of the pieces still identifiable as a single man, Item counted 18 KIA and 
estimated that 50 enemy WIA had been removed. Item itself had taken only a single 
WIA that night, though two more followed from sniper-fire in a daylight patrol.24 
Item Company’s patrol encountered blistering enemy fire “immediately northwest 
of the company perimeter.” Meanwhile, George company used a “precision artillery 
                                                 
22 1st Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 16. 
23 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 18. 
24 Third Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 4-5. 
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adjustment” on an enemy bunker on Hill 751 and successfully silenced one enemy MG. 
This company at 1450 was the recipient of an enemy counterattack in company strength 
covered with a heavy mortar barrage, but the Marine supporting arms shattered it. This 
did not stop “very accurate” enemy mortar fire that struck the company until 1800, 
causing 2 KIA and 23 WIA from that fire alone. The same hour, however, saw an 
airstrike directed by an artillery FO against enemy mortar positions on Hill 1052. These 
were not thought to be the same set that fired on George Company, but they were 
estimated to be eliminated. The pieces harassing George Company were successfully 
suppressed by high angle artillery missions. Tanks wiped out ten bunkers on 751 in 
front of George. The day saw a total of 3 KIA and 31 WIA for 3/1’s Marines, and reports 
came that evening that the KMCs and possibly the 5th marines would relieve 3/1 
sometime soon.25 
September 15, during daylight hours, proved quieter than the thirteenth and 
fourteenth had been, but only by comparison. Marines consolidated positions and 
improved defenses; 3/1 was to hold for further orders and 1/1 remained in reserve. But 
2/1 continued to attack. Its Marines were to finish the seizure of Hill 749 despite being 
dog tired – the unit had received enemy incoming all night long. This battalion was in 
positions indicated on Map # 27 and was trying to complete the clearing of 749.26  
The CO of 2/1 had requested a heavy artillery barrage to soften up the objectives. 
“It was very evident from the dogged enemy resistance of the previous day that 
maximum preparation from all supporting weapons would be required to adequately 
soften the objective,” said the 1st Marines’s historical diary. It went on to add some 
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illuminating statements, “To launch the attack against this stubbornly held enemy 
stronghold without benefit of adequate close air support would entail needless loss of 
lives.” And, “aircraft loaded with napalm and 500 pound bombs were requested 
throughout the day; however, only one strike at 1300 and one strike at 1650 were 
granted, none being loaded with 500 pound bombs.”27 
Furthermore, 2/1’s CO made a visit to the Regimental CO and was told to “delay 
H-hour until, in the opinion of the Commanding Officer, 2/1, sufficient preparatory fires 
had been delivered to enable the seizure of the remainder of Division Objective BAKER 
with minimum casualties to our troops.” But because of the poor air support, he would 
have to try and make do with the poor substitute of artillery, which was fired in heavy 
concentrations to try and complete an adequate softening of the objective.28 
PFC Lyle Conaway remembered that day: 
 Late in the morning Colonel Nihart came up and told a group of us to go 
back along the path we had used earlier and gather up all the ammo and 
stretchers we could find. Around 8:00 A. M. we’d received word that we were to 
continue the attack on Hill 749. While we waited, it had been a strain to have that 
black hill looming over us. We knew it was going to be tough. I remembered over 
and over, Colonel Nihart’s words “a lot of Purple Hearts. . . .” 
 I went down with four other people, one of whom was named McGee. He 
and another man explored an area near a burned-out bunker, and they both 
stepped on land mines. They sat in a state of shock, staring at their smoking feet. 
Immediately afterward, we took about ten rounds of mortar fire. The other two 
men with me were hit by shrapnel, both in the stomach. McGee and the other 
guy tried to move but kept falling over. I yelled to them to stay where they were, 
then dragged the two wounded men nearest me under some pine trees.29 
  
Not all Marines displayed commendable characteristics. An example follows in 
Conaway’s continued account: 
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Up the hill about 200 feet were some engineers clearing mines. I shouted 
to them to come down and give me a hand. They glanced at me and continued 
their work. I knew they had to be rear echelon types. A corpsman named Hoover 
and another guy carrying a stretcher ran up. The three of us went over to McGee 
and lifted him onto the litter. We took a few steps and the man with Hoover 
stepped on a mine. The blast hit Hoover in the arm and eyes, and rattled me. I 
shouted again to the engineers to come down and help us. They didn’t budge. I 
tried something that usually works in combat: I ordered them down to me. They 
never moved. Now I was really pissed! I fired my rifle; the round hit between 
them. That was a real mistake; they just took off running in the opposite direction. 
I was caught now between being very angry and scared stiff. I told Hoover 
and McGee to wait until I returned. I walked to the path, making marks in the 
earth which told me how to get back without stepping on a mine. Then I made 
several trips back until I got all the men out. Eventually, stretcher bearers arrived 
and carried the six men down the hill.30  
 
As much as the actions of one individual could inspire those around him and lead 
them to accomplish their objective with determination despite previously faltering 
advancements, the actions of one man could tear down the will of those around him to 
fight. Lyle Conaway described the attack on Hill 749 that day by 2/1 and one of the 
reasons the attack failed: 
Around 5:00 P. M.  there was an air strike on our objectives. We were 
ordered to move forward. The fight the gooks put up was really fierce. I was up 
with Joe Vittori. The enemy pounded us with machinegun and artillery fire. Then 
two Corsairs made a pass right on us. One guy stood up and waved an air panel. 
He was hit and went down. Vittori yelled, “Whose side are those bastards on?” 
One of the aircraft was so low I actually saw the bomb shackle open to release 
the bomb. That bomb sailed over our heads and exploded in a shallow ravine. It 
was too hot to wonder where the Corsairs went, but they did stop strafing us. 
Then a lieutenant was hit in the thigh and began to yell, “Pull back! Pull 
back!” Here we were, nearly to the crest, and we were ordered back. We pulled 
back to our previous positions. It was still light. Everyone was confused. I saw 
our captain [Frederick A. Hale, Jr.] going from person to person. “What 
happened? What went wrong?” He had an anguished look on his face. “Why did 
you come back?”31 
 
Fox Company would resume the assault with the Battalion CO, LtCol Franklin B. 
Nihart “personally coordinating the attack.” When the attack commenced that evening at 




1710 (delayed because of the very late arrival of CAS) under “extremely heavy artillery 
preparation,” it only made one hour of progress before heavy enemy fire stopped it. In 
addition, the Marines were under crossfire from enemy machine gun emplacements. 
The resistance was so “fanatical and tenacious that the battalion was ordered back to 
its previous positions.” Clearly, any further advance would be useless because of the 
late hour; there would not be enough time to consolidate new positions before dark. 
Thus the assaulting elements of 2/1 withdrew back to their former positions while 
artillery suppressed the enemy fire and tied in with Able Company 1/1 in the positions 
from the night before. Hill 749 was still partly NKPA and covered with mines. The day 
had cost 2/1 70 WIA.32 (See Map # 27) 
The 5th Marines was ordered to help the 1st Marines, and accordingly moved to 
assembly areas on September 15. For 2/5, the situation was SNAFU (situation normal 
all _ _ _ _ed up) because rain commenced falling during the unit’s movement. One 
Marine said “Now everything’s normal: a typical 2nd Battalion moving day!” The new CP 
(command post) set up in terrain typical of that in the valleys along the Soyang River: 
low, terraced rice-paddies, overgrown with tall grass near the rain-swollen, muddy river. 
Also typical of the area, the road was a rutted, muddy trail that was hardly passable, 
with mud holes deep enough in places to entrap even bulldozers from forward 
movement. Supply would be almost entirely by Korean cargadores of the KSC (Korean 
Service Corps), newly formed from the former CTC (Civilian Transport Corps) to be 
under ROK government and military authority in order to improve efficiency. These 
                                                 
32 Second Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 8-9; 1st Marine Regiment, 
“Historical Diary,” September 1951, 16; Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 191-92; 1st Mar 
Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 18; 1st Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 3; 
Second Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 9. 
 162
laborers, many sick and old, would serve with distinction in honor through intense hard 
work, even under fire. Some did, however, commit dishonorable acts. For instance, on 
the night of September 19, some laborers carrying mortar rounds were discovered to 
have lightened their load by dropping one every now and then along the trail. But there 
is no evidence in the sources included in this study that this was a standard action of 
most KSC workers. “Without the help of these carriers . . . the supply of the line 
companies would have been next to impossible.”33 
Division OpnO25-51 provided a plan for the 5th Marines to pass through 3/1 on 
September 16 and continue the assault on Kanmubong Ridge. Marines of 3/1 were then 
to relieve 1/1 as regimental reserve. The Marines of 1/1, after being relieved, would 
pass through 2/1 and attack 749 once again. The 1st KMC, along with the Division 
Reconnaissance Company, would replace the 5th Marines on the Hays Line (Yoke 
Ridge). The 7th Marines was to maintain its role as corps reserve in Wontong-ni.34 
Casualties were 15 KIA and 31 WIA American Marines, and no reported KMC 
casualties. The enemy lost 33 counted KIA, 130 estimated KIA (163 total), and 403 
estimated WIA. Marines took 29 POWs.35 
 
Day Six: September 16 
At 0001, 16th September, the NKPA hit 2/1 on Hill 749 with an ambitious and 
determined counterattack under cover of night. (This was the 91st Regiment, 45th NKPA 
Division, III Corps that had come into the area just a few days before.) The ensuing 
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firefight lasted until 0400 and was preceded by a saturating deluge of enemy mortar and 
artillery preparation. The 1st Mar Div “Historical Diary” for September reported that this 
barrage, “reached an intensity that was estimated to surpass that of any barrage yet 
encountered by the 1st Marine Division in Korea.”36 
The companies of 2/1 were already reduced by casualties from the previous days, 
but the artillery pounded away on their positions, regardless. Enemy fire was of large 
diameter shells: 76 mm, 105mm, and 122mm were received. The enemy mortar fire 
was of the 82mm and 120mm variety. (The Communists had deliberately made their 
82mm mortar tubes one millimeter larger in diameter than that of the Americans so they 
could use American mortar shells, but the Americans, if trying to use captured 
Communist mortar rounds, could not follow suit.)37  
“Flares could be seen illuminating the front lines and the rattle of small arms 
exchanged by troops on both sides of the line shattered the silence of the night.”38 
Like the CCF, the NKPA used bugles and whistles to signal its tactical 
movements, and these shrill and clamoring sounds could be most unnerving in the dead 
of night to American troops crouched in fox holes. For this reason, the Marines had 
trained all its replacements, while in cold weather training at Pickle Meadows in 
Northern California, utilizing whistles and bugles in night attacks by a simulated enemy 
to try to inure them to this effect. That early morning of September 16th was no different 
in that the NKPA attack (in regimental strength) was punctuated by a cacophony of such 
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sounds. (The North Koreans would also yell things in English at the Marines as they 
attacked like: “Harry Truman eats shit!!” And, “Marines die, we die, all die!”) The 
Marines brought the enemy attacks, five waves, each attacking through the one before 
it, to a halt with determination and spirit. The NKPA would have to get used to the idea 
that the Marines were no pushovers and that Hill 749 was Marine territory. “Although 
during the attack, ammunition supply became critical, at no time was the perimeter 
defense penetrated. Elements of the battalion were successfully shifted during the 
attack to replace casualties inflicted by the enemy.”39 
PFC Lyle Conaway remembered the beginning of the attack: 
We dug in, knowing the gooks would counterattack. It got dark. Word 
came down, “Get Vittori’s BAR and a rifleman forward.” I could see our squad 
leader in his hole about forty yards away. I shouted the message to him. Then I 
yelled that I’d go with Joe. In a few minutes Vittori came by. I strapped on ammo 
and stuffed my pockets with grenades. I also had a Thompson submachine gun 
as well as my M-1.  
It was quite black by the time we got to the point. I made a mental note 
that the heavy machine gun was seven holes away. In between were some light 
machine guns and BARs with riflemen. Up toward the heavy was the artillery 
FO’s position. 
The moon came out and lit the area. I remember, too, there was a wind 
blowing. 
We began to get probed, and so as not to give away our positions by 
firing, we threw grenades. Word was passed back to get more grenades up front. 
They were promptly delivered by Sergeant Kesler, our platoon sergeant, who 
missed us and walked into no-man’s-land. We shouted for him to come back. 
Someone said, “Hey, S’arnt, whose side ‘ya on?” Everyone laughed. 
A cloud covered the moon. We heard the North Koreans moving toward 
us. The wheels on a machine gun squeaked as they rolled it forward. A gook 
officer issued orders, then it seemed to me, he began to curse. I clearly heard 
their troops grunting when they tried to move something heavy. We got into a 
shouting match with them. I had picked up some gook curses when I served in 
China in ’46. I called them “turtles,” which is supposed to be as insulting to an 
oriental as calling an American an SOB. I shouted, “Hey, you rickshaw-pulling 
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turtles, stick your heads out so I can knock them off!” From the darkness down 
the hill, someone screamed, “Marine, fuck Harry Truman and John Foster 
Durres!” [Dean Acheson was actually the Secretary of State under Truman, 
Dulles would come in under Eisenhower, however, Dulles was a “consultant” in 
Truman’s administration.] Vittori laughed. I asked him, “Who in hell is John 
what’s-name?” Up till then I didn’t know who Dulles was. 
Our FO yelled for us to get down because he was going to bring in a 
barrage in front of us. CRASH! CRASH! In it came. I felt good knowing we could 
get the gooks when they were between the lines. 
Once it was over I looked over the rim of the hole and saw the flash of an 
enemy 76-mm gun. The shell hissed toward us. It exploded in the treetops above 
us and showered us with shrapnel. The fourth round exploded near the FO’s 
hole. A kid nearby yelled, “He’s dead! He’s dead!” 
A spotter plane flew over and called in artillery. The 76-mm stopped firing. 
Clouds floated across the sky. Sometimes the moon was out and it was 
bright; other times the moon was covered by clouds, and it was pitch black.40 
 
Possibly, the Marines could even smell the enemy. “We . . . listened to Sergeant 
Sam’s advice. He told us that he knew when the enemy was coming at night because 
he could smell them. I had my doubts until several months later when I smelled a faint, 
musty odor like wet blankets that had been lying out a week or longer. This happened 
just before an attack and I knew then what he had tried to tell us. The clothes the enemy 
wore had a strong odor.”41 
Multiple waves of attackers (five waves) fell or were repulsed by the 2/1 defenders 
(an estimated 1,200 NKPAs were either killed or wounded in the assault). An example 
of the valor demonstrated by the Marines is the fact that two 2/1 Marines each 
committed acts for which they were awarded the Medal of Honor within forty-eight hours 
of each other (the Medals of Honor earned on Hills 673, 749, and 680 in three days 
equaled the number for Tarawa in World War II). The action of PFC Edward Gomez 
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from Easy 2/1, September 14, has already been detailed. The second act was by 
Corporal Joseph Vittori from Fox 2/1.42 
When a forward platoon was hard hit and forced to withdraw, Corporal Vittori ran 
past the withdrawing troops with two volunteers at his heels to assault the enemy. His 
posthumous Medal of Honor citation continued: 
Overwhelming them in a fierce hand-to-hand struggle, he enabled his company 
to consolidate its positions to meet further imminent onslaughts. Quick to 
respond to an urgent call for a rifleman to defend an heavy machine gun 
positioned on the extreme point of the northern flank and virtually isolated from 
the remainder of the unit when the enemy again struck in force during the middle 
of the night, he assumed position under the devastating barrage and, fighting a 
single-handed battle, leaped from one flank to the other, covering each foxhole in 
turn as casualties continued to mount, manning a machine gun when the gunner 
was struck down and making repeated trips through the heaviest shellfire to 
replenish ammunition.43  
 
Reinforcements, too, were pinned down by enemy fire, and many Marine positions 
contained only the dead and wounded for a hundred yards around. Vittori, nevertheless, 
fought on. NKPAs made it within feet of him, but fell dead. He and another Marine (Lyle 
Conaway) simulated greater strength in their area by firing rapidly from different 
positions.44  
Vittori was only 22 years old and from Beverly, Massachusetts. He almost single-
handedly met one of the fiercest mass charges of the Korean war, and was credited 
with killing at least 40 enemy himself. He held off the enemy for more than three hours 
with his BAR and expended more than 1,000 rounds of ammunition. He used his own 
body to draw fire in keeping the infiltrating NKPA soldiers from taking out the Marine MG 
positions. He also ranged forward from his fox hole in a wide circle. Twice, enemy leapt 
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from the bushes and wounded him with a burp gun and rifle fire in the side, but he cut 
them down with his BAR.45  
Either of his wounds was ambulatory, but Vittori refused to stop. He had been 
wounded once before from shrapnel in June near Yangu. He had been given 
opportunity then to take a job in his unit that would keep him out of harm’s way, but he 
wanted to be with his buddies. His platoon leader, 2nd Lt Harry Randall of Wisconsin, 
had wanted to make him a squad leader, but he had refused, instead wishing to remain 
simply a BAR man. He did not want to tell his buddies what to do.46 
One of the MGs ran out of ammo. Vittori moved against the NKPA, firing his BAR 
from the hip to cut down the enemy in their dirty cotton uniforms. He moved to the 
downed MG and held from there while it was resupplied. He saved the machine gun 
crew by cutting down four or five NKPA within arms reach of the position. One had a 
burp gun and was right on top of the Marines, but Vittori “came from nowhere to cut him 
down,” said Corporal Johnny Gifford of Eden, Texas. Another Marine MG jammed, its 
barrel glowing red hot. Vittori moved and took over defending that position as well with 
his BAR. He leapt from position to position spraying bullets from his 20lb. BAR. In this 
way he posted himself at three different foxholes, each five yards apart, and defended 
them all.47 
“Mortally wounded by enemy machine gun and rifle bullets while persisting in his 
magnificent defense of the sector where approximately 200 enemy dead were found the 
following morning, Corporal Vittori, by his fortitude, stouthearted courage and great 
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personal valor, had kept the point position intact despite the tremendous odds and 
undoubtedly prevented the entire battalion position from collapsing.” Vittori’s platoon 
was part of the two Marine companies credited with crushing the NKPA regiment that 
had assaulted the hill. One Marine officer, 1st Lt Edward B. Boyd of Nebraska, whose 
platoon was first hit in the assault estimated that “If it’s possible to figure such things in 
percentages, Corporal Vittori was at least 25 percent of the battalion’s strength.”48 
Three 2/1 Marines earned the Navy Cross in the same action. The first was PFC 
Richard N. Blasongame, acting platoon sergeant for Weapons Company’s HMG 
platoon. His HMGs were emplaced along a ridgeline on the point of his battalion’s 
perimeter, “exposed to attack from all three sides and in close proximity to fortified 
enemy positions.” When the massive counterattack came, his gun section was in the 
hornet’s nest of the assault. In the heated chaos of exploding shells, screaming men, 
and white hot-steel, Blasongame remained calm and maintained perfect fire control. He 
manned a gun when one of his gunners was hit, hurled grenades, and gave first aid to 
the fallen. He also made sure the wounded were evacuated, and continually rallied his 
men to repulse every attack.49  
Soon, ammo and grenades were short. Blasongame leapt from his foxhole and 
made his way under heavy fire to tell the CO of the company. He then helped with the 
resupply. Once, he found out the troops to either side of his section were all casualties, 
but he nevertheless refused to withdraw and held his area, “later going to adjacent 
positions, bringing up reinforcements, and placing them in positions on his flanks. When 
a grenade exploded under his last remaining gun,” Blasongame received shrapnel in his 
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face and hands. The blast had also damaged the transverse mechanism on the MG. 
Blasongame continued firing anyway by manually moving the tripod itself from side to 
side. When 0400 came, only four survivors remained of his sixteen man section. Three 
of the casualties had been KIA. In front of his position were 287 dead NKPA. 
Blasongame was one reason his unit was able to hold.50 
The second 2/1 Marine to earn a Navy Cross that night was PFC Lyle F. 
Conaway, a Rifleman of Fox Company, 2/1. When the attack came, he volunteered with 
Joseph Vittori to defend the HMG on the extreme point of the northern flank. This 
required him to be in a relatively exposed position when the heavy barrage came down, 
but he braved the rain of exploding steel, and stayed where he could defend the HMG. 
He punched out round after round into advancing enemy from his M-1 rifle, and when 
the “ping” of an empty clip spent itself inaudibly in the crash of battle, he pressed in 
another 8 round clip from his bandolier and resumed fire. Later, the HMG was knocked 
out by fire, and he rushed from position to position, firing as fast as he could to make 
the enemy think more men were in his area. This enabled other Marines to get the HMG 
back into action. Conaway was seriously wounded in his actions, but refused 
evacuation, continuing to fire on the enemy until he became too weak from blood loss. 
“By his indomitable spirit and great personal valor in the face of tremendous odds, he 
contributed immeasurably to the repulse of the hostile force.”51 
Conaway remembered the actions of himself and Joe Vittori that night: 
I no longer have an accurate sense of when certain events on that night 
took place. I know Joe and I decided each of us should try to catch some sleep. I 
took the first watch, but after only ten minutes Vittori sat up and told me to try to 
get some rest. Damn, I fell asleep. Next thing I knew, Joe was shaking me and 
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saying, “Here they come! Here they come! Look at ‘em. Look at all of ‘em!” I 
couldn’t see shit, I just couldn’t wake up. My eyes wouldn’t open. Then it broke 
loose. Everyone began firing at once. The area was engulfed in flames. All I 
could see were flashes. I fired at muzzle blasts. Two or three Chinese crawled 
toward our position. I fired at them. One of them raised up and threw a grenade; I 
couldn’t see it, but I recognized the gesture. It exploded on the lip of the hole, 
and the concussion blast caught me in the face. I raised up instinctively and 
caught a couple of slugs in the shoulder. I fell back heavily and was now really 
disoriented. Blood from wounds on my scalp and forehead flowed over my eyes, 
nose, and mouth. The noise was tremendous. You had to shout to be heard. Joe 
looked at me, then yelled, “Corpsman!” I knew where I was, but not how badly I’d 
been hit. I knew I wasn’t blind. I moved my right arm, but it was stiff and numb. I 
barely heard Joe’s yell, so I knew no one else could. I really didn’t expect any 
help to get through that hell. Joe leaned down and shouted that I should try to get 
over the ridge. When I looked in that direction I saw enemy fire sweeping it like a 
broom. I concentrated my entire effort now on getting back into the fight. I located 
my rifle by the edge of the hole. When I tried to fire, I found it had jammed. Joe 
kept yelling, “Look at them! Look! They’re all over! Help, throw grenades!” I pulled 
the pins with my right hand and threw with my left. I managed to throw them far 
enough so we weren’t splattered by our own shrapnel. 
I heard the splat that a bullet makes when it hits flesh. Vittori sort of 
slumped. I was really frightened, because his fire had been so effective and kept 
the gooks off us. He straightened up in a kneeling position and rubbed his chest. 
I could see it was wet. He said, “Load my empty magazines. Don’t load ‘em 
backwards like Pete did.” The two machine guns on our left fired steady streams 
of bullets. Joe got his BAR back into the fight. The scene looked as if it were lit by 
a barn fire. I saw men running and firing. I alternately loaded magazines and 
threw grenades. The machine gun farthest away took a grenade, and the gun 
tumbled on its side. Its red-hot barrel ignited some leaves and grass. Then the 
gun pit next to us took a couple of grenades. Both guys fell over. One of the 
guys, Blankenship—I recognized him because he was very stout—got up and 
began firing the gun again. He leaned over, his face nearly touching the red-hot 
barrel. He was hit again and fell on the barrel. His hair caught fire.52 
 
Conaway was no stranger to combat. He knew well the typical tactics of the 
NKPA and what a night-time defensive battle usually amounted to. But this fight was 
different. It was among the most fierce the Marines had seen in all of the war: 
Normally, the enemy ran out of ammo after twenty minutes, and the 
fighting would stop until they were resupplied. Not so, this night. The longer it 
went, the worse it got. I had a tough time breathing—just too much smoke; the 
smell of cordite made me cough. The gooks tried to organize themselves, but 
fortunately they could not hear each other. The noise was deafening. 
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Joe began firing over my head; I ducked as low as I could. The muzzle of 
the BAR was only inches from my ears, and the muzzle blasts felt like my 
eardrums were being pierced. About then, I was overjoyed to find my Thompson 
at the bottom of the hole; I’d clear forgotten about it. Joe shouted, “I’m gonna go 
get the machine gun.” He crawled over Blankenship’s gun. I began firing the 
Thompson. Joe pulled the body off the gun, but when he yanked the gun toward 
him it fell into the hole. I’m not sure, but I think about then, Vittori got hit again. 
He doubled up. I knew if he went down, we’d be overrun. It would then be just a 
matter of time. I saw to my right everything had been knocked out, even the 
heavy machine gun. I think the guy’s in the FO’s hole held out for a while, but 
then they, too, were silenced.53 
 
The deluge of enemy fire lasted for what seemed an eternity, but Conaway was 
eventually able to make it to the top of the ridge. He and other Marines who had fought 
there would receive reinforcement, but for too many, the fight had been their last:  
Suddenly, everything grew quiet. No more noise. A few whistles, but no 
more firing. It was totally unreal. Joe said, “We can’t hold ‘em—have to get back. 
I’ll cover you, go ahead. I’ll cover you.” I could hear many sounds now; the gooks 
were giving commands and trying to pick up their wounded. I heard moans. 
A group of about eight gooks came out of somewhere and walked up the 
hill. I believe they thought we were all dead. I hoped Joe would begin firing soon. 
If he waited too long he’d be in my line of fire. Joe opened up. Then I did. My 
shoulder hurt and was still numb. We really splattered them. Another group 
behind the first opened fire on us, then faded into the night. Joe got into a 
kneeling position. He said again, “Gotta get back to the ridgeline. You go, I’ll 
cover for you.” A rifle cracked. Splat. Joe’s head snapped back. He grabbed his 
face and fell over. When I got to him, I saw steam coming from the blood running 
down his face. I fired one more clip, then scrambled up the hill toward the 
ridgeline. Looking back once, I saw my canteen glinting in the moonlight. I did not 
know then how much I was going to miss that water; if I had, I might have gone 
back for it. 
I stumbled over the top of the ridge and fell into a foxhole. When I looked 
up I was facing the business end of a .45. My face was so swollen and bloody, 
they didn’t know who I was. 
Reinforcements arrived. I showed them where our positions were. This 
done, I started walking south.54 
 
The third Marine to receive a Navy Cross for his actions the day before and in the 
fight that night was Lt Col Franklin B. Nihart, the CO of 2/1. On September 15, when the 




advance on Hill 749 stalled under the heavy enemy fire, Nihart “boldly made his way 
through the volume of hostile fire to the exposed positions of the leading elements and 
personally coordinated all the available supporting arms and aircraft in successfully 
furthering the attack.” He was ever in the thick of the battle that night, as well. He 
“skillfully maneuvered his units to meet the continued thrusts by waves of opposing 
troops and, although exposed to hostile fire from a distance less than 200 meters, 
maintained an effective defense perimeter despite sever casualties within his battalion.” 
Nihart was instrumental in his Battalion’s ability to hold.55 
A Navy Corpsman for 2/1 was Anthony Daniel La Monica from Chicago. “Tony” as 
he was called, was very dear to the Marines around him, not just because of his medical 
role, but because of the selfless courage with which he carried it out. He was known for 
ignoring enemy fire to go to the aid of the fallen, working to patch wounds while bullets 
struck all around him. Once, he had even had his belt shot off. Midway up Hill 749 the 
day before, Tony dashed again through enemy fire to assist a wounded Marine. Dust 
burst up around as bullets mixed with green tracers struck the dirt, but he succeeded in 
moving the wounded Marine to cover.56  
Now in the dense rain of red hot steel and high explosives preceding the heavy 
enemy attack, Tony was again at work. He left the protection of his foxhole and openly 
aided the wounded, but received a wound of his own during the first of the five enemy 
attacks. He didn’t let on about this to the Marines, however, and continued to aid the 
many wounded. In the second attack, he incurred other wounds from bullets and 
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shrapnel. He began to lose blood in dangerous amounts but helped carry stretcher-
borne Marines to the rear and returned with ammunition. He refused evacuation. Too 
many needed help for him to leave.  
Another enemy assault crashed against 2/1’s lines, and Tony got word that NKPA 
troops had infiltrated the Marine lines. Tony armed himself with a fallen Marine’s rifle 
and fended off enemy soldiers who tried to attack the wounded under his care. When 
morning came, Tony was found, dead of his wounds, but he had given his life in the aid 
of the wounded, exemplifying the highest naval traditions of the Navy Corpsmen.57 
One Marine combat correspondent, Corporal Louis Jobst, in a never before 
published account, described the general experience of combat in the dark that chill 
September morning: 
It’s suddenly night. You’re so tired that every muscle cries out for rest. You 
aren’t even thinking any longer. You left a lot behind when you started up this 
slope behind our “walking” mortar barrage. 
It seems only a moment ago that you were crouching behind a little rise 
near the crest of the hill, trying to catch your breath and wait for “the word.” 
Four times the company assaulted this hill. Did it really take only four 
assaults to capture it? Hill 749 is secured. No use looking back. 
Down the line the word is passed: “Dig in against a possible 
counterattack.” Entrenching tools cut into the hillside. You wonder: “What would 
the gooks want this place for? Haven’t they had enough yet?” But you dig your 
hole fast and deep. 
The outfit is five hours by trail from the supply point. The lieutenant asks: 
“What do you want—water, ammo or chow?” Everyone agrees: “Ammo up!” 
Now the darkness deepens. Small talk ebbs and stops. Shells click into 
their chambers and in the ominous quiet you can hear the safety locks click off. 
No one says the enemy is creeping closer. No need to. Everyone knows 
that they are. 
It is one a.m. when flares light up the horizon. A systematic attack is on. 
First come the feelers. They inch up the slope through the shadows. Now, they 
are here. Spasmodic rifle shots rip into your lines. They seem to say: “Commit 
yourselves, Marines. We’re here and in larger numbers than you.” 
But no flashing Marine rifle gives away his position. 
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Then comes the charge. Up the slope comes a wave of enemy. Gunners 
sit behind their sights. In a foxhole one Marine aims his rifle and another pulls the 
pin out of a grenade. Flares fly up, a bugle sounds and you can see the shrieking 
enemy. 
The hill is covered with the enemy like ants. Machine guns, BARs and 
grenades join in the chorus of resistance. 
What follows are individual dramas, all different. 
To one it is the wisp of machine gun fire across the front of his hole. To 
another it is the crash of enemy mortars. 
To some it is the buddy who roams behind your foxhole, standing up in the 
semi-darkness shouting encouragement and firing his Browning into the enemy 
tide surging toward you. 
To others it is kneeling in a pile of cartridges and firing flares. 
But on Hill 749 it is a team of Marines that throw back the enemy. Not 
once or twice, but five times. It is a team so schooled in discipline and accuracy 
that it can repel all attackers. 
Individual dreams blend into an impersonal picture: the defense of the hill. 
In the blazing moment it was stand or die. You were trained to stand and stand 
you did. This story is so big that it can only be remembered. 
With the first gray light of dawn, you can survey the night’s results. It is 
easy to sweep the slope and valley with your eyes and see that this hill was 
taken and held for good purpose. 
Strewn down the grade and across the valley are the enemy dead who will 
never fight against you, your company, or your country again. 
And on the other side of the hill is another ridge.58 
 
The result of the repulse by the 1st Marines of the five successive waves of enemy 
resulted in the decimation of the 91st Regiment NKPA. The enemy attack was well 
coordinated across the entire division front. No less than 150 NKPA assaulted 3/1 (west 
of  2/1) near Hill 751, simultaneous to the attacks against 2/1. This attack was beaten 
back, and the enemy could only muster lesser forces throughout the morning in three 
more attacks on 3/1.59 
George and Item, again, faced the brunt of the onslaught for 3/1. Most of the 
storm, however, was against Item Company. One Hundred-fifty enemy attacked down 
the ridgeline running northwest from item’s positions to Hill 1052, and were only broken 
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after an hour and a half of combat. However, the enemy did not rush in blind. The NKPA 
soldiers sneaked down the ridgeline, prepared entrenchments close to Marine lines, 
then attacked. Light probes persisted the rest of the night but the main action was over 
for 3/1. Morning found 59 shattered North Korean corpses around Item’s firing lanes, 
with another 75 KIA and 50 WIA estimated. In addition, Item took 10 prisoners. 
Casualties for 3/1 were 2 KIA and 14 WIA. The elements attacking Item had been the 
3rd Regiment, 45th NK Division. This division was newly arrived in the area on the 15th.60 
The KMCs and 5th Marines were slated to relieve 3/1 in its positions this day. At 
0600, a company of KMCs began relief of George Company. How and Item were 
replaced by 3/5 and 2/5: 3/5 relieved Item and 2/5 How by 1200. Thereafter, How 
Company moved to Hill 673 to attach to 2/1 as part of its defenses while the rest of the 
battalion headed for regimental reserve in place of 1/1.61 (For unit boundaries, see Map 
# 28.) 
In summary, at 0120, 3/1 was attacked. The enemy assault was thrown back with 
heavy NKPA losses. The KMCs and 5th Marines relieved 3/1 at 1000 that morning, 
whereupon it moved to regimental reserve. It could only be committed again to the fight 
on division orders.62 
The Marines of 1/1 had not gone immediately into the combat line as did 2/1 and 
3/1. They were the regimental reserve at first. Now it was their turn to attack. PFC 
Davidson of 1/1 recalled: 
We set up temporary positions just short of Hill 749, a part of the 
Punchbowl battle line. There were tanks—ours—firing over our heads at the 
North Korean positions on the ridgeline. 
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Marines were always digging in and expecting to stay a few days, only to 
have the gunny come along, usually within hours, with the order “Move out!” This 
is what happened to us a day after we went into reserve below Hill 749. 
We started moving up through an open valley. Gunny Hamilton got us 
lined up and ordered us to keep a five yard interval “because we will be under 
direct enemy observation.” That made us pay attention, no mistake. 
We reached the center of the valley before the North Koreans saw us 
moving up, carrying our mortars and ammunition. They immediately started 
shelling us with 76-mm artillery. One of our platoon gunners [Weapons 
Company] caught a ground burst a few dozen yards ahead of me. He just 
seemed to come apart. It was a terrible thing to see. 
There were a couple of Inch’on veterans in our outfit, men who were about 
ready to go home. They were more nervous than the new men because they 
knew what it was like, and the last thing they wanted to do was go into another 
action only days before they were due to get on the boat for Japan and the 
States. 
The shells were raining down in earnest as we slogged across that open 
valley, and Gunny Hamilton, acting like a Marine in a John Wayne movie, just 
strolled along the line urging us, “Get a move on, Marine, you’re falling back.” He 
was a veteran of Tarawa and a typical Marine regular.63 
 
With daylight, despite the heavy casualties the division had taken, Marines of 1/1 
(relatively fresh because they had been in reserve while 3/1 and 2/1 were under the 
brunt of the enemy attacks) saddled up and stepped out at 0930 to pass through 2/1 
and resume the assault. Mortar fire continued to hit the Marines as 1/1 entered 2/1 
lines, slowing the passage of lines, but by 1050, 1/1 continued to advance along the 
ridge to 749. (The passage of lines ended at 1030.) At 1055, an airstrike and artillery 
barrage prepped the objective. Two strong points in the enemy line dominated the 
positions of the Marines’ attacking companies, two high knobs of ground (Battalion 
Objectives 1 and 2) on the ridge running to 812 from 749. (See Map # 29) Artillery, 
mortars, 75mm RGs, and AT rockets were called to suppress these points while the 
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companies moved forward. (The 2nd Battalion 1st Marines supported 1/1’s advance with 
fire.)64 
“The enemy situation was well known to the 1st Battalion. They now faced an 
unyielding enemy, well supplied with grenades and ammunition for his mortars, A/W 
and S/A.” The 1st Battalion utilized all available supporting arms, but the advance was 
nevertheless slow after the 1107 jump off. (The enemy in the area numbered at least 
300.) “The fighting was intense. Enemy mortar and artillery fire was heavy and 
accurate.” Able Company reached its assigned portion of 749 at 1500 and dug in while 
Baker Company passed through. Eventually, resistance began to slacken as the attack 
progressed. The battalion had its portion of Objective BAKER in hand by 1830. (Charlie 
Company would make a patrol the next day that secured Objective 1. The rest of the 
company attacked and seized Objective 2.) Finally, at 1800 that evening, these Marines 
were in place (on part of the northern ridgeline running from 749 to Hill 812) and began 
to dig in. (See Map#  27)65 
At the close of business on September 16, Hill 751 was in the control of 3/1, and 
2/1 and 1/1 were deployed in a line of fox holes almost a mile long (1,500 yards) on 
both sides of 749. How Company 3/1 was attached to 2/1 for the night as that battalion 
set up a blocking position. (See Map # 27)66  
“Hill 749 had finally been secured. A number of mutually supporting hidden enemy 
bunkers had been knocked out in a ruthless battle of extermination [the battle was not 
                                                 
64 First Battalion, 1st Marines, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 2; First Marine Regiment, “Historical 
Diary,” September 1951, 20. 
65 First Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 17-18; First Battalion, 1st Marines, 
“Historical Diary,” September 1951, 2; Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 193; 1 Mar Div 
“Historical Diary”, September 1951, 19-20. 
66 1st Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 18. 
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that “ruthless” for the Marines; they took many POWs], and veterans of the World War II 
Pacific conflict were reminded of occasions when Japanese resistance flared up in 
similar fashion after ground was thought to be secure.”67  
Even after it was “secure,” 749 was a dangerous place. PFC Floyd Baxter 
continued: 
The enemy covered their foxholes with grass and leaves and whatever. 
Once we had run past their holes, they’d pop up and hit us from the rear. That is 
why we lost so many men. Even after we secured our objective and our mortars 
were set up behind Charlie Company, we still found gooks hidden in small holes. 
Many of them elected to fight, and they died in their holes. 
After everything had quieted down, we sat around our eighty-one [mortar]. 
Suddenly, we were sprayed by a burp gun. Fortunately, only one man was hit. 
The gook doing the firing had lain in his hole for a day. He came screaming up 
the hill at us. A shot from the M-1 of one of the ammo carriers stopped him; his 
head seemed to explode. Needless to say, we sent a couple of patrols then to 
find and destroy any remaining gooks.68 
 
PFC Frank J. Davidson, too, remembered Hill 749: 
I don’t think I’ll ever forget Hill 749. We mortar ammo carriers were used to 
filling in holes in the rifle company lines when we weren’t humping mortar rounds 
to the guns. It was almost better than carrying ammunition up the slopes of Hill 
749, which seemed almost vertical. 
The enemy really didn’t want to give up the Punchbowl. The hills around it 
were valuable—the highest ground in that part of Korea. So there were 
counterattacks on our line almost every night. And when there were no 
counterattacks, we were shelled by their biggest mortars. 
One night I watched from my gunpit as my friend, Mickey Healy, ran from 
one hole to another while the rounds were falling. There was on enormous bright 
flash and I saw Healy flying through the air, his arms and legs flailing away at 
nothing. I thought surely he was dead. But he fell near my own hole and promptly 
crawled in with me. He hadn’t received a scratch. A miracle. 
Our casualties were heavy, but we held on to our hill, and to the 
punchbowl as well. . . .69 
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THE ASSAULT ON DOG 
 
 
September 16 was not over yet for the 5th Marines. Said the 5th Marines Historical 
diary: 
The master plan of the operation as set forth in Division Operations Order 24-51 
and Regimental Operations Order 42-51, began to unfold themselves in the form 
of concrete action. For many members of the Regiment who joined us on the 
10th, 11th, and 12th Replacement Drafts, it meant their first “sip” of the bitter 
realities of combat. For the “salts” it meant the termination of the “luxuries” and 
“securities” of being in reserve, and once again meeting face to face with the 
grimness of war. To all, it would mean a cleared more evident substantiation of 
the fact that Korea can be pretty rough “Police Action.”1 
 
 H-hour was set for 0830. The enemy was elements of the 14th Regiment, 1st 
Division, III NK Corps and the 45th Regiment, 15th Division, and 3rd Regiment, 1st 
Division. The above mentioned Operations Orders basically set forth the following plan: 
while the 1st Marines continued attacking 749, the 5th Marines would send 2/5 to take 
Objective Dog (Hill 812), and 3/5 to take Regimental Objectives 1 and 2: 1 being the 
higher knob on the finger ridge 3/5 had replace Item 3/1 upon, and 2 being Hill 980. 
After 3/5 had Objective 1 in hand, it was to support 2/5’s attack by fire and prepare to 
seize Hill 980 on order. Marines of 1/5 were regimental reserve.2 (See Map #30) 
The Third Battalion, 5th Marines assaulted with How Company 3/5 in the lead. It 
relieved Item 3/1 at 0910 and took over that unit’s zone of action. It then stepped out in 
the attack at 1210 towards Regimental Objective 1, an unnamed hill about 1,000 yards 
southeast of 1052, 1,500 yards southwest of 812, and 1,200 yards north and slightly 
                                                 
1 Fifth Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 18. 
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east of 751. (See Map # 30) It was along the same finger ridge leading to 1052 item 3/1 
had previously occupied.  How had only advanced 150 yards up this finger ridge when 
machine gun and rifle bullets from both flanks sprayed into the company, the air dense 
with snapping steel, the most deadly type of swarm. The Marines had to pull back to the 
LD after two hours of this hail and there brought in artillery to try and squelch the 
sources of the fire. Then, at 1800, an air strike came in and dropped napalm and 
launched rockets into Hill 980, eliminating much of the enemy fire, or at least silencing it 
for a time. That hill was reported to be rife with “heavily entrenched positions” brimming 
with enemy troops.3 
Item Company 3/5 was in direct support of How Company. George, however, was 
in battalion reserve.  
“Little progress was made by the attacking elements of the regiment, as far as 
ground gained was concerned. The day was of extreme value in as much as we now 
had the opportunity to ‘feel out’ the enemy; to get an idea of where and how he was 
entrenched; the type of tactics to employ to ‘dig him out;’ and in general, get a more 
complete picture of the ‘what and how’ of the job that was ahead. It was amply apparent 
that the job ahead would be ‘rough.’ We were now engaged with an enemy that had had 
plenty of time to ‘dig in.’” Casualties for 3/5 16th September were 3 KIA and 7WIA.4 
The day was similar for 2/5. They passed through 3/1 near Hill 751 that morning to 
attack Hill 812 (Objective Dog), 1,000 yards to their north. (And 3/1, then subsequently 
relieved on Hill 751 by elements of the KMC regiment, retired to regimental reserve, 
except for How Company, which set up a company perimeter on Hill 673.) Again the hill 
                                                 
3 Fifth Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 19; Third Battalion, 5th Marines, “Historical 
Diary,” September 1951, 7. 
4 Fifth Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 19, Appendix V, Dispatch 162158. 
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to be seized was atop a “T’ shaped ridge, and there were no routes of approach 
available that were not within mutually supporting fields of fire from the enemy. Many 
enemy defenses were on reverse slopes (making them very difficult to eliminate with 
artillery, tanks, and mortars). The primary attack was to be made by 2/5 on the right. To 
the left of 2/5, 3/5 would advance at the same time and support the attack on 812, but 
were to be ready to attack Hill 980 when ordered. While all this was going on, 1/5 was to 
remain in regimental reserve. It moved to an assembly area on Hill 702, Yoke Ridge.5 
Fox 2/5 was the leading company. Easy Company was battalion reserve, and Dog 
company set up to support the attack by fire from the former positions of How Company 
3/1, which they had relieved near Hill 751. Fox moved out between Hills 673 and 680 
along the low ground formed by a tributary of the Soyang River. The relief of units from 
the 1st Marines rendered a delay, however, and the attack was not really moving before 
mid afternoon (this delay would prove costly). Weapons Company set up with Dog 
Company, its heavy machine guns organized for battery fire over the heads of the 
attacking troops along with support from the 75mm recoilless rifles. In the vicinity of Dog 
Company, several mines cause multiple casualties among members of the 5th Marines. 
Trails in the area were jammed to capacity with the 1st Marine troops being relieved and 
the 5th Marine troops relieving them—it was too unsafe to leave the trails because of the 
heavy amount of mines in the area. The necessary lack of dispersion and interval 
caused a fear of enemy mortar and artillery fire, so elements of the 5th Marines set up in 
positions to provide cover over the trails to prevent observed enemy interdictory fire.6 
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Soon, the Marines of 3/1, recently relieved and filing out on the trails, witnessed 
the disturbing image of seeing many of the men who had just relieved them exiting the 
area in ambulances and on stretchers.7 
Fox Company finally moved out at 1200, and because elements of the 1st Marines 
were still engaged with enemy on Hill 749, the going was slow—contact was imminent 
and there were many mines. Stiff resistance met the Marines in the usual form of 
scathing enemy machine gun, artillery, and mortar fire (from positions on the 
approaches to 812), which halted the attack by 1700. The Marines needed to regroup, 
consolidate, and provide for the evacuation of their casualties.8 
Gerald P. Averill was there that day: 
“F” Company, with the mission of making the main effort against Hill 812, 
had been expected to move out as soon as “D” Company was in position [prior to 
1200]. Instead, it was nearly an hour late in leaving the assembly area, and 
another hour before the assault platoons started up the winding trail into the 
valley [deep and heavily forested, this valley was about 1,200 yards wide at this 
point] between “D” Company [on a ridge between 749 and 673] and Hill 812. All 
this backing and filling, all this aimless milling around had been duly noted by the 
North Korean outposts, who quickly passed the information back to the units on 
the enemy’s main battle position. The little brown men of the North Korean 
People’s Army took up the slack—waiting for the lead elements of “F” Company 
to appear in their fire lanes. 
At 1700, “F” Company stepped into it right up to the neck. Two platoon 
leaders were hit, and the toll of dead and wounded mounted as daylight 
dwindled. Two hours later, one platoon had forced its way forward and upward 
until it had gained the high ground 400 meters south and east of the enemy 
strong point on Hill 812. There was no reason to turn back. It was better to stay 
put, even though it was out of contact with the parent unit.9 
  
Fox Company’s attack and the rest of the initial seizure of Hill 812 has never been 
thoroughly narrated. The above paragraph is about the extent of detail given it in any 
                                                 
7 “Historical Diary,” of the 2nd Battalion 5th Marines, September 1951, 28. 
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published account. This is surprising because the Historical Diary of 2/5 is rife with 
details. Usually, the historical diaries are dull and summarizing with very little detail 
beyond the location of units and times of advance and other lifeless facts. But this 
heretofore unexploited source begs consideration in this account because it actually 
goes down to the platoon level whereas most of the battalion diaries barely go to the 
company level. The story of this battle is incomplete without it. 
Fox Company reached a fork in the trail at 1430 on September 16th, not yet having 
met any major enemy resistance. Here, the platoons separated. The 2nd Platoon 
headed west towards Hill 812. The 3rd Platoon moved up the ridge parallel to the 
boundary between the 1st and 5th Marines zones of action. The 1st platoon accompanied 
the company CP to a draw a little further along. The preparatory fires for the attack were 
reported to have good coverage on the objective (meaning they seemed to saturate the 
target area and not go beyond it too much), but these had to be limited as the exact 
location of friendly frontline units was not certain. The general plan was “to move along 
the trail and valley east of Hill 812 to seek the finger ridges and attack up to Objective 
Dog.”10 (See Map # 31) 
The ridgeline running north between Hill 749 and Hill 812 in the zone of the 1st 
Marines was not yet secure, but Marines were sighted by Dog Company in that area. 
This led the CO of 2/5 to speculate that the 1st Marines now had this area of 749 in 
hand. If this was the case, he could get permission to use the 1st Marines’s zone to 
advance along the ridgeline toward 812 instead of having to get up to it through the 
valley—the attack, instead of going from low ground against high ground, could begin 
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on the high ground. However, the Marines sighted were elements of Fox Company, and 
the area in question was not yet in Marine hands.11  
 Finally, at 1555, word came in as to the locations of Fox Company’s platoons. 
Because word had not been received did not mean that Fox Company had been 
negligent in reporting in, often the radios and landlines were unreliable--the radios for 
various reasons and the wire because anything from enemy fire to a passing vehicle to 
a Korean laborer  acquiring wire to tie his burden could sever it. The best possible 
approach available to the advancing Marines was the southwest finger ridge, which the 
2nd Platoon had ascended. It was heavily wooded to provide concealment and at least 
part of the route was in defilade from enemy MG fire on the objective. This platoon, 
under 2ndLT Roth (no first name given) soon saw that the tree cover had been cleared 
from the summit of Hill 812 and in a radius of 65 yards from the top. This area was 
devoid of any vegetation, a prepared enemy kill zone. The ridge leading to 812, 
furthermore, was a razorback ridge.12  
The enemy emplacements along the ridge are illustrated in Map # 32. “The 
forward slope . . . was defended by a series of mutually-supporting, well dug-in, 
prepared fortifications, mostly bunkers with embrasures for automatic weapons. These 
were positioned in a rough semi-circle . . . and were interspersed with numerous rifle 
pits and foxholes of the small, compact, enemy-type. These gave the enemy coverage 
of approximately 180 degrees in an arc . . . and effectively delivered fire on nearly all 
routes of approach.” The enemy defenses showed that they expected the Marine attack 





to come down the high ground east to west (ridge-running). Their expectation was 
correct.13  
Possibly they had formed their defense as an adaptation to the Marine ridge-
running tactics. Unlike the American troops, the Chinese and North Korean soldiers did 
not “rotate” their men home, so many veterans of the entire war (so far) were among 
their ranks—even former ROKs who had been captured and forced to fight for the 
NKPA—and even some who had fought the Japanese in WWII and against the 
Nationalists in the Chinese civil war. It was not uncommon for Communist soldiers to 
have as many as fifteen years of combat experience. Therefore, they knew lots of little 
tricks and had much experience to draw on in formulating a murderous defense. 
Enemy emplacements were on either side of the spine of the ridge and could 
subject an attacker to forward and enfilade fire. The attacking troops would be forced by 
the narrowness of the razor-back ridge to attack in a column or otherwise very narrow-
fronted formation, and the enemy was emplaced to subject such an attack to a withering 
crossfire. “Bunkers had been placed in saddles, just down from the crest, so that they 
could not be seen from the direct front until the attackers were quite close. . . . These 
bunkers delivered fire along a longitudinal axis down the spine in some instances, as 
the knob which concealed a bunker was not wide enough to prevent fire from 
approximately thirty degrees from the direct front.”14 
Fox company observed an artillery concentration fired on Hill 812 at 1600 as 
“reasonably close.” Therefore its position was closer to the objective than the command 
had suspected. The 2nd Platoon came under fire first as it advanced up the finger of the 





ridge. Immediately, one man was downed from a long range shot by an enemy sniper. 
The rest of the fire received, however, was sporadic and inaccurate, so the first shot 
had been “lucky.” The platoon kept advancing, keeping to the cover of the trees 
wherever possible.15 
The 3rd Platoon, under 2ndLt Charles Conyngham (who had commanded his 
platoon less than two months and had, in an improbable coincidence, succeeded his 
brother, John Conygnham in command), moved along the ridge adjacent to the trail 
taken by the 2nd Platoon, trying to keep in defilade behind the small finger ridge, and by 
1730 had made it to within 500 yards of the objective. It was here these Marines 
suddenly received intense small arms and MG fire from the front. This hot firefight 
stopped the 3rd Platoon’s advance. A withering crossfire swept the ridge, riddling 
Marines with heavy slugs before they could get to cover, and plunging the platoon into 
confusion. Just then the mortar rounds began to drop, spraying daisy-cutter fragments 
of white-hot steel across the Marine positions, some finding flesh and spattering the 
Korean hill with American blood.16 
The wounded fell where they were hit, many in dangerously exposed positions 
with bullets and shell fragments kicking up dirt all around. Among those hit were the 
platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and one squad leader. It was then that Hospitalman 
Clines (no first name recorded), a Navy corpsman with the 3rd Platoon rushed from 
cover to aid the casualties. He seemed to ignore the ground-churning, heavy caliber MG 
slugs that erupted showers of debris, rock, and dirt all around him as he rendered first-





aid to the fallen and then helped drag or otherwise evacuate them to the relative safety 
of cover.17 
Another American on the fire-swept hill found courage within himself. Corporal 
Lonn (no first name supplied) was a squad leader with the 60mm mortar squad attached 
to the platoon. He deliberately exposed himself to enemy observation to draw their fire 
and locate the enemy emplacements by their muzzle flashes or dust. He personally 
directed fire on at least three enemy positions and was instrumental in the destruction of 
one enemy MG position on the flank.18 
In this engagement, radio contact was lost with the parent company. Then, when a 
garbled message came in, the Fox Company Commander sent a runner to the platoon. 
The runner returned with word that the platoon was in confusion from the loss of most of 
its leaders as casualties. Lt Holmes (no first name or specification of rank as 1st or 2nd Lt 
supplied) volunteered to take over and reorganize the 3rd Platoon. In addition a 
helicopter for “med-evac” was requested through the battalion TACP (Tactical Air 
Control Party).19 
The morale of Fox Company was further damaged by an incident of friendly fire at 
dusk involving Dog 2/5 on a ridge to the left of Fox 2/5. This company sighted men 
approaching it, and unsure if these were friendlies or not, called headquarters to ask 
that the assault companies mark their positions with WP, so Dog Company could 
thereby avoid firing on fellow Marines. The “Willie Pete” went up from Fox Company, but 
attack aircraft in the vicinity saw it and assumed it was to mark an enemy position. 
These planes hit Fox Company 2/5 with napalm and strafing fire, but miraculously not 
                                                 





one casualty was incurred from this. Dog Company observers saw Fox Marines waving 
air panels at the planes, but couldn’t help stop the strike because their radio to the 
TACP was out.20 
Even then, the battalion and company CPs could not be sure of Fox’s true 
positions so could not assist with 4.2 inch mortar-fire. The 1st Platoon was sent to assist 
the 3rd Platoon, still pinned down under scathing enemy fire, interspersed with mortar 
and artillery as well as small arms and MG fire.21 
Meanwhile, the 2nd platoon had come into heavy enemy opposition within 225 
meters of the crest of Hill 812. Enemy riflemen cut loose a deluge of fire against the 
platoon, accompanied by the cacophonic chugging of a heavy MG from a bunker 
emplacement. Two Marines fell in the first few seconds of the firefight. The platoon 
advance ground to a halt, enemy fire poured in from all along the crest of the ridge. The 
Marines sought what cover was available and returned the NKPA fire. Just then a 
second MG stuttered to life, adding its punctuating voice to the world-splitting crash of 
combat.22 
The 3rd squad of the light MG platoon, attached to Fox Company’s 2nd Platoon, 
had its weapon already set up to engage the first enemy MG. These Marines turned 
their fire on the new threat. There was a rapid trading of bullets between the Marine and 
NKPA automatic weapons and the Marine section leader fell slain. In addition, both the 
gunner and assistant gunner were wounded. Corporal Lowe, a squad leader (no first 
name supplied) immediately rushed to the out-of-action gun, and moved the gunner, 
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who, shot in the face, had slumped over the MG, as well as the assistant gunner to 
safety. He then took over the MG. His accurate and effective fire helped his fellow 
Marines maneuver to better cover and bring more efficient fire on the enemy. Later, 
Lowe turned the gun over to another Marine and took over leadership of the light MG 
section. He displaced the section’s second light MG forward, and then exposed himself 
to enemy fire continually amid a hail of mortar fragments and machine gun bullets to 
designate targets (sometimes this was done by locating an enemy target by its flash 
and then showing other Marines where it was by firing a single tracer round at it from a 
carbine), and help the less experienced gunners clear their weapons when they 
jammed.23 
The 2nd Platoon managed to get enough of its organic weapons into action to 
achieve fire superiority on the NKPAs to its immediate front. These Marines neutralized 
one of the two enemy MG bunkers, and were greeted by the heartening sight of enemy 
soldiers abandoning that emplacement and fleeing to the rear. Their firefight was not 
over, however, as plenty of other enemy emplacements had the Marines within their 
field of fire and continued to fill the air with hot steel and lead in the vicinity of the 
platoon.24 
Meanwhile, the 1st Platoon moved to assist the beleaguered 3rd Platoon on the 
slopes of Hill 812. By 1845, they had entered the fight. The position where the 3rd 
Platoon Marines were was actually a small finger ridge, and the Marine assault up this 
ridge had run into a line of well defended enemy entrenchments. From a higher finger 
ridge between the 3rd Platoon and the crest of the objective, Lieutenant Holmes, with 





the 1st Platoon, could see that the 3rd Platoon’s position was untenable. He had his men 
set up a base of fire to cover the pinned-down Marines so they could pass through his 
men to safety. The 1st Platoon let go with a steady rate of red tracers stabbing into the 
horseshoe shaped portion of the ridge above them and relieved much of the pressure 
from the 3rd Platoon. By 1900, the message reached the 3rd Platoon about the plan to 
help them withdraw.25 
At dusk, Colonel Stiff (he was actually a LtCol, but LtCols are referred to as 
“Colonel” both as an abbreviation when referring to them in print, and as a courtesy 
when talking or writing directly to or about them) finally made successful radio contact 
with Fox’s CO. He wanted to know, since the platoons were so near the objective, if 
they could have it in hand before dark. Captain William E. Melby, the Fox CO realized 
that the enemy positions were strong and that his units were riddled with casualties (and 
were badly shaken from the near-miss of the friendly air strike). He sent back that it was 
not a likely possibility. Therefore, Colonel Stiff gave him permission to withdraw to a 
defensible night perimeter.26 
By 1915, the 3rd Platoon began the move to withdraw through the 1st Platoon. It 
then moved to the saddle between the 749 hill mass and Hill 812 to set up a perimeter. 
Darkness caused the enemy fire to lessen enough soon after that the 1st Platoon, too, 
could withdraw to a defensible night position under covering artillery fires. The Fox 
Company FO called in the shells. The position for the night was slightly northeast of the 
3rd Platoon in the same saddle. As for the 2nd Platoon, it fought until dark, when the 
platoon leader received word the other two were withdrawing. Lt Roth opted not to 





withdraw his platoon with the other two since he was but 150 yards from the crest and in 
an ideal position to renew the attack in the morning. After a simulated withdrawal to 
confuse the enemy, he set up his unit in a tight perimeter within the tree line with strict 
fire, light, camouflage, and noise discipline so that the NKPAs did not even realize they 
were still in the vicinity.27 
After Fox Company had moved out the morning of 16 September, Easy Company 
was put on alert to be ready to attack. No attack order came down. On the evening of 
the 16th, the Battalion CO received word from the regimental CO that 2/5 was to resume 
the attack the next day. Though “H Hour” had not yet been determined, it was 
suspected that it would be at 0400, “since Division seemed to favor that hour.” Sure 
enough, a couple of hours later “H-hour” came down as 0400. The Battalion CP then 
relayed this information to Fox Company, directing the attack to resume at 0400. The 
message came out as “0900,” however, because of a mistake in the Company’s 
decoder machine. The mistake would not be realized until 0420 when battalion HQ 
realized Fox was not attacking. The evening of the 16th, Easy Company was ordered to 
begin a move to the Fox CP at 0400, September 17.28 
At 1630, September 16, the regimental Operation Order 42-51 came down, 
confirming the earlier verbal orders for the next day’s assault. It designated 0830 as H-
hour for Easy (the 0400 H-hour was from Division for the battalion, a job given to Fox, 
not Easy Company). There was also an airstrike planned to hit Hill 812 and Objective 
Two in the morning before the attack. The battalion S-3, Major Averill, estimated jump 
off could be had at 0800 for Easy Company (earlier than the actual planned H-hour) and 
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so the air strikes were planned for 0600. Since requested two hours early, perhaps the 
usually late planes would actually be overhead before 0800 to make the strike in time 
for the attack.29 
That night was far from peaceful for 2/5. Artillery and mortar shells fell all night 
long. The bombardments would come in intervals, several rounds hitting in quick 
succession and then a time of quiet. This was hell on a man’s nerves. Most of these 
shells originated from Hills 980, 1052, or behind the MLR in the enemy’s rear, but when 
they struck so close to Marines, the men hunkering in their foxholes started to believe 
they were friendly rounds falling short. (Part of this impression was from the fact that 
some friendly 4.2 inch mortar fire had fallen near Marine locations, but the FSCC was 
told and had had the fire stopped.)30 
The 3rd Section of the 6th MG Squad was with Fox Company 2/5 on part of the 
ridge east of Hill 812. That night a saturating artillery and mortar bombardment hit. 
Corporal Burton (no first name supplied), the section’s gunner, was hit by shrapnel in 
his gut and left foot. The wounds were severe and the pain was intense. Warm, sticky 
blood soaked his trousers and hands. Nevertheless, he risked his life to hurl four boxes 
of MG ammunition that had caught fire down the hill, and then gave first aid to the fallen, 
refusing care for himself. He waited until the other wounded had been evacuated before 
beginning the trek to the company aid station himself, but he fainted from blood loss. 
His example, however, inspired the men of his unit through the rest of the night, which 
was cool, with clouds drifting over a full moon.31 
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At 2400, the Battalion CP was informed that for the next day’s attack it would have 
control of an engineer mine team (to locate and disarm mines), and a liaison team for 
the Marine tanks in the area. The evacuation of wounded was a formidable logistical 
problem September 16. In addition, “too many Marines were used as stretcher-bearers 
for wounded that might have reached the forward aid station under their own power; 
some, not in danger, might have waited for Koreans to carry them to the rear.” The 
implication is that some Marines were leaping to be stretcher bearers for men that didn’t 
need it in order to escape the shelling on the front lines for a time. For one Marine, the 
situation was the opposite and he was chastised for it. After being badly wounded, “My 
comrades were unable to get me to the aid station that night. So early the next morning 
I walked. Not the smartest thing I have ever done. My arrival at the Battalion Aid Station 
was highlighted by a detailed explanation of my stupidity. It seems that they had 
dispatched the litter bearers, at first light, to pick us up. Now I had wasted all that 
valuable time and scarce resources. I explained that if it would make them feel better I 
would walk back, up the hill, and lay down so we could start over.”32  
The roads that existed in rear areas, too, were a problem. Most became a “sea of 
mud” that had to be bypassed via a “tank pass,” but soon, that too was “impassable to 
jeeps. [Then] a three-quarter-ton ambulance was used until this vehicle could not pass 
the quagmire; then 6X6 [2 ½ ton] trucks . . . .” And even though hot coffee and soup 
could be had at the CP of the 5th Marines, none of the line companies got any since 
Korean carrgadores humped in only essential items—mostly ammo. Other problems 
were in communication. Again, wires were frequently broken and radios unreliable. For 
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example: “Fox Company’s 3rd Platoon’s radio worked part time and Fox CP had 
difficulties keeping in contact. The 2nd Platoon’s radio came in loud and clear, but was 
not in contact with the 3rd, so could not help.”33 
At 0100 that night a sudden urgent request came in to the battalion CP from Fox 
Company. The frantic Marine reported that two men had been killed and eighteen 
wounded by the intense mortar and artillery bombardment and stretcher bearers were 
needed. Forty laborers were sent to carry down the wounded, (only ten of the wounded 
ended up requiring a stretcher evacuation) and twenty-eight of the laborers became 
unnecessary when Fox Company’s 3rd Platoon carried seven stretcher cases down 
themselves. (The 3rd platoon had had twelve casualties since the afternoon of the 16th. 
Thus the company had barely the strength of two full platoons on the slopes leading to 
812.)  
The excess laborers were sent instead to the supply point over a mile away to the 
rear near the branch of the river that ran west to east between Yoke and Kanmubong 
Ridges to hump ammunition to the lines. At 0300, they began bringing ammo to Fox 
Company, especially the beleaguered 3rd Platoon. Forty more Koreans joined them at 
0800. To get this many laborers into action, the labor officer had to use “Korean cooks, 
interpreters, headquarters personnel, and sixteen Korean officers of company grade;” 
the number of laborers still out on ammo runs from earlier that night was too great to 
meet the demand with the regular personnel. Showing great patriotism, some of the ill 
Koreans on the sick list even volunteered to work though their health was poor. “It was 
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largely through the efforts of sincere, patriotic laborers that the supply problem became 
supportable.”34 
The positions for the night of 16-17 September for the rest of 2/5 (besides Fox 
Company, for which the positions have already been noted) were as follows: Dog 
Company was in a “tight perimeter” on the slopes of the ridge between 751 and 812, 
and between How and Item Companies of 3/5; Easy Company was in the vicinity of the 
Battalion CP near the Hays Line.35 
The Marines of 3/5 passed through 3/1 west of 2/5 at 0830 that morning. It, too, 
attacked north against heavy resistance. It made it to the vicinity of a ridgeline before 
nightfall, where it dug in (night fell just before 2000 in Korea at this time of year).36 
That afternoon, 2/5’s 81mm mortar platoon moved close enough to support the 
last part of the attack late in the evening.37 
Thus 16 September ended for the 5th Marines. Fox 2/5 pulled back and set up a 
defensive perimeter. It then began evacuation of wounded. Contact was made with 3/5 
on the left and maintained all night. That night brought no enemy counterattacks for a 
bright moon was up and the terrain was almost as bright as day.38 
Gerald P. Averill described digging in that night: 
As it had been on countless other nights of combat, the terrain was bathed by the 
incandescence of a full moon, the hills and ridge lines so well illuminated that 
every movement could be detected. Before nightfall Ramsdell and I had dug a 
chevron-type foxhole across the spine of the ridge. In it were the field phone and 
the radio. The colonel’s hole had been dug nearby.39  
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Besides the friendly fire, another bad incident had occurred. Some Marines in the 
5th Marines supply dump had stepped on a buried, undetected mine. One lost his foot 
and others had bad shrapnel wounds.40 
The 11th Marines and supporting artillery had fired 79 missions and a whopping 
7,108 rounds, wreaking an estimated 105 enemy KIA. The 1st Tank Battalion’s Charlie 
Company expended 220 rounds, but was only credited with destroying two bunkers.41 
For September 16, Marine casualties were 24 KIA, 127 WIA, and 1 MIA. The 1st 
KMC had 1 WIA. The enemy lost 169 counted KIA, 418 estimated KIA (a total of 587), 
and 540 estimated WIA. The Marines took 25 POWs. The 1st Marines alone suffered 23 
KIA and 110 WIA as well as 48 NBCs (Non-battle casualties).42 
The previous four days (just in the sector of Hill 749) totaled 90 KIA, 714 WIA, and 
1 MIA. Most of these losses were from the 1st Marines. The enemy losses were 771 
counted dead, over 1,600 estimated dead, and 81 prisoners.43 
“Because of the heavy casualties suffered by Fox, Easy, which had remained in 
the assembly area throughout the day, was alerted to move forward by 0400 17 
September to take positions in rear of Fox and be prepared to make a passage of lines 
to continue the attack.”44 
 
Day Seven: September 17 
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The Operations Orders for the day were Division OpnO 25-51 and Regimental 
Frag Order 139-51, which basically reiterated the previous day’s objectives and 
missions and ordered the attack to resume at 0400. As said the 5th Marines Historical 
Diary, “But for the rifleman in the front lines, upon whose shoulders rests the burden of 
final success of any operation, the detailed planning and commands set forth in these 
orders boiled down to the simple terse words; ‘continue the attack to seize 
objectives.’”45 
For 3/5 the morning began at 0230 when seven NKPAs infiltrated into Weapons 
Company’s area. A fight ensued and the Marines suffered 3 KIAs and 3 WIAs. At 
daylight, How Company would support 2/5’s attack by fire and send out patrols. None of 
3/5’s units moved from the night’s positions. For 3/5, the attack towards the objectives 
was over. The next few days would consist of patrolling and digging in.46 
At 0400 the morning of the 17th, Easy Company (Captain William L. Wallace) 
moved towards Fox Company’s CP, following the same trail as Fox the day before, its 
forward elements reaching it at 0730. There was supposed to be a guide to meet Easy 
and show them Fox’s positions, but he had been “used as a stretcher bearer” and was 
not around.47 (See Map # 32) 
Fox, which had confused the attack order as 0900, discovered the mistake at 
0420. It immediately began to prepare to resume its attack. At dawn, it was nearly 
ready. Lt. Holmes, the platoon leader of the 1st Platoon, was wounded at 0600 by a 
mortar fragment. Captain Victor Sawina, the Company Executive Officer, took it over.48 
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The 5th Marines resumed the attack at 0400 with 2/5 in the assault, and 3/5 
supporting by fire, at least, so said the operation order. Carrying it out was delayed by 
the mistake in communication and by the morale status of the company. Fox 2/5 was 
still shaken from the friendly fire incident of the day before. It did not jump off until 0700. 
This led to an excellent opportunity that would not have been manifested if the Marines 
had attacked while still dark. Now that the sun was up and Fox Company could see 
NKPA troops on the objective eating meals, shaking blankets to dust them, and “walking 
around unconcernedly.”49 Fox 2/5 made and artillery request and decimated these North 
Koreans, though it took rigid fire discipline to keep the Marines, frustrated and impatient 
on seeing the enemy in the open within range, from opening up on them.50 
Gerald P. Averill described the incident: 
Indirectly, it [the delay] turned out favorably, for as first light outlined Hills 1052 
and 980 –the light fully in the eyes of the defenders—the troops of Hill 812 came 
out to enjoy the warmth of the sun, to wash their faces, brush their teeth, and 
cook rice. We watched them through binoculars from the “D” Company ridge, and 
as soon as everyone on Hill 812 was settling in for a pleasant breakfast we blew 
them away with a nicely delivered artillery concentration. It started the day off 
right, but from that moment on, things got rough.51 
 
This successful surprise helped the Marines make significant advances towards 
Hill 812 by Fox Company with Dog Company supporting by fire. The advance was also 
helped by the Fox 2nd Platoon’s location, almost on the crest and hidden in the trees. 
The enemy had not spotted them even when sunning and eating. “From this point on, 
the enemy became very cautious about exposing himself,” said the battalion Historical 
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Diary in a radical understatement. Many of the soldiers who survived fled to the bunkers 
on the reverse slope of 812. Such progress was not to be long lived.52  
The 1st Platoon of Fox, now under Captain Sawina, started up a small finger ridge 
in front of its night positions to set up a base of fire to support the assault. This finger 
ridge was not as well defended as the main finger. It gave the platoon the advantage of 
some defilade to set up MGs to fire on the enemy bunkers. Fox’s CO thought this to be 
the fatal chink in the enemy’s defense. At 0745 the 1st Platoon and part of the 3rd began 
this limited objective attack to regain the ground lost when these withdrew the previous 
evening. Thereafter, they were to consolidate for the night while the 2nd Platoon and 
Easy Company pressed the attack. (The 3rd Platoon had had many casualties and part 
of it was left at the Fox CP for local security. The elements of this platoon with Sawina 
would set up with his 1st Platoon to cover the assault up the northwest finger ridge.)53  
The point Sawina’s men were aiming for was the afore-mentioned finger ridge. At 
0830, the platoons reached this “finger” despite some casualties and stiffening 
resistance (much of the progress was made because of concealment offered by the 
trees). When the fireteam on 1st Platoon’s “point” (all volunteers) learned they were to 
consolidate now and await nightfall while Easy Company got to make the day’s main 
attack, they were crestfallen. This gung-ho foursome of “devil dogs” (as Marines were 
called by the Germans in WWI) each had a Thompson submachine-gun and fancied 
himself eager for action and wanted to be the first Marines on the crest of 812. Later on, 
                                                 
52 “Historical Diary,” Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, 39. 
53 Ibid., 41. 
 
 200
however, after the bitter assault ahead played out before their eyes, they were much 
less ardent in their thirst for battle and were glad to not have had the assault.54 
The Marines on this key finger-ridge had recently finished consolidating when a 
heavy thunderstorm of artillery and mortar-fire shredded the hillside all around them 
followed by a searching spray of thousands of MG rounds fanning all over their 
positions. Corporal Callahan (no first name supplied), a squad leader, had one of his 
Marines fall wounded. He cradled the man in his arms and made his way through “ a 
hail of grazing fire delivered by crossfiring enemy machine guns” to cover where the 
wounded Marine could get first aid. He then moved from foxhole to foxhole among his 
squad, designating targets for his Marines. “His coolness under fire was indicative of 
that represented by Marines this day.”55 
This finger-ridge was about 150 yards from the base of the larger finger ridge to 
the north. Two Marine light MGs were set up on either side of the finger. The original 
plan was to attack simultaneously from two directions, one prong heading up the east 
finger ridge, the other up the south finger. This was changed before jump-off to be a 
three prong attack, one platoon per prong. Easy would pass through Fox with two of its 
platoons and the third platoon would be the 2nd Platoon of Fox. This Platoon (it will be 
remembered) was at a point only 100 meters from the objective, concealed from the 
enemy by thick foliage. Colonel Stiff, CO of 2/5 made the estimate that 812 was 
defended by one NKPA company. Fox was to support Easy’s assault with fire.56 
At dawn, the battalion also sent forward an “Observation Post/Command Post” or 
OP-CP, composed of the S-3 and a miniature HQ. It set up at the approximate position 
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Fox’s CP had been the night before as a “‘classic’ observation post, from which an 
excellent view could be had of all that transpired on the ridge of Objective Dog.”57  
After Fox Company had the base of fire set up, Easy Company leapfrogged 
forward through it at 0850 with Fox’s 2nd Platoon attached.58  
The Marines of Easy Company requested air support, but no planes showed up in 
time (this despite 2/5 having priority of air support and all aircraft on station were to 
report every hour for possible strikes). It was not, in this case, because the planes were 
late, but because of a communications failure that did not allow the 2nd Battalion FAC to 
communicate with them to control a strike. Therefore the planes were sent to 3/5’s FAC 
instead. “As the troops awaited the air-strike, the Battalion S-3 relayed Lieutenant 
Colonel Stiff’s orders to attack at once following the actual aerial attack, to take 
advantage of the expected state of shock the enemy will have suffered thereby,” even if 
Easy’s 2nd Platoon was not quite at the LD (Line of Departure). But since the planes did 
not show, this platoon was on the LD in plenty of time.59  
Finally, at 0755 fighter planes strafed and rocketed positions in front of 2/5 and 
beyond 812. “However, this strike was disappointing, as the area of impact was too far 
beyond the area of our immediate attack to be very helpful.” Later at 0920 and 1045 the 
battalion again tried to direct airstrikes but could not make contact with the TACP radio 
and so could not call priority missions. With no adequate air-strike the assault would 
have to be made with only artillery and mortar support. Fox in particular kept the 
objective under a continuous hail from its 60 mm mortars. Also in support, Dog 
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Company fired 75mm recoilless rifles towards where a big bunker could be seen. It was 
judged to be successfully neutralized.60 
Easy’s 2nd Platoon under Lieutenant Hinson (no first name supplied) made its way 
through the Fox CP and up the slopes of a finger ridge to Fox Company’s northwest. 
(See Map # 33) It had not gone any farther than half way, however, before a withering 
crossfire coming directly down the finger ridge had pinned it down. Four Marines fell 
wounded almost at the first burst. Hinson then decided that the south slope was 
untenable and moved to the reverse slope of the ridge where there was some defilade. 
There the platoon waited for further orders (all before H-hour). At 0850, the rest of Easy 
was ready to jump off.61 
About the same time, 0800, Charlie Company from 1/5 came into 2/5’s area to set 
up a blocking position on 2/5’s right flank, Hill 749. Later on, however, this plan changed 
and Charlie left back to 1/5’s zone.62 
By 1030, only a hundred yards of progress had been made (by Easy) and the 
enemy converging fire was still coming in. The CO of 2/5 then “ordered an all-out drive 
for the objective, following a preliminary barrage of everything that could be thrown at 
the enemy—artillery, 75mm recoilless, rockets, and 81mm and 4.2 inch mortars.”63 
Meanwhile, Fox’s 2nd platoon under Lieutenant Roth, the one concealed in the 
trees near the objective, had been ready to attack by 0550. But the base of fire for its 
support and Easy Company’s advance took so much time that this platoon did not step 
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out until 1100. When the fire was raised, Easy Company would push ahead up the 
ridgeline, while Fox Company’s 2nd Platoon flanked the objective.64 
The base of fire cut loose with its MGs at 1100 on NKPA MG bunkers, and Roth’s 
platoon surged forward with three squads in the assault. As soon as these Marines 
stepped from the tree-line, the enemy noted the platoon’s position and cut down four of 
the Marines with bursts of MG fire. At the same time, Hinson’s platoon, only 150 yards 
from the summit, too, advanced. Hinson could not see any bunkers on his finger ridge, 
he had to keep in defilade on the south or reverse slope so as not to be hit by MG fire 
from the crest of 812. The movement forward of Easy was slow; intense enemy fire from 
rifle-pits as well as bunkers on 812’s east face swept the ground in a steel rain. All of 
the enemy positions were well camouflaged and very difficult to spot. Soon, Hinson’s 
men moved into the beaten zone of Fox’s 3rd Platoon (under Lt Markham—no first name 
supplied), and that Platoon’s portion of the base of fire ceased and readied to also 
attack. This platoon had a difficult mission. It was to assault frontally up the finger ridge 
right into the teeth of the enemy bunker’s fire. Thirty minutes prior to this, the Heavy MG 
Platoon, set up in battery on the ridge with Dog Company, had sprayed a steady 
dispersion of bullets over the head of the attacking Marines, keeping its beaten zone 
about 100 yards ahead of the advance.65 
This use of the heavy MGs in battery, however, proved to be a mistake. Averill 
described the result: 
Everyone wanted to get into the game. The six Browning heavy machine 
guns were set up in battery instead of by section. Slightly down from the machine 
guns was a section of 75mm recoilless rifles from the regimental antitank 
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company, attached to the battalion for operations. Hill 812 was within range of 
both the machine guns and the recoilless rifles. 
Just a short time after the last round of the artillery concentration had been 
expended [from the barrage against the NKPA caught eating breakfast], the 
North Koreans could be seen swarming around the hilltop in great numbers. I 
guess the colonel must have been reading Rommel’s Infantry Attacks prior to 
coming out to Korea. In any event, he favored supporting the attack on Hill 812 
with long range machine gun fire. Rommel had made himself famous by such 
utilization of machine guns in the Great War. Why not give it a try? What to do? 
My advice was offered and rejected. The guns went into action. Across the valley 
the .30 caliber slugs flew, hundreds of them striking the hard ground, kicking up 
little puffs of dust around the bunkers. And then the roar of the recoilless rifles, 
the backflash vivid against the green foliage, high explosive rounds reaching out 
to tear the tough skin of Hill 812. Up on Hills 980 and 1052, the North Korean 
forward observers were watching. They turned to their communications, gave fire 
commands, and turned back to watch the machine guns once more. The 120mm 
tubes were laid, the bubbles leveled, the rounds dropped in. On over, one short. . 
. . Fire for effect! 
Six of our Brownings neutralized, water jackets pierced. Four of the gun 
crews wounded. The recoilless rifles forced out of position. That sudden. That 
smooth. Korea was not Austria or even Italy. Korea was Korea. Eventually that 
fact would sink in.66 
 
The attack, however, went on regardless. “All approaches to the hill were covered 
by enemy automatic weapons fire and the mutually-supporting bunkers were the most 
effective opposition encountered. These provided a crossfire that left the Marines 
almost helpless at times; the 3.5 inch rockets [called the super bazooka by the troops 
since it was a larger version of the old WWII bazooka] might have helped, but couldn’t 
be brought sufficiently close to fire on the positions.” The best weapon, the Marines 
discovered, was direct fire into the embrasures of the enemy bunkers with the Marines 
light MGs. The Marines set up their guns and simply kept a steady stream of bullets 
pouring through the embrasure until finally every North Korean within who lifted up to 
fire was hit. However, “this proved difficult and costly. . . .”67  
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For example is the experience of Corporal Valdez (no first name supplied) of Fox’s 
1st Platoon. He was the gunner on one of the light MGs in the base of fire. Ten minutes 
after the assault began four assistant gunners were hit and incapacitated right beside 
him. The enemy MG fire continued to spray his area, searching for him and traversing 
back and forth in multiple streams, the dispersion of rounds striking all around. Finally 
one bullet ricocheted and hit Valdez. Nevertheless, he remained at the trigger, tickling 
out bursts into enemy bunkers, the canvas belted brass shells feeding into the hungry 
weapon in a steady procession of fire and chattering death.68  
Jon Charles Genrich remembered this technique of neutralizing enemy bunkers: 
There was a higher ridge on our right flank and [1/7 was] attacking the hill 
with battalion strength or greater. Richard mentioned that this would maybe take 
some of the pressure off our position if the enemy needed men and supplies on 
the other hill. The airplanes were back attacking both hills and the napalm lit up 
the skies. 
Sometime around the middle of the day, Corporal Nash from another 
machine gun section came over to our gun. He said two enemy machinegun 
bunkers were giving problems to [1/7]. One machine gun was on the right flank 
firing at the bunkers, but they needed help. . . . We moved our gun to the top of 
the ridge so we could see the larger hill more clearly. We started to set the gun 
up on the hard rocks and Nash said, “You need sandbags or you’ll never hit 
anything.” Sorry, but we didn’t have sand bags, and I chipped away at the rock 
with my entrenching tool. I finally had a few notches in the rocks and set the 
tripod down in the notches. Richard helped me set the gun up and Nash said it 
was about 800 yards. I took aim at the higher bunker on the left, which was 
almost straight across from my position. I looked at the aperture and aimed at the 
top of the bunker about two feet directly above the aperture. 
I fired the first burst of about five rounds and the tracer round went right 
into the aperture the first time. The machine gun in the bunker stopped firing for 
about 15 seconds. When it started firing again, I fired five or six bursts and we 
saw a couple of tracers go into the aperture again. The enemy gun stopped firing 
all together and we switched over to the other machinegun bunker which was 
lower on the hill and further to the right. The angle wasn’t very good so after 
about 20 minutes we decided to leave it to the third section gun and move back 
to the left flank position. This would be my proudest hour in Korea for hitting the 
bunker on the first burst at 800 yards. When new men joined the squad in the 
future and it was mentioned once or twice, I played it down as no big deal. I knew 
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I was lucky and had used a little Kentucky windage that is not approved of in the 
Marines.69 
 
“This sort of machine gun counter battery fire was costly, burning out three barrels; 
however the supporting fires it provided got the bullets into the bunkers where they 
counted, and that is what matters.” A machine gunner was not expected to last long in 
combat: ‘Somebody come up with a number about how long you last in combat on any 
one of these weapons. You last 14 minutes as a machine gunner. You last 18 minutes 
as a mortar man and all this. I don’t know where they get these numbers. Somebody out 
there with a green eye shade on counting this, you know, theoretical stuff.”70 
 Easy Company’s 2nd Platoon advanced up the ridge through intense mortar fire. 
Then enemy MGs added to the deluge around the platoon. The Marines of 2nd Platoon 
Easy Company then set up their own light MGs and returned the enemy’s fire. No 
Marines were wounded by the enemy MG fire and only two were WIA by mortar 
fragments, a miracle considering the amount of incoming. This platoon maintained its 
advance, slowly infiltrating and making maximum use of any cover or concealment 
available. Artillery soon neutralized the enemy MG emplacements and these stayed 
silent until the platoon neared the crest of the finger ridge. Just then a single burst 
wounded all four Marines of the point fire team and hit a radioman as well. Soon mortar 
fire added to the confusion and disorganized the platoon.71 
 Lt Hinson leapt up under the enemy fire and restored order in the platoon. He 
then led it in a successful assault. The 2nd Platoon had the greatest distance to cover 
and so would be the last on the crest. About this time, Easy Company requested from 
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supply one-half unit of fire for all of its organic weapons. Soon after, a train of 
carrgadores was dispatched with the requested allotment.72 
 Meanwhile, Fox Company’s 2nd Platoon bogged down due to many casualties 
and intense enemy fire. The NKPA bunkers were hard nuts to crack and continued to 
deliver withering MG fire into the Marine ranks, filling the air with a swarm of snapping 
bullets. Finally a bunker would fall to a Marine grenade, satchel charge, or MG and 
small arms fire, and the advance would continue until another bunker slowed it down. 
“At no time did our forward movement cease entirely; at least one unit was maneuvering 
at all times, thus the enemy was not able to gain the time or opportunity to 
counterattack.”73 
 One bunker in particular stalled Fox’s 2nd Platoon on the very crest of a finger 
ridge of 812. Lt. Roth crawled and shuffled around his men to get a look and then 
directed them to move on the south slope where there was some defilade and woods to 
offer concealment. By this the platoon was able to outflank the bunker and avoid the 
most deadly portion of its field of fire. Sgt Livingston (no first name supplied), the leader 
of 1st Squad, led the final assault on this bunker. MG fire ripped across both his legs and 
shrapnel tore into his hip and chest. Nevertheless, he refused immediate aid until other 
even more-seriously wounded Marines were helped, and he drug himself forward. He 
“continued to shout directions and encouragement to his advancing fire teams. His 
inspiration and display of magnificent courage materially aided his squad to press the 
                                                 




assault, overrun the enemy position and capture the machine gun, leaving the area 
strewn with enemy dead and wounded.”74 
 A North Korean soldier darted from the bunker and made a beeline for the NKPA 
rear. “Hey! Shoot the bastard!” shouted one Marine fumbling with a jammed rifle. A 
nineteen-year-old downy-faced Marine, called the “‘chicken’ of the platoon” because of 
his youth and blonde hair hurled himself after the Korean soldier, screaming a battle cry 
to chill the fleeing enemy’s blood. He speared the North Korean in the seat of his 
trousers with his bayonet-tipped M-1. The NKPA dashed on another twenty yards, the 
Marine close behind still clinging to the rifle, the embedded bayonet linking the twain, 
until “chicken” managed to squeeze the trigger. “As the soldier fell on his face, the 
Marine stopped, casually leaned his rifle against his left arm, took a tiny KODAK camera 
from his pocket and snapped a picture of the still-squirming Korean.”75 
 At the military crest of the finger ridge, the company “gunny,” Staff Sergeant 
Stanley J. Wawrzyniak found an occupied enemy bunker that would decimate the “left 
flank of the first assaulting squad” if it was not silenced. He did not hesitate. He leapt to 
his feet and dashed through intense small arms fire and showers of grenade fragments 
to personally slay all three enemy denizens of the emplacement despite wounds from 
shrapnel. His personal weapon was out of ammunition, so he seized the BAR of a fallen 
Marine and continued to attack enemy entrenchments.  He “aggressively aided the 
squad in overrunning the position, directed the pursuit of the fleeing enemy and 
                                                 




consolidated the ground.” Wawrzyniak would receive the Navy Cross (his first of two in 
Korea).76 
 The squad’s 1st Fire Team made an attack against “a particularly troublesome 
bunker.” “A sudden hail of grenades and bullets” made the Marines hug the ground. 
Corporal Barczuk (no first name supplied) was the fire team leader. He belly-crawled 
toward the bunker, “turkey looked” (a technique whereby a Marine under cover quickly 
lifts his head to see and then immediately ducks back down) to assess the situation a 
few times, and carefully planned a final assault. He used all available cover and 
concealment to maneuver his men closer to the emplacement and led them in a final 
rush on the position with bayonets fixed. Barczuk had already been wounded by 
shrapnel, but was still the first to reach the bunker to lob several grenades through the 
aperture. Seconds later there was a crunching “WHUMP, WHUMP, WHUMP” as these 
burst white hot steel in the confined space, and there was nothing left of the four 
soldiers within but bloody, smoking husks. Barczuk was not done. He ignored his own 
wounds to take charge of the 1st Squad when Sgt Livingston was hit, and directed the 
final assault. 77 
 Fox’s 2nd Platoon set to eliminating the last of the enemy resistance on that 
slope. The remaining North Koreans there fled their bunkers when they heard the 
“Banzai!” screaming Marines descending towards them. By 1136, the “grim-faced, 
bayonet wielding troops . . . had secured the entire finger ridge and occupied the enemy 
                                                 
76 “Historical Diary,” Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, 44; Navy Cross Award Citation for Stanley J. 
Wawrzyniak. 
77 “Historical Diary,” Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, 44-45. 
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strongpoint . . . [on the crest] with minimum cost to themselves.” The crest of 812 itself, 
however, was not yet secured.78  
Fox’s 2nd Platoon was making the most progress of the assaulting elements. Easy 
Company’s platoons faced “murderous fire from the many positions dotting the ridge 
and particularly from enemy positions on the crest of the rise just beyond the summit of 
812.” Easy Company’s 2nd Platoon found itself under heavy mortar fire at 1330.  The 
3rd Platoon faced a bunker on the forward slope that was both stubborn and deadly. It 
continued to maintain accurate streams of fire that scythed through the platoon’s ranks. 
“Each time the men moved toward the hilltop, the machine gun in the bunker, a heavy, 
M1910 Maxim-type Soviet weapon, chattered and forced them to hug the earth again.” 
This bunker was a tough one. It finally took two direct hits from 75mm recoilless rifles 
(fired from the positions near Dog Company 1,250 meters away before these were 
forced out of position) to neutralize it, and even then only the firing ports on the east 
side had been caved in, other ports were still active. “It was believed by Easy Company 
officers that this single fortified position was responsible for a majority of these 
casualties, so strategically located was the bunker.” Such is an example of the tenacity 
of the NKPA positions.79  
Hospitalman Hunter (no first name supplied) was a corpsman with the platoon. 
Despite painful wounds to the body and legs he refused to be evacuated so that the 
stretcher would be available to a more-severely wounded man. He shakily rose to his 
feet and attempted to make it to the aid station on his own steam, but collapsed from 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
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loss of blood. The Marines then placed him on a stretcher regardless of his continued 
protests (he had come to) and started for the rear. The group came across some 
Marines wounded by a blast from a mine. Hunter insisted that his stretcher be brought 
along side, and he rendered first aid to the wounded Marines from his position upon his 
stretcher. “His prompt and skillful action undoubtedly saved the life of at least one 
Marine.”80 
The 3rd Platoon continued its assault. But so “sparse [was the] cover . . . available 
to 3rd Platoon Marines before they reached the crest . . . [and] so effectively had the 
enemy ‘sighted in’ their automatic weapons along the eastern finger ridge, that 
casualties were inevitable.” Frontal assault was the only option. Lt Markham (no first 
name supplied), the Platoon Leader, was notorious for having strapped fourteen 
grenades to his 782 gear that morning. He was directing the assault when he was shot 
in the chest and severely wounded. The Easy Company “gunny,” TechSgt Patrick (no 
first name supplied) took over until the Company Executive Officer, Lt Kuhn, could make 
it from the CP. Meanwhile, Patrick decisively directed the platoon and achieved fire 
superiority over the enemy and continued to advance. Lt Kuhn took over, but was not in 
charge fifteen minutes before he was struck in the face and side. Patrick again found 
himself in command.81  
“At least three enemy heavy machine guns” and a plethora of light MGs opposed 
the assaulting elements of the Marines. “It was obvious to observers that fire superiority 
was gained by the sheer courage of the assaulting Marines. ‘Had the assaulting forces 
doubted at any time that they could attain their objective, they gave no indication of it,’ 
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said one officer.” The Marines were without cover for the last 50 to 65 meters of the 
assault on every side of the hill. To close with the enemy, they had to dash across a gap 
where they would be fully exposed to enemy fire. “The top of 812 is completely barren 
of all except stumps, sandy soil and the lightest shrubbery; what the enemy had not 
cleared away in constructing his fortifications and fields of fire had been uprooted and 
knocked down by friendly artillery fire and aerial bombardment, indicated by 
multitudinous pockmarks in the earth.”82  
The North Koreans had done away with brush, so if the hill were hit with napalm, it 
would have little fuel to continue to burn. Another preventative measure utilized was to 
erect lips of dirt around a bunker to divert the flow of the napalm.83 
The 3rd Platoon made the bald crest at 1212, but the enemy had another surprise 
in store. Hundreds of enemy soldiers readied potato-masher grenades and slipped a 
finger simultaneously through the pull-loop of at least a pair. They listened and waited. 
Marine feet crunched closer. Then the NKPA “literally cast up a storm of hand grenades 
so that the mountainside looked ‘as if it had exploded,’ so many and close together 
were they detonating. Lieutenant Hinson estimated that three hundred grenades were 
exploded within fifteen minutes on the ridge!” The NKPA did not stick their heads up to 
throw. They simply cast them blind when they knew the Marines were close and 
wounded many not from accuracy but by volume.84 
At 1345, Fox’s 2nd Platoon gained the summit of 812 proper (the prior crest had 
been a finger ridge) and attacked a series of rifle pits and bunkers from the flank; the 
platoon’s positioning took many emplacements designed for a forward slope defense 
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83 Headquarters EUSAK, “Enemy Tactics,” 92. 
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from their blind side. NKPA fled their holes and ran northwest to hole up in reverse-
slope bunkers and again kill Marines. The Marine attack succeeded with this flank 
attack achieving complete surprise. Fox-2’s (Fox Company, Second Platoon) had 
achieved the summit after only thirty-six minutes (for Fox Company’s 2nd Platoon -- it 
was many hours for the others) of close quarters combat with grenades, rifles, and 
machine guns. The fighting was close and fierce, going to bayonets, clubbed rifles, 
rocks, fists, and anything else at hand. “The platoon quickly . . . overcame enemy 
resistance and occupied the position without excessive losses.” In this platoon’s sector 
at least, the enemy seemed to have run out of grenades.85 
One last bunker remained in Fox-2’s area. It was “sizeable” and in the saddle 
between two knobs atop the hill. In it a Maxim-heavy shot scathing fire down the length 
of the ridgeline. It took a 3.5 inch bazooka four rounds to neutralize the position. (The 
rocket-team fired from 250 yards off and shook up the enemy within enough that other 
Marines could demolish it.) The most effective weapon, again, the 5th Marines 
discovered, for taking out enemy MGs was counter-fire from its own light MGs. “It was 
observed that [at least] three machine guns on the hill had been pierced and probably 
destroyed by .30 caliber bullets.” Flamethrowers might have worked better, but could 
not be used that day because of “high head winds.”86 
The slopes were strewn with dead enemy, but not all were really dead. “One 
seemingly dead North Korean Soldier lay crumpled beside a bunker, his rifle broken, his 
pockets turned inside out, for a long period of time.” (Men from the S-2 section usually 
came and searched the bodies right away to glean any documents for intelligence 
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before a Marine could purloin them as a souvenir.) All the passing Marines thought him 
dead. “Finally, well after the ridge had been secured,” a Marine found a live NKPA in a 
nearby bunker and shot him when he refused to surrender. The “dead” NKPA on the 
slope heard this  and sat up whereupon the Marines took him prisoner.87 
One Marine who was there described the fight: “With the lifting of supporting fires, 
the 2d Platoon, “F” Company charged into the North Korean strong point. Thirty-five 
minutes later, after hand-to-hand combat and grenade duels, the southern portion of Hill 
812 was secure, allowing the 1st Platoon of “E” Company to clear the northern tip, to 
pass through the ‘F’ Company platoon and attack toward the base of Hill 980.”88 
By this time, Fox-2 and Easy-3 had set up a hasty defense on the objective and 
reorganized and resupplied themselves with ammo. Very little was left for Easy-1 to 
“mop up.” The objective was pretty well consolidated. The squad of 60mm mortars 
attached to Easy-2 then set up to provide support for a further attack if ordered. This 
completed the seizure of Hill 812. “Since regimental orders had specified ‘before 
nightfall,’ Objective Dog had been seized ahead of schedule.”89  
“As the assault had been a bloody one, wounded Marines were on both slopes of” 
the razor ridge. PFC Bennett (no first name supplied) was a mortar ammo carrier. The 
hilltop was now secure but the ridge extending past it to the west was still enemy 
territory and SA and AW fire was still coming in, in addition to the mortar and artillery fire 
from Hills 980 and 1052. He “crawled over the lip of the ridge” into the face of this fire to 
drag a wounded Marine to the cover offered by the reverse slope. Bennett continually 
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volunteered throughout the rest of the day to evacuate seriously wounded Marines and 
made several trips as stretcher bearer to the aide station. He promptly returned with 
more 60mm mortar ammo that his gun badly needed. (His valor led to his death two 
days later when he volunteered, though near exhaustion, to aide a fallen comrade. He 
was walking upright down the hill—too tired to crouch down—when he was instantly 
killed by enemy shrapnel.)90 
 
 
                                                 






THE ROCK AND 854 
 
It was still September 17. Next up, the Marines continued to assault west towards 
980 atop the ridge from 812. (Both battalions, 2/5 and 1/5, sent patrols from the right 
and left to Hill 812.) Easy-1, under Lt Matas (no first name supplied) got the point with 
Fox-2 following in close support. Preparatory fire for this advance was supplied by 93 
rounds of artillery called in by the Easy Company FO. Prior to this, the 4.2 inch mortars 
had been unable to support the attack because of the uncertain location of the 
assaulting elements. Now they began to add their heavy mortar shells to the many tons 
of steel already pounded into the churned earth of the mountains from just under 3000 
meters off. Their primary targets were roads and trails to the rear of enemy positions in 
hopes of catching enemy elements in the midst of resupplying and reinforcing their 
forces.1  
Easy-1 soon found itself pinned down by the enemy’s own heavy mortars, 120mm 
high explosive shells so large and heavy they could be seen warbling through the air on 
their way to a target like some huge bumble-bee. Nine Marines were WIA by this 
deluge. Soon, however, the Marine FO of the 81mm mortar section with the platoon 
spotted the enemy firing position. He called in several rounds from his section and the 
120mm fire dried up. The attack continued.2 
The attack, coming so soon after the seizure of 812, caught the enemy flat-footed 
and the Marines made significant progress in the advance. The only resistance was 
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2 Ibid. 
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scattered small arms fire until the Marines reached “the strange, unforgettable, granite 
projection called ‘The Rock, or ‘Rocky Nose,’ a distinct feature on the ridge line that 
would feature prominently in the battle over the next few days, and in the sector over 
the next few years. Just beyond it, Easy-1 met “determined enemy resistance.” The 
area was riddled with bunkers and entrenchments including MGs. Heavy fire finally 
pinned the Marines down 100 yards past the Rock, mostly because of intense plunging 
MG fire from 3/5’s “Objective Two,” Hill 980.3 (See Illustration #1)  
 The company (Easy) heard of the progress before this unit was pinned down and 
called regiment and asked if it could seize 980 as well as 812. Regiment denied the 
request since Hill 1052 dominated 980 (in fact, heavy fire was received from that height, 
too). Hill 980 could not be held if taken until the enemy on 1052 had been silenced. So 
Easy Company, Easy-1 specifically, had to withdraw 600 yards back towards 812. While 
disengaging, this unit continued to receive enemy SA and AW fire “from their front and 
left flank.” Covering fire of 333 rounds of artillery had to be supplied to complete the 
withdrawal. Easy-1 had only two rifle squads and one light MG squad left at this point. 
Marines of 2/5 were in defensive positions by 1700.4 
Gerald P. Averill thought the decision not to take 980 was foolish: 
In a short period of two weeks, the hill complex of which 812 was a part had 
ground up the 1st Marines and the 7th Marines on the eastern slopes and now 
was whittling away on the 5th Marines to the west. Hills 673 and 749, connected 
by a ridge line running south to north, had decimated the other two regiments. 
Hill 812, which was in essence a western extension of the north-south ridge line 
upon which Hills 673 and 749 were located, had cost our battalion dearly. With 
Hill 812 secured, we still would suffer heavy casualties, for we had no safe 
ground from which to operate. We could defend the north-south ridge line of 812 
                                                 
3 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 196; 1 Mar Div “Historical Diary”, September 1951, 21; 
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from the east just as the North Koreans had from the west, but here the similarity 
ended. To the west, leading from Hill 812, lay those two dominating peaks, 980 
and 1052, from which the North Koreans could observe our every movement on 
the south side of the east-west ridge line and the western slopes of the north-
south ridge line. Movement in daylight was extremely dangerous anywhere within 
the position that we held. . . . Two rifle companies, watched in daylight, hanging 
on by their fingernails and not much else. I often have thought of how satisfying it 
would have been to have exposed the planners at division, X Corps, and Eighth 
Army to a couple of days on Hill 812. I have an idea that considerably more 
attention would have been paid to Hills 980 and 1052 had those gentlemen spent 
even one hour on those ridge lines in daytime.5 
 
 The decision had come, not just because of  the problem with 1052, but because 
that morning the Division Chief of Staff, Colonel Victor “Brute” Krulak (who, ironically, 
wrote the foreword to Averill’s book) “had observed the attack from the Regimental OP . 
. . and at this point announced that the seizure of Hill 812 accomplished, for the time 
being, the Division’s mission.” Therefore, the 5th Marines CO, Colonel Weede ordered a 
halt to 2/5’s attack. They were to dig in on the most defensible ground. However, 
according to Averill, 812 was not very defensible as long as 980 and 1052 remained in 
enemy hands.6 
That evening, the 5th Marines were ordered to consolidate on the best terrain 
nearby and dig in. The Marines of 3/5 were dispersed across the area north of Hill 751. 
They were not tied in with 2/5 as would be preferred. The latter battalion, 2/5, defended 
Hill 812. Easy Company 2/5 was to the west of 812 in its defense, on the ridge between 
812 and 980. Dog Company consolidated with Weapons Company on the southern part 
of 812 with orders to protect the left flank. Fox 2/5 settled in to the east of 812. The 5th 
Marines also tied in with elements of the 1st Marines to the south.7 (See Map # 35) 
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6 “Historical Diary,” Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, 48. 
7 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 196; 1 Mar Div “Historical Diary”, September 1951, 21. 
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Easy-1 put one of its squads near the Rock as an outpost. “The other rifle squad 
and the machine gun squad were spread along the ridgeline, commencing sixty yards 
east of ‘The Rock,’ to give an appearance of depth as any attack was expected to come 
west to east along the spine of the ridge.” In addition, the AT Assault Platoon was sent 
to reinforce Fox Company.8 
Sniper-accurate fire from enemy 76mm high velocity artillery hit the Marines 
through the rest of the daylight hours. These guns were described by one Marine as an 
“UNGODLIKE NOISE,” that made one’s ears ring constantly and shook up the nerves 
real bad.9  
Ralph Steele described the 76 this way: 
. . . what was firing at us then was what they call a 76. It’s a Soviet artillery piece 
they used at Stalingrad where it got it’s fame, and it got tires, wheels and of 
course it’s tough to get them up in the mountains, but those guys, they’re rugged. 
Those little Gooks got that thing up. And it’s high velocity piece. . . . in all 
honesty, it wasn’t that effective because . . . it doesn’t make a very big fragment 
field . . . but it’s so high velocity the projectile is going about the same speed, 
2,600 feet per second that a rifle bullet does. It comes so fast that a lot of times 
you see the detonation [then] hear the sound of it’s coming, where otherwise you 
always hear a shuuu and then the boom. . . .10 
 
The northern slopes of 812 were particularly vulnerable. Both Easy and Fox 
Companies came under fire from Hills 980 and 1052. However, “as the Marines had 
dropped their packs—with entrenching tools attached—several hundred yards behind 
on the ridge, practically none was equipped to dig foxholes.” Easy-1’s Platoon Leader 
sent a working party back to get the “E-tools,” but even after the party brought back the 
shovels, the enemy fire was such that the Marines could not venture to the forward 
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9 A. Andy Andow, Letters to Big Jim, 64-65. 
10 Transcript of Interview with Ralph B. Steele, Library of Congress. 
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slope at all to dig in. The second a man showed himself above the crest, WHOOOSHH, 
in came an enemy round. After dark some positions were successfully scraped into the 
forward slope while the enemy observers could not see.11 
For the 5th Marines that night the enemy incoming grew very intense. “One officer 
stated that the North Koreans ‘threw everything but the proverbial kitchen sink at us, 
including all popular sizes of Soviet artillery and mortar shells.’” The 5th Marines 
Intelligence Officer (S-2) “reported an estimated one hundred twenty-four enemy 
artillery pieces,” in the 5th Marines zone alone. All night long, 2/5 replied with its own 
81mm and 60mm mortars.12 
That night Hospitalman Kivette (no first name supplied) passed through the 
Weapons Company area tending casualties and was told that a wounded Marine was a 
few hundred yards to the front of the lines who had not been brought in. Kivette headed 
up the trail to find the injured man alone in the dark with incoming mortar and artillery 
fire interdicting the whole area since it was a logical route of resupply for the Marines on 
Hill 812. He found and treated the wounded Marine and then commandeered several 
passing Korean ammo bearers into stretcher duty to get him to safety. The man would 
have one small boon; at the forward aid station that night, all wounded were offered 
pears and “pogey bait” (a Marine term for candy).13 
At 1730, friendly artillery began hitting in 2/5’s vicinity. A call went back for the 1st 
Marines (from whence the rounds seemed to be coming) to keep all called fires to the 
east of the battalion’s boundary. KSC laborers had it rough that night. Between 0200 on 
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September 17 and 0200 on the 18th, they had made four round trips to the front with 
food, water, ammo, and supplies. Each trip took four hours, much of it up extremely 
steep hills, while burdened with between sixty and eighty pounds per man. That same 
night, a stretcher party carrying Easy Company wounded got hit by enemy artillery. 
More than one wounded Marine found himself the victim of a second or third hit before 
they were brought to cover.14 
Earlier that day, 2/5 had asked for resupply via helicopter. This was turned down in 
the morning, but at 1400 in the afternoon, the Btn CP received word the request would 
be granted. The first flight of four Sikorsky PRS-1 Cargo Helicopters brought in 4,792 
pounds of supplies. Each carried three or four casualties with it on its return trip (these 
choppers could carry more than ordinary choppers).15 
That night, too, Fox Company picked up two NKPA deserters who sought 
American lines and surrendered. They reported that their unit had received over 600 
men in reinforcement the previous night. Another POW, this one taken in the fighting, 
claimed his company had had 140 men ten days ago, but now was reduced to only 
eighty. Other NKPA straggled into Marine lines here and there throughout the night, 
voluntarily surrendering. Some said their unit was to be relieved that night and so they 
had escaped before taken back behind the lines and far from the Americans—it was 
much harder to escape then. (Many NKPA troops were former ROKs who had been 
forced to join the enemy, so this does not necessarily indicate a widespread change of 
heart on the part of Communists to capitalists, furthermore, the enemy soldiers were 
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known to have little food, poor medical supplies and equipment, and draconian 
discipline).16 
At 2135, 2/5 received the 5th Marines Frag Order 140-51. It directed that the 
regiment consolidate on the best defensive ground “in the vicinity of its positions and 
prepare to construct deliberate defenses on a line to be announced later. The 2nd 
Battalion was directed to patrol in zone north to the south bank of the Soyang-gang 
River” and to the 3rd Battalion boundary on the left flank.17 
The 1st Marines saw action September 17 in the daylight hours as well. 
As mentioned previously, that day at 1007, 1/1 sent a platoon sized combat patrol 
(Charlie Company) towards where enemy lines had been the night before after an 
“intense artillery preparation.” But the enemy had withdrawn back to other positions. 
Thus 1/1 advanced against no resistance and consolidated for the night on the ridge 
between 812 and 749. The rest of 1/1 and 2/1 remained in their blocking positions.18 
(See Map # 34) 
The KMCs of 1/KMC repulsed a counterattack atop Hill 751 that afternoon (they 
had advanced there on the 16th). The other two KMC battalions filled in the rest of the 
defenses on Yoke Ridge (Hays Line), which 1/KMC had occupied.19 
One other development that had occurred the day before made the Division 
commander stop the advance after the gains made on the 17th. “On 16 September, the 
Eighth Army had ordered X Corps to suspend all major offensive operations after 20 
September. Van Fleet had decided that further attacks along the Hays Line could not be 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 51-52. 
17 Ibid., 52-53. 
18 1st Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 18. 
19 1 Mar Div “Historical Diary”, September 1951, 21. 
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justified. The 1st Marine Division would now have to hold the ground it had seized, 
however unfinished its work.” The fighting was not over, but the deliberate attacks 
towards new objectives were.20  
Van Fleet visited the 1st Mar Div CP and that of the 2nd Infantry Division 
September 16, 1951 “to inspect the operations and determine the morale of the 1st 
Marine Division and 2nd Infantry Division, both of which had suffered heavy casualties. 
He found the morale of these X Corps units good and had no adverse criticism of their 
operations.” He then issued an order “that the Corps Commander firm up his line by 
September 20 and to plan no further offensives after that date, as it was unprofitable to 
continue the bitter operation.” He “reiterated his instructions on the 18th in a confirming 
directive to the effect that X Corps continue making limited attacks ‘until 20 September, 
after which . . . units were to firm up the existing line and patrol vigorously forward of 
it.’”21 
Of course, objectives still being attacked such as Heartbreak Ridge and Hill 854 
would go past the 20th. What the order meant was that the line had been decided on for 
EUSAK and no new objectives or attacks beyond battalion strength would be had 
without express approval—meaning basically not at all.22 
Division artillery expended 1,178 rounds in support of the 1st Marines that day and 
inflicted 50 estimated casualties.23 
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The butcher-bill for September 17 was: 12 KIA and 84 WIA among the American 
Marines, and 1 KIA and 4 WIA among the KMCs. Enemy losses were: 155 counted KIA, 
100 estimated KIA (255 total), and 191 estimated WIA. Marines took 37 POWs.24 
 
Day Eight: September 18 
 
The 1st Mar Div spent September 18 digging in and consolidating on already-won 
positions. The KMCs of 2/KMC fought off two platoon sized attacks before daylight at 
Hills 930 and 1026, and the hour of 0430, September 18, brought a heavy counterattack 
against Easy Company compelling them to fall back a short distance. However, the 
Marines held off a second attack before 0900. Hills 980 and 1052 continued to fire on 
Marine lines the rest of the day. The worst losses were in 2/5, but the day wrought 16 
KIA and 98 wounded among the Marines of the 1st Mar Div. EUSAK estimated that the 
total number of casualties inflicted on the enemy from May to mid September were 
188,237.25 
That night was a fairly quiet one, considering what had become normal in the 
sector the last few days. And the next day dawned with 980 and 1052 still dominating 
Marine positions. 
For Easy and Fox companies, 2/5, the night was not quiet. The enemy struck Easy 
Company’s western outpost, which withdrew. He struck again at 0845. The enemy was 
not in large strength, however, and withdrew after a hot firefight. This enemy force was 
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estimated to have originally been a large one. However, it blundered into one of its own 
minefields and took casualties. Marines could here moaning besides the explosions. 
Only four actually made it through the mines, and the Marine fire, to reach the lines and 
try to infiltrate. The Easy-1 outpost was reoccupied at dawn by the Marines.26 
The enemy again probed the Fox and Easy positions on 812 at 0845. One POW 
captured this date reported that the NKPA had been busy through the night mining the 
ridge to 980 and the approaches from 812 to 1052, also adding boob traps to “reap a 
‘harvest’” should the Marines attack beyond the Rock.27 
The enemy caused other problems for the Marines than direct offensive or 
defensive action. The battalion TACP radio net was jammed that morning by music and 
“repetitious, nonsensical calls that included the repetition of words like ‘U. S. A.’ over 
and over for five or ten minutes.” The Marines had to use very high frequency that day 
to avoid this. However, 2/5 did not attempt to call any CAS that day, so the enemy 
efforts were of little avail beyond annoyance.28 
Fox-1 received a new commander. Captain Sawina turned over command to Lt. 
De Nobriga (no first name supplied) that morning. The visibility, too was low throughout 
the day, but nevertheless, the enemy observers on 1052 and 980 were quick to fire on 
any Marine foolish enough to venture atop the skyline on Hill 812 or over to the forward 
slope. Sixteen casualties were had from enemy incoming in a single two hour period 
that morning. Fox had 1 KIA and 4 WIA, and there were 4 WIA from Easy while these 
Marines were trying to dig emplacements. “These incoming rounds were noted to have 
struck the ridge without fail at approximately the hour of reveille, then during normal 
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meal hours.” This kept most 2/5 Marines in their holes throughout the day. They had to 
choke down cold “C” rations. Some few fortunate ones had wood alcohol fuel tablets 
and managed to improvise a warm meal within their fox hole. If one had to “do his 
business,” it was usually in an empty ration can or container that would be tossed down 
the hillside afterwards.29  
The supply problem was acute. Because of this, only ammo and food were 
brought to the front lines. Mostly ammo. Stretchers were in extremely short supply. Over 
200 had been “absorbed” (meaning cycled somewhere in use and were now missing) in 
two days. A common expedient was to sling a man in his poncho to carry him, sort of 
like a hammock, with one man per corner to carry it. This was often messy, however, as 
blood would congeal in the bottom of the waterproof poncho and pour off in a morale-
disrupting fashion whenever one end was let down. In addition hand grenades and 
belted MG ammunition were scarce. Orders went out to conserve these as much as 
possible.30 
 During the day, recoilless rifles fired on Hill 980 and reported several direct hits on 
enemy bunkers. That day, too, the OP-CP displaced forward to near the position of the 
81mm mortar group (about where Fox Company’s CP had been the morning of the 
17th), while the 81s were firing. Thereafter, the OP group moved to Easy Company’s 
positions. Major Averill and the 2/5 CO, LtCol Stiff made their way up 812 and inspected 
the positions of Easy and Fox.31 
Gerald P. Averill later described his experiences on September 18, 19 and 20, 
1951, on Hill 812: 
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On the Morning of the 19th , [18th according to 2/5 Historical Diary] the 
colonel decided to leave the “D” Company area, go up to Hill 812 for a look-see, 
and establish a command post closer to the lines. Going up that valley trail was a 
hard thing for me. Blood from the “F” Company dead and wounded was 
everywhere. Too much of it, too many people gone south again, too many off on 
the journey from which there is no return. . . . 
The main ridge line was a dreary sight. Colors of dark brown and gray, the 
foliage down off the crest frayed and torn, the main battle position pulverized, a 
heavy mist or a light rain covering the entire hilltop. The North Korean snipers 
opened up on us at once. . . . The gunners of the 76mm mountain guns gave us 
a demonstration. Believe me, until you have heard one of their projectiles sing, 
you don’t fully appreciate music. Extremely high velocity, splitting the air with a 
wicked snap, as accurate as rifle fire and packing a hell of a lot more wallop. . . 
.32 
 
The colonel and Averill made it to the men on 812, and Averill noticed they were 
spooked. He had been with the battalion longer than any other officer, “had humped the 
hills longer, been shot at more consistently, had shared the long days and the longer 
nights with these people. This had been their hardest fight. It was my job to stay, to look 
after them the best way I could.” So he asked the colonel if he could stay on with the 
men on Hill 812 and received permission.33 
The official reason as recorded by the 2/5 Historical Diary is less dramatic. “The 
reason for the displacement and the splitting of the command group was the impossible 
laying and maintaining of telephone wire to the line companies and the exposed position 
of Fox and Easy Companies to enemy fire. The Battalion Commander wanted to 
maintain constant communications with all units and at the same time was unwilling to 
have the group ‘pinned down’ and useless when needed most of all during a firefight or 
an attack.”34 
Averill went on: 
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That afternoon we cut trees, revetted, roofed, and sandbagged a bunker just 
down from the intersection of the north-south, east-west ridge lines, just a few 
steps from the ridge line leading to The Rock, and a few more to the junction of 
the “E” and “F” Companies’ lines. . . . By night fall we had a land line back to 
battalion and the radio was properly netted. . . .35 
 
 He later sent back a message to the Battalion CO. “This place is pretty well 
bracketed. They are dropping 120’s [120mm mortar rounds] all over the area, have 
caused 16 casualties this afternoon. This will be a daily occurrence if conditions remain 
same. 3rd platoon down to 17 men with machine guns included.” But positions would 
remain the same for most of the rest of the month, and for any other unit stationed on 
812 until 1953 when the communists regained it. “The Regimental S-3 [not Averill, he 
was the battalion S-3] intimated in a talk with Lieutenant Colonel Stiff that the 2nd 
Battalion would remain on the present line for a considerable time. . . .”36 
Most think of the position of rifleman as being the most dangerous or the one 
where one would see the most combat. But the less “glamorous” job of wire-laying was 
a dangerous one as well. That day wiremen from 2/5 were stringing wire between the 
companies when a mortar round hit nearby and wounded three out of the four Marines 
as well as two nearby Korean laborers. At other times wiremen had found booby-traps 
like grenades on a wire when they were out running it through their fingers trying to 
locate a break. And furthermore, when one takes in to account that breaks were often 
caused by shelling and that a wireman had to check his wire even under the heaviest 
incoming, he realizes that it was about as dangerous a job as a man could have in 
Korea.37 
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There were yet more difficulties on Hill 812, these caused by the ground itself. 
“The ground in the vicinity was very rocky and difficult to work with, and the limited 
number of entrenching tools available further hampered digging.” “Many casualties that 
might have been avoided with better cover and deeper holes,” were the result.38 
Later on the Battalion CO communicated with the Regimental CO. LtCol Stiff told 
Col Weede that there was no room on the ridge to bring Dog Company up, too. Even if 
the Marines had had more of their units on hand, the difficult terrain precluded their 
employment.39 
At 1725 the NKPA launched a probing attack on Easy Company’s left flank near 
the Rock. After this, the outpost was withdrawn in a ways for the night so as not have 
the line too extended near the probable route of enemy attack, along the ridgeline from 
980 to 812.40 
That afternoon a helicopter evacuating wounded near 812 was taken under 
artillery fire. Though unharmed, the “higher-ups” decided to have the helicopters only 
pick up wounded from a forward aid station further away from enemy fire. (This was 
probably because the Marines were doing a great many tactical experiments with 
helicopters at the time and to lose one to enemy fire might stain the progress of such 
experiments in certain circles.) Fifteen trips were made to the new aid station location 
with two casualties lifted out per trip that day. “All stretcher patients except three 
concussion cases were evacuated this evening . . . .”41 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 56-57. 
39 Ibid., 57. 
40 Ibid., 57-58. 
41 Ibid., 58. 
 230
Seven POWs were taken by 2/5 alone during the day. These reported that their 
unit had received 43 KIA and 54 WIA in the previous days. One NKPA who was 
wounded was ordered to take his pants down by a corpsman in order to see the wound. 
The man was reluctant. The corpsman, weary and impatient, pulled them off for him and 
to the humor of the Marines revealed the man to be wearing “the brightest green long-
handled skivvies this side of Ireland.”42 
Orders came down to continue to consolidate positions and patrol. The 5th 
Marines, furthermore, was to assume responsibility for the 1st Marines zone. Emphasis 
was to be on supporting arms in destroying any enemy encountered.43 
The night was relatively quiet, though Marines on watch could hear the enemy 
laying mines and moving about. “Despite the bombardments and the rain, most Marines 
on the lines who had been able to keep dry got their best night’s sleep since the 15th.”44 
Among 2/5 alone, the casualties were: 12 KIA and 67 WIA. Losses for the whole 
division were: 16 KIA and 93 WIA for the U. S. Marines, and 5 WIA for the KMCs. For 
the enemy, they were: 50 KIA, 55 WIA, both estimated, and 9 POWs.45 
 
Day Nine: September 19 
The Rock  
 
Seven Hundred yards west from Hill 812 on the ridge leading to 980, a 
conspicuous protrusion of granite stood silhouetted against the September sky. This 
landmark was known among the Marines as “the Rock.” It was a “very distinctive 
Gothic-spire-like granite projection rising approximately twenty-five feet into the air, 
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seeming out of place in this region of rounded, green ridges and wooded knobs. . . . [It] 
is approximately seventy-five feet across, lightly fringed with vegetation, and from its 
northern side an overgrown rocky slope leads down to the valley of the Soyang-Gang. It 
appears weird and forbidding, particularly after dark, and effectively obscures from sight 
a considerable area to the west.” The Marines had outposts on the top of the hill where 
the Rock stood and to its east. Just to the west, however, was NKPA “Injun country,” or 
“goonie land.” The Marines had to dig in on the northern slope of the ridge between the 
Rock and Hill 812, the southern slope was untenable due to enemy observation and 
fire.46 
Just east of The Rock were usable North Korean positions, including a bunker. A 
platoon from “E” Company out posted the ridge from these positions and 
furnished a fire team for The Rock. The remainder of “E” Company existed during 
the daylight hours on the east slope of the north-south ridge line. At night they 
moved into fighting holes on the western slope. “F” Company linked up with “E” 
Company at the northern tip of the 812 complex and defended to the north along 
the ridge line running east toward Hills 673 and 749.47 
 
Marines were in short supply of fortification material, too, such as sand bags, 
barbed wire, and mines. It was a sticky problem facing 2/5 of how to get its companies 
much needed supplies. Helicopters again provided the solution. Though request for 
helicopter resupply was only sent at 1100 that morning, the Marines by evening had 
received 12,180 pounds of supplies from sixteen flights within a single hour in Operation 
Windmill II. The helicopter proved to be a significant boon to the 1st Mar Div in the 
mountainous terrain far from the sea.48 
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This day, too, saw 2/5 receiving the most casualties. In addition, 1/5 was released 
from reserve when it was relieved by elements of 2/1, and it marched to support 2/5 by 
setting up on the same ridge, to the right of 812. The Marines of 1/5 held a long front of 
two miles, running east along the ridgetop to the vicinity of the river. Marines of 3/5 
deployed on the left to block the ridgeline between 812 and 751 as an enemy 
counterattack would probably utilize that approach. However, much of 3/5 was still in 
the same positions it had been in on September 16. “This left us [Easy and Fox 
Companies 2/5] with our left flank dangling just down off the southern slope of Hill 812, 
with the valley wide open to the North Koreans should they decide to use it for an end 
run in the darkness.”49 
The 1st Battalion 1st Marines moved south about 1.5 miles after being relieved by 
the 5th Marines. This battalion and 3/1 were ordered to relieve the 8th ROK Division to 
the east (Hill 854). The other battalion of the 1st Marines, 2/1, moved south and became 
division reserve.50 
No “large” actions were had that day, but casualties continued to be had from the 
long range fire of Hills 980 and 1052. However, the day was not uneventful. The day 
began with the repulse by artillery of an enemy infiltration about 0500. Thereafter, at 
0810, reinforced patrols (one rifle and machine gun squad each) stepped out from Easy 
and Fox to explore the finger ridges to the north of 812 leading towards the portion of 
the Soyang-gang hemming the area on the north. Another patrol departed from Dog 
Company at 0915 to patrol the valley at Dog’s right. No patrol met enemy resistance, 
but a supply train of men was pinned down by enemy fire from 1052 and 980 when it 
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made a wrong turn. One combat correspondent with a battalion and Fox Company 
radioman, along with two Koreans carrying the radios, too, became lost. Suddenly, 
twenty enemy soldiers who had been moving to surround them opened fire. The 
Marines dispersed and all managed to escape to safety.51  
One other similar incident occurred, but again ended with the Marines finding 
safety. “Thus ended the last of the day’s series of lost Marine incidents; fortunately, too, 
without any damage except to the self-confidence of the individuals involved.”52 
The companies of 2/5 were thinned by casualties. Easy reported its strength this 
day as 6 officers and 133 enlisted; Fox, 5 officers, 142 enlisted. (A Marine Rifle 
Company at full strength numbered 228.) Harassing artillery fire continued throughout 
the day with at least five rounds per hour hitting on 812. One airstrike was brought in, 
but could not be executed because radios were out. Marine FOs (forward observers) 
continued to call in artillery, and after one deluge of proximity-fused HE (high explosive) 
shells, one reported seeing two enemy “flying through the air.”53 
Just at dusk, two batteries of 4.5 inch rockets cut loose a few “ripples.” These were 
a weapon about as loud as any ever devised and the rain of rockets pounded a large 
portion of 1052 with a heavy volume of HE, boosting Marine morale with accompanying 
cheers. There were 144 rounds in a ripple of rockets. POWs called them “the automatic 
mortars.” The roads became impassable to trucks at this point. “All evacuations after 
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noon this date were by air . . .” or by foot. Some lucky Marines got to have heat tablets 
to warm their chow.54 
When reports were had of a possible assembling of enemy for counterattack in the 
area of 3/5, 2/5 Marines took note of their “own overextended lines and the limited route 
of withdrawal . . . [and] a provisional platoon was organized under the H&S Company 
Commander, from that company.”55 
The incoming continued throughout the night, not all of it missing the flesh it was 
seeking. Several casualties were incurred and one KIA was had “from concussion.” 
Thereafter, “Easy Company Marines . . . reported seeing a large convoy of trucks with 
headlights burning, far off in the distance up the valley, suggesting reinforcements for 
the enemy. Attempts to secure a night airstrike were unavailing, [JOC rarely allowed 
airplanes away from interdiction for ‘night heckling,’ even more rarely than for daylight 
CAS] and the enemy were believed out of range for any but 155mm rifles.”56 
On a lighter note, the password for 2/5 that night was “Dumb Blonde.” One Marine, 
when challenged by a sentry, forgot it and stammered “Gee I-I’ve forgotten it, but it’s 
something about Dagmar!” The result was, “Needless to say, he was allowed to pass 
on!”57 
The enemy was never far away, however. An observation plane spotted NKPA 
dug in “as close as seventy-five yards . . . well camouflaged, dressed in green, quilted 
uniforms. . . .”58 
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 Marine losses were: 5 KIA, 58 WIA, and 5 KMCs were WIA. Enemy losses were: 
100 counted KIA, 50 estimated KIA, 43 estimated KIA, and 15 POWs.59 
 
Day Ten: September 20 
The Rock  
 
The night of September 19-20 was far from one of quiet repose and relaxation. At 
0315, the NKPA tried to seize Hill 812. The attack came after an intense barrage of 
enemy supporting arms, particularly hitting heavy on Easy-1. “This fire was at first 
thought to be a regular bombardment, but as the shells continued falling at a constant 
rate, the Marines assumed that a counterattack was imminent. One observer described 
the half hour bombardment as ‘the most intense’ he had yet experienced in this short 
operation.” It included both 120mm mortars and 76mm artillery, but it was also 
supplemented with 75mm recoilless rifle fire from less than 700 yards off, a more than 
effective range for this weapon. The Marines began laying on their own 81mm mortars 
ahead of their lines. At 0230, the barrage “lifted and moved eastward.” Then at least a 
company of NKPA boiled across the ridge on the slope north of the Rock hurling 
grenades and spraying bullets from their burp guns. The soldiers were right on the heels 
of the walking mortar barrage; they had circled the Rock and poured into the attack 
before Marine 4.2 inch mortars had any chance of going to work. (See Map # 36) (This 
larger mortar could only be used safely a fair distance from friendly lines since the shells 
produced such a wallop, but the enemy quickly closed to within that distance.)60 (See 
Photo #6) 
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One squad of Easy-1 was surrounded before it could blink. The platoon radioed for 
more supporting fire, but Averill told them to remember their rifles and MGs and fight 
back with their own organic weapons. Men in a firefight could easily become too 
dependent on supporting fire and forget their own weapons, a frequent occurrence 
throughout the stalemate phase of Korea.61 
 The platoon tried to counterattack, but the enemy was too strong. The “small 
counterattack succeeded in joining the platoon into a single body and thus probably 
prevented fatal confusion.” Lt. Matas led at the head of his platoon in this assault “into 
the middle of the swarming enemy . . .” but was soon felled by a chunk of grenade 
shrapnel to his neck, severely wounding him. This action confused and delayed the 
enemy enough that the rest of the thin line of Marines on 812 could brace to “repel 
boarders.”62 
One squad leader with Easy-1, Sergeant Weiss (no first name supplied), “took 
charge of the two remaining squads,” and managed to get Lt. Matas to safety as well as 
cover the platoon’s withdrawal, wounded included. “The enemy continued to press 
forward fiercely, screaming and shouting to buoy op their spirits (and possibly to help 
maintain contact with one another as they attempted to strike terror into the hearts of 
the defending Marines).” The platoon had to fall back to the left flank of Hill 812 where 
the 3rd Platoon was. “. . . it was known that any sizeable counterattack would breach 
[the platoon’s line] and this withdrawal did not come as a surprise.” This platoon had but 
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30 men: 2 squads and an MG squad; (the 3rd Platoon only 16 men and 5 machine 
gunners—barely a single squad; 2nd Platoon 34 men and a MG section.)63 
“The momentum of the enemy attack was only slightly diminished by the terrific 
volume of artillery and mortar fire . . .” sent in by U. S. supporting arms. Between 0240 
and 0450 over 1,600 rounds of friendly artillery were delivered on enemy positions. The 
81mm mortars fired 606 rounds before 0700 from their 6 tubes. “The 81mm radio net 
[was] . . . buzzing” with “constant” activity. “Send it Easy. Roger Easy. On the way, 
Easy. Again Easy. Roger. Same again. Roger.” The laborers and Marines assigned to 
keep the mortars supplied with ammunition had to improvise. They used “any 
conceivable type of carrier for mortar shells” from ammo bags, their own pockets, 
packboards, knapsacks, to haversacks. Some Koreans even tied their bundles with 
primer cord. When dawn revealed this, the cord was replaced with rope. That could 
have been one explosive accident.64 
Easy Company received heavy fire along its front lines from positions abandoned 
by Easy-1. The NKPA had set up two MGs in a deserted bunker on a prominent knob 
(See Map # 37), and poured plunging fire from this elevated point directly into Marine 
positions. The enemy kept up the attack with heavy use of small arms and grenades 
against Easy-1 and Easy-3. A squad from the 2nd Platoon was quickly dispatched to 
reinforce them. Averill saw that the defense was at a critical moment. He moved about 
the area, talking to the troops, letting himself be seen, and organizing the men.65 
Again, Gerald P. Averill: 
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The average trooper, enlisted or commissioned, wants to see rank roaming 
around when things turn hot. That is what rank gets paid for. . . . Someone has to 
be there to talk it up, to do the coaching, to be responsible for the team. If you 
stand with troopers in a firefight, they will put on one hell of a show. If you crawl 
into your foxhole and pull it on top of you, why shouldn’t they do the same? There 
was far too much rank in the foxholes that night.66 
 
Corporal Nolen (no first name supplied) was an FO for the 3rd Section of the 81mm 
mortar platoon and was up with Easy Company to direct the fires. He was calling in 
“previously registered defensive mortar fires, when he saw that greater accuracy and 
closer fires would . . .” be beneficial. He crawled out on the ridge outside the lines with 
his radio operator, Corporal Martin, where all the hell was falling and mines were 
everywhere, and began to shout coordinates and fire corrections to Martin, who relayed 
the information over the radio.67 
 The Marines counterattacked again at half an hour before standard reveille time 
(0500). Easy Company provided a holding force, hitting the enemy in the front, while the 
“orphan” 2nd platoon from Fox Company circled and struck the enemy from the flank in a 
crushing attack by grenades and machine guns with complete surprise. The NKPA fled, 
and 60 enemy dead were counted in its wake.68 
Averill’s account was less sympathetic to the actions of Weiss to evacuate Lt. 
Matas: 
About 0200 the next morning the sky fell in. Like a cloudburst, 120mm 
mortar shells came down around us, saturating the whole defensive complex. 
The hills trembled, shuddered, the roar of the explosions unbroken, deafening, 
the deadly whir-rr-rrr of the cast iron shell fragments like the whine of giant bees. 
. . . The land line was hit. We sent a message by radio to inform the battalion of 
our situation, although there should have been little doubt in their minds. 
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We suffered through thirty minutes of shelling before the North Korean 
gunners shut it off and the enemy infantry made its play around the north side of 
The Rock. An attack in company strength—the main body moving against the “E” 
Company Platoon on the east-west ridge line leading into Hill 812, a separate 
force advancing its members cautiously, one by one, slipping far below the 
Marine fighting holes, silently stealing their way into position to attack the 
northern tip of Hill 812 at the junction of the two rifle companies. 
Out around The Rock, the Marines and the North Korean were in a real 
cat fight, tearing each other to pieces. The Marines were holding, 
counterattacking in the darkness, trying to eject the enemy. In close combat the 
platoon leader was badly wounded. Attempts to evacuate him destroyed the 
cohesion of the defense. False priorities. They got him out, but lost the position. 
The North Korean quickly manned their old strong points and started raking the 
north-south ridge line with automatic-weapons fire, pinning Marines low in their 
fighting holes.69 
 
Averill then described some behavior that showed Marines do not always live up to 
Marine Corps standards when in combat: 
Throughout all this action the company commanders and platoon leaders within 
the main battle position had been conspicuous by their absence along the line. 
Here and there troopers were slipping out of the forward positions, ducking back 
behind the hill. Ramsdell and I turned three of them back with bayonet and .45. 
Something positive had to happen or the North Koreans just might knock us off 
that hard-won hill.70 
 
So Averill, a Major, called back to battalion during a lull and asked the colonel if he 
could have operational control of the two companies. Permission was granted. He also 
called in what supporting requirements he would need. It was, “no real sweat, for the 
whole hill mass and the connecting ridges had been shot-in during the initial attack. It 
just would amount to calling for previously coded concentrations when the time came, 
but with precise timing.”71 
It was good Averill was there: 
The troopers were getting spooky. They had reason to be. It was a sticky, 
uncoordinated, confused situation. A couple of A-4 light machine guns started to 
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rattle with no targets in sight—a sure sign of increasing nervousness. Just tickle 
that trigger to bolster your confidence. I had to give one of the gunners a smart 
rap on the helmet with my .45 to get him to knock off firing. He looked back over 
his shoulder, saw who it was, and gave me a grin of embarrassment. . . .72 
 
 Soon, the North Koreans were attacking again. Averill called in the supporting 
fires. 
Rapid booms in the distance, the swish and swoosh of incoming 105mm howitzer 
shells, the sound of the 4.2-in. mortars firing at regiment, the steady thumping of 
the 81mms kicking out of the tubes in the valley behind us. The east-west ridge 
line blossomed into a solid sheet of red, crimson, orange, yellow, and blinding 
white. Enemy soldiers could be seen darting to the rear, sprinting forward, 
leaping from the ridge line. That fire was close—the kind you read about in the 
manuals but seldom see, the kind you dream about when you are about to play 
out your last card. Other concentrations came down on Hills 980 and 1052, a 
thousand meters of pulsating flame reaching from Hill 812 to the peak of 1052. 
Now the eight-inch guns added their power, splitting rocks, tearing out chunks of 
earth, disintegrating trees, throwing bits of enemy soldiers into the air. The 
barrage moved west, and the east again—searching, searching.73 
 
“About 0330, the enemy mortar fire that had been pummeling the nose of Hill 812, 
moved back onto Easy Company positions and reached its crescendo.” Easy’s CO was 
worried the enemy would head down the trail and hit the 81mm mortar positions as well 
as keep pushing his main attack. The “remaining squad” of Easy-2 was given the job of 
heading to a finger ridge of 812 branching towards the south as flank security so enemy 
could not slip past and attack the mortars. Averill radioed the Battalion CO at 0445, “I’m 
going to counterattack with Fox.” He also had a message sent to 3/5 asking it to 
“neutralize” 1052 with fire. Simultaneously, another message requested that an OY 
plane go up and observe enemy artillery flashes and try to direct some counterbattery in 
on them.74 
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The Battalion CO then called Regiment for permission to commit Dog Company f 
necessary. Dog was regimental reserve and could not be used without regimental 
permission. This permission was given. Dog was alerted for possible commitment.75 
Fox-2 was moved at 0500 to a forward post on the left flank of 812. Lt. Anderson 
(no first name supplied) commanded Fox-3 and elements of Fox-2. He then took over 
Fox-1 as well and reorganized it to effectively meet attacks.76 
At 0400 there was a lull of about a half hour, then “the enemy began to intensify 
his fire and the Marines braced themselves for a final assault.” The Easy Company 
60mm mortars kept their tubes hot punching out rounds into the enemy, 167 total 
expended. The radios to the heavier mortars, the 81s and four deuces, went out at this 
point so the 60s had to fill the gap. By 0445 the main body of the NKPA assault was 
within 75 meters of the center knoll of the 812 ridge line, hurling many grenades and 
riddling Marine lines with burp gun bursts. After fifteen minutes of this, the enemy closed 
on Easy-1 and Easy-3 and “‘assaulted with a veritable shower of hand grenades’ that 
wreaked havoc on the friendly positions and demoralized certain persons, already 
shaken up by three days bombardment, within the defensive area.”77  
Most of the Marines had had to wait for the attack in reverse slope bunkers (these 
were where the enemy had lived and slept), not having had a chance to prepare any on 
the forward slope because of enemy incoming and such bunkers were not the best for 
repelling an assault. “The main assault came in the center of the hill and under cover of 
intense grenade barrage, managed to close with Marines in the center positions. 
Marines fought bitterly until they were overcome by superior numbers, then those who 
                                                 
75 Ibid. 
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77 Ibid., 71. 
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were wounded drew back. Some personnel, new in combat and inexperienced, upon 
being wounded, left their original positions and may have participated in a general 
panic, had not [Averill] and others, at great personal risk to themselves, directed the 
reorganization of the units.”78 
The enemy could sense the weakening and redoubled his efforts. “Fortunately, 
however, the flanks of this line had not been overcome by the enemy, and about a 
dozen Marines remained in bunkers on either side of the dissolved center.” These 
Marines rushed towards the center in the dark, firing into North Korean forms, and then 
to clench with enemy soldiers and kill them by feel when they had not the time to reload 
afterward. Pistols were handy here, and bayonets. Sometimes rocks, a shovel, 
whatever else was at hand. Grenade detonations were as common as flowers in a 
meadow.79 
The names of those who turned tail are not known and it is well they sleep 
anonymous through the ages. But the names of those who rose to the occasion with 
duty and courage should never be forgotten. 
PFC Bishop (no first name supplied), was in charge of guarding his machine gun’s 
flank during the maelstrom. He fought off two enemy with his BAR when the gun went 
silent, buying time to restore the automatic weapon to the fray. Then the BAR ran dry. 
His ammo belt of six magazine pouches, each capable of holding two twenty-round 
magazines, and which normally creased his shoulders where the suspenders hung with 
the weight, was light with none left. Bishop then flung grenades into the rushing foe, and 




swept up a carbine with which he peppered enemy forms until the second wave had 
faded.80 
Corporal Smith (no first name supplied) found himself in “the face of intense 
enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire” when a gunner on one of the MGs had 
been wounded. NKPA soldiers were only a few yards away, blistering the area with burp 
gun slugs in the rapid, almost gushing burst that characterized these weapons, 
BBBRRRRRRAAAAPPP. Some of these foes were in a small defilade right in front of 
Smith’s MG position. He leapt to his feet with the MG cradled in his arms in the manner 
of John Basilone and Mitchell Paige who had earned the MOH in the Pacific using the 
same technique, and ripped a belted burst of .30 caliber tracer and full metal jacket 
bullets into the defilade, riddling two enemy with bullets and wounding others. A NKPA 
who had no ammunition left, leapt up and shot Smith in the face with a signal pistol. The 
flare burned him, but he ignored the pain to drill the NKPA with high velocity MG 
bullets.81 
Corporal Farrell (no first name supplied) was on the right flank of the 3rd Platoon 
when the center dissolved. He recognized the danger and dashed through the storm of 
enemy grenade fragments towards the center, hurling his own grenades to drive back 
the attackers. Bodies fell, filled with splintered steel, smoking in the light of gun fire and 
HE flashes.82 
PFC Carr (no first name supplied), saw the gunner and assistant gunner felled on 
his MG. He, with another Marine, immediately took over the “light thirty” and maintained 
the stream of fire it had given the attackers. Enemy crept to only a few yards off, under 
                                                 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., 71-72. 
82 Ibid., 72. 
 244
cover of burp gun and rifle fire. They hunkered down underneath his position on the 
slope and began to lob grenades into the MG pit. Carr stayed with the gun regardless, 
and kept up a relentless fire with his carbine, only pausing to reload or throw a grenade 
of his own.83 
One of the bunkers the Marines held had taken grenades through its apertures. 
Every Marine in it was a casualty, wounded and bleeding badly. One of them, Corporal 
Mac Lain, held a Silver Star from the Yangu operation earlier that year. He was unable 
to move, his wounds were so bad, and he was quickly bleeding to death. Yet the 
Marines around him refused to leave him to death. They stayed and defended him from 
the enemy attempts to occupy the bunker until a corpsman managed to crawl through 
the exploding night and give him blood plasma. “Two of the overrun bunkers were later 
found to have received direct hits by several enemy grenades, most of which were 
powerful Soviet offensive-type fragmentation, similar to our own.”84 
At this time, Fox-2 was committed “to reinforcement of the battle position and 
commenced the delivery of a hail of grenades, automatic and small arms fire on the 
enemy from positions on the ridge. The remainder of  [Easy-2], (Lieutenant Hinson) 
moved to the left, over to the center of Hill 812, to reinforce and back up the line. The 
shock and surprise effect of this added fire made it obvious to the enemy that our 
positions were still strong, but though the defenders were now better organized, the 
issue still remained in doubt. The fact that the flanks on 812 held against repeated 




assaults of determined enemy undoubtedly saved a major breakthrough from menacing 
the front at this point.”85 
 The dawn soon lighted the sky and enemy grenadiers had infiltrated to right under 
the Marine fighting positions, trying to take the right flank of the two companies. Marines 
tossed grenades just outside their holes down onto the enemy on the slope. After this 
attack was beaten back, enemy poured down the ridge from the Rock. Averill, however, 
had made ready a standby platoon for just such an occasion. “They stood to the rear of 
the main bunker in a line of skirmishers—bayonets fixed, weapons and grenades 
ready—just down from the bunker, out of sight. . . . Psyched-up, confidence bolstered 
by the fact that the Marines had given ground, the enemy swooped over the bunkers, to 
be met at point-blank range by a fusillade of grenades, small arms, and automatic-
weapons fire—fire so heavy that it stopped the North Koreans, turned them, and sent 
them flying back along the ridge line and into the western bunkers.” Just then a supply 
train of ammo arrived “‘seeming like a prayer answered,’ said the Fox Company 
Commander.”86 
One bunker was still in enemy hands. A 3.5 inch rocket team had moved to 
engage it at 0420, 250 yards off, but the darkness was too much and the team had to 
wait until dawn to effectively be able to aim. As dawn crept closer, so too did the end of 
this bunker, and as soon as there was light, with MGs firing streams into the 
embrasures to suppress the combatants inside while the rocket team worked. The back-
                                                 
85 Ibid. 
86 Gerald P. Averill, Mustang, 274-75; Second Battalion, 5th Marines, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 
72-73. 
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blast of the launcher scorched the earth and a few well-placed rockets decimated the 
position.87 
Averill’s counterattack force then stepped out after them, a squad in-column on 
point. This was the 3rd Squad of Fox Company commanded by Sergeant Covella (no 
first name supplied) and reinforced with a machine gun section. The rest of the platoon 
provided a base of fire. The time was 0545. “So exuberant and buoyant was Major 
Averill, as he rushed from squad to squad all along the line, that his good humor 
became contagious and when the troops moved out, they advanced in good spirits, a 
far-cry from the near panic of some an hour earlier.” His words were, “Roll ‘em, boy! Roll 
‘em!” Covella “directed his squad through a hail of grenades and automatic fire. Marines 
felled the fleeing enemy and when full daylight came, the enemy was nowhere to be 
seen. Under covering fire from bazookas and MGs, this squad cleared the rest of the 
ridge 100 yards past the Rock by 0630. However, no enemy was encountered in that 
area, and the elements of Fox pulled back into defensive positions.88   
“Some North Korean troops remained momentarily in reverse slope bunker and 
foxhole positions [near the center of the line], and threw poorly aimed grenades at the 
advancing Marines, but these were ineffective. As it was becoming light, the artillery 
was shifted from a concentration on ‘the Rock’ and preceded 3rd Squad by a few 
hundred meters. At approximately 0520, a flare was observed above the trail to the west 
and a bugle call sounded, obviously the signal for the enemy to retreat. So intensive 
was friendly artillery fire pounding the narrow ridgeline, that the enemy was unable to 
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follow his original route of attack (around ‘The Rock’) and was believed to have 
descended the slopes on both sides. . . .”89 
Hill 812 “stood bleak and bare, its rocky sides beaten to a brown powder by high 
explosives, the northern slopes littered with enemy dead.” “By 0645, all former positions 
had been retaken and one half hour later this message was dispatched by radio to the 
Battalion Commanding Officer from the S-3 [Averill]: ‘All ground lost has been regained. 
Patrols now one hundred yards to the front.’” The 2/5 Marines had taken 11 POWs, 
counted 30 enemy KIA, and estimated an additional 20 KIA and 15 wounded had been 
sustained by the NKPAs in this attack. “These estimates were said by Easy and Fox 
Company officers to be conservative, as most believed the better part of an enemy 
company destroyed.” An enemy POW said that his battalion was down to 240 men and 
that the previous night’s attack had been with thirty men, whereas Fox’s CO estimated 
at least 100 enemy involved, but “it was assumed that what he [the POW] stated was, 
rather, the original plan, not what actually happened. . . .” The Marines of 2/5 lost 2 KIA 
and 31 WIA that day. One of each of the two KIA was in Easy and Fox respectively. 
Easy had 21 WIA, Fox 3, Weapons Company 3, H&S Company 2, Dog Company 2. 
Twelve of the WIA were not evacuated but chose to remain on the line, or did not have 
ambulatory wounds.90 
                                                 
89 Second Battalion, 5th Marines, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 73. 
90 Maj Gerald P. Averill, “Final Objective,” 16; Second Battalion, 5th Marines, “Historical Diary,” 
September 1951, 73-74, 76, 77. 
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 The hill was now UN territory and would remain so until Communists wrested it 
from the ROK 12th Division in June 1953. Averill would receive the Silver Star.91 (See 
Map # 39) 
Dog Company then passed through the Fox CP on its way to relieve the worn 
remnants of Fox and Easy. “At least one platoon of Dog Company reached the Fox CP, 
where it was held up, before Fox-2’s counterattack had finished mopping up. The rest of 
Dog Company followed closely; the company’s movement on sudden orders and in 
darkness was most expeditious.”92 
One last hill remained to be taken far to the east to complete the Marine mission of 
establishing the new Minnesota Line (the Hays Line with terrain gained along 
Kanmubong Ridge added). Hill 854 was held by the 8th ROK Division, but the enemy 
was still entrenched along it and resisting. The enemy was elements of the 45th 
Regiment, 15th NKPA Division. The 1st Marines was ordered to take the hill by force if 
not already secured by the 8th ROK Division. (See Phot # 7) The ROKS were reportedly 
on the crest, but over 2000 yards of the hill were still enemy. The Marines moved to a 
position near the hill and began the attack late in the day (1730) after CAS failed to 
materialize. It bogged down almost immediately because the objective was very 
strongly held by about 500 enemy in bunkers. Guides from the 8th ROK Division were 
on hand to get the Marines through the mines and to the positions the Marines were to 
occupy, but the guides seemed incompetent to the Marines. They “bugged out” when 
enemy incoming was received and were not seen again. The Marines of 3/1 took some 
casualties (1 KIA and 1 WIA) from mines, many of them laid by ROKs, on the slopes. 
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The advance was slow and hard fought with How Company in the lead. Enemy fire was 
intense and darkness imminent, so 3/1 consolidated for the night at 1900 having only 
gained 50 yards and lost 7 KIA and 24 WIA in How Company alone.93 (See Map # 38) 
Total casualties for the 20th for the whole division were 12 KIA and 68 WIA.94 
On 21 September, 3/1 moved again to take Hill 854. Prisoners reported that over 
500 enemy with orders to defend to the death held the 2,000 meters of ridgeline, mostly 
in reverse slope positions well stocked with ample ammunition. Artillery had a very 
tough time bringing fire on this reverse slope. “Air support was requested to be on 
station at 0700 but did not arrive.” Once again, the Marines found themselves 
advancing up a steep slope strewn with mines through a rain of steel from artillery and 
mortars and fiery green tracers from machine guns. This attack was delayed until 
almost 1300 in a wait for CAS because the enemy defense was stalwart. However, JOC 
called 1st Mar Div and reported that there would be no more air that day, though one 
strike was eventually executed. The enemy’s mutually supporting positions on Hill 854 
were reported as being better constructed than any yet encountered. The Marines 
finally broke the NKPA back at 1650 when two key bunkers were demolished. The hill 
was reported secured at 1745. The losses this day were 2 KIA and 31 WIA.95 
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The Marines of 3/1 had lost 9 KIA and 55 WIA total to take Hill 854. Enemy 
casualties were: 159 counted KIA, 150 estimated KIA, 225 estimated WIA, and 29 
POWs.96 
Marine losses over the last three days amounted to 33 KIA and 235 WIA. Most 
were in the 5th Marines, particularly 2/5. The enemy’s total losses for the same three 
days were 265 counted KIA, 972 estimated KIA (with the 265 included), and 113 
prisoners were taken.97 As to the estimates, the North Koreans were known to always 
take their dead whenever possible so it is not improbable that the estimates, though 
usually too high, were not without some merit.98 
The “battle” was officially over at this point since no new objectives or attacks were 
made by the Marines, but no one told the NKPA. They continued to probe and prod and 
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CHAPTER 11  
 
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 
 
 
I am prepared to reaffirm my prior conviction that the close 
air support furnished my Division during the heavy fighting of 
10-22 September was not adequate and that casualties 
resulted directly from the deficiency. Adequacy of air support 
in this case, I view as extending not to the number of sorties 
alone, but to the other important matters of timeliness of 
sorties, adequacy of armament and quality of performance. I 
likewise confirm my stated preference that Marines on the 
ground be supported by Marine aircraft – solely because of 
the more effective coordination attainable as a result of our 
extended and detailed training together. I do not view such 
an arrangement as a matter of meeting special requirements 
– of which this Division has none – but rather as a means of 
achieving greater efficiency, and thus to further the common 
effort. 
                                                   --MajGen Gerald C. Thomas 
 
The Marine concept of Close Air Support and the controversy between the 
Navy/Marine Corps and the Army/Air Force (AF) over the CAS system used by EUSAK 
in Korea, played a significant role in the events surrounding the battle in September, 
1951. The Marine Corps had a different idea of how CAS should be conducted than the 
AF, and an understanding of the Marine concept for CAS and how it differs from the AF 
way is necessary to understand this controversy and the importance this battle had in it. 
Throughout the Corps’s time as expeditionary or amphibious troops it was a 
combined arms force, so that by the time of Korea it was an integrated spearhead 
consisting of infantry, artillery, armor, and air components organized according to the 
Air-Ground Team concept. But while the Corps was a combined arms branch, the tip of 
its spear had, since the early nineteenth century, been its infantry.  
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Marines saw this system as unique to themselves, and throughout the Korean 
War, aside from U. S. X Corps, they were right. The Marine Corps and the Navy, as 
opposed to the Army and the Air Force, “had different views on the relative contribution 
to ground operations of interdiction strikes and close air-support missions, views that 
embodied substantial differences in doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and 
tactical techniques.”1  
These differences caused great interservice friction during the Korean War.  
The basic concept for the Marine Corps-Navy doctrine and technique for tactical 
air operations in support of ground forces is that the air operations are closely 
integrated with and a primary supporting arm for ground force operations in the 
assault and seizure of physical objectives. The plans for supporting air 
operations are determined in large measure by the requirements of the ground 
forces being supported. This is particularly true of the plans for close air support. 
The assistance rendered by air is not only general, but is also direct; it is made 
reliably available and is closely integrated with fire and maneuver of the ground 
forces. The primary measure for the effectiveness of tactical air support is the 
amount of direct assistance provided to the ground force in executing its scheme 
of maneuver and seizing its objective. All air-ground operations are controlled by 
a single commander.2 
 
In other words, air was to support infantry and not the reverse. Unlike some of 
the other services and other military forces in the world, the Marine Corps did not see 
infantry as a supporting arm. It was the striking arm and the backbone of the Corps. The 
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the Development of Close Air Support (Washington, D. C.: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 
1990): 345; “1MarDiv ‘Report of CAS,”  Letter of CG (commanding general) 1MarDiv, MajGen Gerald C. 
Thomas, to CG Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, LtGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, dated 25 August 1951, (Alfred 
M. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA: Archives and Special Collections, Marine Corps Historical 
Center Oral History Collection, Marine Corps Korean War document CD collection, 1973): CD #15 of 25. 
General Almond tried to adopt this system for all of X Corps, but once that corps became part of Eighth 
Army, the Air Force system was forced on everybody despite Almond’s and other Army officers’ protests. 
The Marine Corps, too, was forced to route all CAS requests through the Air Force JOC. An Army study 
on CAS concluded that the “1MarDiv has achieved higher effectiveness in the tactical employment of air 
support than has any other unit in Korea . . . the Marines’ success is due to their organization, system and 
training.” 
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artillery, (and most uniquely) the armor and air arms, were not, as utilized by the Corps, 
the primary means for the attainment of an objective, nor were they the principle tools 
by which the chief offensive effect was to be achieved. In the Corps, all other arms and 
supports existed to support the infantry. The planes worked in concert with the ground 
force to eliminate barriers to infantry advance, so also did the artillery. The infantry did 
not deploy to assist armor; the armor deployed to assist the infantry. Again, the primary 
weapon of the Corps was the rifleman, the infantryman, the grunt. It was his job to take 
the beachhead. Not the guns of the Navy, not the planes of a MAW (Marine Air Wing), 
and neither the artillery nor the tanks of a Marine division held that task.3  
(This is because no matter how intense a preparatory pounding by supporting 
arms in the Central Pacific and in Korea, a well-entrenched diehard enemy, such as the 
Japanese or North Koreans, survived and could only be brought out by infantry one 
bunker or cave at a time. Even so, Marines strongly advocated maximum use and 
integration of all available supporting arms, because, while many enemy remained for 
                                                 
3 Marion F. Sturkey, Warrior Culture, 114-115. Some have said that the Marine Corps is primarily a light 
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could go with it aboard ship, and it could be resupplied with ships, whereas the Army division had to carry 
much of its supplies with it across vast distances on the land and therefore could not carry as much 
organic equipment and supplies. On the other hand, when a Marine division fought a land campaign far 
away from the sea as in 1951, its organic supply infrastructure was inadequate compared to that of the 
Army, which had been designed and adjusted through long experience to better facilitate supply in land 
campaigns. 
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the infantry since shells could not reach them all, every enemy that could be eliminated 
with a shell was one less to dig out with rifles, grenades, demolitions, and American 
blood. In addition, the shelling suppressed enemy fire during an advance and was a 
severely effective weapon against enemy morale.)  
For the Corps, the basic implement for the waging of successful combat proved 
to be the rifle-armed leatherneck, and this was true whether it was in the sweltering 
jungles of Haiti, Vietnam, and Nicaragua, the coral strewn beaches of the Pacific, or the 
frigid snows, rugged mountains, and stinking rice paddies of Korea. To this end, every 
Marine was taught first to be a rifleman, a “ground-pounder,” and then schooled in 
something else. Marines believed this focus on the basic implement of the infantry-man 
was not only unique, but made them better warriors. Today, Marines are quick to point 
out, that no other service in the world requires that its initiates qualify with a rifle at the 
distance Marines must fire at, 550 meters.4 
 In the AF view, on the other hand, CAS was not a priority, interdiction was, and 
air power, not infantry, was the primary arm for waging war.5  
This is not to say that the first priority of the air power in an amphibious landing 
was not to first achieve air superiority. In this, the Air Force and Marine Corps/Navy air 
doctrine were in agreement. The first priority was always air superiority over the 
objective. The Air Force provided this air superiority in Korea, however, from time to 
time, Marine ground units were still attacked by a YAK or MIG fighter, though this was 
the exception rather than the rule. The Marine Corps continuously reemphasized the 
need in its orders and reports to maintain its aerial defense initiatives among its forces 
                                                 
4 Robert Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, 306-307. 
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against air attack and that Korea in the respect of posing only a minor enemy air threat 
was not a typical war, especially if the Soviets openly intervened. The Marines were 
ordered not to become complacent or soft in this regard. 
The Marine CAS system consisted of six key factors: short response time, 
accuracy, training, control from the ground – preferably by the unit needing the strike 
and the ones best placed to ensure it did not hit friendly lines, decentralization, and 
close impacts. Two other principles were also involved: “1. Unity of command and 
responsibility are necessary at the point of contact with the enemy; and, 2. The system 
for tactical air support of ground operations must be flexible, provide a simple and 
decisive procedure, and permit short notice of supporting air forces.” The above 
mentioned key factors in turn were unified by these characteristics of the system itself: it 
was reliable; “simple and flexible; communications [were] swift and direct; aircraft [were] 
made available and employed on short notice; and the front line unit normally 
control[ed] the aircraft dispatched to give it support.”6 
The first factor, short response time, ensured that the strike got to the target 
within enough time to: have immediate effect on the situation on the ground, conserve 
friendly lives, and facilitate progress by infantry against an objective. “Working on the 
theory that close air support must be immediate if it is to be effective, the Marines have 
simplified their method of control. If air support is not available when the target 
develops, it may disappear or cause heavy casualties during the waiting time.” Marine 
response time for CAS is supposed to be within fifteen minutes to half-an hour of the 
request. “The average delay time in getting CAS in response to requests was 113 
minutes during September.” Furthermore, even preplanned strikes for the morning 
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hours, the most critical hours of the day because this was when the ground assault was 
usually launched, were only filled 20 percent of the time.7 
The lack of a firm assurance that sorties in any number would be furnished in 
reply to stated requests contributed largely to the unsatisfactory nature of close 
air support for the 1st Marine Division. As a general rule, requests were not 
replied to, either affirmatively or negatively, in sufficient time for alternate 
planning. This meant that to be absolutely safe, the division was required to plan 
its operations without dependence upon air in any degree. . . . Prediction of 
requirements is utilized extensively in the Marine-Navy close air support process. 
Requests for air are formulated sufficiently in advance to enable the air 
commander to best meet varying needs. However, when the air plan is firm, 
confirmation is supplied to affected ground units, in time to modify the ground 
plan if necessary. . . .8 
 
Allen R. Millett said the following of this aspect of the Marine/Navy system: 
The Navy-Marine Corps system for both air requests and air direction 
stressed rapid response and decentralized management of close air-support 
sorties. After evaluating their wartime experience, principally on Luzon, Iwo Jima, 
and Okinawa, by centralizing requests and direction in the battalion level Tactical 
Air Control Parties (TACP). Marine aviators and ground officers created a system 
that ensured that close air-support strikes would arrive within minutes. . . . The 
significant difference [compared to the Army/AF system] came in the degree of 
influence a ground force commander could exercise in requesting and 
conducting close air-support strikes. . . .  
. . . [T]he Navy and the Marine Corps had a quick-response close air-
support system. By eliminating the requirement that intervening ground force 
headquarters process requests, and by placing aircraft on station on regular 
schedules, the naval system ensured the strikes arrived only a few minutes after 
the FAC [Forward Air Controller] made his request. The short response time – 
supplemented by air direction skill and strike accuracy – constituted effective 
close air support for Marines.9 
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Marine Corps doctrine also preferred the orbiting of aircraft “on station” above the 
infantry, ready to respond to a request at a moment’s notice. The AF (Air Force) 
absolutely opposed this.10 
Stated the Marine Corps Board Study: 
The practice . . . of orbiting a number of aircraft on station over the front line area 
insures that aircraft are immediately available, with pilots briefed on the local 
ground situation, for employment on shortest possible notice. [These planes 
could stay “on station” longer than Air Force planes because these usually 
deployed from a nearby carrier or land-based strip, not from Japan as the Air 
Force jets often did.] It also enables pilots of aircraft with large munitions loads to 
make attacks on several different targets during the time spent over the front line 
target area. The provision for short notice employment of aircraft is a 
fundamental requirement of the Marine Corps-Navy system. It insures that the 
front line unit will receive air support promptly after a request and causes the 
ground unit to place reliance upon air support. The employment of aircraft 
orbiting on station has been criticized as wasteful. It is to be noted, in connection 
with this charge, that the orbiting of aircraft is not a requirement of the system but 
rather is a means of insuring that aircraft are available for short notice 
employment when required to assist the ground forces. Other means, if they are 
as effective, can be used equally well, however, two important advantages 
accrue as a result of the practice of orbiting a number of aircraft over a front line 
area: first, as noted above, pilots are briefed on the local ground situation and 
second, the enemy front line area is kept under surveillance by aircraft capable of 
making immediate attacks.11 
 
In fact, on that last point, aircraft served much like cavalry in the 19th Century; the 
planes could swoop in on a fleeing or breaking enemy and cause great casualties 
among the retreating foe. They did this on numerous occasions in the Pusan Perimeter 
battles, the Inchon/Seoul campaign, and the Chosin Reservoir campaign. Another 
advantage of having the aircraft orbit was that upon several occasions in those 
campaigns, the eyes in the sky prevented ambushes by spying them out in advance, of 
                                                 
10 1MarDiv, “Report of CAS,” “Memorandum for Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific,” on 
the subject of “Interim comments on close air support,” from CG 1MarDiv, Maj. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, 
dated 21 July 1951, 3-4. 
11 U.S. Marine Corps, “MCBS,” IV-B-8. 
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course OY observation craft could also serve this function without requiring fighter 
bombers to do it. 
The Air Force system was embodied in the “Joint Training Directive for Air-
Ground Operations.” This doctrine,  
[W]hich the Air Force embraced as authoritative, made close air support difficult 
for a ground command to obtain. Basically, the Air-Ground Operations System 
(AGOS) required that a ground commander request air support prior to an 
operation and be very specific about his needs. Requests had to be processed 
through an Army operations officer (G-3 Air) from regiment through field army 
and reviewed by an Air Force officer at each echelon of command (the air liaison 
officer) until the request reached the Joint Operations Center (JOC), run by an 
Air Force general, which would allocate the available air strikes. The request 
system insured that close air support strikes were not likely to be tactically 
relevant, but the air direction system the Air Force preferred also added to the 
problem. The definition of close air support [to a Marine] was that air strikes 
should be coordinated with the fire and maneuver of the ground forces through 
the positive direction by a forward air controller (FAC) who was fully 
knowledgeable about the ground combat situation. There was no fundamental 
disagreement that a Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) with reliable air-ground 
communications (vehicle- or ground-mounted) should be available so the FAC 
could direct air strikes by sight, just like an artillery forward observer. The Air 
Force, however, did not want to use its own personnel for such missions, and it 
did not trust the Army to provide a competent FAC. The Air Force might provide 
an Air Liaison Party down to regimental level to do air-strike planning, but it was 
not going to send Air Force officers (presumably pilots) out to the front to direct 
air strikes.12 
 
Under the Air Force system in 1951, which Marines were put under after the 
Hungnam Redeployment, CAS strikes averaged over an hour late when they arrived at 
all, and only half were effective. Many Army officers, too, were upset over having to use 
the Air Force JOC system and greatly preferred the Marine System of CAS. Among 
these were Maj. Gen. Edward Almond, CO of X Corps, and Maj. Gen. Clovis E. Byers, 
who would command X Corps at a later date. However, due to a trend towards 
squashing any issues of interservice contention, UNC repeatedly came down on the Air 
                                                 
12 Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 20. 
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Force side of the issue and even relieved General Byers for being too friendly to the 
Marine system. The JOC system was inflexible where the Marines’ was flexible. “The 
unwieldiness of the request and assignment procedure [under the JOC] continues to be 
evidenced in situations where a change of plans is indicated,” but the plan was not 
changed because it was too difficult to modify or alter requests already made through 
the JOC because of the many intervening layers of bureaucracy that extended clear up 
to FAF and FEAC at the Army and theatre levels.13 
 Instead of ground controllers, the Air Force preferred having air-strikes controlled 
by another pilot flying “Mosquito” aircraft. The weakness of this was that an air controller 
in the air knew little of the ground combat situation, was not on the ground with the 
requesting unit and therefore could more easily mistake the target and hit friendly 
troops, was probably not trained in infantry techniques (Air Force and Navy officers 
were not), and the accuracy of the strike was moderate at best because no one on the 
ground was guiding it in (popping smoke or other means of identifying the target only 
alerted the enemy to take cover, thus making the strike ineffective). And “Mosquitoes,” 
“were still hostage to the JOC system. Either the air strikes had to be pre-planned or 
they had to be requested as a matter of dire emergency.”14  
The AF viewed CAS as low if not last on the list of priorities for its aircraft or 
aircraft under its control. It wanted to focus on interdiction, and every plane taken away 
from that purpose was a waste in Air Force eyes, or a duplication of force. Air Force 
                                                 
13 Allan Millett, Drive North, 22, 56-59; U. S. Pacific Fleet, “Third Interim Evaluation Report,” Chapter 9, 
Close Air Support (Byers already had one strike against him in that he was not of the clique of officers 
who had served in the ETO (European Theatre of Operations) in World War II – he had served in the 
Pacific); 1MarDiv, “Report of CAS,” Letter to CG Fleet Marine Force Pacific, LtGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, 
from CG 1MarDiv, MajGen Gerald C. Thomas, undated, pages 1-2; Gerald C. Thomas Oral Memoir, 892; 
1MarDiv, “Report of CAS,” Letter to CG Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, from 
CG 1MarDiv, Maj. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, undated, page 2. 
14 Allan Millett, Drive North, 22, 56-59. 
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officers (and the Army in general) believed CAS within the bombline (the line in front of 
ground forces beyond which artillery could not reach) performed a job that should be 
done by artillery. In other words, anything within artillery range should be an artillery 
target, and to use air to hit it was a waste of air power.15  
The Marines viewed things differently: 
The Marine Corps method is to use all the fire support means which are 
available, to make timely use of those means, and to use them in adequate 
quantity in order to produce the necessary shock effect. In the situations 
encountered in Korea [1950] this shock action was attained by the coordinated 
employment of supporting aircraft, artillery, and organic infantry weapons [and 
NGF]. Air Force and in some instances Army sources have claimed that tactical 
air support is being used on artillery missions and that properly employed artillery 
would reduce the demands for tactical air support. Col S. L. A. Marshall [Army 
officer and noted analyst of military tactics] pointed out when queried on the 
Army’s employment of artillery and tactical air support: “The effects of air and 
artillery are reciprocal rather than duplicatory and if we all begin to understand 
that, we would more perfectly integrate the use of both weapons.” The flexibility 
inherent in the Marine Corps fire support coordination techniques permits the 
attainment of maximum effectiveness of supporting fires in any situation, a claim 
which has been fully borne out by Marine operations in Korea [1950].16 
 
 The next factor, accuracy, was essential to effective air support. This could only 
be gained through frequent and thorough practice by the pilots in CAS strikes on 
various targets from trenches, to caves, to tanks, to bunkers. With many enemy 
positions on the reverse slopes of hills, CAS strikes were often the only way to hit the 
enemy, especially in the rugged, mountainous terrain of Korea where indirect fire such 
as artillery could be extremely hampered in range and target selection. Artillery fire or 
mortars, and direct fire weapons like tanks, could usually not get in a bunker entrance 
on the reverse slope of a hill. And there was no question in the Marines’ minds that CAS 
                                                 
15 1MarDiv, “Report of CAS,” Letter to CG Fleet Marine Force Pacific, LtGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, from 
CG 1MarDiv, MajGen Gerald C. Thomas, undated, page 3-4. 
16 U. S. Marine Corps, “MCBS Vol. 1”, IV-C-2. 
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was by far more devastating to enemy morale; it more effectively softened a position in 
minutes than could hours of preparatory artillery fire.  
 S. L. A. Marshall interviewed many Marines during the Chosin Reservoir 
operation. He concluded the following (never published before) of the Marine CAS 
system in regards to both friendly and enemy morale: 
Line companies in the attack noted that artillery fire, even when generously used, 
and accurately delivered upon the target area, was not a marked depressant to 
CCF fire except at the moment when the shells were impacting. As these fires 
lifted, CCF automatic weapons immediately resumed the engagement. With the 
air strike, however, the shock to morale was noticeable and immediate. The 
position would go silent, even though CCF had not been eliminated by the 
bombing and strafing. From the examination of repeated instances of this 
character, it is even possible to hypothesize that the shock interval, in which the 
defender is unable so to command himself as to make use of such weapons as 
remain available to his hand, varies between 12 and 25 minutes, seemingly 
according to the extent of material damage and disarrangement done the 
defender. The transcendent morale value deriving from close air support is best 
explained in the words of one battalion commander in 1st Mar Div: “An air strike 
puts new zest and determination in our line in a way that no amount of artillery 
fire delivered before our eyes could do. The men see our pilots; they watch them 
come in low and take terrible chances. It makes them want to go forward again. 
The effect is as if they were drawn by a magnet. . . .”17 
  
 “Special loading,” is another aspect of CAS that is important to accuracy. Under 
the JOC system, planes were loaded mostly for armed reconnaissance missions. But as 
one Marine CAS expert observed in 1951, it was more effective on a ground target to 
have a single plane loaded with the proper armament for CAS than to have many 
planes loaded for armed reconnaissance. Under JOC, an Air Force officer far from the 
scene of the combat decided on armament to hit a ground target, not the ground 
commander requesting the strike. Planes on strip alert or aboard a carrier could be 
special loaded for an air strike within minutes, and be airborne to carry it out with the 
                                                 
17 Ibid., IV-C-7. 
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right tools for the job – different rockets for different types of targets, napalm, different 
weights and assortments of bombs if a bunker need obliterating, etc.18  
If a plane was out for armed reconnaissance and was only diverted to perform a 
CAS strike in an emergency, as often happened under the JOC system (which had little 
allowance for strip alert or special loading), the plane almost never had the ideal 
armament for the target at hand. Again special loading was part of accuracy, and this 
was because precision meant not just hitting the target but hitting it with something that 
would get the job done. 
 The Marine version of CAS had a different emphasis on accuracy than did that of 
the AF. For example:  
On 5 July [1951] a large air attack was planned by 8th Army on a strong enemy 
locality in front of the 1st Marine Division. On the day preceding the attack the 
target was announced as a circle of 2,000 meters diameter centered on a 
specific point. Such a general area assignment is wholly foreign to the pinpoint 
technique which has come to be standard practice in the delivery of close air 
support fires under the Marine Corps-Navy system. Fortunately in this case the 
forward air controller involved was able to so direct the attacking aircraft that the 
2,000 meter radius target previously assigned was ignored and the attack 
directed against sound tactical targets.19 
 
 In other words, to the Marines, if CAS was not accurate and focused with 
pinpoint precision, it was useless. This is just one more example of how the AF 
emphasis on interdiction and subsequent de-emphasis of CAS kept them from 
doctrinally mastering the fundamentals of effective CAS. Some individual pilots, did 
                                                 
18 Interview with Major William T. Porter, USMC, 12 October 1951; 1MarDiv, “Report of CAS,” Letter of 
CG (commanding general) 1MarDiv, Maj. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, to CG Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Lt. 
Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, dated 25 August 1951, page 3. 
19 1MarDiv, “Report of CAS,”  “Memorandum for Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific,” on 
the subject of “Interim comments on close air support,” from CG 1MarDiv, Maj. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, 
dated 21 July 1951, page 2. 
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provide effective support, but as a whole, the AF did not care enough about CAS to 
make it more effective.20 
 The factor of training went hand in hand with accuracy (meaning the aviators 
trained as infantry, knew what infantry needed, understood infantry tactics, and trained 
closely with the infantry in CAS doing the very things that would be expected in a CAS 
strike on the battlefield). The pilots to fly CAS in combat needed to have trained 
extensively in peacetime to do so. Furthermore, this factor meant that the pilots had not 
just trained in CAS, but trained closely with the Marine ground forces they were to 
support. You cannot expect to have effective close coordination with ground fire and 
maneuver if you do not train in such regularly. The 1MAW trained closely with the 1Mar 
Div before the war and proved itself effective in supporting the 1st Provisional Marine 
Brigade in the Pusan Perimeter, making some of the first kills of the feared T-34 tanks in 
the war. And in the 1MarDiv request of 30 Oct 1951, wherein the CG 1MarDiv made 
requests of what constituted ideal CAS for his division, it was stated that the Marines 
preferred Marine aircraft (meaning the 1MAW) to Navy or AF because of the more 
extensive training of the pilots with that division. Training also meant that the Marines 
knew the limitations and capabilities of all supporting arms and that Marine pilots knew 
these for the infantry.21 
                                                 
20 Allan R. Millett, “Korea, 1950-53,” 349. 
21 1Mar Div “Report on CAS,” letter of 30 Sep 1951, from CG 1Mar Div to CG EUSAK, via CG X Corps, 
“Comments on ORO-R-3 Close Air Support Operations in Korea,” page 3; Lynn Montross, et al., U. S. 
Marine Operations in Korea Vol I; 1Mar Div, “Report of CAS,” Letter of CG 1Mar Div to CICFEC 
(Commander in Chief, Far East Command), via CG X Corps and CG Eighth Army, “Close Air Support,” 
dated 18 Oct 1951, page 2; Letter of CG (commanding general) 1MarDiv, Maj. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, 
to CG Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, dated 25 August 1951, page 3. Allan R. 
Millett, Semper Fidelis, 447-448: “No new aviator lieutenants were trained in 1946-1950 without first 
serving as ground officers.” 
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 The state of Marine training of combat units prior to Korea had a heavy emphasis 
on CAS, despite the peacetime budgetary cuts: 
The intensity, diversity, and realism of the pre-Korean training conducted 
by FMF elements was a major factor in the combat success of the Brigade, 
1stMarDiv, and 1stMAW. Unit training constantly emphasized the fundamental 
Marine Corps conviction that initiative, professional competence, and leadership 
in junior officers and noncommissioned officers must be developed. Through 
combined exercises of the various ground arms and services with supporting air, 
valuable experience was gained in the skillful exploitation and use of the 
maximum capabilities of the supporting arms and services. . . .     
Training programs were based on the assumption that expeditionary duty 
involving combat was imminent. There was a continued insistence on realistic 
operations (as realistic as peacetime safety and budgetary considerations 
permitted), under combat conditions for both combat and service units. For 
combat units, frequent live firing training problems were a requirement. . . .  
During the pre-Korean period, FMF units conducted numerous ground and 
air-ground training problems, field exercises, command post, and amphibious 
exercises. Particularly significant were the reinforced infantry battalion and 
regimental field exercises which habitually employed close air support. It was 
through these exercises that ground commanders, staffs, and troops acquired 
increased knowledge of the employment and capabilities of close air support and 
confidence in the results to be obtained from its use. At the same time, aviation 
commanders, pilots, and forward air controllers were not only maintaining a high 
level of proficiency in current techniques and procedures but were also 
developing improved techniques in identification and location of friendly front 
lines and enemy targets and for providing close air support best suited to various 
ground force schemes of maneuver.22 
  
Closely allied to accuracy and training was the factor of ground control (meaning 
also that actual pilots served with the infantry as Forward Air Controllers, so someone 
who knew tactical aviation from the pilot’s perspective and combat from the 
infantryman’s view, particularly in the pertinent situation at hand, would be guiding the 
pilot to the target). This meant that a Marine pilot was with the infantry as a FAC. He 
would then guide in the pilots to the target by radio, talking directly to them. A pilot on 
the scene with the ground forces was, in Marine eyes, far more effective than an 
airborne “mosquito.”  There were also several advantages to this system. For one thing, 
                                                 
22 U. S. Marine Corps, “MCBS,” IV-A-5. 
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the pilot was on site with the men the strike was to support, was familiar with flying CAS 
from the cockpit and thus could talk the plane onto target more effectively. CAS could 
be brought much closer to friendly lines with the skill this technique facilitated, and 
therefore, the infantry had less distance to cross when the strike was lifted, thus 
allowing them to bridge the gap and get at the enemy while his head was still down from 
the bombardment, and save infantry lives because the men would be exposed to enemy 
fire for a shorter interval. Furthermore, “Battalions are not required to consult with or 
receive assent from higher echelons, in regard to requests for air support or in regard to 
control of aircraft delegated for accomplishing supporting missions. . . . This Procedure 
requires but a few minutes. It is flexible and decisive. A minimum of time elapses 
between the time of request for a mission and the execution of the mission.” And, 
having the strike under the control of the unit making the request, and thus under the 
command of the ground commander, the strike was much better utilized in a manner 
critical to the progress of the infantry towards their objective. (It would be under an AF 
officer in the JOC system).23 
Under the JOC system, air support was provided to the Eighth Army by 
“Mosquito” planes flown by AF personnel rather than FACs on the ground with the 
infantry. (However, the 1MarDiv retained its own FACs despite the addition of the 
Mosquitoes.)  These Mosquito planes acted as orbiting controllers and guided in CAS 
planes to the targets via radio. However, they were in the air, not on the ground and 
thus much less familiar with the ground combat situation, had no infantry training, were 
AF officers under the command of JOC, not the unit on the ground, and being airborne 
had nearly as much trouble discerning the location of friendly lines as the CAS planes 
                                                 
23 Ibid., IV-B-6. 
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they were to guide. (An FAC on the ground with the unit receiving support knew where 
friendly lines were because he was a part of them.)  
An Army report on CAS described the Mosquito control system in such a way as 
to “leave no doubt of the superiority of ground-controlled air attacks over the Mosquito 
system.” However, one Marine expert on CAS in 1951 pointed out that the Mosquito 
system was complementary to the FAC system because Mosquitoes could sometimes 
communicate with aircraft for the FAC, when the FAC’s radio malfunctioned and could 
not contact the CAS aircraft but could contact the Mosquito. In other words, the 
Mosquito acted as an emergency relay in such instances, and the radios failed often 
enough to make such a safety net necessary. And while the Mosquito was not exactly 
organic to Marine doctrine as working independent from any FAC, Marine doctrine did 
allow for airborne controllers as TACs (tactical air controllers). These could sometimes 
see targets out of sight of the FAC. Thus it can be seen that the Marine system was 
“augment[ed]” by the Mosquito system rather than the latter being obviated by the 
former. In fact, if a mosquito pilot flew one area enough, or had enough experience, 
they improved in their technique and could be effective in situations where the target 
could be seen from the air. However, both North Korean and CCF doctrine stressed 
camouflage to such a degree that it was hard indeed to see a target from the air that 
was not already spotted by someone on the ground. (The JOC system as practiced in 
Korea was not instated in Vietnam or Iraq. Some commanders thought this a mistake, 
while others, a big relief.)24 
                                                 
24 1MarDiv, “Report of CAS,” Letter of CG (commanding general) 1MarDiv, MajGen Gerald C. Thomas, to 
CG Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, dated 25 August 1951, page 4; Interview 
with Major William T. Porter, USMC, 12 October 1951; Headquarters, Eighth U. S. Army Korea, “Enemy 
Tactics.” The Army as a whole did not view the Mosquito system as inferior. 
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Marines believed absolutely that effective CAS reduced friendly infantry 
casualties and that lack of effective CAS increased them. The 1MarDiv, in 1951 
believed that the most effective use of CAS was, “success[fully] . . . destroying the 
enemy with a consequent saving in lives . . . .” In answer to an assessment in an Army 
report on CAS that, “the [Marine] ground forces can, if necessary, plan and execute 
ground operations without close air support . . . [and that] therefore the requirement for 
close air support on the basis of absolute necessity is zero,” MajGen Gerald C. Thomas, 
CG 1MarDiv, wrote that: “. . . the same can be stated for any supporting arms 
recognizing throughout that fires delivered by supporting arms can serve to make the 
task of the infantry easier to reduce casualties. It is considered that the significant 
element in this aspect of the evaluation is a determination of what air support may be 
estimated as a minimum requirement under conditions where the ground and air 
elements involved are properly trained and equipped for the coordinate task.” The 
Marines felt so strongly that effective CAS saved lives that Thomas even referred to it 
as a “matter . . . of life and death to a Marine and we will have to see it through.”25  
The benefit of CAS to the Marine fight of September, 1951 is further 
demonstrated in Thomas’s words:  
Close air support of our units operating in this terrible terrain and with a paucity of 
artillery and supporting ground weapons of a nature to make a Ft. Sill graduate 
weep, is an absolute necessity. As a saver of casualties, its effect – if properly 
delivered – cannot be overestimated. Since I assumed command of this Division, 
it has suffered 504 KIA and 4468 WIA, Marines. At the same time, there were 
308 KIA and 1559 WIA in the Korean Marines. [A regiment of ROK Marines (the 
only such regiment in existence) was attached to 1MarDiv for much of 1951.] I 
                                                 
25 1MarDiv ‘Report of CAS.’ “Enclosure 1,” page 10; Letter of CG (commanding general) 1MarDiv, Maj. 
Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, to CG Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, dated 25 
August 1951, page 5; Letter to CG EUSAK (Eighth U. S. Army in Korea) from CG 1MarDiv, Gerald C. 
Thomas, dated 30 September 1951, pages 2-3, emphases in original; 1. General Holland M. Smith made 
the same arguments about NGF after Iwo Jima. 
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have acquired a lot of experience. My recent action, as you know, has been far 
from hasty [in regards to pushing the issue of inadequate CAS with the FAF (Fifth 
Air Force) and EUSAK (Eighth U. S. Army in Korea) and CINCFEC (Commander 
in Chief Far East Command)]. . . . I know what I am talking about when I say that 
a great percentage of those casualties could have been saved by adequate and 
timely close air support.26 
 
The effects of artillery compared to CAS were further obviated by the fact that 
there was usually a pattern to it. “Enemy prisoners indicated that they had been able to 
march into attack positions through artillery fire simply by studying its pattern.” An 
airstrike was not predictable if done right and quickly, and napalm covered a wide 
enough area in its blast that no troops could plot any avoidable pattern.27 
Centralization on the highest level and decentralization at any lower level (down 
to the battalion) (centralized command of CAS, and coordination was at the battalion 
level with the Marines, as opposed to division or even corps level in the Army, so even 
though command of an air strike was under a single officer of the battalion Tactical Air 
Control Party, there was decentralization in that units as low as the battalion could make 
these decisions instead of only one single operations center for an entire corps or army 
like the JOC of the Air Force). This meant that Marine CAS would be provided by 
Marine “planes under the direct control of the ground commander which could not be 
diverted to other employment by a higher echelon.” In other words, “Over-all control of 
aircraft is highly centralized, but control of aircraft employed on close support missions 
is decentralized to the maximum extent.” So while the TACC (Tactical Air Control 
Center – the highest echelon of tactical air control) would be in control of all tactical 
support aircraft in general, the ground commander requesting an air strike would be in 
                                                 
26 Letter to CG Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, from CG 1MarDiv, Maj. Gen. 
Gerald C. Thomas, undated, page, 3. 
27 Headquarters, Eighth U. S. Army Korea, “Enemy Tactics,” 17.  
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control of aircraft assigned that strike specifically, and he would have this control 
through his TACP (Tactical Air Control Party), wherein resided his FAC (Forward Air 
Controller). TACPs were assigned in Marine doctrine from the battalion level and up 
(the lowest echelon that could receive permanent assignment of a TACP under the 
Army/AF system was the division). This meant that under the Marine system a battalion 
commander could get on the line and request air directly from the TACC (Tactical Air 
Control Center) or TADC (Tactical Air Direction Center -- a subordinate part of the 
TACC located at Corps level) without having to go through intervening levels of 
bureaucracy.28   
In the words of the “Marine Corps Board Study: Evaluation of the Influence of 
Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War,” this was as follows: 
Marine Corps and Navy air units are trained to conduct tactical air 
supporting operations under a single force commander who commands or 
controls all forces in a prescribed area. These operations involve gaining air 
superiority, general and close air support, observation, reconnaissance, liaison, 
air transport, and general utility and miscellaneous air operations including 
transport of troops in helicopters. 
The system for tactical air support involves positive control of all air 
operations through a central control agency at the headquarters of the force 
commander and subordinate control agencies, as integral parts of subordinate 
units down to and including Marine battalions. The system further provides for a 
request procedure whereby a unit commander of a battalion or larger unit may 
request air support direct by radio to the highest control agency and for a control 
procedure whereby the requesting unit commander controls the aircraft 
dispatched in answer to his request.29 
 
Under the Air Force system, a battalion commander would have to request the 
air up through his chain of command the day before to regiment, division, corps, and 
                                                 
28 Andrew Geer, New Breed, 184; U. S. Marine Corps, “MCBS Vol. 1,” IV-B-8; Allan R. Millett, “ Korea, 
1950-1953,” 350. “Ground commander” here means the battalion, regimental, or division commander had 
command of his FACs and through them, the plane making the strike. This did not mean ground 
commanders allocated overall air applications or commanded the Marine air wing. 
29 U. S. Marine Corps, “MCBS Vol. 1,” IV-B-3 and B-4 (emphasis added). 
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then army level (where the JOC was located) and have the strike preplanned. But it may 
or may not even get approval depending on AF priorities for air power that day, and 
when the strike arrived on station, the pilots would likely be from the AF (therefore 
having little training in CAS) and would have little or no idea of the ground situation. 
Then to top all this off, the ground commander would have no control over the strike; it 
would be directed by a Mosquito flown by an AF officer (with no infantry training), and 
the strike would certainly not be coordinated with artillery, NGF, and infantry action, 
resulting in as little integration with the actions of the ground forces as could be 
imagined and a subsequent degree of inopportunity and ineffectiveness with and on the 
ground situation. In other words, the AF system directly reflected the AF and Army view 
(official view despite many lower echelon Army officers’ preference for the Marine 
system) that “land power and air power are coequal and interdependent forces; neither 
is the auxiliary of the other.”30  
This was in direct contrast to the Marine Corps/Navy view demonstrated in these 
words by the Marine Corps Board Study: 
The air operations are closely integrated with and a primary supporting arm for 
ground force operations in the assault and seizure of physical objectives. The 
plans for supporting air operations are determined . . . by the requirements of the 
ground forces being supported [as opposed to the AF system where air 
requirements determine the plans for ground support]. The assistance rendered 
by air is not only general, but is also direct; it is made reliably available and is 
closely integrated with fire and maneuver of the ground forces. The primary 
measure of effectiveness of tactical air support is the amount of direct assistance 
                                                 
30 Allan R. Millett, “ Korea, 1950-1953,” 347 – Allan R. Millett was quoting Army FM 100-20, The 
Command and Employment of Air Power (July, 1943) which established “several important doctrines” of 
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that maintained the same core concept down through the Korean War. This was: FM 31-35, Air-Ground 
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abbreviated JTD, was applied to how air-ground operations would be conducted in Korea, but, basically, 
the doctrine remained that of FM 31-35 throughout Korea. (I have a copy of FM 31-35 in my possession.)  
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provided to the ground force in executing its scheme of maneuver and seizing its 
objective.”31 
 
 However, though the purpose and application of air power in Marine eyes was to 
support the ground effort and be integrated with it, the commander of the 1MAW was 
not subordinate to the commander of the 1MarDiv. Rather, as in the Army/AF system, 
the two were coequal (this does not mean their purposes were coequal like the AF and 
the Army saw theirs as). They cooperated with one another and were under the same 
administrative commander, FMFPAC (Fleet Marine Force Pacific) commander, LtGen 
Lemuel Shepherd through much of the war of movement in Korea, and were both part 
of X Corps while it was an independent command. But under the JOC system, the 1 
MAW was part of FAF and the 1Mar Div was under Eighth Army. Operationally, their 
lowest common commander was General Ridgway, CINCUNC (Commander in Chief 
United Nations Command). 
Marine Corps ground commanders did not command Marine aviation units as 
some Air Force officers thought. Navy and Marine units assigned to an 
amphibious task force functioned under the direction of a single air officer. During 
the assault phase, this officer would be a Navy officer, but during extended 
operations ashore it would be a Marine aviator. Marine aircraft wings were not 
attached to Marine divisions. Either aircraft wing commanders and division 
commanders worked on a cooperative basis (as did Army field army 
commanders and Air Force tactical air commanders) or they functioned under a 
common superior, the amphibious task force commander or the landing force 
commander once ashore.32 
 
The Marine system of decentralization was heavily influenced by amphibious 
doctrine. While one Tactical Air Control Center indeed had administrative and 
operational control over all tactical air from the Joint Expeditionary Force level down, it 
                                                 
31 U. S. Marine Corps, “MCBS Vol. 1,” IV-B-4. 
32 Allan R. Millett, “Korea, 1950-1953,” 352. 
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did not micromanage tactical control over all this air – thus there was decentralization 
even though there was only one over all tactical air commander.  
In an amphibious operation of large scope there is one Tactical Air Control 
Center – at the Joint Expeditionary Force level. In view of the size of the 
operation, however, that Center does not in fact attempt to exercise tactical air 
control; it serves essentially as a means of making general distributions of 
aircraft, from those available, to the various air defenses, air support, and related 
missions, maintaining a certain number in reserve against unexpected 
eventualities. The subordinate attack forces each have a Tactical Air Direction 
Center [at corps level], under whose direct control all assigned aircraft operate. . . 
. This Tactical Air Direction Center should in fact exercise control over the 
delivery of air support within the corps.33 
 
The fact that Marines viewed air support doctrine and land operations through 
the prism of amphibious warfare, a doctrine neither unadapted nor unsuited to 
expeditionary or land warfare, as Marine experience had shown through Okinawa and 
then the Inchon/Seoul and Wonsan/Chosin Reservoir campaigns, is again shown in the 
following excerpt from the same document. 
The present arrangement in Korea [the Army/AF JOC system] fails to exploit any 
of the desirable aspects of decentralization. The tactical air control function is 
discharged from the top-most level in operations which extend over a front of one 
hundred and forty (140) miles. Such an attempt at centralization would be 
unthinkable in an amphibious operation. You will recall that at Okinawa where the 
landing attack initially extended over a front of about fifteen (15) miles there was 
a Tactical Air Direction Center for each of the two (2) Attack Forces, and later 
one for each of the two (2) corps after they were established ashore.34 
 
One reason Marines did not trust over-centralization of CAS is summed up in 
these words, “The statement that, ‘in general, the headquarters of an Army is no more 
                                                 
33 1MarDiv, “Report of CAS,” Letter to CG Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, from 
CG 1MarDiv, Maj. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, 21 July 1951, page 4. 
34 Ibid., page 5. 
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able to determine the priority of individual targets for close support than for artillery,’ is 
considered wholly sound and reflective of a basic weakness in the existing system.”35 
The way the Marine system worked, TACPs were located at each level of 
command from division down to battalion level. This greatly decentralized not only the 
requesting of CAS but the control of actual strikes in a way the AF, having only recently 
won independence from the Army and exclusive control over air warfare (except for the 
remnants of airpower in the hands of the Navy and the Marine Corps), did not trust. In 
each Marine Division there were thirteen TACPs, one for each battalion (nine), one for 
each regiment (three), and one for the division itself (one). Each TACP was linked 
directly by radio to the TACC (or TADC). The TACC would assign aircraft to a TACP to 
control for each request for an air strike (sent to the TACC by a TACP along the Tactical 
Air Radio net or TAR).36   
The whole process from request to delivery of a Marine CAS strike under the 
Navy/Marine system went like this: 
The battalion commander requests tactical air support through his own battalion 
TACP, transmitting by radio direct to the TACC at highest level (or to a TADC at 
Corps level). The net is monitored by the TACPs of adjacent battalions, the 
parent regiment, and division FSCC [Fire Support Coordination Center]. Silence 
on the part of those agencies monitoring the net indicates they have no objection 
to the requested mission, whereupon the TACC (or TADC at corps level) acts on 
the request immediately. Coordination as necessary with artillery and naval 
gunfire, is accomplished by the appropriate FSCC. Thereafter the mission is 
assigned to an airborne flight of aircraft. The requesting TACP is notified of the 
aircraft assigned, the approximate time of attack and whether or not the strike is 
to be directly controlled by the TACP [it usually was – the only times when it was 
controlled by an airborne TAC (Tactical Air Controller, like a Mosquito under the 
AF system) was if the target was out of sight of the TACP’s FAC such as on the 
                                                 
35 Ibid., Letter entitled “Comments on ORO-R-3 Close Air Support Operations in Korea,” addressed to CG 
EUSAK, from CG 1MarDiv, Maj. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, via CG X Corps, 30 September 1951. This 
document consisted of Marine commentary, paragraph by paragraph, of a U. S. Army evaluation of “the 
close air support problem” in Korea. 
36 U. S. Marine Corps, “MCBS Vol. 1,” IV-B-6. 
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reverse slope of a ridge]. This procedure requires but a few minutes. It is flexible 
and decisive. A minimum of time elapses between the time of request for a 
mission and the execution of the mission.37 
 
 
As for the factor of close impacts --meaning the strike could be delivered in very 
close proximity to friendly lines well within the limits of artillery range, the following quote 
from Andrew Geer is informative: 
The daily risks Marine airmen take to assist the Marine on the ground are 
the direct result of esprit, training and indoctrination. The Marine aviator believes 
the chief reason for his existence is to furnish assistance to the rifleman on the 
ground. By “close” the Marines mean the immediate area of the front lines. 
As a result of continual association and training, Marine air and ground 
personnel have worked out a system designed to deliver “customer satisfaction,” 
the customer in this case being the rifleman. Marine airmen have made many 
new and happy customers in the United Nations forces in Korea.  
One Army infantry captain wrote in the Combat Forces Journal, “Our 
tactical air arm should spend a few months with the Marines. I don’t know what 
causes the difference, but it is there. The Marine pilots give us the impression 
that they are breaking their hearts to help us out and are as much in the show as 
we are.”38 
 
An example of CAS close to the lines that also shows the potential tactical 
decisiveness of such close CAS is from the battle for Obong-ni Ridge, 18 August 1950.  
To illustrate the importance of air support at the right time and place, we 
return . . . [to the battle of Obong-ni Ridge]. Marine ground forces had already 
suffered two hundred and sixty-seven casualties. Fenton and Stevens, with two 
depleted companies [there were only two rifle companies per battalion at this 
time – the third was absent due to peacetime T/Os – so this battalion had not the 
ordinary reserve to help it], held a precarious foothold. Throughout the night they 
had barely managed to fight off strong enemy counterattacks. 
Continued penetration of the enemy’s lines was essential. At seven 
o’clock Stevens resumed the attack to dislodge the enemy on Hill 117. Despite 
heavy supporting fires from mortars and artillery, the assault unit was pinned 
down by a nest of four machine guns on the eastern slope. 
Further assault by the Marines of Able Company would have been 
extremely costly and there was doubt that even a resolute attack would be 
                                                 
37 Ibid., IV-B-6. “Battalions are not required to consult with or receive assent from higher echelons, in 
regard to requests for air support or in regard to control of aircraft delegated for accomplishing supporting 
missions.” 
38 Andrew Geer, New Breed, 190. 
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successful. Stevens asked for an air strike. Overhead the orbiting Corsairs were 
briefed and the target marked. Within minutes, a five hundred-pound bomb was 
placed on the position and the guns were obliterated.  
From that moment, the issue was no longer in doubt. The enemy began to 
withdraw; the withdrawal became a rout under the combined assault of ground 
and air. Before the day was over, the enemy was driven across the Naktong 
[River] and the river was clogged with the dead.39 
 
That five hundred-pound bomb was dropped close enough to Marine lines to 
bowl over a few Marines with the concussion, but the effect on Marine morale was 
stupendous, the effect on that of the enemy, crushing.40 
Another pertinent quote to the close proximity of Marine CAS to the front lines, 
which the Korean War era 1st Marine Air Wing (1st MAW) was famous for delivering 
without friendly casualties, follows:  
. . . on 10 January 1951 Brig. General Homer W. Kiefer, commanding 7th Infantry 
Division Artillery, wrote the Commandant of the Marine Corps: “ During the period 
19 September to 20 December 1950 close air support of this division was 
furnished almost exclusively by the 1st Marine Air Wing . . . in 57 days of combat 
1,024 sorties were flown by Marine aircraft (largely Corsairs) in close support of 
the division without a single casualty among our own troops due to friendly air 
action. This record I attribute to the fact that adequate control was available with 
front line units. In many instances Marine planes were bombing and strafing 
within 200 yards of our front lines. . . . Allow me to reemphasize my appreciation 
for the outstanding air support received by this division. The Marine system of 
control, in my estimation, approaches the ideal and I firmly believe that a similar 
system should be adopted as standard for Army divisions.” In his endorsement 
Major General Edward M. Almond, X Corps commander, declared he wished to 
“emphasize” Kiefer’s final statement regarding the Marine system of Tactical Air 
Control, which “has proved itself on every occasion.” General MacArthur added 
that “this correspondence again illustrates the outstanding support that Marine air 
is providing ground forces in Korean operations.” (Fourth endorsement.)41 
 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 190-91. 
40 Jon T. Hoffman, Colonel, USMCR, “1st Marine Division Korea History,” in Robert J. Martin, ed., First 
Marine Division, Vol. II: Korea (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Company, 2000): 14. 
41 Robert Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II, (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces 
Press, 1952): 290n; U. S. Marine Corps, “MCBS Vol. II,” Appendix # 62. 
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The rule of thumb used by Marine aviators to calculate the closest distance from 
friendly lines to drop a bomb is about a hundred yards of distance per hundred pounds 
of explosive, i.e. one yard of distance for each pound of explosive.42 
For the entire Marine involvement in the actions in Korea of 1950, this Marine 
Corps/Navy system was employed. This was even though, during the Pusan Perimeter 
phase, and Northeast Korea Operations phase, FAF (Fifth Air Force) was technically in 
control. This was because, “due to special circumstances, Marine aviation units were 
able to support ground units, almost without exception . . . .” Those special 
circumstances were: the fluid nature of the war, the fact that the Army Air Force JOC 
had not yet been fully emplaced, the fact that X Corps, of which the Marines were a 
part, was a separate command than Eighth Army for a time, and some gentlemen’s 
agreements between the 1 MAW, 1MarDiv, and FAF. But beginning in January 1951, 
the FAF and the JOC were calling the shots, and the mission of Marine air was diluted 
from supporting just the 1MarDiv and X Corps to supporting all of Eighth Army.43  
 In balance to the Marine view of CAS was that of the AF. The AF viewed 
interdiction as preeminent and any CAS as secondary in priority. Said Major General 
Otto P. Weyland, Commanding General FEAF (Far East Air Force): 
I might suggest that all of us should keep in mind the limitations of air forces as 
well as their capabilities. Continuous CAS along a static front requires dispersed 
and sustained fire power against pinpoint targets. With conventional weapons 
there is no opportunity to exploit the characteristic mobility and fire power of air 
forces against worthwhile concentrations. In a static situation close support is an 
expensive substitute for artillery fire. It pays its greatest dividends when the 
enemy’s sustaining capability has been crippled and his logistics cut to a 
minimum while his forces are immobilized by interdiction and armed 
                                                 
42 United States Navy and Marine Corps, NAVMC-4159: PHIB 12, Amphibious Operations: Air Operations 
(Quantico, VA:  Marine Corps Schools, 1948): 37. 
43 U. S. Marine Corps, “MCBS Vol. 1” IV-B-9; Allan R. Millett, “ Korea, 1950-1953.”  
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reconnaissance. Then decisive results can be obtained as the close-support 
effort is massed in coordination with determined ground action.44 
 
“General Weyland insisted that in the summer and fall of 1951 ‘it would have 
been sheer folly not to have concentrated the bulk of our air effort against interdiction 
targets in the enemy rear areas. Otherwise, the available firepower would have been 
expended inefficiently against relatively invulnerable targets along the front, while the 
enemy was left to build up his resources to launch and sustain a general offensive.’ . . .  
[But] Try as they might, the UN air forces could not prevent the arrival of the 2,900 tons 
of rations, fuel, ammunition, and other supplies needed every day by the 58 Communist 
divisions at the front.”45 
The AF also had a gross misunderstanding--Marines thought they did not care 
enough to try to understand--of the tenets of the Marine system. They thought Marine 
units had less artillery than Army land units and so habitually used CAS in place of 
artillery. This was erroneous. Marine Divisions had the same amount of organic artillery 
as Army Infantry Divisions. (See chapter on organization.) The AF also had no concept 
of the tactical value an airstrike could provide to an infantry force. All of this is amply 
demonstrated in the manner in which the subject is addressed in the AF official history 
on the Korean War.46 
The AF did not consider quick response to be a key factor in CAS at all. Said 
Robert Futrell, the author of the Official History of the AF in Korea: 
Since the Marines used air support as a substitute for artillery, they had to have 
forward air observers in each of their battalions. To assure an air strike within five 
                                                 
44 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 169. 
45 Ibid., 169-170. 
46 Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, (Washington, D. C., Air Force 
History and Museums Program, 2000 – reprint of the revised 1983 edition, originally published in 1961): 
705. 
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or ten minutes, they had to have combat air craft on “air-alert” stations over the 
front lines almost continually. The Army, on the other hand, preferred to employ 
air strikes against targets which were normally outside the range of its artillery. 
Even if these remote targets were moving, they could not normally be expected 
to reach friendly positions for some time. These more remote targets were 
usually too far from the front to be visible to observers on the ground. In a normal 
situation, the Army would have adequate time to employ the “call-type” air-
support missions which were more conservative of scarce air capabilities than 
were “air-alert” missions.47 
 
The charge that the Marine system “required” the on station orbiting of air craft 
was blatantly false, just one of many straw men scattered throughout the above 
passage. While Marines preferred to have on station air over the battlefield when 
moving forward in the attack, it was certainly not a requirement. Said the Marine Corps 
Board Study: 
The employment of aircraft orbiting on station has been criticized as wasteful. It 
is to be noted, in connection with this charge, that the orbiting of aircraft is not a 
requirement of the system but rather is a means of insuring that aircraft are 
available for short notice employment when required to assist the ground forces. 
Other means, if they are as effective, can be used equally well, however, two 
important advantages accrue as a result of the practice of orbiting a number of 
aircraft over a front line area: first, as noted above, pilots are briefed on the local 
ground situation and second, the enemy front line area is kept under surveillance 
by aircraft capable of making immediate attacks.48 
 
In fact, General Thomas tried to work a compromise called “strip alert” of air craft 
where the planes did not orbit the battle-field at all, but where a few planes from the 
1MAW were kept on a strip close to the area of ground operations on “alert” ready to 
head to the skies and execute emergency CAS on short rather than extended notice. 
The compromise did not work too well as can be seen in the letters quoted from 
General Thomas on the subject earlier on. 
                                                 
47 Robert F. Futrell, United States Air Force in Korea, 705. 
48 U.S. Marine Corps, “MCBS,” IV-B-8. 
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The AF and UNC saw the 1MarDiv as greedy to strive to get the 1MAW to 
support it with CAS. To them, the Marines were not an “air ground team;” they were just 
one more infantry division in Korea, never mind their preferred doctrine for combat, 
never mind the fact that they were not being allowed to fight the way they had trained – 
and any unit is at its least potential state of effectiveness when it does not train the way 
it fights and fight the way it trained.49   
In the words of the 1MarDiv CG:  
I told him [AF Gen Everest] that my interest was in this division; that we brought 
our own aircraft along to this war; that our officers and men were trained and 
fought with the expectation of receiving air support; that the others had not 
brought their aircraft; that they had never trained with it [and thus could not utilize 
it as effectively], nor ever expected it and that arguments concerning the 
unfairness of so supporting us would not stand examination.50  
 
General Ridgway, the theatre commander, had some understanding of MajGen 
Thomas’s position, but still thought differently than did the Marines.  
I fully understand the natural desire of any Marine Corps ground 
commander to be supported in combat by Marine Corps close support aviation. 
This was the expressed desire of your predecessor [MajGen Oliver P. Smith] 
during my service in command of Eighth Army.       
Moreover, I am of the opinion that such close air support, by reason 
principally of intimate combined training and of long and intimate association of 
the air and ground officers concerned, will be of greater tactical effectiveness, 
other factors being equal. It is not, in my opinion, at all unnatural for you to desire 
that the 1st Marine Air Wing be permanently assigned to your direct support. In 
fact were the 1st Marine Air Division again operating as an independent 
command in this Theatre, such an assignment might logically be made, as I 
believe it was in a previous operation [in either the Pusan Perimeter, 
Inchon/Seoul, or Chosin Reservoir campaigns].  
1st Marine Division is not, however, conducting independent operations. It 
is but one Division in a Corps of several Divisions, which in turn is but one of four 
combat Corps. All these units are engaged in a common struggle for a single 
                                                 
49 1MarDiv, “Report of CAS,” Letter to CG Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, from 
CG 1MarDiv, Maj. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, undated, page 2. 
50 Ibid., Letter to CG Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, from CG 1MarDiv, Maj. 
Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, 4 Oct. 1951, page 2. 
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objective, as too are all supporting naval and air units participating in the Korean 
Campaign. 
The real issue raised by your [MajGen Gerald C. Thomas, CG 1MarDiv] 
request [to have the 1MAW support only the 1MarDiv when the 1MarDiv is in 
combat and for a minimum number of  CAS sorties per day of combat to be 
provided the 1MarDiv] is whether one Division among many on the line in Korea 
is to receive a wholly disproportionate close air support, at the expense of all 
other Divisions, in order that the Marine Corps contingent – ground and air – may 
operate as it was intended and organized to operate, as a separate force on 
Marine Corps missions, or whether the Marine Air Wing like all other combat air 
elements available to this Command, shall be employed in as equitable support 
of all elements of the ground forces as the tactical situation dictates, and the 
Marine Division itself receive neither more nor less that its equally gallant and 
deserving companion divisions. [But the other divisions were not receiving their 
due in Marine eyes – the whole of Eighth Army was being deprived of CAS by 
the AF.]51  
 
However, the idea that the 1MarDiv would receive a disproportionate amount of 
CAS was flawed in the Marine view. The Marines saw anything less than a full MAW 
supporting one division as disproportionate, and that if the other divisions received less 
than that in equivalent, that was because they were not using the most effective 
doctrine for CAS or that the AF was not using the most effective overall employment of 
tactical air power. (The other divisions would only receive less if the JOC allocated less 
than the amount of one Air Wing per division to them, something the AF would not 
conscience because it saw interdiction as the primary mission of air power, and CAS 
inside the bombline as merely duplicating artillery.) The Marines thought that Army 
commanders, too, should insist on the maximum possible amount of CAS for their 
divisions (something MajGen Edward Almond, CG X Corps, and his successor, Clovis 
E. Byers, both believed in and fought for with the latter even being relieved for it); that 
the AF JOC doctrine was not just less effective but deeply flawed; that their more sound 
techniques should replace the JOC system for the entire theatre; and that the JOC 
                                                 
51 Ibid., Letter to CG 1MarDiv, Maj. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, from CINCUNC General Matthew B. 
Ridgway, 15 Oct. 1951, pages 1-2. 
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system was only being propped up by AF partisanship and the belief that CAS was a 
waste of airplanes compared to interdiction -- never mind the effectiveness, or lack 
thereof, of sending fighter-bombers, especially single-prop aircraft such as the F4U 
Corsair, to do the work of bombers and jets hundreds of miles behind enemy lines and 
even as far north as the Yalu River.52  
(There were eight fighter-bomber air wings besides the 1 MAW in the Korean 
theatre and four corps in EUSAK – there were many more air wings for fighter-
interception, fighter-escort, and other tasks. CAS was only required when a division was 
actively engaged in combat. A division in reserve did not need CAS. So estimating that 
there were about three divisions per corps, the number of divisions in Korea numbered 
approximately twelve in 1951. The number of aircraft in theatre capable of providing the 
                                                 
52 Ibid., Letter to CG Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, from CG 1MarDiv, Maj. 
Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, 4 Oct. 1951, page 2. Thomas wrote: “I feel we are strong in our position and that 
the Army will give us full support [this was before Ridgway’s letter of 15 October] – right up to Ridgway 
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feeling here at the Pentagon,’ David Lawrence noted in the Herald-Tribune, ‘that the Marines should not 
have their own aviation’).” -- Robert Heinl, Victory at High Tide, 22. And with the threat to Marine aviation 
and even the very existence of the Marine Corps only recently (and temporarily) defeated in the 
Unification Crisis (see: Keiser, U. S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification and the opening chapters of 
Robert Heinl, Victory at High Tide, as well as Robert Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, 527), it is understandable 
why the Marines should suspect the decision to split up the air-ground team as having less to do with the 
reasons stated by Ridgway and officers in the AF, and more to do with the extension of AF control over 
Marine aviation. Besides, it was understood when the Marines were initially requested by MacArthur that 
the Marine air-ground team was not to be broken up. MacArthur himself said as much, but, “this view was 
anything but accepted in Washington.” -- Robert Heinl, Victory at High Tide, 22. U. S. Pacific Fleet, “Third 
Interim Evaluation Report,” 15-63, “FMF Staff Memo No. 73-51,” 6 June 1951, “Reporting on a visit to the 
Far East by CG FMFPAC and members of his staff.” The Fleet Marine Force elements appear initially in 
the amphibious forces of the naval components [of an amphibious landing]. In the land and air battle 
phases, which might follow an amphibious invasion, the Marine ground units have historically been 
shifted to the Air Force’s joint air operations control. This loss of close and direct command control over 
their task force air elements in joint operations is a matter of continued concern to Marine organizational 
planners. Under the principles of unified command of air forces, including concentration and economy of 
air effort at the objective area, Marine tactical support aircraft are susceptible to consolidation under the 
joint air component command. . . . Maintaining the organizational integrity of this unique task grouping in 
future joint operations under unified commands poses problems to Marine planners. . . . –James 
Donovan, U. S. Marine Corps, 106-07. 
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ratio of one air wing to one division engaged in combat for the purpose of CAS was 
more than adequate.)53 
Ridgway and the AF commanders who influenced him in this opinion were, in the 
Marine view, missing a key fact: even if every division in Korea was provided the 
equivalent of one Marine Air Wing in CAS support, only the 1MarDiv would use it to its 
potential. All of the other divisions except for the 7thID (for a time) did not even have the 
requisite number of TACPs to call that many air strikes, much less the training to do so, 
and simply directing them via Mosquito aircraft, as was standard in the other divisions, 
would be, if not a waste of CAS sorties, a certainly less effective application of that 
combat power.  
(If the 1st MAW had been used solely for CAS, even for all Eighth Army, the 
Marines would have had fewer objections than to its being used primarily for the AF’s 
interdiction campaign – so the whole of Eighth Army was being denied its CAS, not just 
the 1st Mar Div. Furthermore, the deliberate and strong attempts by the AF before the 
Korean War to absorb Naval aviation and especially all land-based air capabilities such 
as the Marine Corps’s air components were still keenly felt by Marines at the time. They 
had reason to suspect that the AF cared less about the actual contribution the 1st MAW 
could make to interdiction than they did about keeping the Marines “in line” and possibly 
setting precedents for greater control over Naval and Marine aviation.) 
In the Marine view, the Marine raincoat of CAS, adequate at protecting an 
individual, particularly the individual who had brought it to Korea, was now taken from it, 
divided into tiny scraps and spread among a whole multitude of persons where but a 
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tiny scrap of raincoat was as effective as none at all and everybody got equally wet. The 
Marines insisted that the air ground team should remain a whole as the National 
Security Act of 1947 and subsequent amendments implied in the phrase “together with 
supporting air units,” and the Marines who had brought their raincoat be allowed to use 
it in one piece. One individual who is dry is better than a whole host that is equally wet. 
Why should the effectiveness of one unit be hamstrung so that it is as equally ineffective 
as those around it, said the Marines. (Perhaps Marines also thought that their own CAS 
was at least their due since they had been moved inland away from the customary 
support of NGF.) 
Furthermore, Ridgway’s contention that all divisions be entirely equal in amount 
of CAS did not take into account the factor of terrain. Thomas’s requests specifically 
concerned a period of time when the 1MarDiv was in the most rugged, inhospitable 
portion of the entire line. There were few roads, and the ability of artillery to hit targets in 
such terrain was severely curtailed. Many targets could only be hit by air strikes. (All the 
conditions for using an air strike were met according to Marine doctrine.)54 To say that 
the 1MarDiv division in the east near the Punchbowl, Porkchop Hill, and Heartbreak 
Ridge should not get more CAS than a division serving in the Seoul corridor where the 
terrain was relatively level and rolling was ridiculous. Furthermore, one Air Wing in the 
                                                 
54 United States Navy and Marine Corps, NAVMC-4159, 32: “Whenever possible, however, employment 
of close air support should be limited to situations where one or more of the following conditions exist: (a) 
Artillery and naval gunfire support are not available. This includes periods when artillery units are 
displacing and fire support ships are maneuvering. (b) The target is beyond the effective range of artillery 
and naval gunfire. (c) Terrain masks the fires of artillery and naval gunfire. (d) The construction of the 
target is such that artillery and naval gunfire are unable to accomplish its destruction. (e) Effective attack 
of the target requires enfilade fires which cannot be delivered by either artillery or naval gunfire. (f) Large 
areas require neutralization for a period of time. (g) The target is of a general and indeterminate nature, 
such as large wooded areas which are suspected of concealing enemy troops or installations. (h) The 
target is constructed of inflammable material. (i)The target consists of inflammable vegetation which is 
obstructing observation or impeding the advance. (j) The target is moving rapidly away from friendly front 
lines. (k) The target is moving towards front lines but at sufficient distance to permit the request, 
assignment, and direction of support aircraft.” 
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Marine view was only enough to support one division, not a whole Corps and certainly 
not a whole army.55  
Besides, the 1st MAW was not even allowed to spend most of its time providing 
CAS period, for Eighth Army either, much less the 1st Mar Div:  
The wing’s operations conformed to the Fifth Air Force’s grandiose interdiction 
plans. Only a third of Marine air strikes went to support the Eighth Army’s 
divisions, and response time climbed from fifteen to eighty minutes for close air 
support missions. The 1st Marine Division received only 65 percent of the strikes 
it requested [and it probably requested fewer than it would have if it knew CAS 
was available on a reliable basis; these strikes could only be requested either in 
advance or under emergency situations], and only about half of those involved 
Marine fighter-bombers. In addition, the interdiction sorties and related “armed 
reconnaissance” strikes sent Marine air casualties soaring; in one two-month 
period, the 1st MAW lost fourteen pilots to intense Communist ground fire, a rate 
much higher than incurred in close air strikes. Conversely, in the heavy autumn 
fighting of 1951, the Fifth Air Force supplied only 96 strikes a day to the entire 
Eighth Army, and the 1st Marine Division received only its share.56 
 
But most importantly, Marines saw less than the amount of CAS they requested 
in a combat scenario as costing them lives. To say that they would receive a 
disproportionate amount only depended on how the other air power in theatre was 
allocated. And as a matter of note, Marines and their Navy brethren were not against 
interdiction, neither did they think it was less important than CAS. They simply believed 
CAS was equally important.57 
Close air support is one fundamental weapon that was all but missing from the 




                                                 
55 Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, The Marine Officer’s Guide, 86. 
56 Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis, 505; also see Allan R. Millett, Many a Strife, 300-301, 311-314. 
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FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION 
 
The Marine Corps method is to use all the fire support 
means which are available, to make timely use of those 
means, and to use them in adequate quantity in order to 
produce the necessary shock effect. . . . The flexibility 
inherent in the Marine Corps fire support coordination 
techniques permits the attainment of maximum effectiveness 
of supporting fires in any situation, a claim which has been 
fully born out by Marine operations in KOREA [through 
January 1951].  
                                                                --S. L. A. Marshall 
 
Further discussion of the Marine system of CAS in the fighting for the Punchbowl, 
and the control system in Korea in general, must include another crucial and 
fundamental portion of Marine doctrine: Fire Support Coordination. 
Fire Support Coordination simply refers to the coordination (and integration with 
the fire and movement of infantry) of all available supporting arms in support of an 
attack or defense of an objective. The Marine Corps officially defined “Fire Support” as, 
“Any bombardment in support of ground troops, the term ‘bombardments’ being 
synonymous whether they be delivered by air, artillery or naval gunfire.”1  
Marine doctrine did not call for the use of all supporting arms for every mission. 
The Navy/Marine doctrine for use of supporting arms stated that, “a commander 
generally considers the three principal supporting arms in the following order: artillery, 
naval gunfire, and air.” And the idea that many in the AF had, that Marines believed in 
using air frequently as a substitute for artillery, was even more erroneous because 
                                                 
1 United States Navy and United States Marine Corps, PHIB-1, Amphibious Operations Definitions and 
Terminology, (Quantico, VA:  Marine Corps Schools, 1946): 1. 
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Marine doctrine further declared that: “Generally, Air will not be used where available 
Artillery or Naval Gunfire can be effectively employed and is adequate. Neither Air nor 
Naval Gunfire will be used where available Artillery can be effectively employed and is 
adequate.” This quote is from USF 66, a document that, along with others in the USF 
series such as USF 6 and 63, delineated the official doctrine of the Navy and Marine 
Corps for amphibious operations.2  
USF 66 goes on that the aim of fire support coordination was threefold: “(a) To 
obtain the maximum efficiency of firepower utilization from the supporting arms. (b) To 
prevent the waste of firepower. (c) To promote the safety of aircraft and ground forces.” 
Marines would add (to the Navy’s wording) that another aim was to achieve the 
maximum shock effect on an enemy target to further the progress of a ground attack or 
defense, thus saving infantry lives.3 
To accomplish Fire Support Coordination, the Marine Corps had Fire Support 
Coordination Centers (FSCC) from division level up. Below the division level, i.e. 
regimental and battalion level, a more informal agency, the Supporting Arms Center 
(SAC) handled the requirements for coordination and integration on the part of the 
supporting arms.4 
Governing principles of Marine Fire Support Coordination were largely developed 
in amphibious warfare, “however, the principles are equally applicable to purely land 
mass operations.”  Fire Support Coordination was necessary due to factors, “such as 
the necessity for maintaining the momentum of attack once it is launched and 
                                                 
2 United States Navy and Marine Corps, NAVMC-4159, 31; United States Navy, USF 66, Tactical and 
Operational Instructions, Amphibious Forces, (Washington, D. C.: Navy Department, Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations, 1947): 11-18. Emphasis supplied. 
3 United States Navy, USF 66, 11-18; MCBS, IV-C-2. 
4 MCBS, IV-C-1. 
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adjustments of scheduled fires to make them conform to troop advance requires a 
flexible employment of supporting arms and a common sense approach to principles. . . 
. Basically, the effectiveness of fire support coordination is dependant upon adequate, 
reliable communications and the flexibility of supporting arms employment.”5 
Marines were not unique in the coordination of artillery fire with troop movement. 
The Army had been doing that for decades. Marines were unique in the American 
military establishment in that, as a standard operating procedure, they superimposed 
NGF (naval gunfire) and CAS over the Army’s “basic structure,” greatly increasing the 
power of Marine supporting arms over the standard Army infantry division -- all other 
things being equal, and assuming that the Marines were allowed to use their supporting 
arms as trained to, and that they remained close enough to a coast that NGF could still 
support them. Army units could and did use NGF and CAS, but the liaison parties 
necessary to use NGF had to be specially assigned to an Army ID, and they did not 
often train with them. Furthermore, as has been noted above, Army divisions only had 
TACPs down to the regimental level, and the whole JOC system it operated under at 
the time of Korea was not as flexible, fast, or effective as the CAS control system of the 
Marines. The Marine and Army divisions had the same number of artillery organic to 
them: one battalion of eighteen 155mm howitzers along with three artillery battalions 
armed with eighteen lighter 105mm guns.6 
Marines liked to use a generous amount of supporting fire wherever possible. 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., IV-C-2; Robert Heinl, Victory at High Tide, 291. “The Marine Corps, habituated to hard fighting in 
opposed assaults, confident and knowledgeable in the Navy’s gunfire support and in the precision 
support of Marine and Navy aviators, believed in these weapons and liked to use them generously. Army 
staffs, having less experience in this type of work, hesitated to rely on the Navy’s guns in the absence of 
their trusted artillery, and knew little of air support as the Marines practice it.” -- Robert Heinl, Victory at 
High Tide, 56-57. The greater effectiveness of the Marine CAS system finally won out so that by the time 
of Vietnam, even the AF had adopted or copied it – Robert Heinl, Victory at High Tide, 56-57. 
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The Marine Corps method is to use all the fire support means which are 
available, to make timely use of those means, and to use them in adequate 
quantity in order to produce the necessary shock effect. . . . The flexibility 
inherent in the Marine Corps fire support coordination techniques permits the 
attainment of maximum effectiveness of supporting fires in any situation, a claim 
which has been fully born out by Marine operations in KOREA [through January 
1950].7 
 
What the Marine Corps Board Study on the Marine contribution to the Korean 
War called “the ultimate example of Marine fire support coordination,” came in the 
Chosin Reservoir campaign.  “The many and varied operations of Marine Corps forces 
in Northeast Korea, some of a nature strange to Marines, vividly illustrate the 
dependence placed upon the coordinated fire support of aircraft and artillery. 
Repeatedly the effect of this fire thwarted CCF efforts to destroy 1stMarDiv and resulted 
in critical losses to CCF units. . . . The devastating fire of these arms was largely 
responsible for extricating 1stMarDiv from the Chosin Reservoir area . . . .”8  
S. L. A. Marshall (who shall here be quoted extensively both because of the 
nonpartisan nature of his writing – he was an Army officer – and the pertinence of the 
content) described the use of such fire on the defensive in that operation thusly:  
The salient note in the whole record of in-fighting during the campaign is 
found in the promptness and strength with which all supporting weapons were 
brought to bear in the decisive area of engagement whenever any part of the rifle 
line came under pressure by direct assault. . . .  
In this, there was nothing radical or unorthodox. The defense at all points 
simply exploited the full advantages of the supporting weapons, using them in 
varying combinations so as to achieve the maximum effect, according to the 
manner in which the enemy attack was developing. It was war waged “according 
to the book” but done with such precision and power as to re-illuminate the 
ancient truth that weapons when correctly used will invariably bring success. The 
moral effects upon the defenders of these stoutly resistant “hedgehogs” were as 
pronounced as upon the CCF who were beaten down by the fire. It is an old and 
familiar story that the rifleman feels himself pretty much alone and unhelped 
when at close grips with the enemy. But from riflemen who manned 1stMarDiv’s 
                                                 
7 U. S. Marine Corps, “MCBS Vol. 1,” IV-C-2. 
8 Ibid., IV-C-3, IV-C-4. 
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front lines in the several perimeters came abundant testimony that they were so 
impressed with the power and flexibility of their supporting fires as to be 
“absolutely confident” of turning back the CCF attack. In vouching for the morale 
effect upon themselves of these systemized fires, they spoke as individuals who 
had survived an ordeal rather than as Marines putting in a plug for their own 
methods.9 
 
Marshall went on to describe the method by which Fire Support Coordination 
worked among the Marines. 
Under the system used in 1stMarDiv, the platoon and company leaders 
are relieved of the complex task of plotting, planning and then directing 
supporting fires by the heavier weapons, in preparation for, and during the 
course of, the fire fight. This devolves upon the SAC (Supporting Arms Center) 
which operates at battalion [and regimental] level[s]. Essentially the SAC 
coordinator is a sort of assistant S-3 in charge of the plan of fires, both in the 
attack and on defense. In the normal situation, he operates at the battalion OP; 
when in perimeter and defending all around circle, his station is at the CP, or the 
S-3 tent. During the organization of a defense, he accompanies the S-3 on initial 
reconnaissance; this gives him opportunity to familiarize himself with the front, 
spot the HMG’s, and take note of the approaches which must be covered by 
artillery and mortar fire. When the reconnaissance is completed, the front lines 
are plotted on a situation map. The mortar and artillery officers are then told what 
fires to register. The actual conduct of fire is done by their FO’s; when the 
registrations are completed, this information is relayed to the SAC and the 
concentrations are plotted on an overlay to the situation map. Also, when patrols 
move out, the SAC keeps their positions plotted so that supporting fires can be 
loosed quickly [and so that supporting fires do not hit the patrol]. The SAC 
coordinator ties in closely to the Tactical Air Control Center so that if there are 
targets on which his weapons are working that would also be suitable for attack 
by air, coordination will be immediate and complete. 
1stMarDiv’s battalions attribute a great measure of the effectiveness and 
total organization of their supporting fires to the perfecting of the SAC’s 
operations in the course of the campaign in Korea. 
The enthusiasm for the technique is general in all ranks and particularly 
among the line companies.10 
  
 In addition to his splendid description of the system of Fire Support Coordination 
among the Marines on the defense, Marshall also described it in the attack. 
The main characteristic of the 1st Mar Div in the attack is the care with 
which it elaborates the employment and synchronization of all weapons which 
                                                 
9 Ibid., IV-C-4 through IV-C-5. 
10 Ibid.,  IV-C-4 through IV-C-6. 
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will assist the rifle company or battalion to win ground at minimal cost [so much 
for the stereotype that Marines are headlong and blindly aggressive and waste 
lives]. 
In the typical situation, the rifle company has temporarily been brought in 
check by intense automatic rifle (fire) from the high ground, and the enemy 
deployment is such as to indicate that the line cannot continue its advance 
without taking excessive losses from fire coming at it from several directions. 
The company then calls for mortar fire on the position, meanwhile holding 
its ground. 
Simultaneously, or immediately following the mortar fire, artillery works 
over the enemy ground from which fire has been coming, as well as the ridges 
beyond it. 
There is an air control officer with the company [probably an FAC from the 
battalion TACP].  
A number of planes have been called in and are on station. It is arranged 
that as the final rounds of artillery fall, the planes will make their first strikes at 
these same positions. 
The infantry bounds forward as the planes begin to attack, or, depending 
on the proximity to the CCF position, starts to advance the moment of final 
impact. 
This is not the rare or unusual instance of coordination between 1st Mar 
Div’s rifle components and the supporting arms in the attack. 
It is the average procedure, and during operations in the north there were 
relatively few deviations from it. Attack after attack, by the company, battalion or 
regiment, was according to this same pattern. 
Clear to the average rifleman was the proof that he was being helped by 
every agency possible. 
That this conviction gave extraordinary impetus to the infantry attack 
would seem to be beyond question. 
The multiplying of fires and the combining of flat trajectory, angle and 
vertical missiles no doubt resulted in the killing of more CCF than would have 
been done by any part of this combination acting singly. 
However, the chief findings have to do with morale values, particularly 
those rebounding to the benefit of the attacker.11 
 
Marshall then continued with the analysis of CAS being more effective in 
suppressing enemy fire than artillery, quoted in the previous chapter. 
As can be seen from the above excerpts, Marine Fire Support Coordination was 
a fundamental part of the Marine way of fighting and one that played out well in practice 
as well as theory -- at least when the Marines were allowed to practice their way of 
                                                 
11 Ibid.,  IV-C-5 through IV-C-7. 
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fighting. In September, 1951, CAS was rarely coordinated effectively with movement of 
troops, was unreliable, late, and inaccurate; and time and again attacks were delayed to 
await planes that never showed up. In the end, FSC was an essential element in Marine 
doctrine for effective CAS that was conspicuously absent in September, 1951, due 
primarily to the unwieldy nature of the JOC system and the unreliability of even pre-
planned air strikes in arriving on time to further the attack. This gives some credence to 
General Thomas’s claim that inadequate CAS cost USMC lives. 
Fire Support Coordination was not always utilized by the FSCC or the SAC, 
however. “When we were frequently away from units higher than the company that 
could influence the action, the supporting arms are controlled, requested and evaluated 
by the company itself. That is why it is important for company commanders, potential 
company commanders, and platoon leaders, to learn all the capabilities and limitations 





                                                 
12 Marine Corps Historical Section Interview with Captain Robert Barrow, October 8, 1951, Marine Corps 
Korean War document collection CD# 14, part one of interview, page 4. 
 
 
CHAPTER 13  
CONCLUSIONS 
Now to summarize our offensive, though they turned down 
the Kojo operation [one of the Amphibious hooks planned in 
1951], which with very few casualties we could have gotten 
some results, we had a frontal assault against one mountain 
range after another, just to keep pressure on the North 
Koreans—pressure that cost us 2,000 casualties in the 1st 
Mar Div. 
                                                 —Lt Gen Gerald C. Thomas 
 
September 20 marked the end of the mobile phase of the war for 1st Mar Div. “On 
That day the warfare of movement came to an end, and the warfare of position began.” 
This was the end of the final offensive the 1st Mar Div fought in Korea. “On 16 
September, the Eighth Army had ordered X Corps to suspend all major offensive 
operations after 20 September. Van Fleet had decided that further attacks along the 
Hays Line could not be justified. The 1st Marine Division would now have to hold the 
ground it had seized, however unfinished its work.”1  
Half of Kanmubong Ridge (Hills 1052, and 980) was still in enemy hands, but there 
were now 4,500 more yards (beyond the Hays Line) of Korean soil behind the 
Minnesota Line (the Hays Line was renamed the Minnesota Line to include the real-
estate taken in September, this was the new MLR). The total number of miles gained 
above the Kansas Line, the starting point for the offensive, was approximately ten to 
fifteen, depending on the location in question. Phase Two of the battle had cost the 
Marines almost 2,000, with 254 KIA. The entire month of September (not just phase two 
of the battle) wrought 2,416 total losses in 1st Mar Div (KMCs included). Casualties for 
                                                 
1 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 198; Allan R. Millett, Many a Strife, 310. 
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the month of September 1951 exceed those for every other month of the year except 
June. The enemy was estimated to have lost 10,442 casualties in the month of 
September due to action by the 1st Mar Div. The ratio of enemy losses to friendly ones 
was 4-to-1 in September.2 (See Chart # 15) 
The 1st Marines lost 69 KIA, 2 DOW (Died of Wounds), 575 WIA, and 291 NBC 
(non battle casualties) in September. However, 297 Marines wounded in previous 
actions were returned to duty, and 380 replacements were received. The regiment also 
captured 137 prisoners that month. Just in support of this regiment, 5,900 rounds of 4.2 
inch HE mortar rounds, and 34,242 rounds of artillery were expended. Artillery in 
support of the 1st Marines fired 34,242 rounds for September. It was credited with killing 
an estimated 1,407 enemy and wounding 1,252 during the month.3 
Just for 3/7 one of the battalions hardest hit, the September losses were 38 KIA, 2 
DOW (died of wounds), and 325 WIA. That is a total of 365. When one considers that 
the unit’s strength on September 1st was 1,165, (the total authorized strength for a 
Marine Infantry Battalion was 1,123) the percentage of losses amounts to just under 32 
percent. (The battalion’s full strength at the beginning of November after receiving 
replacements was still only 943 men.)4 
On September 30, 1951, Van Fleet issued a statement informing the troops why 
they had been fighting that fall and to let them know the method to his strategy. He 
stated that the purpose of the operation had been to destroy as many enemy as 
                                                 
2 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 205, 213; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 
5; Joseph H. Alexander, “Kanmubong Ridge,” 23. 
3 1st Marine Regiment, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 6. 
4 Third Battalion, 7th Marines, “Historical Diary,” September 1951; U. S. Marine Corps “Reference Data: 
Amphibious Operations,” 1-6.  The number 32 percent was reached by multiplying the unit’s starting 
strength for the month (1,165) by .32 resulting in the number 372. The total casualties taken by this unit 
(365) is thus just under 32 percent. (To multiply by .31 brought the number 362.) 
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possible to save Eighth Army lives and to take out as many enemy weapons as 
possible, meaning artillery. He then went on to justify the high casualty numbers 
expended as being to keep the enemy off balance and that it “was mandatory that we 
control the high ground features, so that we could look down the throat of the enemy 
and thereby better perform our task of destruction. . . .” He summed up by saying that 
these losses had saved thousands of others by bettering EUSAK’s position on the 
terrain; that the enemy’s ability to counterattack had been crippled , and that his “hill-
hopping tactics” had not destroyed the Communists but had wounded them severely.5 
That the Eighth Army was now looking down the enemy’s throats would have been 
an absurdly laughable statement to the men on Hill 812, but as for the effect of hurting 
the Communists, they had certainly lost many men. In the Marine sector alone, the 
enemy had suffered: 2,799 counted KIA; 2,374 estimated KIA; 4,707 estimated WIA, 
and 557 POWs; a grand total of 10,442 casualties, in September 1951. For the NKPA 
and CCF forces that faced the 2nd ID, from late August through October, the losses 
were: 25,000 total; 1,473 KIA counted; 8,938 estimated KIA; 14,204 estimated WIA; and 
606 POWs. In mid-September, EUSAK estimated the losses sustained by the 
Communists since May 1951 to total 188,237. And with those sustained by the enemy 
in the Fall Offensive (when it was finally finished in October) added in, that total rose to 
234,000. Such numbers were probably exaggerated, but as stated by Clay Blair, “even 
half that would have significantly hurt the CCF and NKPA units engaged.” Total UN 
                                                 
5 EUSAK, “Command Report,” October 1951, 5-6, 29-30, and Plate 1; Lynn Montross, et al., The East-
Central Front, 202-203. 
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losses for August, September, and October were 60,000, with 22,000 being from the 
United States.6 
General Thomas was embittered by the order to stop the advance. He saw a halt 
to the offensive as “tantamount to capitulation to the Communists. . . . and the thought 
that such sacrifices [as made by his division] would not produce an imposed peace . . .” 
as very disconcerting indeed. Thomas thought an amphibious approach applied to the 
operations in 1951 would have been much more successful. “Now to summarize our 
offensive, though they turned down the Kojo operation [one of the Amphibious hooks 
planned in 1951], which with very few casualties we could have gotten some results, we 
had a frontal assault against one mountain range after another, just to keep pressure on 
the North Koreans—pressure that cost us 2,000 casualties in the 1st Mar Div.” That 
pressure, however, had helped the 2nd Infantry Division in its fights to the west.7 
In any case, Thomas would be with the division only until December. Higher 
command in the UN forces may have decided that his continual agitation for better CAS 
was detrimental to “consensus” and a “unified attitude” in the theatre. Thomas at one 
point detected unsaid in a communication from Ridgway that the CINCUNC would 
relieve him if he could do so without causing publicity.8 
Nevertheless, for 1st Mar Div, the rest of the war on the eastern end of the UN line 
would consist of digging entrenchments for the MLR and conducting limited patrols and 
raids forward of the defensive line. After the offensive, the Marine zone of action was 
                                                 
6 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 950; U. S. Pacific Fleet, “Third Interim Evaluation Report,” 15-25; Arned 
Henshaw, Heartbreak Ridge, 127; EUSAK, “Command Report,” October 1951, 5-6, 29-30, and Plate 1; 
Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, 202-203.   
7 Gerald C. Thomas Oral Memoir, 892-93; Allan R. Millett, Many a Strife, 310; 1st Mar Div, “Historical 
Diary,” September 1951, 8. 
8 Allan R. Millett, Many a Strife, 313; Gerald C. Thomas Oral Memoir, 889. 
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enlarged considerably (by 9,000 meters, mostly eastward). “The Marines’ war—the war 
of movement—had ended. The war of position had begun.”9 
The 1st Mar Div had seized all the assigned objectives it was allowed to assault. 
The fighting in many ways resembled “the close combat against the Japanese in World 
War II and the North Koreans demonstrated an ability to construct excellent defensive 
emplacements and bunkers, and conduct a determined defense of every piece of 
commanding ground.” And though this fight was not touted in the media as were those 
of September, 1950, the division received yet another Presidential Unit Citation for its 
actions, the same award it had received for those of 1950.10  
This citation commended the division for “extraordinary heroism in action against 
enemy aggressor forces in Korea during the periods 21 to 26 April, 16 May to 30 June, 
and 11 to 25 September 1951.”11  
For the last period listed, the citation stated:  
In the final significant offensive of the action in Korea . . . the First Marine 
Division, Reinforced, completed the destruction of the enemy forces in Eastern 
Korea by advancing the front against a final desperate defense in the ‘Punch 
Bowl’ area in heavy action which completed the liberation of South Korea in this 
locality. With the enemy’s major defenses reduced, his forces on the central front 
decimated, and the advantage of terrain and the tactical initiative passing to 
friendly forces, he never again recovered sufficiently to resume the offensive in 
Korea. The outstanding courage, resourcefulness and aggressive fighting spirit of 
the officers and men of the First Marine Division, Reinforced, reflect the highest 
credit upon themselves and the United States Naval Service.12 
 
 The assessment of the citation on the end-state of the offensive in Korea was 
wishful thinking of the first order, on the part of the Truman Administration. The enemy 
                                                 
9 Gerald P. Averill, Mustang, 276; 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 3. 
10 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 2; Major Gerald P. Averill, “Final Objective,” 10-16; 
Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 62. 
11 This citation is included in full as an appendix to Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front. 
12 Lynn Montross, et al., The East-Central Front, Appendix D. 
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was not destroyed in the area. He still had major defenses just a few miles from the 
front lines and only yards away in some cases, and he certainly had the capacity to 
resume the offensive later (he even did so in some sectors). In addition, the tactical 
initiative was lost to the enemy when the decision not to resume the offensive was 
made. Nevertheless, the 1st Marine Division did not make policy, and it carried out the 
orders it received in a manner well worthy of the credit bestowed upon it by the 
President and left the NKPA and the CCF with a great respect for the “yellow legs” 
(called thus because of their leggings) division in Korea.13 
The fighting had been very intense. “The resistance was characterized by the 
enemy’s willingness to fight for every bunker and his dogged determination in the face 
of heavy artillery and mortar fire supplemented by air strikes on his most heavily fortified 
positions. Close-in fighting decided the issue on every hill.”  But even with the high 
casualties and bitter fighting, the morale of the 1st Mar Div remained high.14  
Spike Selmyhr remembered the division fondly: “never in my lifetime would I serve 
with such a splendid group of men (warriors) who, to a man, would lay down their lives 
for one another.” And, “the battle of September 13, 1951 stands out in my mind after all 
these years because of the absolute skill, courage, and willingness of my Marines to 
close with the enemy.”15  
The view of many Marines that the enemy fought as fiercely as the Japanese in 
World War II was correct in that the NKPAs were harsh in their discipline and expected 
their men to fight to the last, but their ideology was not as strong among the soldiers 
                                                 
13 Jack L. Cannon, “Attack on Hills 673 and 749,” 24. 
14 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 3-4. 
15 Interview Transcript, Garlen L. “Spike” Selmyhr, 2000. 
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that almost no one surrendered, as among the Japanese. Prisoners were both taken 
through the campaign in action, and from voluntary surrender. 
Selmyhr recalled: 
About 0900 [on 13 September], Lieutenant Connolly, the Company commander, 
and Lieutenants Marsh, Morton and I made a reconnaissance of the area we 
would attack. We spotted a group of enemy moving along the ridge line above 
us. Suddenly two enemy soldiers came out of the bush with their hands in the air, 
waving surrender leaflets. Because of the enemy on the ridgeline, Lieutenant 
Morton and I motioned with our .45 pistols for them to move back against a bank 
so we would not be observed by their friends on the ridge line. . They sort of went 
hysterical in the probable belief that they were about to be shot. They got down 
on their knees and drew diagrams of the positions where their comrades were. 
They said there were “many, many machine guns.” Were they ever correct!16 
 
POWs taken from the enemy were often very cooperative and useful in 
determining intelligence about the enemy. Unlike the Americans, the Communists 
believed that their lower ranks would be inspired by knowing many details about the 
plans of their leaders. 
Three veteran NKPA who surrendered to the 7th Marines told their capturers why 
they had voluntarily given up. Their platoon had been part of an assault force that threw 
themselves four times against Marine defenders on the summit of a hill. All four times 
they had been decimated with severe losses. At the last muster, their platoon numbered 
only three. By mutual agreement, the three soldiers marched their platoon leader into 
the woods, killed him, and surrendered to mortar men from the 7th Marines.17 
The Communist enemy also utilized formidable tactics based on sound training 
and much experience. Said a EUSAK report: 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Undated Public Information Document with no Author Named, National Archives: RG 127, Records of 
the U. S. Marine Corps, “Division of Information, Publicity Articles Relating to the First Marine Division in 
Korea, Final Copies, Oct. 1950-Feb. 1952.” 
307
 
Enemy tactics were sound and well-executed. Contrary to the popular 
conception of the enemy as “a screaming horde,” the NK and CC Forces were 
well-coordinated fighting machines. Enemy attacks showed considerable prior 
planning and good judgment for the most part. 
. . . Tactics employed were similar to Western tactics; especially, the old 
Patton adage of “holding them by the nose and kicking them in the pants.” 
Envelopments were widely used. It is believed that air superiority, fire-power, and 
mobility of the UN Forces provided the difference between the two forces. 
Defensively, the enemy used the same tactics, on the whole, as UN 
Forces; namely, that of trading terrain in an effort to gain time and inflict 
maximum losses on the opposition.18 
 
Communist soldiers did not get to rotate home after a few months on the line like 
the Americans did. They either fought and survived, or they died, so those who were 
veterans had much experience to draw on. The NKPA was known for outstanding 
camouflage discipline, brought on as a necessity to avoid being spotted from the air. 
Both his positions and his personnel were very difficult to see if not silhouetted by a 
skyline, or in some other manner breaching that camouflage discipline. “They have 
been forced to perfect this skill as a direct result of a lack of air support.”19 
The NKPA enemy used counterattacks extensively and according to his doctrine. 
“North Korean defensive doctrine holds that only a well-timed and determined 
counterattack can achieve eventual victory in a defensive situation. Commanders of 
smaller subordinate units are therefore encouraged to launch continuous small-scale 
counterattacks against penetrations in their sector. . . .” The counterattacks were “an 
integral part of their defensive system and were used for various purposes: (1) to blunt 
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the edge of a United Nations assault; (2) to annihilate a portion of the hostile force; and 
(3) to recapture a lost position.”20   
Usually, these were at night to counter the UN advantage of air support. Early in 
the war, too many Communist troop formations had been decimated in daylight by air 
strikes. The Marines, like the rest of the UN forces, favored daylight attacks to maximize 
the effectiveness of their air support. The NKPA differed from the CCF in its use of night 
attacks in that it preferred the blackest of nights for attack where the CCF favored the 
light of a full moon. Thus was the night of greatest illumination in this battle also one of 
the quietest in terms of enemy activity.21 
The method of an NKPA night attack followed this SOP (standard operating 
procedure): 
(1) Soldiers to participate in the night attack are selected by the officers assigned 
the mission of launching the attack. Particular emphasis is placed on strength, 
health and character in the selection of the men. 
(2) During the day the soldiers are told of the attack scheduled for that night and 
are given an opportunity to rest and sleep. Two hours prior to departure time the 
men are awakened. 
(3) The men are oriented on the route and method of approach to enemy 
positions, and the special password and signals to be used during the attack. 
After thorough study of the area, the assembly point for use after the attack is 
selected. 
(4) The approach to the attack area is through defiles, valleys, and along little-
used trails with the troops in a single file formation—10 yards between men. 
When a point is reached some 100-200 yards from the UN positions, the 
attacking force deploys. After each man is positioned, the attackers crawl to 
within 50 yards of enemy lines. The first shot, fired by the leader, is the signal for 
all the men to charge and open fire on the UN forces. Each man is equipped with 
the PPSh [burp gun] sub-machine gun. Heavy and light machine guns are 
employed to assist a withdrawal in the even the attack fails. 
(5) The attack will usually take place at 0400 hours and seldom on moonlight 
nights. 
                                                 
20 Headquarters Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, “Interrogation Reports: 
North Korean Defensive Tactics,” February 1951, (U. S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 
Carlisle, PA): 19; Headquarters EUSAK, “Enemy Tactics,” 62. 
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(6) Reports have been received that North Korean troops carry wooden clappers 
for deception purposes to simulate gun fire and at the same time preserve 
ammunition. 
(7) Local civilians are employed to spy on the enemy and obtain information 
concerning the terrain over which the attack will take place.22 
 
There were other elements characteristic of an NKPA attack: 
The enemy deployed in depth and employed numerous waves of troops 
depending on the formation of the United Nations defensive positions. As a rule, 
too much strength was not concentrated in the spearhead of the attack. The 
terrain determined the number of men used. If the leading element failed to break 
through United Nations lines, a second and third wave were used until a 
breakthrough was established. . . .23 
 
The UN forces, the Marines among them, adopted “defense perimeters in depth, 
with physical contact between units and prearranged fields of fire.” These “prevented 
enemy patrols from determining friendly boundaries.” Also, “rigid control of fire . . . 
denied the enemy this information. Only troops immediately to the front of the enemy’s 
probing action fired on him. Friendly flank elements held fire except in the face of a 
sizeable enemy attack.” Another report described the UN preventive measure similarly 
as “a tight perimeter in depth, together with coordination of fire between units, permitted 
the United Nations units to withstand and repel enemy counterattacks.”24 
The enemy’s defensive layout, too, followed his doctrine. NKPA defensive lines 
followed this basic structure. An “outpost line” of defense was “located 6 to 8 miles in 
front of the main line of resistance . . . and is designed to harass and delay the hostile 
attack. Comprised of hasty positions manned by forward detachments, this defensive 
belt allegedly may be omitted entirely at the discretion of the senior commander.” Either 
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23 Headquarters EUSAK, “Enemy Tactics,” 39. 
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This line was dissolved by the attack of the U. S. 2nd Infantry Division and 8th ROK 
Division before the Marines came up to relieve them, or the commander had omitted it 
entirely in front of Yoke Ridge. Between the Outpost Line and the MLR was a “Security 
Line.” It was usually about 1 ½ miles in front of the MLR. “This line is said to be 
comprised of individual strongpoints, protected by a system of obstacles, and receives 
fire support from the main line of resistance. The security line is allegedly designed to 
prevent surprise attacks and to act as a reconnaissance screen. It reaches its greatest 
depth and strength in front of the main position.” Yoke Ridge could have been the 
Security Line for the MLR, Kanmubong Ridge.25 
The enemy MLR “has a depth of 3 to 4 miles and is divided into regimental and 
battalion sectors which consist of a number of strong-points which, protected by 
obstacles, afford all around defense even when isolated.” Kanmubong Ridge was 
probably part of the NKPA MLR, constructed as it was for deliberate and unyielding 
defense with so many mines, and bunkers with interlocking fields of fire. In addition, the 
reverse slopes had many deep emplacements for the enemy to live in and survive 
strong artillery attack. When artillery preparation was lifted, they would swarm out of the 
reverse slope bunkers and man their fighting positions on the forward military crest.26 
There were weaknesses in the enemy’s tactical methods as well. In carrying out 
his orders, an NKPA commander was given very little leeway or discretion. “While North 
Korean defensive doctrine, outlined in captured enemy documents, clearly reflects its 
Soviet origin, this analogy cannot be carried too far, as field conditions imposed certain 
modifications on the enemy’s defensive pattern. Nonetheless, PW [POW] reports 
                                                 




indicate that in the North Korean as in the Soviet Army the lack of flexibility granted 
individual commanders, particularly at lower levels, has predicated an adherence to 
certain preconceived tactical dispositions and maneuvers.”27 
The Communist attack doctrine, as observed in all major enemy attacks in Korea, 
was inflexible. [The same was true of NKPA defensive doctrine since only the 
senior commander could order a withdrawal.] Subordinate units were not 
permitted to make adjustments which terrain, friendly defenses or other factors 
might have indicated as being desirable. . . . Preparations for an attack followed 
an inflexible and unvarying pattern which soon became apparent to friendly 
forces. And finally, enemy insistence, due to inflexibility, on mass employment 
tactics proved costly in the face of United Nations air and artillery fire.28 
 
 Furthermore, there was no tolerance for failure, and draconian discipline enforced 
the rigid will of senior command. “It is a characteristic feature of North Korean Military 
doctrine that a commander is expected to accomplish his mission even under the most 
adverse circumstances. . . .” The subordinate commander was also responsible for 
everything that happened under his command. “According to a captured field order, unit 
commanders are held personally responsible, not only for the adequacy of defense 
plans, particularly as regards preparation of the ground, but also for the implementation 
of these plans.”29 
North Korean officers and troops alike are directed to hold their ground at all cost 
unless ordered to retreat by competent authority and are instructed to commit 
suicide rather than surrender to United Nations Forces. To persuasive 
propaganda depicting UN troops as barbaric murderers who kill all prisoners was 
added the direct threat of execution to hold down the desertion rate and prevent 
retreat, notably among the demoralized and ill-trained replacements conscripted 
south of the 38th Parallel. Many prisoners relate that their squad and platoon 
leaders brandished a pistol and threatened to kill them should they attempt to 
surrender. Others purport that in combat units composed overwhelmingly of 
recent ROK draftees, special guards were posted right behind the forward 
echelon of troops with explicit orders to shoot all deserters. Unit cultural officers, 
too, seem to play an important role in preventing desertion; they collect surrender 
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29 Headquarters Far East Command, “North Korean Defensive Tactics,” 4, 5. 
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leaflets immediately after they are dropped and mete out sever punishment to all 
personnel found in possession of such a document.30 
 
The primary enemy disadvantage was in morale. The Marines had high morale 
while the enemy’s was very poor. Indications of the low enemy morale was the 
willingness of NKPA soldiers to surrender if out from under the vindictive eye of their 
officers long enough to do so with out being executed, and that the prisoners taken by 
the Marines often told of the poor and inadequate food they had. In addition, “the 
capture of many enemy troops suffering from old wounds indicated that Communist 
medical support was limited,” a fact corroborated by Marine intelligence summaries. 
Another SOP followed by the enemy forces undoubtedly contributed to their low morale, 
though it maintained the maximum application of available manpower for firing 
weapons. No NKPA was to receive medical attention while a firefight was still going on. 
All personnel were to be fighting. Medical care was for after the combat was over. 31 
The enemy clearly did not have the manpower to expend on the heavy, bloody 
counterattacks he launched against Marine positions time and time again. This broke 
the back of the NKPA forces defending Kanmubong Ridge. Like the Marines in World 
War II used to say about the Japanese, “when they Banzai, that’s when we break their 
backs,” the relentless counterattacks of the NKPA broke their strength.  
These attacks were not as suicidal and headlong as a Japanese Banzai charge, 
however. They were launched with ample preparation, and retreat would be sounded 
after a culminating point was reached with no penetration. In addition, the enemy often 
had “waves” of reserves ready to exploit any penetration made by a previous wave. And 
“the enemy counterattack did not extend beyond the limit of frontal supporting fire, and 
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when a position was taken, the enemy main body dispersed to the flanks to avoid UN 
artillery fire.” Furthermore, these attacks were not a last gasp, a desperate and futile 
attempt to inflict casualties and preserve honor in a final glorious attack like the Banzai 
charges were. They were deliberate, carefully planned, and intended to succeed.32  
In fact, in many cases throughout the Korean War, these tactics did succeed 
against UN forces, particularly earlier in the war or against ROKs, causing many mass 
“bug-outs,” with the UN troops falling back or out-right breaking and running from the 
enemy onslaught. The experience of a black night suddenly filled with shrieking whistles 
and bugles, and screaming, charging men was enough to freeze the blood even of the 
brave. The NKPA tactics were intended to strike fear into the heart of the enemy and 
cause him to flee, or to be so demoralized that he could not repulse the attack. The fight 
on Hill 812 is an example of how these tactics almost succeeded.  
Nevertheless, the enemy had not the resources to maintain such a manpower-
intensive method of fighting, at least the NKPA did not. Their Chinese brethren could 
have kept a steady flow of troops for years and years yet at the same rate of attrition 
without being bled dry, but the North Koreans hardly had the manpower of vast China in 
the tiny section of Korea it held. “It was also probable that, during the latter stages of the 
Korean Conflict, North Korean troops realized they were fighting for their homeland and 
would not trade space for time. The armistice talks no doubt influenced the Communist 
armies to resort to a stubborn defense line.”33 
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On why the enemy was reluctant to give up ground, and probably why he decided 
to return to negotiating (since he was not succeeding in repulsing UN attacks and was 
losing ground) a EUSAK report speculated: 
When the enemy reached the 38° Parallel, he could not afford to “lose 
face” by sacrificing territory of the homeland of the North Korean people. To do 
so, he may have felt, would cause loss of respect of the North Korean people 
and possibly of the entire oriental world. 
In view of a possible armistice, to permit sections of North Korea to fall 
into United Nations hands would have given UN delegates a weapon in 
negotiation. Furthermore, forcing the UN troops to halt at the 38° Parallel would 
have enabled the Communist world to retain its “iron curtain” in Korea. 
Probably the most logical reason for the change to stubborn defense 
tactics [as opposed to trading space for time] was . . . because of friendly air and 
artillery, [he had to resort] to attempts to annihilate small friendly units [as 
opposed to isolating and destroying larger ones]. This tactic was more effective 
when the MLR in defense was employed. . . .34 
 
UN forces used the following basic process as SOP to overcome enemy defenses: 
In a typical assault on an enemy defensive position, air and artillery were 
first used in the softening up process. Aerial bombs weighing 250 and 500 
pounds, with a 10-second delay nose and tail fusing, proved effective on enemy 
fortifications provided a direct hit was scored. Aerial bombardment was restricted 
due to the lack of required precision bombing [or CAS, which could actually 
achieve a precision hit as opposed to the area “precision” of the AF]. On an 
average, one bunker was destroyed out of eight bomb drops on positively 
identified targets. This average decreased in adverse weather or because of poor 
target identification. Field commanders felt that three fighter-bombers, utilizing 
250-pound bombs was required for each bunker. 
. . . [Concerning artillery] it was proven that a direct hit by a 155mm shell 
was effective on enemy pillbox with 5-foot protective roof; a direct hit with 105mm 
shell was effective on one with a 3-foot protective roof. The best artillery support 
was provided by the direct fire of a 155mm gun, although high angle fire from 
heavy artillery also proved effective. . . . 
When artillery fire was lifted, 4.2mm and 82mm mortars pounded the 
enemy positions at three-minute intervals as the assaulting force moved up. 
Tanks moved forward of the infantry in the final assault and tried to close within a 
range less than 1000 yards to fire on the enemy bunkers. A range of 300 to 400 
yards was preferred. . . .35 
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After the softening up, the attack would proceed for the Marine forces in the 
manner described by S. L. A. Marshall in the previous chapter, but considering the 
harsh terrain, with slower speed. Wherever possible, the Marines probably used this 
process to actually eliminate bunkers: 
 The infantry used assault teams consisting of one rifle squad, two flame 
throwers, one demolition team,  . . . one 75mm recoilless rifle squad, and one 
light machine gun squad, or a total of 26 men. 
The teams deployed with the 75mm recoilless rifle squad placing fire on 
the apertures of the enemy bunker at a range of about 600 yards. The light 
machine gun squads deployed to the flanks to support the attack. The rifle 
squad, together with the two flame throwers, closed in as far as possible and 
placed small arms and BAR fire on the bunker. The flame throwers then moved 
forward until 35 yards from the enemy position and engaged the bunker with fire 
while the demolition team planted the explosive charges. When the positions was 
neutralized, the team hastily reorganized and prepared to move forward . . . [to 
do it all over again].36 
 
Tactics aside, there are other conclusions about this battle in the way of problems 
hindering the Marines. Close Air Support, or the rather the lack of it in the September 
fighting exacerbated the issue in the minds of Marines. In the half month of battle in 
September 1951, 182 requests were made by FACs in the Marine division for CAS. For 
127 of the requests, planes did arrive, but only twenty four of them arrived when they 
were still needed for the purpose initially requested. It usually took over two hours for 
planes to arrive in response to a request. The tactical situation (mostly terrain and 
weather) had severely limited the division in its maneuvers. General Thomas believed 
that more adequate CAS would have saved many of the 2,416 casualties taken in 
September.37 
“A fatal defect in the Air Force/Army system as used in Korea was usual failure 
even to acknowledge an advance request for close air support sorties. Not knowing 
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what action was being taken on his request, the commander of the Division could not 
rely on air support in planned operations.” General Thomas told General Frank Everest, 
commander of  FAF, “As a division commander, in order to make an attack, and I know 
exactly what I have got to do with tomorrow morning in my own division – I’ve got 
artillery, supporting weapons and all – but you ask me to go into an attack and I don’t 
know what weapons I’m going to have, I don’t know what planes I’m going to have to 
support me until JOC tells me tomorrow morning what the hell’s coming up . . . I simply 
can’t plan operations on that basis.”38 
Furthermore, the planes that did arrive, when not Marine aviators, had no clue how 
to deliver CAS. A flight of ten New Zealand planes was sent in one day, and they 
dropped their ordnance on friendly lines. The Marines told them to go home. To them, 
no support at all was better than that kind of sloppiness. Thomas did some research 
about that particular day, and found that JOC had given the 1st MAW sorties that day to 
an ROK division, and the Marines the New Zealanders even though the 1st MAW air 
field was only fifteen miles away.39 
In fairness to the Air Force, however, it should be pointed out that an air war of 
interdiction was not exactly the war it would have preferred to fight, either. Its doctrine 
mandated the destruction of the enemy’s capacity to wage war by attacking his 
production centers, but since these were mostly located in China in 1951, they could not 
be attacked unless Truman decided to expand the war, something he was absolutely 
against, as the wrangle with MacArthur and his firing shows.40 
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Another problem was limits from EUSAK on the amount of ammunition that could 
be expended. The shortage of ammunition at the front is one probable reason. Though 
these limits were obviated in an emergency, the pre H-hour bombardments and other 
uses of artillery were not as generous as might otherwise be the case.41 
Logistical support for the division was mostly from the same sources as other U. S. 
divisions in Korea.  And, “logistically the Division maintained a high degree of material 
preparedness for an amphibious operation or whatever assignment it was called upon 
to perform.”42 
Like the attacks of the 2nd ID to the west, the attacking units were fed somewhat 
piecemeal into the grinder. However, the 1st Mar Div had no choice in the matter since 
its commitments to defend the Kansas Line and to keep the 1st Marines in corps reserve 
tied up more than half its offensive power. But this situation would soon change as the 
1st Marines were released from reserve and the 5th Marines from responsibility on Line 
Kansas. However, at no time in the Punchbowl Offensive for the 1 Mar Div were more 
than two regiments engaged simultaneously. Besides, by the time the 1st Marines was 
finally at the front, the 7th Marines and KMC Regiment both had already been chewed 
up and would have been necessarily kept in reserve anyway, so either way, the use of 
the division in a divided manner curtailed its strength.  
But then again, considering the difficult terrain, it may be that no more than two 
regiments could have been committed even if the commanding general had had them 
available and so desired to use them. This certainly seems plausible given the logistical 
difficulties of operating in the area. Furthermore, the reason the 1st Marines was in corps 
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reserve was for the purpose (though vetoed by higher HQ) of conducting an amphibious 
“end run,” something the Marines would have pulled men away to participate in even if 
only a single private was left to defend a regimental sector. In any case, as part of X 
Corps, the division certainly had to, and rightly so, come to the aide of its embattled 
fellow UN divisions. And while the CG 1 Mar Div chose the CAS issue as the cause for 
the high casualties suffered by his Marines, perhaps the divided attention of the division 
between defensive and offensive mission mandated by orders and decisions from 
higher commands, is partly to blame. But how could that have been alleviated unless 
the Truman Administration had authorized and sent more troops to Korea?43 
Marines were not above mistakes and not all Marines adhered to the ideals of the 
Corps. For instance, some Marine officers did not follow Spike Selmyhr and Gerald 
Averill’s examples, and the Marine ideal, of leading from the front. 
One Marine of Fox 2/7 shot himself in the hand in order to get out of combat. 
Averill remarked: “The weak are always there, in small numbers but ever present, and 
others must carry their loads. The strong had survived that night, had stood fast, had 
changed the enemy assault from certain victory into a rout. The lessons learned so well 
in other battles, in other places, were borne out once again. Look after your men, and 
they will look after you.” Though small numbers of Marines proved “weak,” the strength 
                                                 
43 Let not the reader misinterpret the argument to infer that the Marine Corps was not a part of the U. S. 
fighting forces. This is not the case at all. The Marine Corps was every bit as much a part as any other 
service was. In the case of 1951, the Marine division in Korea was set to the same task as Army divisions 
under Army command when according to its doctrine it was to operate under Naval command for primarily 
amphibious operations. However, as Gen Thomas told General Almond when questioned on a rumor that 
he had said the corps commander could go to hell: “I will execute any order it is proper for a soldier to 
receive.” The 1 Mar Div, even when fighting for better CAS, never at any point considered itself out of 
subordination to EUSAK or its corps commander, its correspondence on the subject up the chain of 
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of the others held true; some bad-eggs have probably existed in every unit that has ever 
marched in war.44 
And Averill’s assessment, mentioned earlier, that it was a mistake not to take 
Hills 1052 and 980 certainly seems correct in light of the fact that many casualties were 
taken from those heights after the Marines had ceased advancing, and many more 
would be taken from them all through the winter with EUSAK on the defensive line. It 
seems that Hill 812 was one bad place to try and set up a permanent defensive MLR. 
One thing this battle illustrates about warfare in general is that combat against 
prepared defenses almost always comes down to hard infantry combat on the platoon 
and company levels, which requires the elimination of each bunker, pillbox, trench, and 
fighting hole one by one and with rifles and grenades in the majority of cases and at 
heavy cost. “In spite of excellent artillery, air, and the support of other weapons, the 
infantrymen had to finally close and dislodge the stubborn foe.” The paucity of CAS 
aside, this would still have been the case with as much and as accurate an amount of 
supporting fire from all arms as a commander could dream to have. Combat to take 
fortified, mutually supporting, enemy positions in defensible terrain is brutal, bitter, 
bloody, and heartbreakingly costly whether that terrain be in Italy or the Pacific of World 
War II, the trenches of the late Civil War and World War I, the NVA-manned hills of 
Vietnam, the mountains of Afghanistan, or the death-trapped houses of Fallujah, Iraq. In 
every case, push-button, “easy” warfare, low on casualties and high on monetary price, 
is proven to be what is obsolete not the infantryman. (Or at least, it is not the final 
solution to overcoming enemy resistance – and obsolete is perhaps the wrong word for 
this type of warfare has never been more than an ideal). And in all such cases it is the 
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heart, esprit de corps, training, and will of the rifleman who decides the tactical issue, 
not the planes of the AF, the guns of the Navy, or the tanks of the Army. It is the infantry 
of whatever service who both pays and exacts the price of victory. And as long as there 
is combat, it is doubtful such a constant will ever be overridden.45 
And the men on the line are most effective when they allow their supporting arms 
to supplement not replace their organic weapons. That does not mean, however, that 
every possible shell or rocket or napalm canister delivered by these arms is not 
invaluable to the infantry fight. They facilitate the advance and save friendly lives by 
cracking the morale of the enemy defenders and gouging a not insignificant portion from 
their numbers. It means that supporting arms alone, air, rockets, and today, missiles, 
are not the sole or primary instrument for the destruction of enemy forces, when they 
are in fortifications (or hiding among civilians). In Korea, more artillery rounds were 
expended than in the whole of World War II. Here the commanders tried to trade steel 
for lives and succeeded in doing so to the extent their mission had become a defensive 
rather than an offensive one. Yet the fact remains that on the offense, it is the 
infantryman, today as then, who finally comes to grips with and defeats an emplaced 
and determined enemy. 
The stalwart dedication to duty and ardent execution of assigned missions 
displayed by the American infantry around the Punchbowl, both Army and Marine, is all 
the more remarkable considering the discouraging fact that the “ground-pounder” was 
fighting for, not the destruction of the enemy armed forces, but just one more hill to add 
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to the UN line. The ultimate decision in the war, after the Spring of 1951, would come 
not from the guns of the fighting forces, but from the pens of negotiators.46  
However, it is doubtful that the infantryman on the ground had realized the 
foregoing at this point in the war. Most men knew the Communists had walked out of 
negotiations. In their minds, that meant the war was back on in the same way as before 
Kaesong. It was a turning point in morale and the nature of the war in the eyes of the 
men fighting it. 
The men’s not knowing they were fighting for a line rather than the more 
traditional and cultural objective of destroying the enemy’s armed forces changed in the 
fifth phase of the war (this battle was in the fourth phase). Here both sides had resigned 
themselves to military stalemate in exchange for diplomatic firefights of words and 
propaganda on the one hand, while casualties continued to mount on the other to hold 
and adjust the line already in hand. Here, the men realized the talks would drag on 
indefinitely, and that their lives when lost on the battlefield would be lost for seemingly 
useless gains or just the status quo. This was a most disheartening prospect, and the 
state of morale in EUSAK became a real problem for the rest of the war. It became the 
tendency among more and more troops to fight not for the overall mission in Korea, not 
for the cause, but simply to survive one’s tour or protect ones companions on the line, to 
avoid dying and simply await rotation home. There was no longer any vision of purpose 
that commanders could hold up before their men’s eyes as a motivation for the combat 
and to inspire them. The decision to fight and negotiate simultaneously with the 
emphasis on the latter at the expense of the former, had robbed them of that. 
                                                 
46 Burton Kaufman, The Korean War, Chapter Five. 
322
 
It is accepted among most military historians who study the Korean War that the 
first Communist move for negotiations in the Spring of 1951 was for the purpose of 
gaining respite on the battlefield in order to rebuild its forces, and that the walk-out on 
these negotiations in August was because they believed themselves ready to return to 
the battlefield, if not on the offense, then at least on a very strong defense. But in the 
period of suspended negotiations, their defense proved unsuccessful and any turn to 
the offense impossible; the UN forces gained ground across the entire front. One key 
and dear, in Communist eyes, portion of terrain lost was the Punchbowl. Time and 
again they would argue for its return at the negotiating table.47 
There is little evidence at present that they did not intend to return to negotiating 
at any point when they walked out at Kaesong, August 23, 1951, but the losses incurred 
thereafter probably put impetus to a resumption sooner than the CCF and NKPA may 
have preferred. The CCF, too, like the Americans in dealing with the South Koreans 
over the issue of whether to negotiate or not, probably had some doing convincing the 
NKPA to opt for negotiations rather than an all out campaign to seize the whole of 
Korea. Possibly, the manifold losses taken by the NKPA in this campaign made them 
more open to that as the only option. But until North Korea opens its archival records, 
without censorship, to the world, it is impossible to know for certain whether the losses 
inflicted on the NKPA in this offensive were for certain instrumental in the decision of the 
Communists to resume negotiations,.48  
There is the possibility that the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc (“after 
this therefore because of this”) applies to this reasoning – the sun comes up in the 
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morning after the rooster crows so the rooster must be the cause of the sun coming up. 
But like there is no direct evidence, per se, that the United states would have lost the 
Civil War (or at least, not conquered the Confederacy, which is much the same thing) if 
the British had come in on the side of the Confederacy, it is a reasonable and probable 
conclusion to make. So, too, is this one. 
That the infantry in this offensive showed the Communists determination and 
tenacious aggression in the face of the most relentless counterattacks they could 
muster, and that so many Communist soldiers were lost so soon after the rebuilding and 
regrouping done in the period of the talks at Kaesong -- a period of respite wherein to 
recover from the most staggering losses of the war, taken in the bitterly failed CCF 
Spring Offensives – points to the conclusion that the Communists decided to resume 
negotiating in October 1951 because of the Fall Offensive. Afterall, one of the “ten 
principles of war by which the CCF fight,” declared by Mao himself in 1947, stated: 
“Avoid battles of attrition in which gains are not sufficient to compensate for losses, or in 
which gains merely balance losses. We (Communists) are numerically inferior, but we 
must secure local superiority in every section and every campaign.”49  
The American infantry showed the Communists resolve, improved the UN terrain 
for the UN defensive line, and gained ground for South Korea, even in the offense 
taking fewer casualties than an enemy on the defense (defense, noted Clausewitz, is 
the stronger form of war) at a time when Washington and its allies like Britain and 
France were showing weakness and wringing their hands in fear of Soviet intervention. 
The infantry put the steel in what otherwise would be limp words at the negotiating 
table, providing further evidence, if the Communists thought the truce talks signaled 
                                                 
49 Headquarter EUSAK, “Enemy Tactics,” viii; Burton Kaufman, The Korean War, Chapter Five. 
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military weakness in the UNC, that this was not the case and that further combat would 
result in the UNC gaining ground, not losing it. The period between Communist 
indefinite suspension of the peace talks and the resumption of these talks had resulted 
only in more lives lost and less Korean soil behind Communist lines. (The Fall Offensive 
had gained had gained approximately fifteen more miles of ground in the X Corps 
zone.) One tenet of Sun Tzu is to attack one’s enemy’s weakness, and the Communists 
probably saw the weakness of the Americans (the chief belligerent on the UN side) to 
be in negotiating.50  
Furthermore, one point Americans had stressed was that the demarcation line, 
when reached, should be the actual line of contact, not the 38th Parallel, which would 
have resulted only in the status quo antebellum. Resuming the talks would make the 
Americans back off their offensive movement (they probably hoped – it had the first time 
the talks had been held) before more ground was lost, showed the prolongation of 
active warfare to be to the American’s advantage, and that negotiating was the 
instrument whereby the most advantage could be had against the Americans in 
propaganda victories, technique, and will. The Communists had great faith that their 
negotiators were far batter than any the UN could send. Furthermore, dealing more 
directly with Washington and its State Department (even though it was still indirect via 
negotiators who were military officers) would produce more gains for the Communist 
cause than bullets would in facing the Department of Defense’s fighting forces.51 
One conclusion is inescapable. At least from the Marine perspective, the 
application of its forces in the Inchon/Seoul operation on the one hand, and the advance 
                                                 




north of the Punchbowl on the other, showed the far greater effectiveness (if the 
traditional goal of war, to force the enemy to submit to one’s will, was maintained) of the 
amphibious turning movement and assault inland from the sea over the rigorous frontal 
assault through the mountains far away from the sea.52 
The Marines had had to fight like an Army Division and had done so very well. 
They were out of range of NGF until September 23 when the lines had extended far 
enough east in the division sector that it could be brought to bear. Nevertheless, the sea 
was still 20 miles off.53 
While Marines did foresee the fact that their forces might very well be used in land 
campaigns in their thinking before the war, the view after the campaigns of 1951 
regarded this as a very serious possibility, even a probability. To that end, the U. S. 
Pacific Fleet and the Marine Corps examined the organization and performance of the 
1st Mar Div in Korea. Several shortcomings were observed in the division for operations 
in extended land campaigns, but these were mostly in the area of too little organic motor 
transport and too little material and supply in communications sections.  
Nevertheless, the Marines still preferred amphibious operations as its best 
potential contribution to a war whether it be a limited or “all-out” war. The campaigns of 
1951 and the manner in which the Marines were utilized in them, led to further 
emphasis by the Navy and Marine Corps on how Marines should be employed in war: 
                                                 
52 It might be said by some here that the Marines and Navy were against MacArthur’s Inchon plan. This is 
not the case at all. The Marines and Navy were all for an amphibious hook as MacArthur envisioned it, 
they did, however, disagree with the location being Inchon, arguing on very sound doctrinal principles for 
a location just south of the city, which presented a better amphibious landing location. And always after 
Inchon, the Marines and Navy pushed for another such amphibious hook. It should also be remembered 
that at Okinawa, the Marines and Navy were for an amphibious end-run around the Japanese main line of 
resistance, when it was encountered, to take them in the rear, but this decision was overruled by the 
Army who preferred to slug it out in frontal assaults along the land mass. 
53 1st Mar Div, “Historical Diary,” September 1951, 4. 
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 [Concluded:] That whenever possible, a Marine force, operating in an extended 
land campaign as part of a field army, capitalize on its special skills in employing 
naval gunfire support, the Navy-Marine system of close air support, and the 
amphibious maneuver, by being assigned a zone of action near the sea. . . . That 
the Marines’ value as an amphibious force of the mobile fleet or as a mobile 
theater reserve force, be compared to their value as an ordinary component of a 
ground army.54  
 
In other words, the Navy and Marine Corps saw in the use of Marines as troops in 
an extended land campaign what economists call an “opportunity cost.” Though the 
Marines made a very efficient and effective element within a land army as another 
infantry division on the line, this cost the opportunity to use the Marines to greater effect 
on the overall course of the war. Operation Wrangler was a perfect example (see 
chapter summarizing the Marine’s operations of 1951 prior to the Fall Offensive). So, 
too, was the “Kojo Operation” mentioned by Thomas (see page thirty-five) in which the 
1st Mar Div and the 8th ROK Div would make an amphibious hook around the east end 
of the NKPA defensive line and destroy it from the rear and flanks. 
The comparatively narrow geographical zone of action later presented by Vietnam 
caused proximity to the sea to be much less of a problem. Marine experience in Korea 
doubtless had an influence on Marine Corps preferences and policies in Vietnam. For 
example, important Marine generals in Vietnam, such as Lt Gen Lewis Walt and Lt Gen 
Victor H. Krulak, had served with the 1st Mar Div in Korea. Walt specifically had 
commanded a Marine regiment during the stalemate phase on the Jamestown Line in 
west Korea, and Krulak had been General Thomas’s chief of staff throughout 1951. 
Marines in Vietnam also had the kind of air support they wanted and depended upon. 
And even though the Marine preferences for the way it was employed in 
September 1951 were not followed and the division had inadequate CAS and little NGF, 
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the Marines who fought there and the way they fought still bore the indelible mark of the 
Marine Corps and its culture and values in their performance, conduct, attitude, and 
accomplishments. And while the standards Marines hold for themselves are sometimes 
exaggerated, the 1st Mar Div in Korea, 1951, added many laurels to the name of Marine, 
and bore its “proud burden” well.55 
Until North Korea opens up its archives, and if its documents are authentic and not 
merely propaganda, a more complete picture of this battle cannot be had. This is one of 
the biggest weaknesses of Korean War historiography: relatively few documents can be 
had from the Communist side, and the question is important whether any that do see 
light are not edited as to their content by the Communist governments. 
And one thing is certain, no matter how forgotten Korea is and this battle in 
particular, the men who were there can never forget. 
Oscar Franco has never been the same: 
Even today, I am not completely over being “shell shocked.” Any sudden 
noise will make me jump. I landed in the hospital two to three times after I got 
back in 1952. One time the rodeo parade was going through downtown when 
they shot their .45s. I hit the deck in front of the Woolworth’s store! People 
gathered around me and a policeman wanted to know if I was drunk. . . . 
When I worked for the City of Tucson, the guys at work had a steel plate 
that they would drop on the floor near me to see me jump. It was a big joke to 
them. . . .56 
 
William T. Dunn recalled: 
I brought with me the names of five Marines that I was with when they 
died, as I thought perhaps it might ease their parent’s pain, if they talked to 
someone who was with them when they died. The first visit was to the parents of 
Dave Munson from Richmond. This was about a week after I returned home that 
I drove to Richmond, went to the newspaper office for his address and located 
his house. He was an only child and his parents were two of the finest people 
                                                 
55 “Indelible” is certainly the best word to use; it means, “incapable of being erased or removed.” 
56 Oral memoir of Oscar “Challo” Franco.  
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that I had ever met, but there were so many questions, and so many tears, that 
when I left their house, I threw the remaining list away. It was just too emotional. 
Started the making use of the GI Bill, got married, raised a family and got 
on with my life. I have been so fortunate, and life has been so good to me, that I 
would never want to change anything. However, not a day has gone by in the last 










                                                 
57 Account of William T. Dunn, “My Year in Korea, 1950-1951.” Found at: www.1-
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Channels of Command, July 1951 

















































Source: Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, Marine Officer’s Guide. Used by Permission. 
 380
Figure 20. Strength, Losses, and Replacements in 1 Mar Div—1 June to 15 
October 19511 
Authorized Strength                                                                  25,710 
Average Strength (as a percentage of authorized strength)           96 
Battle casualties                                                                          4,241 
Nonbattle casualties                                                                    5,549 
Casualties returned to duty                                                         6,706 
Rotation Losses                                                                        11,637 



























                                                 























































A Bunker on Hill 812 

















A View From 749 
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